




EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Miller Center

University of Virginia



*I've always loved history,
and I've long believed that scholars,
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benefit from a fuller examination of
what we do as Senators, and that's
the purpose of this oral history project.*

SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY



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Vicki Kennedy shows President Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama a replica of Senator Kennedy's Senate office at the dedication of the Edward M. Kennedy Institute in 2015.



FOREWORD BY VICTORIA REGGIE KENNEDY



Victoria Reggie Kennedy

Senator Kennedy at his oral history interview with the Miller Center at his residence in Washington, D.C. in 2006.

“Imagine if we could hear the voices of the Founders today, hear their own account of their deliberations and interactions and of the hopes and fears that weighed on their minds during the birth of a nation,” Senator Edward M. Kennedy observed in his March 2006 remarks at UVA’s Miller Center. That love of history and appreciation of the important insights to be gained from having a window into the thoughts of our leaders as they made the decisions that affected our lives led my husband to decide, more than a decade ago, to embark on his own oral history project.

Teddy’s career in the Senate spanned nearly five decades and ten presidential administrations. He came from a family that saw history and made history and was in the unique position of often being in the center of significant history-in-the-making. He understood the importance to future generations of preserving his insights and perspectives as well as those of his friends, family, and colleagues. He had great trust in future generations to continue the country’s forward progress and in the power of history to inspire young people to pursue public service. I believe that the Edward M. Kennedy Oral History Project is Senator Edward M. Kennedy’s gift to the ages.

It all came about because of Ted Kennedy’s understanding of history. In 2002, when my husband achieved the milestone of representing the people of Massachusetts for 40 years in the United States Senate, his deep sense of history led him to bring together a trusted group of family and friends for a dinner discussion at his sister Pat Lawford’s home. “Where do we go from here?” he asked the assembled group. There were no doubts in his mind that he wanted to continue to serve in the Senate, but he was at the stage in his service where his mind was also on the legacy he would leave behind. We were all tossing out ideas—Ed Schlossberg suggested an Institute for the study of the United States Senate and out of that suggestion the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate was born. I recall raising the issue of oral history. The renowned historian and presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger was at the table and he quickly embraced the idea. Dr. Schlesinger urged Teddy to record his own voice and those of his family, friends, colleagues, foreign leaders, journalists, and staffers who knew him over his extraordinary life and his decades in the United States Senate.

After the dinner, Teddy pursued the idea of oral history, asking our dear friend Lee Fentress to spearhead the effort to find the best institution in the country to help with the project. At the end of the day, with Fentress’s leadership and our enthusiastic agreement, we turned to the nation’s preeminent Presidential Oral History Program at the Miller Center of the University of Virginia to explore the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue via the Edward M. Kennedy Oral History Project.



Senator Kennedy launches his oral history project with the Miller Center in the Russell Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C. in 2004.

Expertly led by Professors James Sterling Young and Stephen F. Knott, the project launched in late 2004 inside the Senate Caucus Room where my husband's brothers, Jack and Bobby, had announced their respective presidential candidacies. That room is today called the Kennedy Caucus Room. Teddy had kept extensive notes throughout his life and had amassed a vast archive of official papers. Yet he had never sat down with impartial scholars to record a complete set of recollections about his personal and professional experiences. Over the next five years he gave a total of 29 interviews, many of which I had the pleasure of attending.

Senator Kennedy placed no subjects off-limits to his interviewers, discussing events and impressions he had never articulated for a public audience. Thus, he described growing up in an irrepressible Irish-Catholic clan headed by patriarch Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. As a youngster, Teddy witnessed his father's ambassadorship to England on the eve of World War II, in which his beloved brother, Joe Jr., would lose his life. My husband's nomadic school years proved challenging for him, but he relished learning grassroots politics from his maternal grandfather John F. (Honey Fitz) Fitzgerald, a former congressman and Boston mayor.

While still a teen, Teddy practiced those timeless lessons in his brother Jack's earliest campaigns for Congress. As the youngest Kennedy, looking up to his older brother, Teddy never forgot the time that JFK devoted to showing him the magnificent buildings in Washington while urging young Teddy that it was even more important to learn and appreciate what transpires *inside* them.

In that political arena, Teddy found his greatest joy and suffered his most profound losses. After President Kennedy's assassination, Teddy nearly lost his own life in a 1964 plane crash just after casting his vote on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as he headed to the Massachusetts Democratic State Party Convention that was to nominate him for his first full term as Senator. Yet he recovered in time to welcome his brother, Robert Kennedy, to the Senate in early 1965. When Bobby entered the Democratic presidential nomination race three years later, Teddy enthusiastically joined the campaign, just as he had for Jack in 1960. Teddy was at a campaign event in San Francisco when he heard the unfathomable news that, just after declaring victory in the California primary, Senator Robert Kennedy had been shot. At age 36, Teddy was the last surviving Kennedy brother. He was to become a surrogate father for 13 nieces and nephews, along with his own children, Teddy Jr., Kara, and Patrick.

Senator Kennedy's spoken history transports us to his first U.S. Senate campaign in 1962, when, as the president's brother, he filled JFK's vacated Senate seat in a special election. Eight more times Teddy would successfully appeal to his Massachusetts constituency for another six-year term. Supporting the Democratic Party's core values, while pragmatically working across the aisle to solve problems at home and abroad, forging consensus on Capitol Hill, reaching out to ten presidents of both parties whose tenures spanned his Senate career, and running for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1980, Teddy compiled an incomparable record that tallied far more victories than defeats.

Professor James Sterling Young was at Teddy's side throughout the entire five-year process of this oral history, gently coaxing, questioning, prodding, and building the trust that led Senator Kennedy to open up. Although my husband and Jim Young hailed from strikingly different backgrounds, they discovered common ground over their mutual interests in American politics and history. These interviews, which were conducted in our homes in Hyannis Port and Washington, surrounded by our dogs Sunny and Splash (who chimed in occasionally),

and in Teddy's Capitol Hill office, explore his legacy in American political life during nearly a half-century of public service.

Jim Young painstakingly examined Teddy's observations and what they teach us about the Senate's institutional evolution, especially in an age of presidential predominance. Senator Kennedy's instincts for knowing when to hold firmly to his party's ideology, and when to employ bipartisanship for the nation's benefit, are poignant lessons for our contemporary era of polarized and gridlocked politics. Teddy never lost faith in the American constitutional system established by America's Founders, and his interviews provide a unique understanding of political agency in our complex system of checks, balances, and separated powers. Indeed, his ability to comprehend and apply *shared* power among three branches and with the 50 states facilitated his contributions to historic legislation in civil rights, education, health care, welfare, economic equality, immigration, labor law, environmental quality, defense, and civic engagement. Family, patriotism, and religious principles informed his advocacy in each of these policy areas and bolstered him in times of tragedy.

Building on the lessons gleaned from Senator Kennedy's unequalled vantage point, 250 additional interviews with some 150 of his associates add depth and breadth to the Kennedy family's impact on American politics, as well as Teddy's specific contributions to government policy, judicial appointments, and international relations. As Arthur Schlesinger explained, oral histories provide more than facts. They complement the written record by adding "flavor and context" to historical events. Interviews are often available for public use long before official documents are processed and released. In this litigious age, contemporary public officials are well-advised to forego keeping journals and diaries. Teddy knew that interviews conducted by scholars allow "those who participate in history, rather than historians, to provide tone and shading to the words that describe their thoughts and their deeds." He relished "the genuineness and spontaneity of the human voice."

My husband's cancer diagnosis in May 2008 ended his formal conversations with Professor Young, but the information contained in their interviews served Teddy well as he raced fate to complete his memoir *True Compass*. We were deeply grateful to the supporters of the Edward M. Kennedy Oral History Project and the Miller Center for providing the foundation for this acclaimed narrative of his



remarkable life and the legislative battles he fought to implement historic public policies. My husband's spoken history made his memoir a more revealing, personal, and nuanced portrait of the man called the Senate's "last lion." The final version of his book arrived on August 25, 2009, the day he passed away at our home in Hyannis Port.

Teddy fervently believed that recorded interviews with those who make history enhance our understanding of it and render historical events "more accessible to a wider audience of individuals." He was convinced that the Edward M. Kennedy Oral History Project "would provide important new resources for scholars and the general public to learn more about the most significant legislative debates of our time." My husband considered it a privilege to work with the Miller Center to produce a body of evidence that would, he hoped, encourage "people to love the Senate as much as I do." We hope the stories presented in this commemorative book and volumes to follow, along with the opening of the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate in Boston, will bring Teddy's final wish to fruition.

Family and friends attend the launching of Senator Kennedy's oral history project with the Miller Center in 2004.



INTRODUCTION: REMARKS BY THE PROGRAM CO-CHAIR



Professor Barbara A. Perry

Co-Chair and Senior Fellow
Presidential Oral History Program
University of Virginia's Miller Center
Charlottesville, Virginia

Senator Edward M. Kennedy titled his 2009 memoir *True Compass* because, as he said in its opening pages, “Sailing, for me, has always been a metaphor for life.” With that historic life ebbing, the Senator concluded, “[Y]ou might not reach your goal right away. But if you do your best and keep a true compass, you’ll get there.” He would not reach the distant shore of seeing his oral history project to completion, nor would his trusted navigator, the late Professor James Sterling (Jim) Young. It has been my honor and privilege, however, to steer the project into port. Launching this endeavor in December 2004, Senator Kennedy remarked, “I’ve always loved history, and I’ve long believed that scholars, politicians, and private citizens and the country as a whole, would benefit from a fuller examination of what we do as Senators, and that’s the purpose of this oral history project.”

A cooperative endeavor of the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate in Boston and the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, the Edward M. Kennedy Oral History Project comprises nearly 300 interviews, including 29 with Senator Kennedy, and the remainder with his family, colleagues, staffers, friends, adversaries, journalists, and policy makers. Taking recorders all the way to the Oval Office, Jim Young interviewed President Barack Obama about his former Senate colleague. Professor Stephen Knott initially directed the project before departing the Miller Center for the U.S. Naval War College. He and Professor Young, founder of the Miller Center’s Presidential Oral History Program, were assisted by Janet Heininger in conducting interviews.

Conversations with Senator Kennedy’s associates, who gave graciously of their time and recollections, range in duration from an hour or two to day-long sessions. The Senator’s nearly 30 discussions, to which he intended to add more, until his cancer diagnosis in May 2008 precluded doing so, cover his compelling life in the political arena and with his remarkable family. No questions or topics were placed off-limits, and all participants patiently fielded interviewers’ queries about their relationship and work with Senator Kennedy.

This volume focuses on material taken from those transcribed interviews that Senator Kennedy’s estate has released to the public. While volumes have been written about the Kennedy political dynasty, careful readers of this commemorative book will discover nuanced details from Senator Kennedy’s own descriptions of his life and work. Along with most of his interviews, nearly 200 of his associates’ interviews are now available to everyone on-line, as a public service, at www.millercenter.org. Consistent with our on-going obligation to protect confidentiality, however, some parts of these interviews remain closed until future dates as requested by the interviewee. Yet the released transcripts form an unprecedented archive of spoken history that will surely become, as Senator Kennedy hoped, “a part of our national cultural heritage.”



THE PRESIDENTIAL ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Senator Edward M. Kennedy correctly labeled Professor James Sterling Young “the pre-eminent leader” in the field of oral history. The Senator also noted that Jim’s “powers of persuasion” were “quite effective.” So much so that, after several visits with Kennedy on Capitol Hill, the two gentlemen decided to collaborate on what would become each man’s final history project—one that would cement their legacies for scholars, journalists, students, biographers, public officials, and informed readers interested in politics and government.

Two years before his passing in August 2013 Jim told a *Roll Call* reporter, “So much of history is written from the ivory tower looking down, and it’s amazing how much is written about politics from people who have never met a politician. You get a much better feel for the human element, and you get a much better understanding of the connection between the personalities and the choice-making” from the recollections of those who made history. Systematizing the gathering of such stories fills the gaps in memoirs, letters, media, and public documents, which are often unavailable to scholars and the public for decades after they are generated.

The Miller Center’s first foray into oral history began in the early 1980s when Jim Young persuaded fellow Georgian President Jimmy Carter and members of his administration to participate in a project of recorded conversations about the 39th presidency. Through the leadership of then Miller Center director Philip Zelikow and Jim Young, a continuing oral history program emerged when the George H. W. Bush Foundation financially supported an oral history of Bush 41’s administration. The program went on to conduct oral histories of Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, which have been released to the public. The Miller Center’s Presidential Oral History Program is now producing the final interviews for George W. Bush’s presidency.

In addition to these presidential projects and Senator Kennedy’s spoken history, the Center has also produced a project on Lloyd Cutler, as well as recorded group sessions examining the Falklands War, White House congressional relations, presidential speechwriting, and the presidency and domestic policymaking.

Jim Young, Steve Knott, and Jan Heininger could not have conducted hundreds of interviews for the Edward Kennedy project without the support of first-rate Miller Center staff, including Jim’s successor Russell Riley, Marc Selverstone, Rob Martin, Jane Rafal Wilson, Bonnie Burns, and Beatriz Lee Swerdlow, along with Senator Kennedy’s superb and loyal aides. The senator’s wife, Vicki Reggie Kennedy, and his friends, Lee Fentress and Paul Kirk, were crucial to the enterprise. Nell Breyer, of the Edward M. Kennedy Institute, provided superlative assistance as the Miller Center processed interviews. The Miller Center’s director from 2006 to 2014, Governor Gerald L. Baliles, remained committed to the project throughout his tenure, and the chair of the Center’s Governing Council, Eugene Fife, offered the expert guidance to acquire and execute this project. Finally, without generous donors, this oral history might have found its sails becalmed.

Instead, the last two lines of what would be the final interview between Senator Kennedy and Professor Young, in March 2008, convey an accurate assessment of their journey:

Kennedy: I think we got a lot of material down.

Young: Yes, we did.





The Making of a Senator

Senator Kennedy sailing in Hyannis Port after participating in an oral history interview with the Miller Center in August 2007.

The last of Joseph and Rose Kennedy's nine children arrived on February 22, 1932. Although the Kennedys had moved to New York in 1927, Rose returned to her beloved hometown for the birth, ensuring that Edward Moore (Teddy) Kennedy would forever be a Bostonian.

He was only six when the Kennedys sailed to London, settling into the American embassy for Joe Kennedy's ambassadorship. The family's time together in London was short-lived, however, as the outbreak of World War II prompted Ambassador Kennedy to send the family home in 1939. Back in the United States, young Teddy found himself unsettled, as his parents soon sold their home in New York and annually followed the sun from Palm Beach to Hyannis Port. Teddy attended ten schools in all, nine of them before reaching high school. He was constantly forced to make new friends, deal with bullies, and play catch up academically. He had a more stable time at Milton Academy where he spent all four years of high school. After Milton, he followed his brothers and father to Harvard, but was forced to leave school when he was caught having a friend take a Spanish exam for him. He enlisted in the Army and after two years in the service was readmitted to Harvard.

After graduating from Harvard in 1956, Teddy enrolled in the University of Virginia Law School, as had his brother Bobby, and served as Jack's campaign chairman for his 1958 Senate reelection. Teddy had learned Massachusetts politics from his maternal grandfather, John F. (Honey Fitz) Fitzgerald, former congressman and Boston mayor.

Fresh from law school, Teddy plunged into presidential politics when Jack asked him to campaign in the western United States during his 1960 bid for the White House. With Honey Fitz's flair for grassroots politicking and a natural exuberance, the candidate's kid brother was an enthusiastic stand-in for Jack. After serving as an assistant prosecutor in Boston, Teddy claimed JFK's Senate seat in a special 1962 election. Jack was now in the White House, with brother Bobby his attorney general and Teddy on Capitol Hill.

Edward Kennedy eagerly accepted appointments to the immigration and constitutional rights subcommittees of the Judiciary Committee. Performing his legislative homework each night, he also made sure to attend meetings for his other assignment on the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. As a junior Senator, Teddy was presiding over the chamber during a routine debate on November 22, 1963, when an aide dashed in to tell him that the President had been shot while riding in a Dallas motorcade. The burden of informing his invalid father that Jack died from his wounds fell to the youngest Kennedy brother.

The next November, Teddy ran in the regularly scheduled 1964 Senate election. Having suffered a broken back and other severe injuries in a private plane crash on the way to the Massachusetts Democratic State Party convention that past summer, Teddy had to campaign from his hospital bed through surrogates, especially his wife and mother. He returned to the Senate in January 1965, just in time to welcome the new junior Senator from New York, Robert F. Kennedy.

Bobby's assassination during his quest for the 1968 Democratic presidential nomination piled new responsibilities on Teddy. He became a surrogate father to Jack's and Bobby's thirteen children, including watching over his own three, Kara, Teddy Jr., and Patrick. Sailing relieved some of Senator Kennedy's grief, but an assassination nightmare haunted him.

In July 1969, Teddy retreated to Martha's Vineyard for the annual Edgartown sailing regatta and a nostalgic party on Chappaquiddick Island for several women who had labored in Bobby's ill-fated 1968 campaign. The tragic events that followed would haunt him for the rest of his life. Still, he maintained his Senate seat, after Massachusetts voters responded ten-to-one in favor of his staying in office. Tragedy continued to befall his family. In 1973, Teddy Jr. underwent surgery to remove his cancerous right leg and endured two years of debilitating, experimental chemotherapy. Senator Kennedy stayed by the boy's

side—an experience that only strengthened his resolve in the public-policy battle of his life to expand health coverage for all Americans.

In 1980, Senator Kennedy challenged President Jimmy Carter for the party's nomination. Teddy pursued his presidential candidacy all the way to the convention, but conceded to Carter before the roll call vote. Yet he dominated the quadrennial meeting with his eloquent concession speech, concluding, "For me, a few hours ago, this campaign came to an end. For all those whose cares have been our concerns, the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the dream shall never die."

Now a Senator for nearly two decades, Kennedy found his influence challenged when Republicans captured the Senate in the wake of Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential victory. Nevertheless, Senator Kennedy redoubled his domestic policy efforts on behalf of job training, minimum wage increases, voting rights, AIDS treatment and funding, and equality for women and gays. In foreign affairs, he labored for peace in Northern Ireland, an end to nuclear weapons proliferation, and abolition of apartheid in South Africa. When possible, Senator Kennedy reached across the aisle to like-minded Republicans. Yet his liberal principles remained intact. He led the fight against the confirmation of conservative Judge Robert Bork—Reagan's 1987 U.S. Supreme Court nominee to replace retired Justice Lewis Powell.

Although Kennedy could take pride in his prodigious legislative accomplishments, his personal life was increasingly out of control, especially after his first marriage ended in 1981. Kennedy delivered a speech at Harvard in 1991, acknowledging his shortcomings and taking responsibility for them. In the audience as his special guest was Victoria (Vicki) Reggie, a brilliant and successful Washington attorney, who would become the senator's wife less than a year later and bring much-needed stability to his life. He defeated Mitt Romney for another Senate term in 1994.

By the dawn of the twenty-first century, Senator Kennedy had produced an admirable legislative record. Expanding civil rights, lowering the voting age to eighteen, abolishing poll taxes, fighting for universal health care, ending the draft, supporting peace initiatives throughout the world, expanding education opportunities, establishing public service projects, and leading the charge against conservative judicial appointees were all part of his portfolio.



The *New York Times*'s Adam Clymer deemed Edward Kennedy “the leading senator of his time” and “one of the greats in history, wise in the workings of this singular institution, especially its demand to be more than partisan to accomplish much.” In 2008, Kennedy endorsed his young Senate colleague, Barack Obama, for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. President Obama made health care reform the centerpiece of his domestic agenda. Kennedy worked on what he called the cause of his life for as long as he could, but brain cancer overtook the 77-year-old senator from Massachusetts on August 25, 2009, before the legislation became law. Kennedy was laid to rest near his brothers, Jack and Bobby, at Arlington National Cemetery, overlooking the nation’s capital and the U.S. Senate, which he had mastered in his nearly half-century there.



Honey Fitz

KENNEDY: As I think back on the times of politics, looking reflectively back, the presence of my grandfather [John F. Fitzgerald] emerges as a larger and larger figure, because I did spend a good deal of time at a very impressionable age, and I had a very close, warm personal relationship where he was sort of my father, a member of my family when I was first off at boarding school. I saw him and observed him and observed his relationship with people and the joy he had from relating to people, and how he related. He was outgoing and warm, and he was able to break through people’s barriers and reticence, and do it in an expansive, warm, lovely way. These were my first observations of what you really talk about in politics, and what is most important—how you’re going to relate to people.

Senator Kennedy meeting with President Jimmy Carter in the Oval Office in 1978.

Senator Kennedy’s charismatic grandfather, John (Honey Fitz) Fitzgerald, who had served as U.S. congressman and mayor of Boston.

Discrimination and Honey Fitz

KENNEDY: Some of my earliest impressions were about discrimination in our society, rather than just the issue as we think about it today, in terms of civil rights. And I believe those earliest impressions really started from my relationship with my grandfather, during the time that I was going to school up at Fessenden, and used to go in and visit him at the Bellevue Hotel to have lunch.... He'd come downstairs from his room and there would be newspaper articles coming out of all of his pockets. We'd go into the kitchen first and say hello to all the waiters and waitresses there, and then come out into the dining room, and he'd still continue to move around the room and say hello to everyone. Everyone knew him, he knew everyone.

But in those walks that we'd have around Boston, he'd talk about the discrimination that took place against the Irish, and about the different sections of the city. In some sections, the Italians lived; in other sections, the Irish lived; and others lived in other communities. Jews lived in other parts of the city, Negroes lived in other communities, and some of these communities moved and shifted as the immigrations came on. He talked about how, in some places, the last people who came in, who would get the jobs, would be of a different party. He talked about the French up in Lowell and Lawrence. They came in and they got the jobs and replaced the Irish. The people who gave them the jobs were Republicans, and so they were much more inclined to be Republican....

