

in any place in Cuba. [*paraphrasing again*] And when we get agreement there, I shall certainly be ready to discuss the matter.

Now the only problem with this letter—again on page 3—is when we get agreement on Cuba, which he isn't going to give us. He's now moved on to the Turkish thing; so we're just going to get a letter back saying: "Well, we'll be glad to settle Cuba when we've settled Turkey."

So I think we have to make the crucial point in this letter, without opening up Turkey, is the question will he—at least in the next 24 hours, while we discuss all these matters—will he agree with me to stop the work on the bases. That's the only thing we can, because we have—because he either has to say yes or no to it. If he says no to that, then we are—at least, we have some indication. Then we'll—

**McNamara:** Well, you could take out paragraph 1 and put it at the end. That isn't part of the deal. The deal is: They remove the weapons. We guarantee not to invade. And then put paragraph 1 at the end.

[*Unclear exchange.*]

**President Kennedy:** [*Unclear*] you'd have the first two paragraphs?

**Sorenson:** It should still come at the beginning but it should not be a numbered paragraph. It [the language on stopping work and rendering missiles inoperable] should not be part of the solution paragraph. It should be a precedent to everything else.

**McNamara:** Yeah, that's right. It's a precedent to the deal.

**Dillon:** Instead of saying, again, when we have *agreement* there, we've covered the whole thing. It's only when we get to [numbered] paragraph 1 that we get beyond Cuba.

**President Kennedy:** Well, now if, number 1, you'd [Khrushchev] undertake immediately to cease work on offensive missile bases in Cuba and promptly to render inoperable all weapons system in Cuba and permit U.N. verification of this action. That would be number 1.

**McNamara:** Right.

**President Kennedy:** Then we would get into discussion of all these matters.

**McNamara:** Right.

**Bundy:** But I think that that ought to just be made as a separate matter in the letter.

**Sorenson:** I just raise the question to make sure that we do insist on U.N. verification, because I understand from the Defense Department that we could verify it by ourselves, and even, they say . . .

**President Kennedy:** If we can't let the U.N. in?

**Sorenson:** Yeah.