

more dramatic offensive weapons. Because everybody has bombers everywhere. So is there some way that we could tie it into the construction of these missile sites, rather than just the bombers?

**McNamara:** Well, we could do bomber fuel and associated petroleum products that are used for . . . [*Unclear exchange.*]

**Bundy:** [*Unclear*] is whether you want at the end to have the bombers there. If you want to get them out, this is as good a time as any to tie them into . . .

**President Kennedy:** No, I'd rather . . . What we're dealing with once again is the same problem, of stopping tankers, and I would rather tie as much as we could to the missiles.

**McNamara:** Can't we do it to both?

**President Kennedy:** Yeah, that's what I [*unclear interjection*]. The missiles . . . I would say that we ought to have . . . It seems to me, that in view of the fact that the missile work is going on, the sites are going on, we are tying up that fuel which contributes to that work. And, in view of the fact that the work on the missile sites is going on, we are also tying up aviation [fuel] because of the bombers. So that we—I think the missiles are the dramatic one. Bombers—hell, they might say: "We can just [*unclear*] your bombers every place."

**Dean Rusk:** Mr. President, can we break that into two pieces? I think that there would be some advantage in our having a real shot at the U Thant talks for 24 hours before we consider putting on the POL. We really need to have a round there, to see if—

**President Kennedy:** Wouldn't we be better then to say something about, that the work is going on, and that this must come to a stop, and then tomorrow say it isn't stopped, and therefore move to POL?

**Bundy:** Well, the 24 hours, I think that doesn't bother the Secretary very much. The point of not losing the momentum is of concern here, and that's a timing problem.

**Taylor:** Mr. President, should we announce every day that when we have evidence that work has continued, that we view the fact with mounting indignation?

**McCone:** Yes, this is an awfully important point.

**President Kennedy:** Yeah. Well, that's why it seems to me what we're going to do is really give them a 24-hour notice that if they don't stop the work or assurances, then we're going to start . . .

**Bundy:** Perhaps, Mr. President, the consideration here we might . . . If we agree that this is the next step on the line of pressure, we might leave the timing until we've talked about the U Thant thing, and see just what— [*Unclear exchange.*]