

I think that's [*unclear*] hard to say that this is what we want. [*Unclear exchange.*]

Bundy: All of these things are timesaving operations, and I think that we have to find a way to—

Robert Kennedy: We are what?

Dillon: We're prepared to accept inspections. We went down to [*unclear*] inspections in Europe.

Robert Kennedy: Well, we do it with Cuba first. That will be their move and then if we want the Turks out, we've got to—

Dillon: Accept the same inspections. [*Unclear.*] It puts it right back on them.

Roswell Gilpatric: [*Unclear*] the President first.

McNamara: We ought to really check the time. These are absolutely contradictory. Check the time.

Unidentified: What?

McNamara: Well, Khrushchev's statement to U Thant is absolutely contradictory to his statement to the President.⁹ Now the question is, which came first? I thought the reply to U Thant came first.

Unidentified: What's the statement to the President?

Gilpatric: The long letter last night.

Unidentified: Oh.

Gilpatric: The long letter of last night initially, and just to be . . .

Unidentified: Yeah. And this one is just—

McNamara: We ought to mention this in the reply.

Thompson: [*trying to clear up the timing of Khrushchev's October 26 message*] Because this has to be translated. We got this in Russian in Moscow. They had to translate it.

Unidentified: It [*Khrushchev's October 26 letter*] was delivered [*to the U.S. Embassy*] at 4:43 [*P.M.*], Moscow time, which was 9:43 yesterday morning [*in Washington*]. Now, the telegram was not sent, it was sent—

McNamara: Can't we call up there and find out what time we got the message from Khrushchev?

Unidentified: Yes, you can do that.

Rusk: I think the message to U Thant was later than the long letter sent last night to us.

9. See the editors' introduction to "Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban Missile Crisis," 26 October 1962.