And very early as a child. Grandpa talked about the unfairness of the immigration rules—I remember that, long before everybody got into the immigration—how the immigration worked, discriminated against people about where they were born. He was very strongly against that.

Grandpa [Honey Fitz] talked about the unfairness of the immigration rules, how the immigration worked, discriminated against people about where they were born. He was very strongly against that.

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He was a mender, and he was looking for ways to try to mend the different kinds of groups together as a politician, and he saw that this was something that was very strongly held in terms of the different ethnic groups. I can remember him talking about that at a very early age.

Religious Discrimination

KENNEDY: I was also aware of the discrimination on the basis of religion on this. There had been a good deal of discrimination. I mean, Catholics in Massachusetts in 1780 couldn't even vote, and you had discrimination in these schools—the Lord's Prayer in the public schools, so the Catholics all wanted the private schools. They were sort of evident around in Boston, and the reasons you hear why is because the Protestant schools made Catholics say Protestant prayers and things like that. When I went to Protestant schools, I always had to have a separate time out to go to Catholic instructions with the other boys. It was always made possible, because my mother made such a deal out of it, but it was always, you were very much aware that there was tension between the Protestant and the Catholic....

Running for Senate

KENNEDY: I had thought at that time [1961] that I was interested in doing something with the [Kennedy] administration in arms control. I was interested in arms control, it was the height of the Cold War, and I knew this was going to be a priority for him [JFK]. I thought it would give me an opportunity to learn a very substantive issue, to be involved with very good people, and to have a chance to travel. I thought it would give me a good breadth of experience, no matter what I was going to do in the future.

I had this well-thought-out rationale, and I went to talk to my brother, who, I believe, was here. It might have been down in Florida, but I believe it was here. And he said, "Put those thoughts aside. You're interested in getting into elective politics, aren't you?" And I said, "Well, yes, I am."

He said, "Well, you ought to leave right away and go back to Massachusetts. Every day you're in Massachusetts, you're making friends, you're understanding the state and its people. If you're interested in elective office, that's what you ought to do. You'll have a chance to get involved in these other issues at a later time. The important thing is to get up there. You ought to think about what you can do and get started up there."

I remember that conversation very clearly. It was like a major shift in my arrows, going from one direction to a completely different direction. It seemed to me to make some sense after that, to move up to Boston....

.....
KENNEDY: So every lunchtime [while serving as assistant district attorney] I was free, and every lunchtime Frank Morrissey would arrange that I would go to a different place in Boston and give a talk. There are just hundreds of clubs in Boston....

Well, in the beginning, I talked for about forty minutes about my trip to Africa. I had some slides from the time just before and after the election. My brother called me one time and said, “I hear you’re talking for a very long time. How long do you talk?” I said, “Forty minutes.” He said, “If I could do the State of the Union in twenty-three minutes, you can shorten up Africa and do it in twenty-five. Just talk for twenty minutes and answer a couple of questions. You don’t have to do more than that.” I said, “I just can’t get this speech down. There’s just no way of squeezing that down. It’s just too much information.”

.....
KENNEDY: So this was a question of getting out and meeting a lot of the people. I had in my mind at that time—I knew pretty well—that I was going to run, and I was thinking of the Senate. I didn’t talk much about it. The person I talked to most was my father. I probably started talking to him a bit about it in the spring. I think Frank Morrissey helped him understand it best, because Morrissey had this wonderful gift of gab and was enormously enthusiastic and always knew that my father wanted to hear positive things. He would gild the lily on my talks and speeches and the receptions I was getting. My father thought I was just on fire up there. And so he became rather a co-conspirator....

That was a great uplift and a great thrill, because all my life, energy had been focused on the older brothers, the older members of the family. All of us pitched in, delighted to do it. We saw the system work in an extraordinary way. The elections were coming, and we were winning. So the process was working, and it just didn’t seem like there was any end to what the possibilities were. I had the sense that I had a good ally on my side at a very early time. That was very reassuring, and it was a wonderful year with my father, because I had his undivided attention during that one year until he got sick at the end of ’61.



Teddy, Jack, and Bobby Kennedy, 1958, Charlottesville, VA, where Teddy and Bobby were UVA law students.

KENNEDY: That was an interesting occasion. I came down here [Washington, D.C.] for the weekend—on a Friday, I think—and I went over to see my brother at the White House. I waited around for a while, and then I finally went in to see him. I can remember it very clearly. He said to Evelyn Lincoln, “Don’t bother me for a while,” and then we went over, and he sat me behind the desk and asked me questions, all on foreign policy and domestic policy. I gave my answers, and he said, “Well, we’re going to have to sharpen these up a bit.”

Then he had Ted Sorensen and Mike Feldman come in, and they peppered me with questions. That went on for about an hour, hour and a half. They wrote up the answers as we went through it. I had felt fairly confident until I hit the big time, but going over it, I felt less so. But I wasn’t really very rattled about it.

My brother left, I think late Friday night. He went down to Florida, and he watched the *Meet the Press* program on Sunday. Dave Powers tells the story of how he turned it on and then walked in and out of the room for the half hour and asked Dave how I did. Dave said I did fine, and then he called Larry Spivack and asked Larry, “How did he do?”

6
My mother said, “You ought to keep the cameras going, dear. Tell them that politics is joyous. Politics is fun. You take the issues seriously, but people, you enjoy.”

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And Larry said, “He did fine. I just could never get an answer out of him on this aid to education. I just couldn’t pin him down whether he was for aid to Catholic schools or against it.” And my brother said, “That’s just fine, Larry. That’s just where he ought to be.” [laughter] That was the hot issue at that time, what they were going to do. I think after that, everyone was aboard. I had the announcement in Massachusetts.

KENNEDY: I remember the announcement; it went off well. It was around St. Patrick’s time, and I got a great reception at the St. Patrick’s Day parades. I think just about this time I left the district attorney’s office. I got a great reception, and then I remember my brother Jack calling and saying, “Teddy, I think it’s good if we get that Harvard story [on Teddy’s expulsion] out.”

And I said, “What do you mean by that?” And he said, “I think you might as well get that whole story out from beginning to end. Get it out in the early part of this campaign.” I thought that was awfully nice of him to think about it. Then the next day or two, Bob Healy ran a big front-page story in the *Boston Globe*. I thought that was the end of the whole campaign, and I remember that being a long, long day.

I remember going that evening down to Milford, Massachusetts. There’s a wonderful hall down there that holds about three or four hundred people. And I remember being outside in the parking lot saying, “I don’t think—They’ve all read the *Boston Globe*, and I just don’t know whether I can get myself to go into that hall. It’s just such a bad—oh, it’s so bad, what in the world is going to happen with this thing?”

I remember going into that hall, and everyone was cheering, everybody was supporting, and it was just a terrific shot, a lift. I said, “Maybe I can get through this.” And of course people are understanding, and they certainly were. The campaign kept going on a roll. But I always remember Milford and the parking lot as being one of the great moments of the campaign about whether people were going to be forgiving or understanding or how they were going to react or treat me.

KENNEDY: One little funny side story that I’d forgotten about and was reminded of during the lunch hour is that when we were down at the Cape, probably in the summer of ’62, I was up visiting with my brother, and Jackie [Kennedy Onassis] would tease me a little bit. She’d say, “Well, all right now, Teddy. It’s clear you’re going to run, and you’ll probably win. Now let’s figure out when your brother is going to finish with the Presidency. Ben Smith looked out for you; I’m sure you’re going to look out—Don’t you think, Jack? Wouldn’t you like to go back to the Senate?”

She did it in a light-hearted way, but I heard afterwards that Jack said to her, “Don’t be teasing Teddy about this. He’s not at the point where he can take it.” He and Jackie would talk in a light-hearted way about what he might do after he’d been President, just in a fun way.

KENNEDY: ...I think ethnic politics were a wonderful aspect of political life, and that is really retail politics, face-to-face, up close, up front. It’s basically the measurement of the heart and the soul. It isn’t so much the message, it’s the messenger, and it’s their take on you. They feel that if they can take the measure of a candidate, that candidate will protect their interests. They’ve been right more than they’ve been wrong, but they have been wrong, because there are a lot of scalawags who are very good retail politicians and have obviously taken advantage of the trust.

But it’s the political characters who have been involved in these events who give it a sense of joy and laughter and make a lot of the mundane things bearable. It has in terms of our family. I can remember doing an interview down at the Cape, and my mother was sitting there watching. At the end of the interview, my mother said, “You ought to keep the cameras going, dear. Tell them that politics is joyous. Politics is fun. You take the issues seriously, but people, you enjoy.” So I said, “Well, as my mother said, politics is joyous, politics is fun.”

Kennedy's Early Days in the Senate

KENNEDY: And then there's a story, which happened when I just arrived here [the Senate]. I went over to a debate and listened to Willis Robertson speak very passionately in favor of an issue. The time came for the roll call, and it came to Kennedy, and I said "Aye." And then it went on to Robertson, and he said "No." After he had spoken in favor of it, he voted no.

So I went up to him and I said, "Senator, I just listened to your speech, and you spoke in favor of the issue, and then you voted no. I'm confused." He said, "Well, Senator, in my state, the people are evenly divided, and to those who favor the issue I send my speech, and to those who are opposed, I send my vote." I said, "Thank you very much." That was my first exposure to the Senate floor. I said, "I think I might be able to make it here after all." [*laughter*]

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YOUNG: How shall I say this? You didn't have the kind of investigative, entrepreneurial journalism and media attention in the early sixties that you have now, did you? Although there was a lot of focus on the White House and the glitz.

KENNEDY: There's a very dramatic difference and contrast, just with regard to information. If the Department of Health and Human Services said that the glass was half-full, everyone on the committee said, "It's half-full." I'd say, "Let's fill it up." Republicans would say, "It's half-full. We're doing pretty well." But no one disputed that the glass was there, or that it was half-full....

Now, today, you'd say, "Even if the glass is there, it really isn't a glass, and I don't know whether that's water in it. And what do you care about that because I have another study that says the water is going to evaporate in the next two hours"—all of this cockamamie kind of falsified information. It really isn't evidence. People have just manipulated facts, fiction, in a dramatic, dramatic departure. Nothing has credibility. We used to believe the National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine. Today people rebut all that as well, and that's very dramatically different. I think the growth of negative aspects in terms of legislation, quite frankly, follows a pattern in commercial advertising.

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YOUNG: Almost your first year here was also a kind of a reunion, wasn't it, between you and your brothers? You were living in the same place. And you'd been apart doing different things.

KENNEDY: That's right.

YOUNG: That must have made it a fine moment.

KENNEDY: Very enjoyable. As I mentioned, we were here in the summers. We'd go up [to Cape Cod] on the weekends, but we were here during the week, and more often than not, I'd go over and have a swim in the White House pool and have dinner with him [President Kennedy] or sit up on the balcony, smoke a cigar or whatever....

It was almost simpler than being in a private home. People didn't bother us. He was relaxed. About 9:30 or ten, he'd want to go read or do other things. That was fine with me.

The 1964 Plane Crash

KENNEDY: On June 19th [1964] it [civil rights bill] passed in the Senate, and that's the day that, that evening, Birch Bayh and Marvella Bayh and Ed Moss left on a small plane, in an Aero Commander, from Washington to go up to Springfield, Massachusetts, where Birch was going to be the keynote speaker. Those Aero Commanders, they have the pilot that—

YOUNG: And you were going to be the nominee.

KENNEDY: For the Democrats, in Massachusetts, for reelection. The seats are such that there's a pilot, co-pilot, and in the cabin, there's a seat behind each of those, and then there's a longer bench seat where three can sit. So it's configured that five could get into the cabin. Well,

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we had one pilot, and I had my aide, Ed Moss, who sat with us in the plane, and Marvella and Birch Bayh, and then as we were coming into—we left late. I don't know the time. Late afternoon, probably 6:00, 7:00, and we flew up there. It was probably 45 minutes in that plane, and as we were coming in over Springfield, Ed Moss got up and said, "You people need more space, because you're working on your speeches." And so he got up and moved to the co-pilot's seat.

Birch worked on his speech and I went over mine, and then we were getting into the beam and coming into Barnes Airport, and as we were coming in, I turned in my seat, which was right behind the pilot's, to watch coming in, because I was a pilot too, and as I looked out in the front of the plane—Usually you look out the front and then down, and you'll see the lights beginning to blink, you know, the measure that says you're coming out of the mist. As we came down, where I should see the lights beginning to blink, I saw this sort of rock hill with big rocks on it, and just at the same time the pilot saw it, and when I looked up a little bit, I saw trees that were right up ahead of us.

So the pilot pulled back on the instruments in order to lift the plane up, and at that time, we rode along the tops of these trees, 177 feet, at the tops of these trees, because he was trying to get the plane up, but he couldn't rise out. And then we hit this big tree with the left wing, which tipped the plane off to the left. This was the fortunate thing, because all there was was a big stand of pine trees that we were on, but when he hit it off to the left, it drove the plane over to the left and into an apple orchard, and we came down between trees in the apple orchard—120 feet, a two-foot trench, but that was enough to slow the plane down.

It opened up the front of the plane and there was just absolute silence, and I was thrown up into the front of—and I looked up to the left and I saw the pilot, and he looked in bad shape. I looked to the right and Moss looked in bad shape, and then I could hear Birch Bayh saying, "Is there anybody alive up there? Is anybody alive?" And I couldn't answer. Marvella was hysterical. The sleeves of my coat had come off from the impact, shoelaces broke on my shoes, and I couldn't move from my waist down. I was still lying there and I heard Birch moving, and Marvella saying, "We've got to get help, we've got to get help, we've got to get help." And then Birch said, "I smell gas. That plane might catch fire. I'm going back to see if there's somebody alive in there." And it sounds very easy, as I describe that, to say that plane's going to catch on fire, we'd better hurry and get help, and for Birch to turn around and come back and look in that plane.

YOUNG: They had gotten out and you were still there?

KENNEDY: They had gotten out and gotten a distance away, yes. I mean, it's just completely dark. You could see the silhouette of the trees but you couldn't see a road or anything, up on the hill. So he came back on over, looked in and talked and talked, and then I said, "I'm alive, Birch." He said, "I can't bend over because of my back." When I heard the plane might burn up, that gave me a little jounce of juice to try and get out of there. And so I turned around in the plane, even though I was sort of paralyzed from here down, and got to where the window was and put my arm around him, and he dragged me out of that plane, and far enough away, and then I just let go and went down. Then he left. He went over, but he couldn't see that the others—he didn't think either of them were alive, and then he went down.

Nine cars passed on this back road before one stopped, and finally about an hour or twenty minutes or so, people came running on up. They came over to me, and I said, "You'd better go over to the others, see if they're alive," and then they took Moss out, who was still alive. They ran down and came back to me about a half an hour later. We went to the Cooley Dickinson Hospital, and they—I was looking for sodium pentothal. I had dislocated my shoulder one time, and that sort of knocked you out, and they said, "No, no, we can't give you that." They cut all of my clothes away, and then boom, I passed out.

I had a rib through my lungs and had broken my back, and they were worried about the spleen and bleeding. I remember the first thing I saw when I woke up, I saw Jeeb [Najeeb] Halaby from the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], who said, "What happened on the plane?" And I thought, *what the hell am I doing talking to this guy? What in the world am I talking to Jeeb Halaby about on the plane?* Then my members of the family came, and I got the news that Moss had died in six or seven hours. Birch was a real hero in that, in terms of his willingness to come back and see and find out who was alive.

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KENNEDY: Well, one of the positive aspects of my being laid up after the plane crash, when I was at the New England Baptist Hospital, I used to have issue days, where people would come in and brief me on different subject matters. I first met Ken Galbraith at Harvard, but now I was getting a crash course on Ec[onomics] 1. He remembered coming into there and he also remembered a number of other people who had come there to brief me on different policy issues. During that period of time, I also had people who came in and briefed me on civil rights, in a number of different areas.



1963: Senator Kennedy attending a family birthday party for his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., in Hyannis Port.



Senator Kennedy presents Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Award to President Lyndon B. Johnson, January 7, 1964.



Replica of Senator Kennedy's Senate office at the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate.

Core Values from Religion

KENNEDY: I think there are complicated ethical issues and questions that always need focus and attention, and we all need guidance in areas. But my sense is that on the one hand you have your basic moral and spiritual religious motivation, which helps to define your philosophy. You can go back and say, well, can you be agnostic and have values? A non-believer and have values? Many of them do. They say that that is part of the human gene—goodness and evil.

Others believe that the basic moral values comes from religious traditions, and great religions have common values of fairness and caring about the poor, others. My religion has the precepts which are laid out in its teachings, and which I find very powerful, and that motivated me—[St.] Matthew, about the hungry and the thirsty and clothing the naked, welcoming the stranger and visiting the prisoner, and the provisions of [St.] John—when you have done it to the least of these, you have done it for me. The very powerful passages that exist, which are uplifting, inspiring, and pretty clear as to the purpose of life.

Religion and His Family

KENNEDY: There are obvious dramatic events that shake those foundations. You certainly face those. In the '70s my son lost his leg with the cancer, and others which are dramatic. But I always found that at the end of the day this was a wonderfully constructive and positive force in my life. And I think it's part of the eternal optimism, that makes me sort of an optimistic person. I think it's the hopeful aspects of the belief. Leave it to others to do the analysis, but for me those teachings and that uplifting aspect of faith is the one that gives a great deal of hope and optimism to me.

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YOUNG: The darkest aspects, the violence, that must sorely try one's faith, I would guess.

KENNEDY: It's senseless, the senselessness of violence.

YOUNG: You mentioned a moment ago sometimes it shakes your belief, it shakes your faith. But you said at the end of the day there is hope.

KENNEDY: There is hope. I think you have to develop a kind of a

climate, an atmosphere to be able, moments where you'd be able to feel that. I think you can't get yourself in a constant kind of a spiral. You can get yourself into a downward spiral, the depression, negativism, loss. I think—and people do. But I've been lucky enough to be able—when I start down there, I've been able to see another side, or know of another side that can try to catch you on the way, which has been important in terms of my own life.

Obviously Vicki's been a big part of it. She's been a great source of inspiration and strength and love, and she's—I like having a common, in this case faith, an underlying belief, has been something that has been enormously important, certainly it has been in my life, and I hope in hers.

Possibility of Running for Vice President

KENNEDY: ...In '68, when Hubert [Humphrey] mentioned it [the vice presidential nomination] and offered it to me, I was just really too close to all the events of 1968, and I wasn't prepared at that time even to try for the nomination. I never felt that that was something real. I know there was a lot of positioning by some political leaders on it, but the serious issue was the Vice Presidency, and I wasn't interested. I didn't feel that it was appropriate then. In '72, I always felt that there would be a time when I could run and would run, but I always felt that I had much more opportunity to affect public policy in the Senate. If you're going to really do the Vice Presidency, you're there for eight years, then you have a leg-up with regard to the nomination.

Although it was during that time, I think, that Ted Sorensen gave me a memorandum that said it was possible for me to be a Vice President and also be a Cabinet member. So that sort of opened up a little interest—that I could serve as a Cabinet member, rather than just being the Vice President. There's nothing prohibiting that, historically and constitutionally, but it still didn't have an appeal for me.

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EDWARD KENNEDY

The 1980 Presidential Campaign

KENNEDY: Going into '79 now, I think we had polls that were going along and showed us being in a strong position. And I think the time when I was the most struck about really thinking about running in '80 was when I listened to the speech he [President Jimmy Carter] gave in July of that year on the "national malaise." I thought that this was contrary and in conflict with all the things I believed in terms of the Democratic Party, in terms of what I thought the country was about. I thought this was a direction of the country that needed change. And with that kind of attitude and mood, I couldn't see how we were really going to address the central problems we were facing, both in the economy and foreign policy.

And so after that, later that summer, we began to get the people together down here to talk about the pros and cons of running. I met September 7 at the White House and indicated to Carter that I was giving consideration to running against him, and that the family had given their blessing.

Now, I had decided that I was going to make up my mind in the summertime, and I did, just before Labor Day, down here, that I was going to run. But I was also conscious that Carter was coming up to the Kennedy Library and speaking. So I thought I would have to wait to announce until after that. This was one of the real challenges I was facing. I had it in my mind. I didn't talk to people about it, and I wasn't going to talk because I didn't want to have it leak out at the time. And so I waited until November 7. He spoke on October 20, and we had the hostage crisis on November 4. And then I announced on November 7.

[O]ne of the searing events was this Roger Mudd interview. The background on that was that Roger Mudd and Dan Rather were in a contest to see who was going to be the anchor on CBS. Roger Mudd had been a social friend, particularly to the Robert Kennedys. I knew him, but he was not a personal friend of mine. I'd see him out at the Robert Kennedys'.

At the time—we think it was in June of that year—when the President of Mexico [José López Portillo y Pacheco] was in New York, I had the chance to meet him about ten at night at the Waldorf-Astoria. After I met him and walked out, Roger Mudd was there. He said, "I'm in this contest with Dan Rather, and I'd love to get an interview with your mother." I said, "Well, my mother doesn't do interviews. She's older; she just doesn't do interviews. But let me think about it, and I'll get

back to you.” He said, “It would make a big, big difference if I could ever do that interview down at Cape Cod. Everybody’s always wanted that interview with your mother.”

So I talked to my mother and my sisters about it, and decided that he could do the interview with Mother walking, but I’d have to be with her. He could talk with her a bit, she could chat and talk a bit, but we just didn’t want to have a sit-down or only Mother. He said that was fine. I said, “Our children are going to be there, so that’s going to be the setting.” He said, “That’s fine.”

