

can't very well make the announcement and not do it [the night reconnaissance].

McNamara: We won't make the announcement. But at that time we'll make it.

Bundy: Well, I would suggest we review it at four and make the announcement.

McNamara: Or we'll have the announcement prepared, and how we're going to get it out.

Bundy: If you make the announcement late it's not much good. So have the announcement all ready to go from the Pentagon at four.

McNamara: And we'll have some time to chat over it.

Bundy: We'll have to make sure the President gets that in time.

President Kennedy: OK.

Vice President Johnson: Does that involve these flares dropping and so forth?

McNamara: Yes, it does, Mr. Vice President.

Unidentified: [*checking on news about the possible Khrushchev statement*] Will you be ready to beam it in?

Unidentified: Yes sir, if I get the word on the radio.

President Kennedy: You finished, Mr. Secretary?

McNamara: Yes I am.

President Kennedy: Getting to this, in case this [newly reported Khrushchev proposal] *is* an accurate statement, where are we with our conversations with the Turks about the withdrawal of these . . . ?

Paul Nitze: Hare says that this is absolutely anathema and as a matter of prestige and politics, but George [Ball] has read the [*unclear*] reports from Finletter.⁵

5. Raymond Hare was U.S. ambassador to Turkey. A few days earlier the State Department had cabled him to ask how he thought the Turks would react to a possible deal involving the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Hare was not instructed to approach the Turks, just to give his opinion. Hare was sure the Turks would object. "Problem would be partly psycho-political, partly substantive; psycho-political, in sense that Turks are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise. . . . Problem is also substantive in sense that Turks, as we well know, set great store on arms which they feel necessary meet their needs and were adamant in refusing our suggestion last year that Jupiter project not be implemented. . . . [I]f we insist to contrary, demand for arms to fill vacuum would be specific and sizeable." (Ankara 587, 26 October 1962, in "NATO—Weapons, Cables—Turkey" folder, National Security Files, Box 226, John F. Kennedy Library.)

In the second section of his cable, received in Washington as this meeting of the Executive Committee was getting underway, Hare suggested four alternatives. One, no deal. That would be easiest. Two, unilateral phaseout of Jupiters to be replaced by the long-discussed but still-nonexistent NATO multilateral seaborne deterrent force (MLF) in Polaris submarines. Three,