

This is what I'd tell him. I'd tell him this is a . . . I'd just use one of the messages that he's sent to us, and I'd send it right off. And if he won't . . .

And I would trade these Turkish things out right now. I wouldn't be talking to anybody about it. We sat for a *week* and there was . . . everybody was in favor of doing it. And I would make that part of the message. Tell him we're going to conduct surveillance as announced by the President, and *one shot* and in we come. And he can expect it. If he wants to sit around and talk about this thing, he can call off his gunfire and do it right away.

McNamara: Well, I think that we can assume that that kind of an approach will be made against the . . . I mean I think we can assume an approach to trade the missiles will be made one way or another. He'll know that. But now let's assume that that's made. And time goes by and nothing happens and we're losing airplanes. What do we do here?

Dillon: Well, I mean, this is what John said.

McCone: That's what I said.

McNamara: I know. Let's assume that the approach [for a Cuba-Turkey trade] is made.

Dillon: And he doesn't do it.

McNamara: And either he doesn't do it or he comes back . . .

Let me go back a second. When I read that [Khrushchev] message of last night this morning, I thought, my God! I'd never sell, I would never base a transaction on that contract. Hell, that's no offer! There's not a damn thing in it that's an offer. You read that message carefully. He didn't propose to take the missiles out. Not once is there a single word in it that proposes to take the missiles out. It's 12 pages of fluff.

McCone: Well, his message this morning wasn't that way—his public message.

McNamara: Well, no. I'm speaking of the last night message. The last night message was 12 pages of fluff. That's no contract. You couldn't sign that and say we know what we signed.

And *before* [he slaps his hand] we got the damn thing read, the whole deal changed—*completely* changed! All of which leads me to conclude that the probabilities are that nothing is going to be signed quickly.

Now, my question is, assuming nothing is signed quickly, what do we do? Well, I don't think attack is the only answer. I think we ought to be prepared for attack, all-out attack. And I think we ought to know how far we can postpone that. But I don't think that's the only answer, and we ought to think of some other answers here.

Now John's suggestion, I think, is obviously one, to try to negotiate a deal.