Now, just before the time, in September, my mother got sick and went to Boston. . . . Then my daughter [Kara Kennedy] got an invitation to the Hopi Indian tribe in Arizona. That is the only matriarchal tribe in the country, and they wanted the oldest daughter to come there and be a part of their big, big ceremony. Kara wanted to go, so she was out. For some reason, Teddy couldn’t go. So it’s only Patrick [Kennedy] and me.

So I said to Roger, “This interview isn’t going to work, because my mother’s not here, the others aren’t here.” “Oh, no,” he said. “That’ll be all right. I’ll come on down. We’ll do you and the sea and Cape Cod, and what the sea has meant.” I could talk about that, and my brother [JFK] learning to swim, and then fighting in the water and coming back, and using the sea as a place of repose and thought and rest, and what this place all meant to him and the family.

So down he comes and sets up at Squaw Island, and the only two people there are Patrick and me. I have no staff, no nothing, because we’re just going to talk about the sea. We talk about the sea, and we look at the time. I say, “That’s about it.” And he says, “Yes, just about.” And I say, “Patrick, why don’t you go down and get the boat and pick me up, and I’ll just get these people out of the house.”

So then he [Mudd] said, “Can we do one more film?” I said, “Well, I’d really like to go. I think we’ve done it.” “No,” he said. I had to do one more. And then we got into whether you’re going to run for President, and what’s your view about all this. I had made up my mind. I sensed that Patrick’s down there by himself. He’s 12 years old; he’s bringing the boat in, saying, “What in the world is this all about?” knowing that I’m not prepared.

It was a disaster. I remember getting on the boat afterwards with Patrick and telling him it was a disaster, and calling Mudd and saying, “Look, if we’re going to do this thing, I ought to get another crack at that thing.”

No. No way, José. And they ran that part on the November—you know, whatever.

YOUNG: There was considerably more to that interview, wasn’t there, than was actually broadcast?

KENNEDY: Oh, there was a lot. Yes, I had talked to him for 40 minutes just about the sea, and about how we learned to swim here, and the sailing here, and it was because of that he [JFK] was able to save people’s lives, and he came back here, and how the sea is sort of a metaphor of life, and my life— You know, all of these things I had thought through, and knew what my brother said. But it was this last part that he was in for.

That was on September 29, the interview. Not aired until November 4, which was the hostage crisis, and then I declared on the 7th. At that time, they knew I was going to declare, and he has all these answers from five weeks before.

YOUNG: Why was the timing of the release—?

KENNEDY: It suited their interests. I was a hot item at that time, and he was going to have the jump. They knew by that time I was going to announce for President. “Here’s Kennedy. He wants to be President. This is what he had to say.” But I didn’t have much to say.

YOUNG: Were there any understandings about when this would air?

KENNEDY: Well, no, I never understood that that was going to be a part of it in any event. It was all going to be about the Kennedys and Cape Cod.

YOUNG: It was kind of a dirty trick.

KENNEDY: Well, we’ve just swallowed over the years, and you have to be smart enough if you’re going to do an interview. I certainly am now. You have things all worked out with your professional staff, and you have a very clear idea. They can ask whatever questions, but what is the purpose of the interview, and what is it going to be about? Then you can go on. We go with Tim Russert and do all the Sunday programs, and they can ask whatever the hell they want and we’re ready for it, but you know at least the framework and where these things are going.

But now, this is the situation. We get off to a start, and as I’m the first one to recognize, having been a candidate any number of times, I find getting started in the course of a campaign always takes time. There are good campaigners who can leave the Senate this afternoon and be

President Kennedy said the greatest social program is a good job. And the strong economy, which is going to be an expanding, growing economy, is going to be a key.

EDWARD KENNEDY

red-hot on the campaign tonight. It takes me a couple of days, two or three days, to get warmed up and into the mood. Less time than it used to, but it takes me a day or two. You could see even when we were down here last week, I talked twice in the noontime and the evening, but by the evening time, this part is much more sharpened up. It has always been like that. And it took longer in 1980 for me to get going.

So I thought the statement for running was strong, but we were right out. We left Faneuil Hall and went up to New Hampshire, and we had this strong national press following by then. But the presentation was not crisp and tight, with a strong message as a candidate. I think eventually it got there. It was a lot stronger after January, and it got stronger during the course of the campaign. Our organization—rather than building up and their all knowing that we're going to get in—had to jump-start. We had very good people, just superb people, but they hadn't had a long lead-time getting in. And they had to get moved up and started in a very jump-start way. And I think they did. They're remarkable people who have worked in subsequent campaigns and have been recognized generally among the very best. Even today, there are a number of them who have done all that and are still doing it.

So that was a deficiency. My brother-in-law, Steve Smith, who is like a brother to me, was very influential. In '60, Bobby was the campaign manager and Steve was right underneath him, and then he did Bobby's campaign in '64, and Bobby's campaign in '68. Steve had really gone through it and he wanted to work on it, but he had a lot of angst about my safety and security and all the rest of those things.

So this was getting started. And you had the hostage situation. It changed the whole atmosphere, where the President obviously became

stronger and stronger as a national leader, and we had the foot-faults in the beginning. It took time to get our feet underneath us.

YOUNG: Can we go into a little bit more on that general subject? You had made up your mind sometime during the summer. Did you have a concept at that time of what your theme or your platform would be? The reason I'm asking this is that when the hostage crisis came, that changed the circumstances. Was it healthcare, or was it leadership, or was it the direction of the Democratic Party, or all of those things? Did you have a concept about what you would attempt to accomplish, and the message you'd try to get across, when you decided in the summer?

KENNEDY: My core sense is the economy is the makeweight. President Kennedy said the greatest social program is a good job. And the strong economy, which is going to be an expanding, growing economy, is going to be a key. We had now gone through these extraordinary interest rates, high unemployment—and there just seemed to me a complete unwillingness to deal with those issues. And then the health insurance was—

YOUNG: Double-digit inflation at that time.

KENNEDY: Inflation, and a real abdication or unwillingness to deal with this issue. And the health issues. He [President Carter] had four years of getting through it, and effectively had either misrepresented or misstated what his own commitment on that would be, and I felt strongly about that issue.

And I thought just the general leadership issue—what the Democratic Party historically stood for, what I had seen it stand for. We had *seen* this party that had ended the war, the party that had fought for civil rights, the march towards progress. All of that was on the move, and all of that was at risk. And President Carter had said that he believed that the spirit of America was the spirit of malaise, which is so in conflict with the inherent view that I have about what this country is about, what I think the party is about, and what I'm about. I think that's about where it is. We had those platform issues, and other kinds of issues—jobs, programs, and other kinds of things—but that was the inherent sense we had.

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KENNEDY: The other thing was, we had all the UAW people in the beginning, and I started to lose them. And they called it Chappaquiddick, but it was really the gun issue. They did a terrific job on me on guns. You know: Kennedy and gun control. The gun issue



was a very powerful—and is powerful. Actually, I have a very strong position that I'm very strongly committed to, but that was a very powerful factor. By the end of that campaign, in terms of the UAW—I had it 90/10 when I went there, and it was probably 55/45 by the time the election was held. Very interesting.

After that, after I went home and listened to the results [from the Iowa caucuses] in McLean, that night I had to call my mother. I was the first Kennedy who had lost an election. [Actually Robert Kennedy had lost the Oregon Primary in 1968.] So I called my mother to tell her that I'd lost. And she said, "Oh, that's all right, Teddy dear. I'm sure you'll work hard and it'll get better," and was very upbeat and hopeful.

And then, she was so sweet. She said, "Teddy, you know that nice blue sweater I gave you at Christmastime? Do you remember that?" And

I did. I remembered it, yes. She said, "Have you worn it?" I said, "Well, I'm not sure that I've worn it." She said, "Is there something special about it? Because I just got the bill for it, and it was \$220." It had a turtleneck, and it had a little pocket in the front. It was a sweater that had been made in France that she'd got on Worth Avenue down there. It was wonderful material; it just felt so good. So she said, "Well, Teddy, will you check it out? And if you haven't worn it, will you send it back, because I've got another blue one here that I think is just as nice and is not nearly as expensive." [laughter] It was kind of a reality check after all this.

But I can remember that night very clearly, and Steve Smith had told me, "Look, no money now. We're in debt. If you get out now, no one really— You took a crack, but don't worry. Your career is still intact. You go back to the Senate, and it's not a real knock. But if you stay in,

Senator Kennedy running for re-election to the U.S. Senate in 1982.

I have the poll here in Massachusetts, and you're getting beaten by 25 points in Massachusetts. And if he [Carter] beats you in Massachusetts, your career is gone. Finished. That's what you're looking at. And that's in another seven weeks. You have no money, and I don't know what's going to turn this thing around."

KENNEDY: I wasn't planning to give up the Senate. If I quit the Presidential, I'd be going back to the Senate. I wasn't going to give up, but if I continued, I had a pretty good shot at Carter beating me in Massachusetts in a primary, and that was not a good message for me in Massachusetts.

YOUNG: As Steve was saying, that would be the end of your career.

KENNEDY: That would be the end of my career.

YOUNG: You might even be ineffective in the Senate.

KENNEDY: Might be ineffective in the Senate, and any number of things could happen. I hadn't thought about all those things. The day before, I thought we had more people in Ames, Iowa than anybody else had and we were going to win it, and then—

YOUNG: And Steve talked to you, and you saw the results in Iowa. And then you spent those two days, and you stuck with it.

KENNEDY: Yes.

YOUNG: Risk it all.

KENNEDY: Yes.

YOUNG: You were willing to risk—

KENNEDY: Yes. I thought it was worth the effort. We'd gotten started, gotten in it, and believed in it, and I thought there were enough other people out there who shared in that belief, and we could go on.

KENNEDY: I wanted to give a good talk [at the 1980 Democratic Convention], but I didn't have any sense that the speech itself was going to be more than a good speech. In retrospect, I could give that speech at another time, and it would be a good speech, not a great speech. What made it a great speech was the fact that I had gone through all of this and had lost. It's the drama of the moment as much as the words, the resonating words. The words have enormous impact because you've carried those words and they've had meaning during the course of campaign. So that's more than rhetoric in

people's minds or the delegates' minds. When you talk about those, they had real meaning and real resonance because you've gone through it. And I think that's it, rather than if you just went on out there and made that speech in Hyannis this afternoon.

KENNEDY: Things about the speech that were very important are that every night when I got back to the hotel at 10:30, my sisters were there. All of my sisters: Jean [Kennedy Smith], Pat [Kennedy Lawford], and Eunice [Kennedy Shriver] were there. And they would come in the room, and they would work for a couple of hours on the talk. The beginning part was authored and suggested, and other parts were done by [Robert] Shrum, but the part that bothers me and troubles me is the box that had all of these changes is gone. Someone stole it out of my office. So I don't have the record from the very earliest copies to the very end.

That speech was completely altered and completely changed. We laid it out on the floor, put all of it out on the floor, and I can always remember being upstairs, and all my sisters were reading different parts of it, saying, "Look, Teddy, you have this part here...." They have very good judgment and very good political sense and are really good editors. Pat reads it, and used to read everything, and is very good, and Jean as well, and Eunice has a lot of common sense. And they all were very sharp. They're still sharp, but they were particularly sharp then, and they had all been a part of the campaign. They had a very important impact. I remember that, and that's never gotten out, but every night from about ten to one—we weren't doing anything in the evenings, but every night we came back there and worked on it and made changes. They'd redraft that part in the second, and incorporate that thing, and it would be there again the next night.

Changes in the Senate

YOUNG: The Senate was a very different place?

KENNEDY: Take, first of all, the structure of the work. From the time of civil rights through the Vietnam War, we were working virtually twelve months of the year. I remember coming back and voting between Christmas and New Year's when my brother Bobby was in the Senate. It was probably '66. We always had [Abraham] Lincoln's recess off. We got the Fourth of July and Labor Day and Thanksgiving weekend, and the rest of the time we were in. We were in all summer, all fall, all spring. We might have gotten Easter weekend, maybe.

YOUNG: So working twelve months of the year—

KENNEDY: I'd come down [to the Cape] on Friday nights in the summertime, rarely getting here in time for dinner. More often than not, I'd leave Sunday night, and the Senate was starting on Monday at 9:30 or 10:00. Everyone showed up for those, the markups. They showed up for all of the days. We were in a good number of the evenings and nighttime. Everyone stayed around during the week. For social events, there might have been a few traditional dinners or the White House press or radio correspondents' dinner, on occasion. But Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday we were in through the evenings....

People listened to each other, and they took the action. That's nonexistent today. Ninety-five percent is done by staff, and people come what I call "parachuting" into the Senate on Tuesdays, listen to the lunch discussion, go back to their office and see people, because they're so far behind. They're out the door for fundraisers every night—Tuesday, Wednesday. They want to be out of there Thursday night. We don't have serious votes on Friday. If we have a vote, it's at 9:30 in the morning with no debate.

KENNEDY: You lose the whole essence of what the Senate is, about your involvement in it, your relationship with people, and what the purpose is, which is the exchange of ideas.

This has been the corruption of the Senate, which has been driven by two factors, I think. One is the forces that don't want the Senate to meet and be very active. If we're not active, it's much easier to slow legislation down. There are people, primarily Republicans, who don't want us to deal with these issues. It's difficult enough to get things through over a period of time, but if you don't meet that often—

So the ability of forces to paralyze the Senate has been enhanced immeasurably, and those are basically anti-Democratic forces. Those are institutional forces. Those are financial interests. Those are special interests of every form and shape. That has happened institutionally. We have the deadlock between the Republicans and the rest, which is philosophical, which is the way the country has voted. So that's different.

KENNEDY: I'm on committees that deal with civil rights, with human rights, with civil liberties, with immigration, and I'm on the Armed Services Committee that deals with foreign policy and national security, and on the Human Resource Committee—the Labor

Committee, which is health and education and elderly issues, a pretty broad scope. My basic approach in terms of economic and social justice is still very deep, and that's an opportunity for people. I have a commitment to being a voice for the voiceless—all of those are out there. You have to pick and choose your fights....

And you have to decide where you're going to try to be effective, and being effective in the Senate means prioritizing. You have to prioritize and spend a lot of time, and you can't spend time on things that you might very well like to. I've always said that every day in the Senate I could be three people: to go to the hearings I want to, the preparation, and to be able to speak to these kinds of issues. And there's another, different kind of issue—how the Senate has changed, how I relate to the institution, and how it becomes more difficult to become effective.

Boston Roots

KENNEDY: I can look out my window next to my desk [in Boston] and see where my grandfather was born on Ferry Street and where my mother was born on Garden Court Street. My father was born on Meridian Street in East Boston; that's fairly blocked. I can also see the old North Church and St. Stephen's Church, the Bunker Hill Monument, the *Constitution*. And if you lean out a little bit and look to the right, you can see Faneuil Hall....

This is the whole birthplace of America, and down the sweep of the harbor, I can see the building where eight of my forebears came in in 1848, out of one window, which is absolutely unique and special. That's a very inspiring location.

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we [the Senate] were working virtually twelve months of the year.*

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EDWARD KENNEDY



A CALL TO
ACTION FOR
COMPREHENSIVE
IMMIGRATION
REFORM



Civil Rights: Marching Toward Equality

Senator Kennedy speaking at an event to help promote comprehensive immigration reform in 2007.

Civil rights constituted Edward Kennedy's defining legislative issue. From the outset of his Senate career, fighting for equality took precedence on Kennedy's agenda. In his maiden speech on the Senate floor, he chose to speak on what would become the historic 1964 Civil Rights Act, and his first legislative initiative was a bold attempt in 1965 to abolish the poll tax that prevented thousands of African-Americans from exercising their right to vote in the South.

Kennedy's commitment to civil rights was shaped by his Catholic faith, his experiences in school and the army, and his family's Irish immigrant roots. His grandfather, Honey Fitz, taught Kennedy early lessons about discrimination based on religion and national origin, and his brothers, Jack and Bobby, became ardent supporters of the civil rights movement. All of these influences broadened Teddy's definition of civil rights. Discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, language, gender, sexual orientation, mental illness, and physical and mental disabilities, all fell within Kennedy's civil rights rubric. Nothing captured his heart and mind like the need to help any disadvantaged group whose rights were systematically denied.

Kennedy particularly embraced the cause of individuals denied health care, education, jobs, and housing. When Bobby joined the Senate in 1965 as New York's junior senator, they worked together on these issues. After Bobby's 1968 assassination, Teddy continued laboring on those policies, while championing traditional civil rights and

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Cooperating with Republican colleagues to pass landmark legislation would, in fact, become one of the hallmarks of Edward Kennedy's Senate career.

expanding them to encompass more contemporary causes, such as marriage equality and military service.

In addition to his work at home, Kennedy also fought to protect civil rights overseas. Nowhere were his efforts defending civil rights abroad more visible and effective than in South Africa. Continuing Robert Kennedy's work there from the 1960s, Teddy led the fight in 1986 to pass, and then overturn President Reagan's veto of, the Anti-Apartheid Act.

Often speaking of the slow march of progress, Kennedy understood all too well that crafting and passing legislation took time. Never lacking perseverance, he tried no fewer than four times in the 1980s to pass the Civil Rights Restoration Act, only succeeding after overriding President Reagan's veto in 1987.

Kennedy also understood the importance of reaching across the aisle to work for compromise reform. His first collaboration came in the 1960s in working with Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) on "one man, one vote," ensuring equally apportioned voting districts. Over the years he would toil with many other prominent Republicans on civil rights legislation, including Senators Robert Dole (R-KS), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), John Danforth (R-MO), Charles Mathias (R-MD), and Jacob Javits (R-NY). The 1982 Voting Rights Act extension, the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act served as testaments to these bipartisan alliances. Cooperating with Republican colleagues to pass landmark legislation would, in fact, become one of the hallmarks of Edward Kennedy's Senate career.



How Kennedy's Family Influenced His Views on Civil Rights

KENNEDY: ...In those walks that we'd [young Teddy and Honey Fitz] have around Boston, he'd talk about the discrimination that took place against the Irish, and about the different sections of the city.... The divisions that existed between the races were very powerful, because people had come over in groups. They depended upon each other to survive, in terms of employment, and then beginning in terms of politics.... The key aspect of it was jobs, housing—it was where people lived, it was employment. So it was a form of discrimination that was very real, and the discrimination against the Irish was very real, the no jobs for—Irish need not apply. There was the limits, the ceilings, and it was very apparent to me, even at that time, about the prejudice and discrimination.

How Kennedy's Army Service Shaped His Views on Civil Rights

KENNEDY: I went from there [Fort Dix, New Jersey] down to Camp Gordon, Georgia, and I went to military police school for eight weeks, and there it was a much higher percent, it was probably 45% black. But the training was very intense when I was in the Army. You could see how people performed....

After a forced march at night, carrying a full field pack, which was 46 pounds and 26 miles, people would just sort of collapse, and they'd put the tent over them, and hope it didn't rain, they're so exhausted.... Washburn, who was from Brooklyn, was the toughest guy. He swore, you know, just a mean son of a gun, and after 11 miles, he just collapsed. You began to see who were the people who stayed the course, who were the people who were reliable, who were the people who were dependable, and who were the ones who did their duty in terms of cleaning the weapons and doing everything else—and you saw what their names were or what the color of their skin was. Sort of an equality aspect. You've got to value the people for what they were and what they did, and how well they shaped up, and not the color of their skin.... That whole experience was eye opening in terms of how people got along, and how they worked together, and how they could—and as a younger person, it was a pretty open idea, a pretty open kind of a view about people. I found I got along fine with all the people I had to get along with.

Placing the 1960s Civil Rights Movement in Historical Context

KENNEDY: Let's look at this issue of civil rights, let's step back a little bit from it, and then get into it in considerable detail. It's the defining issue of the country, and it stems from the fact that the Founding Fathers wrote slavery into the Constitution. We fought the Civil War and made some progress, but it was really the leadership of Dr. [Martin Luther, Jr.] King in the '50s that made such a difference—and, of course, some Court opinions like *Brown v. Board of Education*. But the leadership of Dr. King in the '50s opened up the possibilities in terms of the American public trying to do something about the walls of discrimination.

And we had new leadership after eight years of Republicanism and [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. We had new leadership, people who had fought in World War II next to men and women with different colored skin, people who thought more deeply about what the country represented and felt strongly about trying to make progress in these areas. You had the integration of the military during this period, by President [Harry] Truman's executive order.

The mood reflected that our foreign policy had engaged with the Soviet Union and its expansionism and the dangers of nuclear exchanges in the 1960s, with the partial test ban agreement between President [John F.] Kennedy and [Nikita] Khrushchev. That was still very much out there in foreign policy.

The country turned in to see how we resolved some of these issues, and race was the issue that was front and center. There were other issues we'll come back to at another time—the progress we made with Medicare and Medicaid and others—but the overarching issue was race.

This was a time of great optimism in the country. We had new political leadership, we had young leaders. There was the challenge to young people to participate in the decision-making process: President Kennedy's call, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country" resonated around the country. People were excited, they were interested, they were volunteering for the Peace Corps, and they were paying attention to national leadership. The confidence in government at that time was exceedingly high. I can't remember the figures now, but the percentage of people who believed that the Federal Government would act in the best interest of the country was considerable, around 70. (Now we're talking in the teens.) So there was a great deal of confidence in the government in terms of its leadership.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

KENNEDY: [George] Wallace was trying to prevent the integration and then in 1963, Jack [Kennedy] made that extraordinary speech about asserting the morality of the issue and what was really at stake in terms of the country, in terms of our society, in terms of values. I think it was one of his greatest and moving speeches, about who would want to change places. He had a word picture of the life of blacks in the country that was just enormously powerful, and I think it made a real impact on the country....

