

**LeMay:** That's right.

**Shoup:** You're screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing, some way, he could say: "Either do this son of a bitch and do it right, and quit friggin' around." That was my conclusion. Don't frig around and go take a missile out.

**Wheeler:** Well, maybe I missed the point [*unclear*].

**LeMay:** [*Unclear*] off any decision, Dave.

**Shoup:** Well, that wasn't my intention. Goddamn it, if he wants to do it, you can't fiddle around with taking out missiles. You can't fiddle around with hitting the missile sites and then hitting the SAM sites. You got to go in and take out the goddamn thing that's going to stop you from doing your job.

**Wheeler:** It was very apparent to me, though, from his earlier remarks, that the political action of a blockade is really what he's . . .

**Shoup:** That's right. His speech about Berlin was the real . . .

**Wheeler:** He gave his speech about Berlin, and

**LeMay:** He equates the two.

**Shoup:** That's right.

**Wheeler:** If we smear Castro, Khrushchev smears Willy Brandt [in Berlin].

**LeMay:** Berlin [*unclear*] talk about it. I think our best chance is that we won't have anything happen.

**Wheeler:** [*Unclear, mixed voices.*] I gather that I can go ahead and issue these orders? [*Unclear exchange.*]

**Unidentified:** [*Unclear*] do the National Guard, cut it down to 600 and come back over a month with 300 replacements. [*Unclear exchange.*]

**LeMay:** We're all set then.

**Wheeler:** Well, this is good. I can get those people moving.

**Unidentified:** Right. OK then.

*The generals leave, and the tape runs out shortly afterward in the now - empty room.*

President Kennedy was now less sure that the blockade was the right answer. This might have been because of the weight of arguments he had heard from the Joint Chiefs. He had also talked again to Bundy, probably at the start of his day, before the meeting with the Joint Chiefs. Bundy had changed his mind during the night and had switched from supporting no action (because of concerns about Berlin) to supporting a surprise air strike. Though we can see from the meeting with the Chiefs that President Kennedy continued to favor a blockade, it is possible that Bundy's change of heart gave the President added cause for reflection.