

**President Kennedy:** What, that he would [*unclear*] on invasion?

**Bundy:** Well, that he thinks you musn't have a half-finished job.

**Lovett:** Look, when do you tell the work is half-finished?

**Bundy:** That's quite right, I quite agree with that.

**Lovett:** That was the point that I am trying to emphasize here. You have to wait until you see what they . . .

**McCone:** I think that we're all pretty well agreed with what you said, that there's no such thing as a small military action. To have a strike or a series of strikes, you've got to follow it up.

**Lovett:** Then you've got a second front [in addition to Berlin].

**McCone:** What concerns me is the blockade as a whole, they don't try to penetrate it. They go ahead and complete these missile sites, with more and more missiles now under cover of warehouses and so forth and [*unclear*]. Then we have no way of telling what the status of warheads is. What [is it that] we're going to do, in view of the threat, in view of the situation, in view of the symbol of strength that this gives—the effect it's going to have on Latin America and all the rest?

And this might happen. The pictures that we saw here today which were taken [by overflights] yesterday, the evidence of work going on on the sites. [*Unclear*] take some more tomorrow or the next day.

**McNamara:** I saw Cuba as our hostage. I think it's just as much our hostage as Berlin is a Soviet hostage. I think if we can remain cool and calm here, we've really got the screws on. They're being restricted from what the [*unclear*] thinks is their right—

[*Unclear exchange with Bundy.*]

**President Kennedy:** It seems to me, but anyway we don't want to decide that. But it is a fact that if they put the screws on Berlin in the way that Gromyko said they were going to, then we are bound to invade Cuba under those conditions.

**McNamara:** Yes, exactly.

**Lovett:** But we can also put the screws on Cuba.

**McNamara:** Yes, this is exactly—

**Lovett:** By increasing—

**President Kennedy:** They've committed their prestige much more heavily—

---

11/12/62" folder, National Security Files, Box 170, John F. Kennedy Library). For Ormsby-Gore's report on his talk with Bundy and on the Macmillan positions that concerned him, see Washington 2667, 24 October 1962 and Foreign Office to Washington 7457, 24 October 1962, Public Record Office (PRO), PREM 11/3690, 24020.