YOUNG: Right after your brother gave his speech. Quite a reaction. Did you have any chance to hear from either of your brothers about their experiences in Mississippi or Alabama during the run-up to that speech? I mean, that was pretty powerful stuff in Alabama and Mississippi. The second thing I wanted to ask about is did you have any chance, or did you have a sense from other Senators, of how they reacted to that Presidential commitment in that speech, and how the chances were assessed for getting it through, because it seemed to me to be very chancy at that time. It was a very high risk policy also for your brother to take this moral stand and push it. So those are two things you might have something to say about.

KENNEDY: I think on the speech, it got very wide attention on television and in the print media. The people who were allies in Washington were very reassured and very uplifted, I mean, people we worked with very closely, Senator Mathias, Senator [Philip] Hart, at that time, and Javits. We were very moved by it and uplifted by it. I don't know of the other side, you had a very important and significant opposition, because you really had the deans of the Senate. We had a big Democratic majority in the Senate, but a big chunk of those Democrats in the Senate were from the South, and they had some very formidable leaders....

And then we run into November of 1963. We were effectively out of there for some period of time, until probably January of '64. I have heard that of the 67 Democrats, 21 came from southern states, 20 of them vigorously opposed the civil rights bill, and Republicans were split too. So you had a major chunk of the Democratic Party opposed to it, and a very important part of the Republicans opposed to it....

KENNEDY: And so in the spring of that year [1964], I made my maiden speech on civil rights. Up to that time, newer members rarely spoke the first two years they were in. Now they all speak fairly soon, but at that time, they waited a couple of years to be able to speak. It seemed



President Lyndon B. Johnson signs the 1965 Immigration Act at Liberty Island, New York. Senator Kennedy had managed the bill on the Senate floor..

to me that this was the issue, this was the time. We were increasingly involved in both the substance of the discussion and the debate, and I felt it was very important to speak. I think it was an important speech—we spent a lot of time on it—and afterwards, we were very appreciated. . . .

KENNEDY: The issue in question now, whether we're going to have to try and change the rules to be able to get the bill, change the cloture rules. So then we had those kinds of battles going on, on the side, and then you had President [Lyndon B.] Johnson speaking about these issues now, after 1963, and bringing a new sense of urgency to all of this, giving it additional new energy. The tragedy, the loss of President Kennedy, and debates and roll call votes to try to change the rules, which were unsuccessful. Eventually, they had a conversation, Johnson did, with [Everett] Dirksen, who said he'd make some adjustments on the public accommodations.

The most interesting part of this for me was the meeting that we had in 1964 in what is now called the Howard Baker Office. It's the room right opposite the Old Senate Chamber, which is the room where the British soldiers lit their torches when they went down and burned the White House [in 1814], and it's the Republican leader's room. It was [William] Frist's room when he became leader. In that room—which

at that time was a regular office room, and now it's extended into a series of rooms to become a suite for the Republican leader—but in that room, Nick Katzenbach came, and we had about eight or nine Senators. All the members of the Judiciary Committee were invited, and you could bring one staffer. We sat in there for probably seven hours, and went over this particular provision, this public accommodations provision, the part that was the heart of the bill.

At the end of it, there were still areas where there was not agreement, but the basic core of the agreement was that we would not—no one would attempt to alter or change the heart, the framework, of the public accommodations. You could have amendments on other different parts of it, but we would not change or alter the basic core framework of the legislation. Everyone signed off on that, and that was really the basis of the provision, and it was the fact that the Senators stayed in the room—they didn't let staff do a rough draft, then come back. They stayed in that room, and just stayed there until they got that thing worked out, all of them. . . . Katzenbach would go out a little bit and come back on in, but all the others worked it out. Dirksen was in and out. He didn't stay the whole time. That was what I thought was *the* meeting on the '64 Act, that he—Dirksen finally signed off and the rest of it began to make sense. That happened a little later in the year.

KENNEDY: They had the old guard, Richard Russell, who was a very talented and highly regarded Senator under other circumstances, very knowledgeable about the rules. Besides him you had [Allen] Ellender, who was from the Deep South, and Spess [Spessard] Holland, who had been around a long time in the South, and [Herman] Talmadge, who was very gifted and a smart, tough person. Senator Byrd—the two Byrds, Harry Byrd and Bob Byrd. You had a very active, committed, determined, tough, knowledgeable group of people who were very resolute, and so how this was going to play out certainly didn't appear to me to be a clear path towards victory. I don't think I saw it at that time, and it took a good deal of time to be aware of it. Certainly it appeared to me that the opponents seemed to have the horses on this. . . . I mean, the country had to move ahead, and the Senate was the place to move ahead, but you had a very strenuous, vigorous, determined opposition on this. And it continued through the early fall, until we had the great confrontation in early fall, September, between Wallace at the schoolhouse door, and I guess there was Katzenbach, on that great moment about who's going to move and who's going to shift and change, and a few days later you have the young girls at the Birmingham church who got killed. So that startled the nation. . . .

The Vote for 18-Year-Olds

KENNEDY: I think this whole 18-year-old vote issue that came up in '70 was really the result of the Vietnam War, clearly. It was tied in the back end of this, that we had had a draft system that worked to the disadvantage of the poor and minorities, and that had been highlighted as really a civil rights issue, and the country changed and went to random selection so that everybody would serve. That was 1968. Nixon wins but the war continues, even though Congress had taken action to try to cut off the funding. There was still a lot of turmoil about who was serving and what their rights were.

Busing

KENNEDY: At this time, you had busing in Boston...[Judge] Arthur Garrity was appointed by the court to work out a system to do this. His proposal included increased busing.... It operated in such a way that it moved children from these particular communities that I described earlier, into other communities, all of which were very isolated, individualistic, and had a separate life and culture and view and attitude, and it caused unshirted hell.... I think once Garrity got involved in this and once they started to draft the programs, we had the emergence of a number of local political leaders who were extremely demagogic in some instances. In some instances racist, not all of them, but in a number of them. Racism was a factor and a force with some, but not all. My own sense was I could have no influence on the racists but some influence on people who were concerned and bewildered and troubled and filled with anxiety and wondering what was happening to their children....

There were individuals like Louise Day Hicks, who was a very tough, shrewd, confrontational and bellicose figure, and Pixie [Elvira] Palladino, from East Boston, who followed me around and hassled me, who was small, short. I can see the pictures of these people in my mind just like you're there, Jim, I can see them. You're much better looking. This Pixie Palladino—short, pitch black hair and flaming eyes.

YOUNG: Did she confront you?

KENNEDY: She confronted, and always came out of nowhere. Louise Day Hicks, you could spot her a half a mile away, but Pixie Palladino, you walked into some hotel lobby and boom, she was there with all of her people and standing in front of you, not letting you move, wanting you to push her or do something.

YOUNG: She was stalking you politically?

KENNEDY: Yes, yes, any place, any public place. Any place it was announced that I was going. In any hotel, inside or outside. If she could get into the hotel, she got into the hotel. The lobby, top of her lungs.

YOUNG: Make a scene.

KENNEDY: Make a scene....

KENNEDY: There was a lot of anxiety in the black community, a lot of fear, physical fear. When the buses were going, I had one of my aides, Bob Bates, who was black, ride into South Boston, and they broke the windows.

YOUNG: Have to get down on the floor.

KENNEDY: Yes. I mean, there was real physical intimidation and real fear....

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KENNEDY: I met with the school committee, I met with teachers, I met with parents. I met with the black community, including Tom Atkins, who had been the attorney for the blacks, and the Snowdens and Ellen Jackson. We were in constant contact with all of that community, so we had a series of meetings. Eventually, I believe it was after this time, I'm pretty sure it was, I met with ROAR, and that's another meeting that I'll describe. In any event, we pulled up to City Hall and there was a crowd, several hundred, outside the JFK [John Fitzgerald Kennedy] Building, not far from in the middle of that red brick area between City Hall and the JFK Building. There were several hundred there, and they had bullhorns, and there were speakers going on. I don't remember being necessarily invited to it. I don't know whether they invited all of us to it. I kind of think they didn't. I think they just were having this rally against it.

We had had a draft system that worked to the disadvantage of the poor and minorities, and that had been highlighted as really a civil rights issue, and the country changed and went to random selection so that everybody would serve.

EDWARD KENNEDY

So I thought I ought to go over there, but I thought I ought to go by myself. I didn't want it to look like I was coming over there with a group—that would be a different feel for it. So I just walked across the mall there, towards the crowd, and as I got closer I heard them say, “There he is, there he is, there he is.” Then they started yelling insults, and they had their own security. They kind of opened it up, a way for me to get on the podium. I think it was a fellow named [John] Kerrigan, who told me, “What do you want to do, speak? You're not going to speak. You've taken away our rights, we're going to take away your rights, how do you like that?” Then they sang *God Bless America* and all turned their backs to me. Then they turned around and they had some more insults. . . I went over towards the mike, and they put their hands on the mike and wouldn't let me talk. Then they all turned their backs and sang another song. So I had a feeling that this isn't going to work, this thing isn't going to work.

After that they were still yelling insults, and the people on the stand started yelling insults and being nasty and saying, “Why are you being nice to him?” “Well, we're not going to let him talk. You shouldn't.” It was an increasing rise of hostility, so I thought it was better just to—there was nothing more I could do confrontationally. I mean, there wasn't any ability to confront them because they weren't going to let me talk. So I started down. There was another stairs on the other side, and I started down. They opened it up a little bit but not too much. They opened it up and then they raged insults to me and my family and blacks and all kinds of things. “One-legged son, send him to Roxbury” and stuff like that. It was just a very nasty day. Then I can remember there were some things being thrown, and then there was some pushing and shoving. . .

YOUNG: Were they coming at you?

KENNEDY: Yes, following me. I mean coming around and going to the sides, but not in front of me. They didn't get in front of me. I saw the doors of the JFK Building, and then I stopped a couple of times but each time I stopped, they kept getting closer and closer, and finally there was about 30 yards to go. That's when I went towards the doors and they opened those doors and then boom, they threw rocks and everything, crashed through those windows. I went in and they didn't get in the building. . .

YOUNG: That must have shaken you terribly.

KENNEDY: Well, that was a really nasty crowd.

YOUNG: Was that the first time you had ever encountered that kind of nastiness?

KENNEDY: Yes, I suppose. Yes, yes.

YOUNG: And it just erupted. There wasn't a cheerleader there.

KENNEDY: No. It all fed on itself. Then I had a situation that I always thought was more dangerous, and that was when we were in Quincy at an event out there. It was something in the mid-morning. I can't remember what the particular event was. There were several hundred people on something else, some domestic issue. At the end of it, we had heard that ROAR was out there demonstrating, and there were a few hundred of them outside. They were picketing. So I thought, Well, we still have to go outside. There was a fellow named Jack Crimmins, who used to drive for me during this time. We walked out and Jack usually stayed with the car, but he came into the back of the meeting hall and then we went back out.

They were yelling and had signs, and there were several hundred and I thought, Well, we'll get in the car. We came over to the car and all the tires were flat, and they had put dog doo under all of the handles and on the windshield, so you couldn't move the car. Now they are around, and there's very little security around there. I don't think we had any at this time and there were several hundred of them. So I start to walk, and I don't know where the hell I'm walking. I have no idea where I'm walking. I'm talking to whoever was the aide at that time saying, “Do we have a friend around here, do they have a house? There must be somebody around here who's got a house. I could just walk on in and stay in his house until we can get out of here.” They said, “Let's see, which street are we on?” They didn't know, so we walked and they all started walking behind. There was no one else in the streets, and they were taunting and yelling, and I didn't have the slightest idea of where to go. I just knew we had to get moving. I didn't know if I could see a house or didn't know where the hell I was going to go.

YOUNG: Was this a residential area?

KENNEDY: A residential area. We walked and then the crowd was beginning to build and was getting nastier. Then, out of the corner of my eye I saw the subway station. I looked at Jimmy King, who was with me then, and I said, “Jimmy, we've got to get in there.” But of course I thought, My God, I'll be in the subway and I'll be waiting seven minutes for the subway to come. I knew if I walked and indicated it, they'd all go over and block it. So I had to walk in sort of a different



Senator Kennedy attends the signing of the Martin Luther King, Jr., Day legislation.



Senator Kennedy working to promote the Civil Rights Act of 1984.



Senator Kennedy attends a hearing in 1984 to discuss his fact-finding trip to Ethiopia and Sudan on humanitarian and refugee issues.



President Ronald Reagan signs fair housing legislation in 1988, which Senator Kennedy had strongly supported.

direction but fairly close to it, and then they kept going and Jimmy King went on over to the door, and when I got about 50 yards I turned and they said, “He’s headed to the subway station!” So then I ran into the subway and they all ran after me. I got in the door and Jimmy King kept that door shut. They were all trying to come through the one door, the only door that they could get in. I get downstairs, and he held that door closed. The subway came and I got in it, and they’ve got rocks and everything, hitting the subway cars all the way back into Boston—

Kennedy’s Broad Definition of Civil Rights

KENNEDY: The Education Title was really the Civil Rights Bill; that was the civil rights for the South, education was. Alabama Congressman Carl Elliott, who won the first JFK Profiles in Courage Award—and he won it for fighting for federally financed, non-discriminatory education in the late ’50s and getting defeated by a segregationist, because they didn’t want to educate blacks—he always said that education was *the* civil right, and that was going to be the real hope for the South...

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KENNEDY: Now comes this whole instrument of change in the education issue and *Brown v. Board of Education*, the issues of desegregation and isolation, and how they were going to be dealt with

in terms of trying to recognize that we were no longer going to be separate and equal. We were going to be one country with one history and one destiny, trying to move beyond the bounds of discrimination, and trying to knock down the walls of discrimination on race. Then of course in ’65 we began to knock down the walls of discrimination on immigration by eliminating the national origin quota system and the Asian Pacific Triangle, which were remnants of the “yellow peril” from the early 1900s. And we began to knock down discrimination on women’s rights and also on the disabled and the handicapped, or the children initially. Those forces were beginning to take place. So the forces of change were coming, but the most obvious and dramatic was on the issues of schools and race...

KENNEDY: I think one of the real dilemmas I felt during this whole period of time is on the one hand, the leadership that had been provided by my brothers in the whole area of civil rights, and the involvement of my brother Jack and obviously Bobby [Kennedy]. The principal reasons of his [Bobby’s] candidacy were the poverty issue and the war, there were always those two. So much of his life had been the deterioration of the quality of life in the inner cities, particularly among poor blacks and poor whites. People had commented during his candidacy that he’s the candidate who could bring poor whites and poor blacks together in a rather unique and special way, which I think was very true, and that had always been impressive.



President George H.W. Bush signs the Americans with Disabilities Act on July 26th, 1990.



Senator Kennedy attends a White House ceremony with President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton celebrating the 35th anniversary of the Equal Pay Act in 1998.



Senator Kennedy meeting with the Dalai Lama in April 1991.



Senator Kennedy meets with U.S. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in 1997. Holder later serves as U.S. Attorney General under President Barack Obama.

My service had been on the focus of opportunity for people in the areas of education, health, jobs, housing. Those issues, and knocking down the walls of discrimination—I spent a lot of time on that issue in the Senate, and I think the overarching issue for our country and society is how we are going to deal with the forms of bigotry and discrimination. I think we were and are the revolutionary society. No country, no culture, no history has ever made the progress that we’ve made on race and religion, on ethnicity, on women, on disability, and also now I think in terms of gay rights....

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Knocking down the walls of discrimination—I spent a lot of time on that issue in the Senate, and I think the overarching issue for our country and society is how we are going to deal with the forms of bigotry and discrimination.

EDWARD KENNEDY

KENNEDY: There are no political forces that are alive in our country that want to go back, but I always call this the march of progress, which is this period of time in American history. There’s no politician saying let’s go back. They’ll come along the edges about courts and let’s have strict constructionists, and they will try and limit the possibilities of voting, and then they’ll play up emotions and tensions in terms of race.... But there is no political process to try and reverse these major elements of progress that we’ve made in our country and society....

Women’s Rights

KENNEDY: We also had an opportunity to knock down the walls of discrimination against women. This was an evolving process.... This whole movement in the country of knocking down the walls of discrimination really started over extensions of the 14th Amendment and the existing constitutional provisions that had been passed as a result of the Civil War and how they applied to women. That took a period of time in the early- and mid-’70s, before there was a recognition that the Court interpretation—even though the courts were interpreting some of these other areas dealing with civil rights positively, even though they were beginning to turn about this time—wasn’t going to finally do what was going to be necessary to

free women to have full equality and recognize that there were Founding Mothers as well as Founding Fathers.

That was really the origin of the Equal Rights Amendment, which I welcomed the opportunity to sponsor and support. That effort continued for some time. But as that constitutional amendment was moving through—and it was going to face major dissension—there was also continued movement in our committee on what we called Title IX, which was developed as an extension of the Civil Rights Act.

Title VII knocked down walls of discrimination on employment. Title IX was to knock down the walls of discrimination against women in sports and also at universities, and that's its great significance today. There's no question it had a dramatic impact in terms of full equality for women in sports....

Gay Rights

KENNEDY: [In the 1970s], my colleague Paul Tsongas introduced the first legislation to knock down walls of discrimination on the basis of employment for gays, and I was one of five co-sponsors of that attempt. It never got a hearing, never moved at all, but it was a place-marker in the movement. I would say, from my own personal evolution in terms of the full understanding of both of these areas, that the '80 campaign was where we first had strong, strong support from the gay and lesbian community and strong support from the women's community. They were very much involved in the campaigns in California and New York and otherwise. At the end of those campaigns, I was very much in their corner in terms of being a spokesperson and leader in the Senate, working with others to try to continue to make progress in these areas.

YOUNG: Was that campaign a defining moment for you?

KENNEDY: I think it was.

Marriage Equality

KENNEDY: This issue is completely generational in terms of the politics, not the morality. You will find in Massachusetts and some other states, people over 40 strongly condemn this while people under 40 couldn't care less. That's not true about the death penalty, that's not true about most other issues. It's all across the borders with different age groups, different communities, different educational experiences, all that. Not on gay marriage; it's absolutely generational. I'm aware of this now, but I wasn't aware of this when we got involved in it.



*Hate crimes are a form of domestic terrorism.
We're fighting terrorism abroad, and this is
terrorism here at home.*

EDWARD KENNEDY

Hate Crimes

KENNEDY: We had seen hate crimes in this country, initially, obviously, against blacks, the lynching hate crimes. Those spread to Jews and to gays and now, in our time, Arabs since 9-11. The Matthew Shepard case is the outstanding example in this generation. We worked on this with Gordon Smith, a Republican from Oregon, and we plan to offer it when we get back on the Defense Authorization Bill. Interestingly, when I first thought about whether we ought to offer the Defense Authorization Bill, there were those on the Armed Services Committee who said no, we shouldn't have it. That has nothing to do with defense authorization.


And I pointed out, this is a value system. Our people are fighting overseas for American values, and this is a form of terrorism. Hate crimes are a form of domestic terrorism. We're fighting terrorism abroad, and this is terrorism here at home. We're fighting for American values and to free our society from hatred in all of its forms, and it should be on there. There are arguments to be made against it, but I think that's a powerful argument in favor of it.

YOUNG: When did hate crimes become an important issue in your mind?

KENNEDY: In the '80s. We had hate crime legislation, but we had a number of instances of hate crimes that had taken place against blacks and gays. We even had some against women in one of the national parks.... The question was whether you were going to fight hate crimes with one arm tied behind your back or with the full power of the federal government in terms of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]. The argument on the other side is, isn't any murder a hate crime? And if



Senator Kennedy meets with Nelson Mandela in 1993.



Reverend Desmond Tutu at his oral history interview with the Miller Center in 2006.

that's true, aren't we federalizing all of this? So it had to be clarified, and we had procedures whereby local authorities would consult with the Justice Department. We wouldn't give them a complete blank check, but we had ways of proceeding.

The Fight Against AIDS

KENNEDY: A very important public policy related again to the whole discrimination against gays was the issue of AIDS [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome], and how that was going to be handled.

My first real association with this and understanding of it, other than in a general way, was thanks to Mathilde Krim.... Mathilde Krim was a foreigner by birth and just a brilliant, intelligent, caring person.... She got started very early in terms of the AIDS issue and asked me to come up to New York so she could give me a briefing, which I did, and which was enormously informative. She was incredibly helpful.

That was in 1983, just after the virus had been identified. She wanted our Health Committee [Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions] to do a good deal on this issue. I told her that we had a full health agenda, and I didn't have personnel who understood the issue or had the time and all the rest. She said she would provide the personnel. She provided a fellow named Terry Beirn, who eventually died from

AIDS, and Mike Iskowitz, who's still around. She said she would pay them, and if I found that they were valuable and this was the issue, I ought to pick it up, but she would start it off. They were two superstars. They made an extraordinary contribution in terms of my understanding and in terms of the nation's focus on AIDS.

South Africa and Apartheid

KENNEDY: We met these incredible miners and looked into the mines where they worked, just horrific conditions. Soweto was a positively devastating kind of life for these people: the separations of the family, separations of the women from the men. It was really barbaric.

The question came up then about the sanctions, and virtually every one of them said, "We have suffered so long, go ahead and put the sanctions on. We don't mind suffering so our children won't." Every one of them said that—the miners, the leaders of the miners, all the people who were going to be hurt most by it. All the government officials said, "You don't want it. The sanctions won't bother us; they will bother the people you're trying to represent, the miners."

The Republicans and the Civil Rights Movement

KENNEDY: Reagan seized these value systems of family, country, and patriotism in a very clever way. He had a very sunny disposition, but at the same time he was assaulting and attacking the progress the country was making on civil rights....

YOUNG: Are you saying that this was a conscious racism, or he was just capitalizing on a mood of racism in the country, without calling it by that name?...

