

**Dillon:** Tomorrow morning. That's what . . . If you have the [North Atlantic] council meeting, you'll probably get a strong reaction from a great many of the members of NATO against our taking any action in Cuba. Doubtless they'd say: "Don't trade." But they'd also say: "Don't do anything in Cuba."

**Robert Kennedy:** Exactly. [*Unclear interjection.*]

**McNamara:** Mr. President, I wonder if we should not take certain actions with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we act in Cuba. And if we decided to take that action with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we acted in Cuba, then we could tell NATO that, at the time we talked to them about this proposal from Khrushchev and our response to it.

If we act in Cuba, the only way we can act now is with a full attack. I don't think we can take any of these limited attacks when they are shooting at our reconnaissance aircraft because we would—we would not dare go in with the kind of limited attack that we've been thinking about the last 24 hours without taking out their SAM sites.

The moment we take out the SAM sites and the MiG airfields we're up to the 500-sortie program. If we send 500 sorties in against Cuba we must be prepared to follow up with an invasion in about seven days. If we start out on that kind of a program, it seems to me that the Soviets are very likely to feel forced to reply with military action someplace, particularly if these missiles—Jupiter missiles—are still in Turkey.

We might be able to either shift the area in which they would apply their military force, or give them no excuse to apply military force, by taking out the Turkish Jupiters and the Italian Jupiters before we attack Cuba.

One way to take them out would be to simply develop a program with bilateral negotiations between Turkey, Italy, and the U.S. saying that we are today defusing the Jupiters in those two countries and replacing them with Polaris submarines stationed off the shores of those nations to carry the same targets the Jupiters were directed to, in order to reduce the risk to those two nations but maintain the full defense of NATO.

Now, if we were willing to undertake . . . In the first place, I think that kind of action is desirable prior to an invasion of Cuba. In the second place, if we are willing to decide to do that, we're in a much better position to present this whole thing to NATO.

**Nitze:** What would be the reaction if the Soviet Union was to reply that they were going to maintain three atomic [missile] submarines off the United States coast?