KENNEDY: I think there were men and women of good will who thought we were moving too fast and we shouldn't be doing this, but there was no question, in the mid-'70s, we had these series of anti-race amendments. They were tied primarily to busing, but they were anti-race amendments: cutting off help and assistance to education, to schools, President Reagan's appeal in 1981 to Bob Jones University.... You start going to Bob Jones and saying they can have tax deductions for schools that encourage that kind of activity [racism]—let alone, as we'll see as time goes on, the vetoing of civil rights reform bills and anti-apartheid bills and others. I don't think there was any question in any of our minds that the battle on race was going to be enormously difficult. It continues to be one of enormous difficulty, and it's very easy to exploit that...

We had important Supreme Court decisions being made then. In 1984 the *Grove City* case, which was really the architecture of the Reagan Justice Department, said that American taxpayer funds could be used at a university, in different departments of the university, as long as the financial office of that university did not practice discrimination. That meant there could be discrimination in the dormitories, there could be discrimination among the faculty, there could be discrimination in sports, there could be discrimination in other aspects of the life of the college and university. That was decided by the Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision, which is absolutely extraordinary because one of the underlying tenets of the Civil Rights Acts of '64, '65, '68, and others, was that we would not permit taxpayer money to be used in any way to support segregation, in whatever the form or shape that it would be. This was in complete conflict with that decision....

To the extent that there's any vibration of the Reagan legacy, patriotism now is torture and wiretapping and Guantánamo. If you're not for that, you're not patriotic, you're not for the war. I think religion has been used to argue that the poor are basically bad and lazy. The poor are lazy. If people are poor, they have themselves to blame. It's not any other circumstance; it's because they're lazy.

I think on religion, if you're poor, you're basically bad, and you get this whole attempt to legislate religious truth, and resorting to religion for political purposes, as in the case of a woman's right to choose. There's a religious dictate on that or a religious dictate on gay issues. There's a religious teaching on it, and so we return to religion and family.

They've turned family values on their head. The total number of children living in poverty has increased by two million because of cutbacks in the food programs for children, the resistance to paid leave, paid sick leave. They're against all this—the mentally ill. You know, we emptied them from the institutions, but we've never created community programs to try to help them. There's very little sense of the religious teaching of [St.] Matthew about feeding the hungry and giving a cup to the thirsty, or clothing the naked and welcoming the stranger and visiting the poor or the imprisoned....

KENNEDY: A point just made a few moments ago was the strategy of Republicans to work the Supreme Court in a way to override the march of progress, particularly in the areas of race, but in other areas as well. When you look at people on the Court at the present time, you realize how entwined they have been over a period of years with the Republican strategy. [Samuel] Alito had been an assistant U.S. Attorney



from '77 to '81, an assistant to the Solicitor General, and assistant AG [Attorney General]. He had been on the Third Circuit. That's a 10-year period during the Reagan administration.

Scalia had been in the OLC [Office of Legal Counsel] for a number of years before being on the D.C. Circuit, and [John] Roberts clerked for [William] Rehnquist. He had been an assistant AG in the Justice Department in '81, when he worked on the Voting Rights Act. He was White House counsel from '82 to '86, the Reagan period, deputy solicitor from '89 to '93, and then on the D.C. Court in 2003 before the Supreme Court in 2005. Justice [Clarence] Thomas was in the EEOC from '82 to '90, when they did very little....

KENNEDY: The courts themselves have been so programmed that politics has emerged as the dominant force, rather than the true meaning of the Constitution, and that is something that this country is going to have to deal with.

There's very little sense of the religious teaching of [St.] Matthew about feeding the hungry and giving a cup to the thirsty, or clothing the naked and welcoming the stranger and visiting the poor or the imprisoned....

President George W. Bush signs No Child Left Behind into law in 2001. Senator Kennedy had worked closely with the Bush White House to pass the bill.

Senator Kennedy and Orrin Hatch before passage of the Ryan White CARE Act in 1990.





Vietnam and Prag: Escaping Quagmires

Like many Americans, Senator Edward Kennedy initially did not oppose the war in Vietnam. Instead, he supported President Kennedy's policies to increase the flow of aid and military advisors to the region. Following his brother's lead, and the consensus among both Democrats and Republicans during the Cold War, the Senator believed it was necessary to take a strong stand against communism's spread. He continued to support such policies when Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency upon JFK's assassination. Senator Kennedy agreed with the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution, which escalated America's role in the conflict. (Recovering from his near fatal plane crash that summer, however, he was not present to cast a Senate vote on the measure.)

Returning to Capitol Hill in early 1965, he began to focus on refugee issues, arguing that neither the U.S. nor Vietnamese governments had a plan to assist the many people displaced by the war. As chairman of the subcommittee on refugees, Kennedy participated in an inspection tour of Vietnam organized by the U.S. military in 1965, where he received encouraging reports on refugee issues.

The Senator's views began to shift, however, after a meeting with French journalist and historian Bernard Fall. Kennedy learned that the U.S. military had misled him during his refugee tour. In 1966, Senator Kennedy wrote his first critical statement on Vietnam, marking the beginning of his transition from hawk to dove. One of Kennedy's main concerns regarding Vietnam addressed the war's impact on the American people. Kennedy

Senator Kennedy appears with members of the U.S. armed forces in 1996.

Kennedy's opposition to the war increased after he organized his own inspection tour in January 1968, where he witnessed rampant corruption within the South Vietnamese government.

knew first-hand the painful costs of war, having lost his oldest brother, Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., in World War II. He was particularly troubled by the unfairness of the draft system, which drew disproportionately from the poor and the African-American community. In addition to refugee issues, Kennedy began to fight for draft reform and, later, to lower the voting age so that those subject to the draft at age 18 could also vote on the very policies affecting their lives.

Kennedy's opposition to the war increased after he organized his own inspection tour in January 1968, where he witnessed rampant corruption within the South Vietnamese government. He grew increasingly disillusioned with President Johnson's reports on the war and questioned their accuracy. As Senator Robert Kennedy was moving closer to challenging President Johnson for the 1968 Democratic presidential nomination, Edward Kennedy was becoming a national leader in the anti-war movement. After Bobby's death, in June 1968, Teddy continued calling on Johnson and, subsequently, the Nixon Administration to stop the bombing campaign and to re-focus the peace talks on U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.

The lessons Kennedy learned from Vietnam informed his views on the use of force in Iraq nearly four decades later. He kept an open mind, however, listening carefully to witnesses before the Armed Services Committee. High-ranking military leaders opposed the rush to war in Iraq, and Senator Kennedy found them particularly persuasive. Drawing from the writings of Saint Augustine and Saint

Thomas Aquinas, Kennedy believed that certain criteria must be met before he could support going to war. While in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the Senator asserted that the U.S. was justified in striking its perpetrators, Al Qaeda, and their patrons, the Taliban, in Afghanistan, he did not believe the criteria for a just war had been met in Iraq. The Bush 43 Administration's rationales for removing Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, by force remained unconvincing to Kennedy. He fought against the 2002 authorization of the use of force in Iraq, as he had in 1991's Gulf War, to expel Saddam from Kuwait. Once more, Senator Edward Kennedy became the national leader of an anti-war movement.

Unable to prevent the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kennedy turned his attention to ending the war. Calling Iraq "Bush's Vietnam," the Senator fought to pass a timetable for the drawdown of U.S. combat forces. Kennedy also called for the Bush Administration to keep Congress fully informed and to adopt specific criteria for measuring progress in the war. At the same time, Senator Kennedy fought for funding to help keep the troops in Iraq better protected. In 2005 Kennedy worked with the Hart family, who had lost their son in the war, to pass funding for "up-armored" troop vehicles to defend service personnel from deadly improvised explosive devices placed along roadways.

Edward Kennedy's principled opposition to the wars in Vietnam and Iraq not only shaped U.S. foreign policy, but also defined his legacy, both as a Senator and as a national leader.



EMK's Transition from Hawk to Dove

KENNEDY: I think, Jim [Young], in understanding my transition in Vietnam, from a hawk to a dove—and I've thought a good deal about it—I think I have to really go back to my life's experience, from the time I was in college and absorbing and learning primarily from my older brother Jack, about foreign policy. He believed very strongly that at the end of the Second World War, the great challenge in foreign policy was going to be the test between democracy and communism, and he saw the role of these emerging colonies as playing a very important place.

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KENNEDY: My brother, after the 1960 campaign, urged that I go to Africa to find out what was happening there, and I spent five and a half weeks there.... We went to Rhodesia and Belgian Congo and Kinshasa, and then through the countries in West Africa: Togo, Ghana, French Guinea, and we met the various leaders there.... So you saw these forces that were coming out and being enormously successful in knocking down these colonial powers.

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KENNEDY: ...I had a basic presumption in favor of decisions that my brother made, and I think that certainly was reinforced after—I mean, I have enormous confidence in him, a great belief in him, and I was exposed to enough of the general kinds of discussions that take place, and they'd take place frequently down here on Cape Cod on the weekend.... So I came to it as someone who was aware of the Cold War implications.... The idea of the domino theory was something that appeared to make a good deal of sense, particularly having seen what happened in Eastern Europe.

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KENNEDY: There was a strong presumption that my brother had it right in Vietnam. Although I was aware that towards the midsummer of '63 he had some qualms, and he had made statements about the Vietnamese fighting the Vietnamese.

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KENNEDY: The first time I really became wary of Vietnam was after returning from my trip [to Vietnam with the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1965].... We got invited over by Bernard Fall, who was the French writer who had written about the fall of France as a colonial power in Asia, and was an expert on Vietnam.... What Bernard Fall did is take the places that we had gone in Vietnam and then said, "Now, who did you get briefed by?" "Well, we got briefed by the State Department and the land reclamation people and the economic development people, and they said there's more rice being produced here than ever."... And Fall just, just using American documents, based on what these people had told us about these particular—all of which we would write down, about what the rice was in these places and all of the land settlement in these areas—raised the serious issues and questions about honesty, truthfulness, candidness in the war.

We all know that the first casualty of war is truth, and this was the time where at least for me, it fit into the internal anxiety that I had, the feeling that I had, going back to these other life experiences, where I began to see similar kinds of uprisings that were coming from other places. It began to seem different—rather than the neat aspects of

Cold War, East/West that we started with, and I think that was the beginning of my transition, which took place almost immediately afterwards. It started being expressed in different ways over a longer period of time.

EMK's Personal Interest in Vietnam

KENNEDY: I'd probably say I entered this tangentially, rather than should we be there or shouldn't we be there, should we withdraw or should we cut off the bombing. I got into all of that but by nature and disposition, and responsibility in the Senate, I started off with the people issues, the humanitarian issues, and the issues of justice that surrounded the war.

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KENNEDY: I spent a good deal of my time and effort with regard to refugees and the humanitarian aspects of the war. Most of my speeches were about what was happening to the people, and the failure to take care of the refugees, the creation of the war refugees and the free-fire zones, the bombings of villages where people had no idea they were going to be bombed.

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KENNEDY: [During the mid-1960s], we [Senate Judiciary Committee] had been working on issues on discrimination, but we had also been working on issues of immigration, some on refugees, and I was appointed as the Chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. That committee had been interested in immigration law, but it also had been interested in refugees, primarily refugees from communism. It had been active at the time of '56, the Hungarian uprising, making recommendations primarily, and it looked out for immigrants who were leaving Eastern Europe, and was focused at other times on that. So it had been involved in refugees.

I was interested in immigration and I was interested in the plight of refugees. We went to Vietnam in...October of 1965.... We started off with briefings on refugees. What became so immediately apparent to

I spent a good deal of my time and effort with regard to refugees and the humanitarian aspects of the war.

EDWARD KENNEDY



Senator Kennedy visits Bahrain while traveling in the Middle East.

me is this incredible gulf between what was happening over there from governmental action and the military action, and what was happening to the people, primarily refugees but basically people generally, what was happening to the civilian population.... It was the movement of people as a result of the creation of these free-fire zones, and this incredible bombing that had not taken place yet, but these free-fire zones were taking place, and free fire meant that American artillery could shoot into the jungle, as long as they cleared it with local officials. What happened was most of those local officials would be sitting and drinking tea someplace or in a bar, and write the thing off and boom, boom, boom, and we were firing this artillery in these jungles and into the countryside and destroying villages.

KENNEDY: I was [also] interested in trying to make sure that we were going to have a fairer system for those who were going to go over there [to fight].... I remember walking into Bobby's [Kennedy] house, probably '65, '66, and he mentioned the draft and who was fighting the war. It was all the poor and the blacks.... He said, "I can't take that on." I had an interest in that, so I started offering these amendments, which we were getting beaten on. But we had very good debates on them.... We spent a lot of time on that. It was reflective and indicative

of, one, the injustice about the war, but also what was happening to our people, and who was paying the price. It was people from the inner cities, the poor.

RFK, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election

KENNEDY: I think history—and reality—would show that through '67, with the increase in losses and the increased futility of a military solution, there were increasing questions about how we were going to change the policy. Even with the [Senator J. William] Fulbright hearings, it didn't appear that there were going to be the votes in the Congress to change it. The only place it was going to be changed was the executive branch. It was about this time, '67 or so, that there were a series of polls taken by different national organizations that showed Bobby in a strong position, even ahead of LBJ for the Democratic nomination, which is very heady stuff.

KENNEDY: I'm convinced that if [Eugene] McCarthy had begun to talk about the cities and what was happening, then Bobby still wouldn't have run. He would not have run. But McCarthy had no interest whatsoever—by nature, disposition, he had none, and demonstrated none. For the war, yes, but that was pretty [much it]. You look back historically, his interest in the war came pretty late, too.

The Lessons of Vietnam

KENNEDY: I think one of the big lessons... is, what is the role of the larger power? I mean, shouldn't we have recognized a lesson [about] the use of military power...? What is its value? How does it fit in strategically? How does it protect America, versus America's security interests?

KENNEDY: One has to be cautioned about the ability of the United States to resolve political conflicts with military solutions. I think there was a healthy kind of skepticism about that [after the Vietnam War]. But there was also a recognition that the United States had to be prepared to involve itself in areas where we had strong interests. We were slow in responding to Bosnia, though the Dayton Accords were a success. We didn't get into Rwanda, despite the killings that took place there. I think history will have to judge our unwillingness to do that. We were slow getting involved in Kosovo, which eventually, with American leadership, turned out in a satisfactory way.



We clearly have an interest in being involved abroad, but the emphasis should always lie in diplomacy first—the economic, social, political initiatives that can be made—and in a military approach last.

The Iraq War

KENNEDY: To understand my view about the Iraq conflict and my hesitancy about the involvement of the United States, I think it's only fair to look at both the immediate and the historic background. Both are very important. The immediate background is the fact that it was Al Qaeda and the Taliban that attacked us on 9/11. They were the adversaries, and Iraq was a diversion that echoed and resonated with the American people as we were coming into the administration's rush to war with Iraq.

We have to understand that going to war is the most important decision a legislator makes. Clearly it is for a President, but certainly the votes we cast to bring a country to conflict, into war are the most important. I think even with this Iraq situation, it's important that we look at some of the experiences of the immediate and the historic past.

The past experience for me was not just Afghanistan, which I'll come to, but if you look back further, it was the Vietnam War and the great

conflicts we faced in World War II—when everyone signed up and was aboard. We had been attacked, just like we were on 9/11. The other series of conflicts we've gotten into sprang from the tension we had with the Soviet Union in the post-World War II period—the anti-communist period, the surge by the communists to expand their influence, and the tensions that brought.

KENNEDY: I can remember talking with friends in Boston about the increasing likelihood that it was going to take place, and I was honest about it, but I indicated that I was going to wait until we had some hearings. We had an incredibly important and powerful hearing in the Armed Services Committee on September 23 [2002]. We had General [John] Shalikashvili, [General] Wes Clark, General

Senator Kennedy attends a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower in 2003.

Senators Kennedy and Richard Lugar (R-IN) work to create programs to help strengthen understanding between America and the Islamic world.

We have to understand that going to war is the most important decision a legislator makes.

EDWARD KENNEDY



Senator Kennedy greets Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before attending a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2005.

Senator Robert Byrd (p-ww) at his oral history interview with the Miller Center in 2006.



[Joseph P.] Hoar of the Marines, General [William] Nash, who was a commander in Bosnia, and General [Thomas] McInerney.

A number of those had retired, but all are very distinguished military officers on a panel addressing the challenges of going to war in Iraq. They were virtually unanimous in cautioning against going to war with Iraq, and particularly going to war without the international community. General Hoar is from Massachusetts. He said that if we did go to war with Iraq, it would end up being an urban war. He pointed out that all the advantages the United States has in terms of technology, firepower and all the rest, would be lost because it would end up in a street fight, which would be just soldier versus soldier, and it would look like the last 15 minutes of *Saving Private Ryan*.

KENNEDY: In any event, historically, I think Senator [Robert] Byrd deserves an enormous amount of credit. He was very eloquent through all of this, and right on the button about who brings a country to war. The nation has to be brought to war. It has to be a shared power, a shared responsibility. This was a unilateral action, and it was going to be a great mistake. Of course he was absolutely right on all points. It was a lonely position during that time. Those who took a different position were roundly criticized and condemned readily and repeatedly.

YOUNG: For what?

KENNEDY: For having a different position, for saying that the attack of 9/11 was by Osama bin Laden—not Saddam Hussein—and we ought to keep our eye on battling him. We ought to keep our eye on battling Al Qaeda. They were the threat to the United States. They were the ones who had attacked us. We were involved in diverting the resources from the battle against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It had been demonstrated most basically and fundamentally that Iraq did not present a clear and present danger, an imminent threat to the United States. Nowhere could they [the Bush 43 administration] demonstrate that Iraq was an imminent threat to the United States or to our national security—and this is ultimately the criterion that has to be used in deciding to use force to protect the United States. They failed to meet that criterion and that measurement. They took their eye off the ball in terms of who the perpetrators were on 9/11, and with this action, we saw the collapse of the support of the international community for the United States' position in fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

This crowd, these neocons, had a policy and a zealotry about Iraq and Saddam Hussein and have basically undermined and destroyed,



temporarily, America's standing in the world. They've pursued the war with an ideological commitment, incompetence, misrepresentation and distortion, rosy pictures, and open-endedness. They've failed to give the servicemen proper equipment and the support they need. In the meantime, look at what the lessons have been.

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KENNEDY: This whole government secrecy is a monumental shift in terms of executive leadership. It's basically saying that he, as chief executive, has all power on war-related subject matter and that he will exercise it any way he wants to. It's an extraordinary byproduct of this whole period and something that's so inconsistent with the Constitution, the Founding Fathers' view about the shared power. That's very evident in the Founding Fathers' writing about war-making powers: the Commander in Chief is on the one side, and the ability to declare war is on the other, with Congress. They obviously wanted that as a shared power.

But this executive [George W. Bush] has usurped all power dealing with the war to itself. We've gone through ... the War Powers Act that came after the Vietnam War. What the country understood at that time, Republicans and Democrats, was that going to war is a shared responsibility. We're back to what we talked about at the

opening: nothing is more important for a member of Congress to do than to cast a vote about war and peace.

We saw how the President ran off with that authority in the Vietnam War, and we needed the War Powers Act to try to reclaim it and have it a shared responsibility. We have not learned from history. We have the same experience now [2007]—we have the wars both in Iraq and Afghanistan. This President has usurped power for himself and to his administration—and he has a Supreme Court that's dangerously close to just rubber-stamping it.

U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Mullen meets with Senator Kennedy before testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2008.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2008 on the future of Iraq.

We've gone through...the War Powers Act that came after the Vietnam War. What the country understood at that time, Republicans and Democrats, was that going to war is a shared responsibility.

EDWARD KENNEDY





Advise and Consent: Shaping the U.S. Supreme Court

President Bill Clinton nominates Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993.

Senator Edward Kennedy's direct impact on public policy is usually measured by his crafting of legislation and a tallying of his yea and nay votes over his long Senate career. Yet his indirect influence on American law was also shaped by his participation in the Senate's constitutional role to advise and consent on the President's judicial nominations. Most notably in facilitating or blocking U.S. Supreme Court nominees, Senator Kennedy helped to mold the high tribunal and its decisions for decades.

Kennedy missed by only several months the opportunity to vote on his brother Jack's two Supreme Court nominees: Byron White and Arthur Goldberg. In Kennedy's forty-six-year Senate career, he cast votes on twenty nominations¹ to the nation's highest court. His first major contribution to a nominee's defeat occurred in 1969 after Richard Nixon named U.S. appeals court judge Clement Haynsworth for the Supreme Court seat vacated by Justice Abe Fortas. Conservatives had blocked LBJ's promotion of his friend Fortas to the Chief Justiceship. Subsequently, Fortas resigned amidst controversy over his ties to an indicted financier. As a University of Virginia law student a decade earlier, Ted Kennedy had won the moot court championship, with his teammate and fellow future Senator, John Tunney, in a competition judged by Haynsworth. Although Senator Kennedy maintained "some respect" for the Harvard-trained jurist, he joined forces with labor and civil rights activists who opposed the southern judge's record. The confirmation vote failed 55–45.

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Senator Kennedy proclaimed, “The framers of the Constitution envisioned a major role for the Senate in the appointment of judges. It is historical nonsense to suggest that all the Senate has to do is check the nominee’s IQ, make sure he has a law degree and no arrests, and rubber-stamp the president’s choice.”

About G. Harrold Carswell, Nixon’s next nominee, Kennedy had no doubts. He was patently unqualified, by virtue of his lackluster résumé and controversial opinions, to sit on the nation’s highest court. White supremacist statements made as a state candidate in 1948 doomed Carswell’s nomination.

President Nixon abandoned his effort to place a southerner on the Court and, instead, named federal appellate judge Harry Blackmun of Minnesota. “Old #3” Blackmun would call himself, after his unanimous confirmation vote placed him on the Supreme Court in the wake of two failed nominations. He would become one of the Court’s liberal votes, including in *Roe v. Wade*, whose majority opinion allowing abortion he authored.

Senator Kennedy opposed Nixon’s final nomination to an associate’s seat, William Rehnquist. Though having been a top student at Stanford Law School and a clerk to Justice Robert Jackson, Rehnquist had no judicial experience and was serving in the Nixon Justice Department. The ACLU condemned his law-and-order conservatism, but Rehnquist’s confirmation succeeded.

Kennedy believed that Rehnquist, labeled the “Lone Ranger” by his clerks for his frequent solo dissents supporting conservative causes,

should not be promoted to the Court’s center chair 15 years later by President Ronald Reagan. In the Judiciary Committee hearings, Senator Kennedy proclaimed, “The framers of the Constitution envisioned a major role for the Senate in the appointment of judges. It is historical nonsense to suggest that all the Senate has to do is check the nominee’s IQ, make sure he has a law degree and no arrests, and rubber-stamp the president’s choice.”

Kennedy zeroed in on two pieces of evidence from Rehnquist’s past that raised the specter of racial bias: his alleged harassment of black voters in Arizona in the 1950s and ’60s and his authorship of a memo supporting “separate but equal” public schools, when the Court was considering *Brown v. Board of Education*, during his clerkship with Justice Jackson. Rehnquist survived to become Chief Justice of the United States, but the 33 Senate votes cast against him were the most ever recorded for a successful nominee to the Court’s center chair. Senator Kennedy famously opposed Reagan’s third nomination, which came in 1987, to fill the crucial seat, held by the retiring justice, Lewis Powell. A moderate, Powell cast the deciding votes, sometimes on the liberal side, sometimes with the conservatives, in a host of civil rights and liberties decisions that mattered most to Kennedy. When Reagan announced the nominee to succeed Powell, conservative federal appellate court judge Robert Bork, the Massachusetts Senator immediately denounced him on the Senate floor. Recalling that Bork, as Solicitor General, had executed Nixon’s order to fire Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, Senator Kennedy sought to preempt Bork’s supporters, who saw the intellectually gifted jurist as the perfect conservative antidote for Powell’s liberal votes.

Senator Kennedy described “Bork’s America” as one where “women would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens’ doors in midnight raids, school children could not be taught about evolution, writers and artists could be censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for whom the judiciary is—and is often the only—protector of the individual rights that are at the heart of our democracy.”

But Bork was his own worst enemy. His lengthy trail of conservative scholarly publications, recorded lectures, and judicial opinions, along with his Senate testimony that bolstered this record, sealed his defeat in the full Senate by a vote of 42 yeas to 58 nays. Ultimately, Anthony

Kennedy (no relation to the Senator) filled the Powell seat and became another curial voter. In all of the cases in which Justice Kennedy has voted with his liberal colleagues, it is more than likely that Bork would have been on the opposite side. Senator Kennedy had the clearest judicial impact on American law through his namesake's votes in civil rights and liberties case.

Senator Kennedy opposed both Bush 41 Supreme Court appointees, but it was the second, Clarence Thomas, that sparked the more hotly contested confirmation battle on Capitol Hill. Believing that Thomas was simply unqualified to assume Justice Thurgood Marshall's historic place on the nation's highest court, and pondering Thomas's conservative ideology, the Senator found this nomination an easy call. As a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he voted against Thomas. The committee's verdict was evenly split, sending Thomas's nomination to the full Senate without recommendation. Before the upper house could vote, however, Anita Hill's accusation of Thomas's alleged sexual harassment of her when he headed the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights a decade earlier became public. Back to the committee went Thomas for another round of hearings on Hill's claim. No irrefutable evidence emerged to prove either Thomas's innocence or guilt. By the narrow margin of four votes (52–48), he emerged victorious to take his seat on the Supreme Court.

In 1993 Kennedy was delighted to vote for gender equity pioneer Ruth Bader Ginsburg, President Bill Clinton's first Supreme Court nominee. She joined Reagan appointee Sandra Day O'Connor as only the second female Justice to serve in the Court's history. Kennedy was doubly proud to see his protégé and former Judiciary Committee staffer, Stephen Breyer, ascend to the high Court one year later.

President George W. Bush's two nominees, John Roberts to Chief Justice in 2005 and Samuel Alito as an Associate Justice in 2006, forced the Senator back into opposition. Although Roberts had an unassailable reputation as a leading legal mind of his Baby Boom generation, complete with Harvard undergraduate and law degrees, and a clerkship for Associate Justice Rehnquist, Senator Kennedy questioned Roberts's self-proclaimed neutrality. He had worked in the Reagan administration, producing conservative memos on a variety of policy issues. Yet merit overcame ideology, placing Roberts in the chief's chair, vacated by his mentor's death in September 2005.

Alito had a 15-year tenure on the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to reflect his conservative judicial philosophy, and Senator Kennedy joined



President Richard Nixon and Edward Kennedy with the League of Women Voters, April 17, 1969.

efforts to filibuster the nomination. Visions of Bork's confirmation row returned, as Alito would replace O'Connor, a moderate conservative and swing voter. Most obviously, O'Connor nearly always voted in favor of women's rights. What would happen to such cases if Alito took her seat? Yet Kennedy and his liberal colleagues could not sustain a procedural obstacle to Alito's confirmation. The Republican-controlled Senate confirmed him by a vote of 58–42.



*I'm going to vote only for people for the Supreme Court
if they are going to make affirmative commitments
to Constitutional values.*

EDWARD KENNEDY



Senator Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor at her confirmation hearing, September 1981.

President Bill Clinton appoints Senator Kennedy's former counsel, Stephen Breyer, to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Nominee Battles

KENNEDY: ...I'm basically by nature and disposition not interested in the destruction of people. I'm interested in advancing the cause of humankind rather than being judgmental. I don't relish it. I love fighting on minimum wage or health or civil rights issues, but not in terms of the destruction of people. So in any of these battles, I never got a lot of personal satisfaction from the defeat. I suppose more so with [Robert] Bork at the time, for obvious reasons, the real threat that he posed. I never thought [Clement] Haynsworth posed the kind of threat that Bork did, or that [Clarence] Thomas was going to pose.

By the end of it, I thought [G. Harrold] Carswell was kind of a buffoon. I didn't have any respect for him at all, but you couldn't help having some respect for Haynsworth. He had been an important jurist. He certainly went back [to the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals] and had a good career. I never really relished the thought of defeating these people.



The Bork Nomination

KNOTT: Senator, you came out very quickly, right after Bork's name was announced by the White House. You were ready for this one, it seems.

KENNEDY: Yes. There generally is a fairly good idea about who the four or five possible nominees are going to be. That was true with [William] Clinton, and it was certainly true about [Ronald] Reagan as well. We had had a long association with Bork, going back, obviously, to the firing of Archie Cox at the time of the Saturday Night Massacre, which was notorious. He had been around writing very provocative articles on a wide range of different issues, antitrust and a lot of other kinds of issues and questions. He was, by far, the most ideological hard-liner of any of the people coming up.

What happens in these Supreme Court battles is people say, "Let's keep our powder dry"—both the people for and against. But all the time, "keeping the powder dry" works to the advantage of the nominee to move ahead, because they unveil a whole strategy

of support for these nominees—and they do it very quickly, before people who have reservations get a chance to do it.

I have to come back to that, how it's done now, in an immediate time cycle. Haynsworth and Carswell took time, weeks and months of hard work. Bork was a long time, and even Thomas took some time. But with these recent Supreme Court nominees, in the time we take a break while they go to the bathroom, Senators are going out and spinning. When we say we're going to take our time, it works to their advantage because the other people are so strong in favor of it. That's why it seemed to me that it was important to say whoa on this [Bork's] judgeship.

YOUNG: You got some time. You got [Joseph] Biden to postpone, or to not hold, hearings, I think, until the fall, which gave you the summer, additional time to do the groundwork for the hearings.

KENNEDY: That's true, but I spoke right away on Bork—within a half hour of when he was nominated—to hold people in their place. It was a placeholder, so they had to understand that they were going to have a battle. This thing was going to be a fight, and they were going to have accountability on it. Otherwise, the rhythm of these battles flows in favor of the nominees quite strenuously, and it makes it more and more difficult.

I think Bork was honest in his views, but he just lost. They made a decision to go very hard ideologically, and then they tried, to some extent, to mask it. I think when Meese and Reagan made the decision to reverse the courts, one of the spin-offs was that there wasn't going to be consultation and compromise. If you look back historically at the appointments made by different Presidents at different times in the country, they had that kind of exchange and interchange in the selection of nominees. The Senate was very much involved with it.

We had new Senators from the South, and most of those had won with the help of strong black constituencies. I talked to all the leaders of all the black organizations personally [about the Bork nomination]. We were very active in working with the black preachers, and the black preachers worked with churches and local communities to build grassroots organizations. We worked with editorial boards at newspapers and radio, and we worked with the political wing of the DNC [Democratic National Committee] to get to the people who were active and would be concerned about these kinds of jurists back in people's states. It was a full-court press across the board....

We prepared books for all the members of the Senate and had those books tuned to relate to the interests of the various members, looking back over the kinds of things they had talked about in the course of their careers or the things they campaigned on. We delayed the hearings for some time so people had an opportunity to read them.

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KENNEDY: Once we had made the decision in early July that it wasn't going to be over until the fall, we had an unprecedented campaign, with legal experts who examined his opinions and writings and speeches. We even had commercial television, with Gregory Peck targeting the moderate Senators. By August, we had organized 6,200 black elected officials, and, as I mentioned, I talked to [Joseph] Lowery.

They turned that summer convention into an anti-Bork organizing session. The AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations] got involved, and Bill Taylor organized a lot of professors. We had 1,900 law professors in opposition, which was 40% of all the legal academics, and then we had Bill Coleman, Barbara Jordan, and Andy Young speak about it in the beginning, when we started in September. During the course of the summer, I spent a good deal of time phoning Senators and other political people.

YOUNG: It sounds like you didn't have a vacation.

KENNEDY: Well, it was a full-court press. On Bork, we had Chesterfield Smith, who was president of the Bar Association, very highly regarded, and he testified in opposition. He was from the South, from Florida. Bob Meserve, who had been against Frank Morrissey, came down and spoke in opposition. The ABA [American Bar Association] was very powerful; they talked about his temperament and ideology. My statement in the beginning freed the country, and then we were able to mobilize the thoughtful and respected leaders in the Bar and all of these organizations to weigh in, and they made a very powerful case.

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One thing I'd say in conclusion is that Bork did crystallize the sense in the country not to go back on civil rights.

EDWARD KENNEDY

KENNEDY: Just a bit more on Bork. One thing I'd say in conclusion is that Bork did crystallize the sense in the country not to go back on civil rights. They didn't want to go back and fight the old rules on affirmative action and abortion. He did agree that there was a Constitutional right to privacy, and all Supreme Court nominees since Bork have recognized that.

Clarence Thomas's Nomination

KENNEDY: Now we can go to Thomas. With him we had a number of forces working. One was [John] Danforth himself, who had a very decent record with regard to civil rights generally, and was also, at this time, the key Republican sponsor of the Civil Rights Act, which was coming up just about the same time. That was a dynamic that sometimes has been missed. He had a strong civil rights record, being the prime sponsor of it, and with Thomas being black, there was a basic presumption in favor of Thomas, certainly at the beginning. And Bill Coleman [the first African American Supreme Court clerk and Gerald Ford's Secretary of Transportation], who was strongly against Bork, now flipped and was supporting Thomas.

John Roberts's and Samuel Alito's Nominations

KENNEDY: One point on Alito and Roberts. There's been a tremendous turnover in the Senate since we had some of these battles. If we had had people who were in the Senate and had gone through the Bork and Thomas battles, I'm not sure that Alito and Roberts would have gotten quite the free ride they got. I think members of the Senate who went through that period of time spent a lot of time thinking about the Supreme Court, and a lot of time thinking about who should serve and what their responsibilities were. We are some distance beyond it, and the Senate has changed very much. And with the very significant turnover, we don't have people in the Senate who have witnessed these kinds of battles. I'm not sure how our Founding Fathers would have thought about that. They're coming at it fresh, and coming at it fresh is not always advantageous. As a matter of fact, it's quite deceptive.

KENNEDY: My sense about Roberts is that he was an indispensable figure in Republican administrations going back to the very early '80s, when we had President Reagan and the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Restoration Act, the solicitor general bringing cases, and all the way through. He had a very cramped view, I think,

of civil rights, voting rights, and the role of the solicitor general. He was able to portray that view as being that of the administration and not really his own. And in the course of the hearings I don't think we were able to break that out at all. He just sailed right through. He's a very pleasant person. He's very smart, and he had a lot of allies here, and at Hogan & Hartson, among the Federalists, and otherwise, and he was able to go right on through.

Problems with Confirmation Process

KENNEDY: My own belief is the confirmation process has broken down, because the nominees are so coached in their answers. The nominees look at videotapes showing where the mistakes were made for other nominees in answering questions about the *Roe v. Wade* case. They go through that time and time and time again and see how the successful nominees got through answering it, and how the other nominees got themselves in trouble answering it. This is like the preparation for a Bar exam or the SATs [Scholastic Aptitude Tests]. These people are all bright, and they go on through. There are only a few of these kinds of questions that are troublesome.

KENNEDY: What we've seen, though, is from that [post-Bork] period, they've all spoken in generalities, never anything specific. They [Supreme Court nominees] say *Brown* is okay, like we saw with Roberts, but they won't get into it. *Griswold* is okay—that was on birth control—but they don't get into it. So basically, the sense you get is that the administration is looking for ideologues, but now they're looking for them without the paper trail, and they're moving on. That's the lesson you get with Bork, who had written so much, was so opinionated, was such a poor witness, and the country rejected it.

KENNEDY: I'm going to vote only for people for the Supreme Court if they are going to make affirmative commitments to Constitutional values. If they're going to leave this to be an open issue, or if there's a question about it, then I don't feel that I have a responsibility to support them. This is a life-long job, it's extremely important, and there is too much at risk.

1 Fortas, Marshall, Burger, Haynsworth, Carswell, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist (Associate Justice), Stevens, O'Connor, Rehnquist (Chief Justice), Scalia, Bork, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, Alito



Senator Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and former President Bill Clinton in April 2009.





Northern Ireland: Promoting Peace

President Bill Clinton appoints Senator Kennedy's sister, Jean Kennedy Smith, U.S. Ambassador to Ireland..

Over his long Senate career, the centuries-old conflict in Northern Ireland became a transformational issue for Senator Edward Kennedy. Growing up in a family whose Irish heritage served as both a point of pride, as well as a source of discrimination, gave the Senator a multi-faceted perspective. Some of Teddy's earliest memories were of his grandfather, Honey Fitz, relating stories about the Emerald Isle and how one day the North and South would unite in a republic free of discrimination. For the Kennedy clan, Irish politics were visceral. From Kennedy's initial days in the Senate, he was an outspoken critic of British policy and the discriminatory treatment of Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland. In 1971, he drafted a resolution, with Senator Abraham Ribicoff, calling for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland and, ultimately, for a united Ireland.

Senator Kennedy's thoughts on Northern Ireland grew more nuanced, starting in 1972, when he met John Hume, a moderate Irish-Catholic political leader in the North. Hume cautioned against fiery rhetoric, arguing that it perpetuated the cycle of violence. He instead called for a peaceful political dialogue that was respectful of the civil rights of all groups in Northern Ireland. With Hume's encouragement, Kennedy published an article denouncing violence by any group, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA, dedicated to ending British rule of Northern Ireland), and calling for power-sharing between the Catholics and Protestants there.

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political leader in the North.*

In his talks with Hume, Kennedy came to realize that the flow of money and arms from the U.S. to Northern Ireland was a major impediment to the peace process. He began working with other prominent Irish-American political leaders to urge that Americans stop providing support to the IRA.

Through these groups, Kennedy also worked to influence White House policy. He encouraged Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan to pressure the British government to moderate its position. The Senator forged a particularly strong relationship with President Bill Clinton on the Irish question. Not only did Kennedy provide the White House with a valuable back-channel to Sinn Féin (the IRA's political wing), through his former staffer Nancy Soderberg, at the National Security Council, but Clinton named Jean Kennedy Smith, Teddy's youngest sister, Ambassador to Ireland. These relationships paid dividends in 1994 when Kennedy and Ambassador Smith lobbied Clinton to approve Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams' visa for a trip to the U.S., clearing the way for a cease-fire and the start of the Good Friday negotiations.

Kennedy continued to play an active role throughout the peace talks and implementation of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, working with Clinton's special envoy, Senator George Mitchell, as well as with key interest groups in Northern Ireland. Senator Kennedy even refused to meet with Adams at various times to pressure the IRA to respect the cease-fire and to disarm, which illustrated how far Kennedy's position had transformed since his early days in the

Senate. In 2007, the Senator witnessed the culmination of his work when he traveled to Northern Ireland to attend the Stormont ceremony that inaugurated the power-sharing government of which he had long dreamed.



Kennedy's Irish Family Background

KENNEDY: I think it's probably appropriate to start with my grandfather, John Fitzgerald, who was the son of Irish immigrants who came in the late 1840s from Ireland. He was the son who was born here. He was the first immigrant who really made it politically in this country. He was elected to Congress in 1896 and elected mayor of the city of Boston in 1906.... He had this great, great love of Ireland and Irish history, Irish tradition, and he was the spokesperson for the Irish community.... So I had heard about Ireland a great deal as a child because that was something he was very much involved in and cared about.

There was a lot to do with Grandpa, but if you're talking now just about the Irish connection, I think we can leap from that to the fact that my brother [John F. Kennedy], after he was elected to Congress in 1946, took a trip to Ireland and hitchhiked around. He went down and visited the Lismore Castle, where we had family relations from my sister Kathleen [Kennedy Cavendish]. He hitchhiked to Lismore, and he had a very good time—I don't think a spectacular time, but he had a very good time, and he had stories....

Kennedy's Trips to Ireland

KENNEDY: We ended up stopping in Ireland, I think, and were there for a few days.... I saw Sean Lemass [Republic of Ireland's Prime Minister, 1959–66]. I don't know whether I saw Sean Lemass that trip or when I went back, right after '64. There was a fellow named Grant Stockdale [U.S. Ambassador to Ireland, 1961–62] there. He was a good friend of my brother's, kind of a character. At the Embassy there, they'll bring horses up to you, right to the Embassy. You can go out to ride in the morning. The American Embassy is in a wonderful location in the capital.

I said I was going back and having dinner with my brother, and he was going to ask whether Grant Stockdale rode a horse, because everybody in Ireland rides a horse. So he got all dressed up and said,

“This is going to kill me.” He had never ridden a horse before, and he got on that horse and just went boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. [laughter] I said, “That’ll get me through dinner with my brother.” And when I came back, I went and had dinner with my brother, and he called up Stockdale and had a good joke about that.

YOUNG: He liked your story?

KENNEDY: Yes, he said he’d earned the rest of the term over there.

KENNEDY: I went to Ireland in 1962 before I ran for the Senate, on a brief visit. I went to Israel and Greece and Italy, and then to Ireland very briefly. I went back to the [Kennedy] homestead [in Dunganstown] there just for two or three days. It was basically a political trip prior to the time I was running.

YOUNG: Is that where you gave your St. Patrick’s Day speech that upset the British?

KENNEDY: I think that was when I gave my St. Patrick’s Day speech. The trip was basically seeing some government officials. We were down to visit the homestead and then out to the west and Galway. I met a very interesting woman, Frances Cendell, who was the Lord Mayor of Limerick, and until very recently was still active in the community. We had a very nice lunch in a hotel, and she said afterwards, “There’s a crowd outside who would like to talk.” We went up to the second floor and out on a porch, and an extraordinary crowd had gathered. They came from all over. She gave a magnificent introduction, and I was really challenged as to what my message was. I remembered my St. Patrick’s Day speech, which I gave and they loved. But it was provocative in terms of the British. When I got back, my brother [President Kennedy] said something along the lines of it was interesting that I had my own foreign policy....

How John Hume Changed Kennedy’s Position on Northern Ireland

KENNEDY: Probably in late ’71, I had made a statement on the [Abraham] Ribicoff/[Daniel Patrick] Moynihan/Kennedy [Resolution] calling for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland and establishing a united Ireland. Then we went through the history of the Irish contributions, and there are a lot of parts in that speech that had a ring to them.



Senator Kennedy holding a sign from Dunganstown, the ancestral Kennedy hometown in Ireland.

I went to Ireland in 1962 before I ran for the Senate.

When I got back, my brother [President Kennedy] said something along the lines of it was interesting that I had my own foreign policy....

EDWARD KENNEDY

There were different formulations as time went along, but at the core of it was that different traditions ought to be able to work out their differences through mutual respect. The political process rather than the bomb and the bullet.

EDWARD KENNEDY

I got into that speech tragically, “The government of Great Britain fails to realize the presence of British troops in Ulster is compounding the violence instead of contributing to peace.” Where have we heard those words, in relation to what country? “Indeed, the government is moving blindly in the opposite direction, and rarely has there been a clearer example of the well-known truth that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” I talked a little bit about what was happening in Vietnam and also what had happened in the Algerian war.

YOUNG: That was a very strong speech, and what’s interesting about is that it comes apparently before you met Hume.

KENNEDY: That’s right. That was before I met John.

YOUNG: Was the speech your idea?

KENNEDY: It was. There was a new British policy of internment in Northern Ireland, and that triggered a good deal of reaction and resentment. Ribicoff had spoken about it, and I felt that I ought to speak about it. That’s what basically triggered it at that particular time—the internment policy.

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KENNEDY: In January of ’72, the marchers are killed, and there’s a dramatic escalation of violence in the North. The British dissolved

the Stormont Parliament, and they would rule the North directly until a political settlement can be reached. The IRA exploded bombs in Belfast, on Bloody Sunday, and then in November of that year, I traveled to Europe and met John Hume in Bonn. I had called him—I think ’72 was when [Charles] deGaulle died. . . . I was someplace else in Europe and called him about meeting me in Bonn, and then we had a conversation. He came to Bonn, and I spent a couple of hours with him in the residence of the Ambassador or the chief counselor. I think that’s where John began the great education of Edward Kennedy about Northern Ireland and planted the seeds that grew and grew and grew into a wonderful relationship.

YOUNG: He said when he got your call he didn’t believe it was you. He thought it was somebody playing a joke on him. And yet he borrowed money from his savings and loan to pay for his trip, and was put up at the Embassy, which is where you met him. How had you come to identify him as a person you ought to talk to?

KENNEDY: I think he had established himself. He had certainly established himself on Bloody Sunday in Derry as a courageous political figure. He lay down in front of tanks—with his wife and his children standing there—and they moved to within a foot of running over and killing him. He never flinched, and that’s what basically stopped it. So he was a charismatic figure who believed in non-violence and was principled, eloquent, and profound. I think he has always maintained those qualities, and was therefore convincing, sincere, and visionary in terms of what the future was going to bring.

You look through the different types of discussions that took place from ’72 up to even now, and you’ll find the resonance of Hume’s sense about different communities, different traditions working together based on respect and non-violence. There were different formulations as time went along, but at the core of it was that different traditions ought to be able to work out their differences through mutual respect.

YOUNG: And through politics, not through arms.

KENNEDY: The political process rather than the bomb and the bullet. He lived that, and he was a very colorful figure as well as being enormously persuasive and eloquent. I’ve listened to him when he’s talked to important groups, and he’s eloquent and visionary. In casual or smaller groups, he has a lot of warmth and friendship. He’s a delightful person. He mixes those elements to be an important political figure, and he’s been recognized as such over the course of his life.

So his view of the situation and of how progress could be made made a very important impression on me. He certainly outlined a pathway that would offer the opportunity to help resolve the differences, and that was a pathway I basically embraced from that time on....

KNOTT: Did what John Hume told you change your views in any way?

KENNEDY: Yes, the answer is yes. He looked at this as a political process that was going to be built upon different traditions and mutual respect. It was going to be resolved in a political evolution rather than in unilateral actions by the political parties. How that was going to be done, as I mentioned, was going to evolve—whether they were going to get into questions of counteractions or changing and altering the police and the judiciary, then seeing reductions in violence—or whether a different framework was going to be suggested later on.

A process was going to be established that he believed could move the whole debate and discussion within a non-violent framework and could result eventually in some settlement. That's how he viewed it rather than the groups taking action. Some of us had suggested that they withdraw troops, and then there would be counteractions, movements toward unification and other kinds of actions. That was the significant change. And it certainly appeared to me that it was important to listen to someone who had suffered the way he had, and had shown the courage and determination he had shown, living on the ground as he was and experiencing the harshness he was experiencing. I believe it's important to listen to the ones who are risking their lives and are attempting to do it in a non-violent way.... These people were tough individuals who were risking everything and were still non-violent. And it seemed to me that their cause was going to certainly be my cause, and their views were going to be very persuasive. I was going to advocate and support. That was the beginning of that whole process.

So we've been back now to '73 where I outlined a different framework in the article on foreign policy that's still referencing the major kinds of challenges that were faced. But in that article, I point out, "The violence and terror must be ended. I condemn the brutality in Northern Ireland. I condemn the violence of the IRA. I condemn the violence of the UDA [Ulster Defense Association]. I condemn the violence of the British troops. I condemn the guns and bombs. I condemn the flow of arms or any funds for arms from the United States or any country to Northern Ireland. And I share the words of Cardinal [William] Conway, who spoke eloquently about the Ulster terror in his Christmas

message, "To kill a man deliberately, snuff out, is a terrible deed, and this is true no matter who does it, no matter what side he is on."

This was condemnation of violence on all sides. Then I went through the difficulties and perceptions in terms of the continued internment, and also the troops.

YOUNG: You were consulting with or talking with Hume—or Carey Parker [Senator Kennedy's legislative assistant] was—throughout this period, weren't you?

KENNEDY: Yes.

Including Northern Ireland in the 1976 Democratic Presidential Platform

KENNEDY: I'm also including here the '76 Democratic platform, which included the references to Ireland. It's the first time that the Democratic platform—or any platform—referred to Ireland.

YOUNG: Do you want to tell us how that happened?

KENNEDY: I think it was me and [Bruce] Morrison, the Congressman from Connecticut, who was very involved in Ireland and Irish affairs at that early time. We were in touch with the platform committee to see whether we could get some language in the platform—I'll have to remember who was on the committee at the time. [Jimmy] Carter was aware of what we were doing. This was going to be different and controversial, but we had negotiations. I can remember for one reason or another being up in Boston at the time.

*I believe it's important to listen to the ones
who are risking their lives and are attempting to do it
in a non-violent way.... These people were
tough individuals who were risking everything
and were still non-violent.*

EDWARD KENNEDY

Finally they accepted some language in the Democratic platform. It said: “The voice of the United States should be heard in Northern Ireland against violence and terror, against the discrimination, repression and deprivation which brought about that civil strife, and for the efforts of the parties toward a peaceful resolution of the future of Northern Ireland. Pertinent alliances such as NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and international organizations such as the United Nations should be fully apprised of the interests of the United States with respect to the status of Ireland in the international community of nations.”

It was recognition that this was not going to be a local problem. It wasn't just a British problem; it was going to be an international problem and an international issue, and the United States was going to be involved.

YOUNG: That was controversial?

KENNEDY: That was very controversial, obviously, because the British were very strongly against us. Within the administration as well—it's difficult for me to characterize it. It was because there were a number of us who felt very strongly. And although I was not in a very strong personal relationship with Carter, we worked it through his staff and his people to have that included. It was the first time any political party platform had recognized that this was going to happen, that the United States as a country was going to have an interest in Ireland....

YOUNG: So you were the prime mover?

KENNEDY: Yes. I'd say so—with Congressman Bruce Morrison, who was also involved.

It was recognition that this was not going to be a local problem. It wasn't just a British problem; it was going to be an international problem and an international issue, and the United States was going to be involved.

EDWARD KENNEDY

Kennedy's Efforts to Convince Irish-Americans to Stop Funding the IRA

KENNEDY: This was a time, probably in the early part of 1977, when John Hume was at Harvard and was my contact. He was clearly the most persuasive and the most articulate, passionate, knowledgeable person about all of this situation. I worked with [Speaker of the House Thomas] Tip [O'Neill] and [Representative] Hugh Carey, both of whom had a long traditional position on the Irish issue, which was to support unification and fudge the question on violence. By showing that there was another way, which John Hume was able to do—these were enormously important meetings that he had with them to convince them of the appeal to non-violence....

YOUNG: And you arranged that?

KENNEDY: I arranged that.

YOUNG: Did they occur in Washington?

KENNEDY: There were several but the most important ones were in Boston.... These were meetings that took place by and large in Boston with John Hume.

They had a remarkable effect, a quite dramatic effect, where both Hugh and Tip agreed that there should be a different path to be followed, one that would discourage the financial support for the IRA, and that we ought to try to find a different roadway towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland. That really resulted in the coming together of Tip and Hugh and myself and Pat Moynihan in what was labeled the Four Horsemen. We issued a statement in March of 1977 that really emerged from the meetings. That was the historic break with the Irish-American tradition and it was welcomed with relief by both the British and Irish Governments....

It was very clear from what Hume was pointing out to me, certainly, that if we were going to have any success with a political process, we had to stop the flow of arms and funds for arms to the IRA from the U.S. I did that in the '73 article. Hume felt that that was the most important thing we could do for Ireland: urge Americans who were sending the arms and money to the IRA to withhold support. I guess the figures show that about 75% of the IRA funds were coming from the U.S., and NORaid [Irish Northern Aid Committee] was the principal organization for all of that.

It was very apparent to me that I certainly couldn't do it alone. If it was going to be done, it would have to be with a broader-based group of prominent Irish. We were able to get Tip O'Neill—who had just been elected Speaker at the time—and it was a confluence of events. Mike Mansfield left the Senate, and we had a good friend, Charlie Ferris, whom I had worked with when I worked with Mansfield, going over to the House and working with Tip. He was particularly responsible for this. And with my own conversations with Tip and Charlie Ferris—and I think with John Hume's conversations with Tip as well—Tip came on board, and after that it was easy to get Moynihan and Hugh Carey to join us.

We had a series of statements with a number of our Democratic and Republican colleagues in the Senate and with House members. But it was basically the four of us who initiated those statements, and to a great extent most of them were drafted by Carey Parker working with John Hume. We did a lot of work on that, in later years with Trina [Vargo] on my staff. This was getting us started on that first statement in '77. The theme was to get all organizations engaged in violence to renounce the campaign of death and destruction. It was an obvious reference to the IRA, and I think we were getting some traction then. *Newsweek* magazine had a story about "forcing Irish Americans to consider the bloody use of their guns and money." So even though the conditions in the North were not improving, at least we began the process....

We had a very strong organization called NORAID, which is the Irish American group that was very supportive of the IRA in terms of finances. They didn't like the criticisms of the IRA, but their principal opposition really developed a few years later in 1977, when we brought together what we called our Four Horsemen urging Irish Americans not to provide support for the IRA or engage in violence. After '76 we had a Democratic President increasing escalation or evolution of the fact that Ireland was a matter of interest to United States foreign policy. Our interest in Northern Ireland was always a source of antagonism to the British, who said that Northern Ireland was an internal British matter....

YOUNG: Could you tell me when in the course of these events or talks with Hume the difficulties posed to the peace process by not only NORAID but the pro-IRA sentiment among the Irish Americans in the Diaspora came up as an important impediment in the eyes of the people involved in the peace process? Was that discussed at all?

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I did that in the '73 article.

EDWARD KENNEDY

There came a time when the Four Horsemen, you and others, took a major role in turning that sentiment around in support of the peace process and against the support of violence by the IRA.

KENNEDY: I think it really was in '76, the Four Horsemen, and the continued statements and comments we made in each subsequent year. A number of events were taking place at the time as pointed out in my notes: "Hume mentioned that the European Commission on Human Rights has vindicated the Catholic position on torture and inhumane conditions in the internment camps. Although proceedings for the commission have not received much publicity, Hume finds it increasingly embarrassing to British politicians."

All of this was working at one time. That didn't have much impact in terms of NORAID, and Hume was talking about a time-phased withdrawal of the British, and reform of the local police. Even Hume had talked about the phased withdrawal because they can't be there, you can't have peace while having the troops present. And then there was the discussion about trying to find some common ground—getting away from your question—trying to find common ground and begin to try to find ways they could work together. I don't remember—until the '70s with the Irish Four Horsemen—that we really were able to take on NORAID and the strong economic support

that Irish Americans were giving to the IRA. That took a good deal of time, and it was controversial. We were finding out through the Justice Department that it was beginning to have some impact and effect....

KNOTT: Senator, did you find that your own Irish-American constituents had a romanticized view of the IRA?

KENNEDY: Oh, there's no question that they had a romanticized view of the IRA. There were a number of Irish who were coming in here illegally, and they depended upon the Irish community to get jobs and to develop relationships. There were thousands and thousands of Irish who came over here during this period. I saw it as the chairman of the immigration sub-committee. We ended up with the [Congressman Paul] Donnelly visas, but they tried to increase their ability to immigrate over here. So we had a force coming here illegally—some legally, but many illegally—and intersecting with the existing groups here, and that added velocity to the groups and their romanticizing about the struggle, particularly when there had been a good deal of violence in the wake of Bobby Sands and the hunger strikers....

Carter's Northern Ireland Statement

KENNEDY: I don't think there's any question that the dramatic shift and change are really attributed to Hume and the confluence of events that took place at this time.

YOUNG: Now '77 was also the year, wasn't it, where the other side, that is, getting U.S. government involvement began. It was kind of a crucial year.

KENNEDY: The issuing of the statement, which we did on St. Patrick's Day, was one way of indicating a different course to follow for Irish Americans but it needed to be followed up with policy actions and policy expression, and the place to do that was with the Democratic President, who was President Carter. We started on a personal campaign to see how we could involve him in a way that would also begin to express a viewpoint that had not been expressed by any previous American government, and that was that America had an interest in a peaceful resolution in the North and how the North was eventually going to develop democratic institutions.

We began our campaign with President Carter on this....

Both John Hume and I were going to speak at that fund. We talked about trying to persuade President Carter to appeal for a partnership

in the North with a promise of substantial economic aid linked to accepting a political solution. This seemed an interesting proposal that I had talked to John Hume about, and that was if they could encourage the political parties to move towards some kind of negotiation with the idea that the United States would provide sizeable economic aid and assistance. It was sorely needed in the North. What had some particular appeal was the fact that it was being done by Carter—a Protestant, a southerner.

YOUNG: Did you and John Hume discuss strategy for getting this out of the administration? Did he ever talk with Carter, or did you ever talk with Carter about it directly?

KENNEDY: My conversations, and I believe John's, were with [Secretary of State] Cy [Cyrus] Vance and a number of the people who were advising and guiding him at that time.... Vance was really—if you look historically—the go-to person on a range of different human rights issues. We had a good relationship personally with Vance, historically, a good personal relationship....

We were faced with the historical posture and position by both the United States and Great Britain, where the United States policy considered Northern Ireland issues to be an internal British affair. In the absence of a particular request from the British Government, it was always our government's position that U.S. intervention would be inappropriate and counter-productive. That was the United States position. The British position was virtually identical to that, that this was their area, their zone, and that they didn't welcome, want, or like the United States or anyone else interfering or commenting or offering suggestions or ideas about how to deal with it.... In early June, Tip and I and Pat Moynihan went to the State Department to present a proposal to Cy Vance. This was the proposal—if there was going to be progress made in terms of the two different traditions in the conflict, the United States was prepared to offer economic aid and assistance in order to try to move the conflict into the political sphere and political resolution. We had a proposal and we pointed out that it fit perfectly into President Carter's commitment to a moral foreign policy and his strong commitment on human rights.

Vance said he would take a look at it and he reviewed it. At that time, we talked about \$100 million in reconstruction aid for Northern Ireland if a peace settlement could be reached. He wanted to run it by the British and the Irish embassies before sending it to the White House. The British balked at the idea of a Presidential statement and

they considered the involvement of the Irish Republic in this to be an infringement on their sovereignty, but they were willing to accept language on a solution that the people of Northern Ireland as well as the governments of Great Britain and Ireland can support.

On the economic aid proposals, the British resisted the idea and the Irish objected to it, believing that any funds shouldn't just go to the North. Direct aid was watered down—encouraging private investment was substituted, which was a disappointment. But the core of the statement, the appeal to Irish Americans not to support the violence, the call for a just solution involving both parts of the community, and the promise of economic help linked to an agreement survived. We had that in early June and then we had a response, as you mentioned, Jim, from Hodding Carter on June 28 that said, “If all the parties were to conclude the U.S. could play a useful role, we would naturally consider what we might do. However, none of the parties concerned has requested U.S. to take an active part. In the absence of such a request, the U.S. Government is convinced that U.S. intervention could be both inappropriate and counter-productive.” In other words, we aren't interested.

YOUNG: So this was the building speaking?

KENNEDY: This is the State Department.

YOUNG: But then Cy Vance—that was not Cy Vance's position?

KENNEDY: No, that was not Cy Vance's position. Vance, obviously, when he was touching base with the governments, the State Department became aware of all of this and that was the official line. Eventually, at the end of August, President Carter issued the statement and it was the first time an American President had spoken out for the human rights of the minority in Northern Ireland. We sent a note over to Carter saying that no other President in history had done as well by Ireland, and then I gave a talk in the Senate that we ought to have a more expansive program that would be a real program of economic aid and assistance.... Cy Vance understood what we were attempting to do and I think he had a broader view in terms of understanding the dimensions and the implications and the positive aspects that this could provide. He was empathetic and sympathetic and he was a very skilled diplomat. He was able to use his very considerable skills to try to buck the tradition of the State Department, the bureaucracy, on this, which was very strong and very deep.

Kennedy and the Origins of the Hillsborough Agreement

YOUNG: Didn't you introduce, or weren't you involved in introducing, some economic assistance legislation in Congress after it was watered down, after the Carter statement?

KENNEDY: His statement was made at the end of August and I spoke in early September, welcoming the statement, and talked about the assistance that was going to be necessary. I said [*reading*]: “The assistance could take a variety of forms, including not only direct appropriations by Congress under the foreign aid program but also loan guarantees, other incentives and subsidies for U.S. firms to invest in order to provide needed jobs for the people there. My hope is that once a peaceful settlement is reached, the United States will undertake a Marshall-type program of assistance to heal the wounds of the conflict that will benefit the people of the North, Protestants and Catholic alike, and I think there will be broad support for the assistance of jobs and other assistance.” So it was multidimensional.

YOUNG: That eventually resulted in the Hillsborough Agreement, I think.

KENNEDY: Yes....

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and I think he had a broader view in terms of
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EDWARD KENNEDY

YOUNG: They put great stress on that, especially Al [Albert] Reynolds, looking back on the crucial importance of economic assistance to the success of the enterprise. From their point of view that was very important.

KENNEDY: That was very important. This was an extra or a newer kind of dimension where the United States had not been before, such as on the Sunningdale Agreement, which had been proposed earlier, and which the Unionists shot down. What they showed was that if there wasn't going to be an extra dimension to these kinds of understandings, they just weren't going to work.

Kennedy, Reagan and Northern Ireland

KENNEDY: The [Four] Horsemen were moving. Corresponding actions were taking place among the British during this period, and different leadership was coming on, and discussions, but I can't recall any important alterations or change. At some time—I think it was probably the first year after '80—we started having the Speaker's St. Patrick's Day lunch with Tip O'Neill. That became an important event. St. Patrick's Day began to change, and instead of just having a bowl of shamrocks given to the President, the President had to come to the Speaker's lunch.

A number of us persuaded the Taoiseach that this was the time for him to come to the United States. What I'm outlining now we perfected later, but we persuaded him to come over at that time to garner greater attention. Either the Taoiseach would have an opportunity to talk to the President about policy, or they'd have a chance to talk to him at the Speaker's lunch. All Reagan wanted to do was have jokes at the

lunches. I don't think from '77 to '80 Jimmy Carter showed any interest. I might be wrong, but I don't believe there was any action by the administration during that time....

After 1980, we had President Reagan and very tough action from Margaret Thatcher, and a different phase of the relationship. We had the Speaker's luncheon, and then Reagan started to at least meet and have leaders from Northern Ireland come. They hadn't come before... It was enormously important eventually, because it gave some focus and attention to this issue. A fellow who worked under President Reagan—I guess it was William Clark—was the Northern Ireland contact. He showed a good deal of interest. He had some Irish roots, and he was willing to listen. I think the President had some conversations with Margaret Thatcher to try to soften her up a little bit—at least it was always thought that she softened up a little bit—and then Tip let her speak to a Joint Session of Congress. I don't remember talking to Tip about that in detail. We didn't see a great deal of change or alteration—some, perhaps.

YOUNG: Was part of this trying to counteract the British position and the State Department's traditional position that this was an internal affair?

KENNEDY: That's it, and that continued all the way through President Clinton. But this was not an issue back in '81. We had the hunger strikes and people starving themselves to death. This was not an issue that was going to go away. We tried a number of different interventions with Reagan to get him to appoint a special envoy for peace, but he was not interested in that.

I introduced a resolution for a new Ireland forum to establish institutional alternatives to British control. Margaret Thatcher was very strong in her rejection of anything and everything to do with it. That was the early '80s, '80 through '84. Then in '85 Thatcher signed the Irish Agreement with Garret Fitzgerald.

YOUNG: Wasn't that a step of progress?

KENNEDY: Very important....

YOUNG: He [Reagan] finally came around, didn't he, more or less, in the second term?

KENNEDY: I think Clark had a positive influence on him [Reagan].... He certainly moved from just wanting to tell jokes. Over the time he was President, as he came up to those lunches, it had

We tried to get some of the large American corporations, companies who had branches in Northern Ireland, to see if we could work with them in ways that would be constructive and positive.

EDWARD KENNEDY

gradually become more substantive. The first time, everyone was told very clearly they were just to tell stories. He would tell a couple of stories, and Tip would call on people around the room to recall stories. He'd call on the Americans, Jimmy Burke or others, to tell stories. Then he gradually called on some of the Irish, and they would tell a story, but they would also make some little comments. Eventually those lunches turned into being about substantive kinds of issues—not profound, but at least the chance for people who came from different kinds of traditions to sit down at lunch. And of course that format became the very significant and important framework where eventually, under President Clinton, all the leaders came over and stayed for three days....

So that framework was very important, and it eventually evolved that the Irish Prime Minister would come over and sit down and would actually have substantive talks with the President. The people who were interested in Ireland came to town for these receptions, and they would talk to people within the administration. All of this was an evolutionary process where the Irish issue became of much greater substance, and was really important and got a lot of attention....

The Anglo-Irish Agreement

KENNEDY: I think during this period, the '80s, the whole question about these negotiations—the framework and reforms that were going to be necessary in the North—also included the economic component: if they're going to work out and get some progress made, we ought to have an economic component. That was going to be the sweetener, because there were a lot of hard economic times in the North, and this would be helpful and appreciated, particularly by the Protestant groups.

YOUNG: So you were getting appropriations for an Ireland fund.

KENNEDY: We were talking about trying to get appropriations as a sweetener to the conclusion of a framework. We went to work on President Carter to get economic assistance. Reagan had proposed \$50 million for five years, but most of it was all incentive for the private sector to come in. Tip and I wanted direct aid, and when we talked to [Secretary of Treasury] Don Regan about that, he indicated he was prepared to get us the money if we were prepared to call off the dogs on the [Edward] Boland Amendment, which was to end the war with the Contras, in Nicaragua. It was sort of a *quid pro quo*, and we weren't going to have that.



Senator Kennedy meets with President Ronald Reagan in the Oval Office in June 1981.

KNOTT: Senator, were you involved in getting Irish American businessmen to invest in Northern Ireland?

KENNEDY: We tried to get some of the large American corporations, companies who had branches in Northern Ireland, to see if we could work with them in ways that would be constructive and positive. We had people like Jack Welch, a whole series of successful, prominent Irish American business people, who came and we met, particularly during the Clinton period. We had a very significant number, several hundred, to try to see if we could get them to take some interest in making their various subsidiaries in the North a constructive force. We talked to the State Department and Treasury Department as well as the intelligence groups, but that never went anywhere....

KENNEDY: May of '85. Prime Minister [Garret] Fitzgerald came to Cape Cod, a visit with Mrs. [Joan O'Farrell] Fitzgerald. I can still remember him pushing her wheelchair across the lawn down there. As these notes reflect, he mentioned three areas: one is security, the second the judiciary—how we were going to get confidence-building in terms



Senator Kennedy working to end the Troubles in Northern Ireland.

of the judiciary. (He had a really complex proposal there.) And then the future role of the Irish Government in the North and who was going to speak for the North, those kinds of arrangements, and how much authority and how much power they were going to have....

YOUNG: This was in May of '85, and the agreement came later that year, did it not?

KNOTT: Yes, in November....

YOUNG: And the third issue, according to your notes, is the "future role for the Irish Government in the process." It appears that Fitzgerald was pushing for that as a precondition, as almost a precursor for being able to do much—to have the government of Ireland accepted as a player.

KENNEDY: In the North.

YOUNG: In the North. When he visited you, that had not yet happened. But in November, that was allowed for the first time.

KENNEDY: That was very significant. There was the agreement between Hume's SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour Party] and the Irish Government. One of them had to have the role, and the question was how much the role was going to be. Eventually he was able to negotiate that the Irish Government was going to have a role. I don't know how the Anglo-Irish [Agreement] considered the political parties, the SDLP, how they included them. In that agreement, he also talked about the financial aspect—the importance of it—and we talked about talking with Tip O'Neill and also [Madeleine] Albright. I had talked to Democratic Senator [Robert C.] Byrd, who was on the Senate appropriations committee, and I also talked with Republican Senator [Mark O.] Hatfield about it, and they were open to helping. Without getting into the details of this, I always thought that it would have to start in the House with Tip, where we had the most leverage, and that these people were going to respond. I know that my son Patrick [Kennedy] was up there for this meeting as well.

YOUNG: I think it was the Anglo-Irish Agreement that Fitzgerald negotiated with Thatcher. It also recognized, for the first time, consent as the basis for the government of North Ireland. That was recognized in the language of the '85 agreement, which was considered at least a breakthrough in principle, some give on the British feeling that it was, in effect, their colony.

KENNEDY: That was very significant and important. I remember Garret had spent a lot of time thinking through all of these multidimensional aspects of it and having a very good grasp of the interrelationships of these issues and what was possible. He had backup positions and a very comprehensive view. I think he deserves a lot of credit for the whole movement. It was a difficult time.

The Momentum for Peace as President Clinton Takes Office

KENNEDY: So President Clinton is elected and we are in a situation in '92 with a new administration and someone that we feel that we can work with on many different issues. There is certainly the hope that we're going to be able to work with President Clinton on the Irish issue. He is surrounded by people that we know and who are empathetic, sympathetic to what we'd been trying to do in Northern Ireland. So we're trying to figure out the best ways that we can move the whole process forward in terms of getting a cease-fire and governmental institutions up and functioning and working.

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KENNEDY: We've got now a situation where [Gerry] Adams was head of Sinn Féin and the leading voice for policy for the IRA. He and John Hume had issued a joint statement designed to inaugurate a peace process in April of 1993. While the December 15 joint declaration by [John] Major and [Albert] Reynolds had offered all-party talks if all agreed to a cease-fire, Adams hadn't renounced violence and there was no IRA cease-fire, and neither Sinn Féin nor the IRA had accepted the joint declaration. Major succeeded Margaret Thatcher so the Downing Street Declaration had to be in this period of time. This is December 15, 1993.

YOUNG: Al Reynolds had become Prime Minister [of Ireland] and was engaged in private talks with John Major on this. The British Government, it subsequently turned out, had been also talking with Gerry Adams during this period secretly, without acknowledgement. John Hume and Gerry Adams had opened a dialogue back in the late '80s, looking to getting together on a political solution, renouncing violence and so on. This was all going on in the '80s and when Clinton came it was brought to a head by the visa issue.


KENNEDY: They had a very interesting priest, Father [Alec] Reid, who had worked at the grassroots level with a number of the IRA people and Sinn Féin people, and I think Hume had worked with him.

There was a very important kind of outreach by a number of the members of the clergy, favorite pastors of people who had been involved and active, continuing ongoing dialogue, debate, appeal to consciousness that were very important in terms of altering and changing viewpoints on this. So you had this multi-dimension aspect about political issues, and it had religious, social, and family kinds of influences.

YOUNG: Father Reid was also close to the IRA so he had to take a very low-key role, but he was an important link to the IRA for John Hume, in addition John Hume's talks with Gerry Adams. Alec Reid was in the picture very much earlier.

KENNEDY: As you point out, his work with Hume on this gave Hume the real sense that this was possible. The Hume philosophy of non-violence and respect for traditions is deeply rooted in him, but there was no question that there was a several-year period of a lot of quiet conversations and activities and appeals to important leaders for an opportunity for a change and new direction, and I think that's a feature. I don't know whether we'll ever know what really went on, but that was mentioned to me by several of the parties as an understanding of the change in attitude by Sinn Féin and the IRA.

We're talking 1992, the election, then we're talking 1993. My sister [Jean Kennedy Smith] had been appointed Ambassador.



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about political issues, and it had religious,
social, and family kinds of influences.*

EDWARD KENNEDY

Jean Kennedy Smith's Appointment as U.S. Ambassador to Ireland

KENNEDY: In 1992, we have the election of President Clinton, and we have some interest on my sister Jean's part in being Ambassador to Ireland. At first I didn't know whether she was enormously serious about it, but she was. I pursued it, and we got on track fairly quickly and began to gain momentum. It was eventually accomplished.... And I think once Jean became conscious that this thing was happening, she got very serious about it. She had been involved in the Very Special Arts; she had been in Ireland. She had a number of things over in Ireland, and she had traveled with my brother there in '63. So she had maintained some relationships, particularly in the areas of the arts.... She had really both demonstrated familiarity and interest and understanding, and had a good set of credentials. She's a very bright, smart person, and she worked at the appointment process and did very well before the committee....

The process moved ahead. In March, 1993 the President named Jean, and she went through the process and was appointed.

In 1992, we have the election of President Clinton, and we have some interest on my sister Jean's part in being Ambassador to Ireland.

.....

Jean was very active in a lot of different ways, and she also established contacts with people in the North, which upset the State Department.

EDWARD KENNEDY

The Gerry Adams Visa

KENNEDY: When she [Jean Kennedy Smith, U.S. Ambassador to Ireland] was over there, Jean was very active in a lot of different ways, and she also established contacts with people in the North, which upset the State Department. They indicated that this was a different jurisdiction, and that she didn't have a role there. The State Department got very upset. People in that Embassy got very upset, and they were very strong when I went over on New Year's of '94.

This was after my brother-in-law Steve [Stephen Smith] had died. Jean was over in Ireland, and at New Year's, Vicki [Reggie Kennedy] and I went over to visit her for a few days. We thought it was going to be just a social visit. Once I got there, I found I was on a merry-go-round about Gerry Adams and a visa for Adams to visit the U.S.... I had been opposed to Adams having a visa because of what I considered to be his association with the IRA. Reynolds made a very powerful case. He showed me letters from people who had been on the Protestant side in the North, very considerable and thoughtful people, saying how they had seen the difference in Adams in very recent times. He made a very powerful and well-thought-out case. He gave assurances that he, as the Prime Minister, had seen the British intelligence, and since John Hume's announcement, everything had been positive and non-violent. He was absolutely convinced that Adams was committed to a course of non-violence....

She [Jean Kennedy Smith] was strongly for it then. As I've said previously, the people who were on the ground and had a feel and understood this made a very strong case. I changed my mind about it. They thought it was enormously important that we get it done and get it done early.

It's now January of '94. I returned home with that in mind.... Now we had a situation with the Clinton administration where my former staff member Nancy Soderberg had gone to the National Security Council. Madeleine Albright had bigger fish to fry with the expansion of NATO, and the Northern Ireland issue was being run from the White House. I got back here and began to call some of our colleagues, some of the Irish [-American] Senators. I remember talking to [Speaker of the House Thomas] Foley, who said absolutely no. He called the White House right away and told them there was no way they could do it. I remember talking to Moynihan, who said of Hume, "Why are you getting along with that Socialist? I think he's

probably a Communist. I won't interfere, but I don't think it's where you want to go."

I talked to [Christopher] Dodd, who was supportive. I think Tip was sympathetic to it. I remember Foley being so strongly against it, and I think I would have remembered if Tip hadn't been, but I don't remember him being involved one way or the other. Then I asked to see the President, and I went down with Dodd to see Clinton. This was about the time that Adams had been invited over to speak at the National Committee on Foreign Policy on January 5.

[reads] "The National Committee, sponsored by Bill Flynn, sent an invitation to Adams to come over." So the fat was in the fire then—was he going to be able to get the visa? I was just back, and the conference was going to be February 1. I didn't talk to Tip O'Neill because he was dying. We have the invitation coming, and Tip O'Neill dying, and then John Hume coming over and I'm having a long dinner with John Hume at Locke-Ober's in Boston about this. I'm sure I have notes on that too, which we don't have. But he was very strong for the visa....

On January 14, Adams submits the visa application, and on January 15 I write to Clinton, supporting the visa.... I was probably in touch with Nancy Soderberg, but that would certainly be the way I'd proceed. Now is the time that I speak to Foley. He was the leader. I also spoke to Moynihan, Dodd, [Joseph] Biden, Carey, and a number of other Senators. So there was some backwash from the members of Congress and Senate following the situation, but there was clearly a strong, solid base in the Senate that would support the President should he make the determination. It was clear that it wasn't going to be made by the Attorney General or the immigration office. It was going to be made by the President.

YOUNG: The Attorney General [Janet Reno] was not in favor, was she?

KENNEDY: No. The State Department was not in favor, and the British Government was strongly against it.

YOUNG: They were lobbying like mad, weren't they?

KENNEDY: They were lobbying like the devil. At some time—we have to get the date—I went down to see the President. I remember talking to him, and Chris [Dodd] came down and talked to him. Basically, I thought the argument was just overwhelmingly in favor of



Senator Kennedy travels to Belfast in Northern Ireland in 1998.

doing it, once you became convinced that the serious people in Ireland—Reynolds, the people in the government—were very much in favor of it. John Hume was strongly in favor of it, and a few other people we talked to. They believed that Adams was going to maintain his neutrality and give up the violence.

.....
KENNEDY: The reasons were number one, this was going to give peace a chance. How could we turn down an opportunity when we had this kind of historical situation? We had this incredible background of the last 20-odd years—the hunger strikes and the violence. How could we possibly turn down giving peace a chance?

Two, we had the incredible constituency following this. This wasn't an issue of passing reference. The Irish in America followed this very closely because we had all the problems with NORAID, who were passionate about it. People had followed the Four Horsemen on the issue. So the communities were very involved in it, and the communities would never forgive us if we didn't give peace a chance. They would understand if we gave it a chance and it didn't work out.



Senator Kennedy meets with Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Hillary Clinton (D-NY), and Chris Dodd (D-CT) in Kennedy's Senate office in 2005.

The bottom line was how could we not do it when we've had the British talking to the IRA—and now they're trying to veto an opportunity for the United States to play a role in brokering the peace? So their argument about not giving peace a chance falls on its face in terms of what they've done over the years. They can't say, "You can't do this," because they've been doing it; they've had these negotiations going on for a period of time....

The first thing we did was prepare a letter to President Clinton and tried to get as many co-signers as we could. The letter spelled out the arguments for the visa as critical to the peace process. This would be a really important contribution to that. And then we talked about the existing Hume-Adams dialogue, the British Government contacts, the IRA, the joint declaration. Then, the realities. This was a one-time proposition and we ought to take the chance, the risk for peace. There

were other provisions in there, too, other arguments in there, too, and we anticipated that the British would be opposed to the visa. We got a number of signatures. We led off with the principal Irish in Congress: Moynihan, Dodd, and then [George J.] Mitchell, the Democratic Leader, [Claiborne] Pell from Foreign Relations, [William] Bradley. Fifty members of Congress signed on....

I felt that at the end of the meeting with Clinton that we were going to get it. I thought we were going to be successful. I thought he listened from every point of view—the cause of peace, the chances for peace, what was going to happen if he didn't take the chance for peace. The substance of this thing was so powerful. The politics were so powerful on this thing and the decision not to do this thing even if it went south made no sense. He was going to take the chance. He could demonstrate that he was trying to get the chance for peace. Even if

you took the worst arguments that Foley had—and they had provided such arguments. The fact that he took the chance for peace was so convincing, because he could make this case and it could all be buttressed by conversations with Reynolds and talking to the Prime Minister and other people, security people.

You don't often get political decisions that come down your way at the White House that are this compelling, I don't think I had been with President Clinton where I thought I had him convinced and it still didn't go, it didn't work.

YOUNG: But you didn't get that feeling on the visa issue?

KENNEDY: No. I didn't know whether it was going. I thought he was convinced, but I didn't know what the other factors were going to be that would try and sink it.

YOUNG: What was your sense of what resonated with him particularly?

KENNEDY: One, the chance for peace, and two, the politics. He could understand both. Those were the two things, the chance for peace—you'd make a difference in terms of getting the chance for peace and be unique in that sense—the first President who reached this. And the politics of it—the fact that all Irish-Americans would appreciate that he had tried for peace. If he didn't, they'd all know he didn't. He could understand that.

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YOUNG: You saw Adams when he came over. What was your measure of him?

KENNEDY: I think he's a very able, gifted, and talented politician. He's a charismatic figure. I can see why he's a leader in a first sense and he's a very clever political leader. I can understand why he's been so successful. He's got a lot of very strong qualities of leadership. My own sense is that they have to get out of the cloud and the shadows and the darkness of criminality. I spoke to him about that just briefly out in the corridor. I didn't want to talk to him in front of all those people but I said that he has every kind of opportunity in terms of the future, in terms of the South and the North, given the timeframe, but he has to get out of that shadow of criminality. He cannot have a blind eye to these thugs and the criminal element in the North. He's got to sign up for the police and cooperate with them, and he has to deal with that whole area of criminality.

The Joe Cahill Visa

KNOTT: Then you had another visa situation shortly after that with Joe Cahill [of the Provisional IRA], right?

YOUNG: That was a tough one.

KENNEDY: Yes.... Having Cahill come in was very controversial. But it just made political sense to me that if you're trying to convince people here, the best way to do it was somebody they'd listen to, and they would obviously listen to him.

YOUNG: Do you think it would have been much rougher sledding if the request had been for visas at the same time for the two of them?

KENNEDY: Oh, I think so. It was the confluence of circumstances....

YOUNG: Somebody wrote that Clinton—when he decided to grant the visa—pushed a door that was already half open. I think it was an Irishman who wrote that. [*laughter*]

KENNEDY: God love him. Well, he made the right judgment. There are a lot of times you don't, and I think he got clearly vested in Ireland, continuously vested in it.

YOUNG: What was it about Ireland?

Well, he [Bill Clinton] made the right judgment.

There are a lot of times you don't, and I think he got clearly vested in Ireland, continuously vested in it.

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The overwhelming conclusion on this—and particularly in the climate and atmosphere of the world community now—is that this worked in Northern Ireland.

This has now taken hold, and everyone has benefited, and they didn't have to have success at the expense of one of the parties; each of the parties benefited.

EDWARD KENNEDY

KENNEDY: I think that he found out that this thing worked. I think he wasn't having a lot of successes in a lot of different places, and this was a process that was going through and that looked like it had some real prospect of making it. He appointed Mitchell and had him go over, and it looked like Mitchell was making some progress. This is really very significant—you know, you're going to be able to work it here, and that raises the possibility that this could have an impact in terms of the Middle East.

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KENNEDY: My sister Jean ran into a lot of hard water after they got that visa—there were people over there who differed with her. But there's no question that just opened up all new possibilities, and I admire her willingness to stake out that position and see the moment and see the part in history—and the timing. I think it was a very key decision at a crucial time, and made an incredible difference....

Kennedy and Gerry Adams

KENNEDY: I do think that ... we were tough on Adams. On several occasions when Adams was over here as he was increasing his election strength both in the North and South and increasing his support over here—he still had his private army—I said, “You can't be

a democratic political party and have a private army.” He was using it very cleverly to do the negotiations with [Anthony (Tony)] Blair, which was raising his prestige and his standing.

So at some time, this thing had to end, and we tried to do it as nicely as could be, but he was keeping us at arm's length, he was rising in terms of the politics and that kind of thing, still had all of these parts that were going, and not making a judgment decision. But this thing wasn't going to work. Then when they had the coincidence of the breakdown just before Christmas, and then four days later the bank robbery, and then the killing down there, that was it. It was for me. But now, they've had those assurances on the weapons, and both governments and both the British and the Irish intelligence agencies say that thing's for real, and the IRA has stopped the surveillance and the other kinds of activities.

Kennedy and Stormont (Northern Ireland's Parliament Buildings)

KENNEDY: You take the grassroots leadership that was in Northern Ireland, of all the political parties, plus then the leadership from people outside who could have an influence on it, which was basically Blair and [Patrick Bartholomew (Bertie)] Ahern, and it was [William (Bill)] Clinton over the period of time and President [George H. W.] Bush to some extent, and all working, for a ten-year period since the time of the ceasefire of Northern Ireland to a time where two weeks ago this Tuesday, they transferred power, gave power to [Ian] Paisley and [Martin] McGuinness. This was a monumental moment and it took a lot of time, but it had the grassroots support.

I remember in this instance, asking Blair, when I was in Northern Ireland, why he thought it would take this time, and he said this time, unlike other times, he could look at the audience that he was speaking to—and the audience he was speaking to at Stormont were the representatives of the most conservative Paisley-ites as well as those who supported Sinn Féin and others. He said he could look at all of them and see that this time they were committed to making the process work, they had come through the hot fires of domestic kinds of consideration and had been welded together by these outside forces in their own country and society, courageous political leaders, but those that were immediately outside, in terms of Ahern and Blair and by the United States and other interested groups....



Senator Kennedy meets with Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness in 2007.

Adams was there. He had all of his top lieutenants there, very political—they call them “hard men”—and the Protestants’ hard men, people who despised and hated each other but were forced into the process. It was an incredibly eclectic group, and they had this performance by the Down Syndrome children, Protestant and Catholic. It was a surprise, but extremely well done.

There was a poignancy. People stopped talking and listened. You know, at any other occasion like this, everyone would be talking, no one would be listening. But because it was so poignant, everyone listened, and it made people think of the Troubles [between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland]. People really listened

and watched, and they saw these children, and they realized that if they weren’t in conflict, there may be some hope for these kids....

The overwhelming conclusion on this—and particularly in the climate and atmosphere of the world community now—is that this worked in Northern Ireland. This has now taken hold, and everyone has benefited, and they didn’t have to have success at the expense of one of the parties; each of the parties benefited. That was John Hume’s great theme in the very earliest days, at the start of this whole process—that everyone could benefit and not at the expense of the other. That’s been the theme that has kept those negotiations positive and constructive and open: if everyone holds hands and moves together, everyone benefits.





Striving for Universal Health Care

President Barack Obama, with Vice President Joe Biden and Vicki Kennedy, signs the Affordable Care Act on March 23, 2010. Senator Kennedy, who fought passionately for the cause, had passed away the previous summer.

Walking toward the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate, on Columbia Point in Boston, a visitor might notice a neat, modest building housing the Geiger Gibson Community Health Center. Named for two Tufts University doctors who developed the concept of neighborhood-based medical care for low-income residents, the center was conceived at a 1965 policy dinner held by Senator Kennedy. Inspired by the innovative idea, the Senator soon introduced and guided legislation that eventually resulted in funding of similar community health centers across the country.

The origins of his interest in health care, however, are traceable to family experiences much earlier in his life. Teddy's eldest sister, Rosemary, had special needs, diagnosed in the 1920s with what at that time was labeled "mental retardation." John F. Kennedy battled chronic medical conditions his entire life. Joseph Kennedy Sr. spent the last eight years of his life wheelchair-bound and could not speak intelligibly after suffering a stroke in 1961. Senator Kennedy learned at an early age the importance of receiving quality health care, a point that was undoubtedly reinforced after he broke his back, and sustained other serious injuries, in a 1964 plane crash during his first Senate term.

During six months of convalescence and recuperation, Kennedy recognized that he enjoyed certain advantages unavailable to less fortunate Americans. He witnessed first-hand the unfairness of the health insurance system

Kennedy's battle to reform what he saw as a broken and unfair system led him back repeatedly to one of the defining issues of his career—universal health care.

while his son, Teddy Jr., endured arduous treatment for bone cancer in the early 1970s. Senator Kennedy learned that the parents of other children in similar situations could not afford the same level of successful treatment that his son received.

Fighting for disadvantaged groups who lacked access to quality health care quickly moved to a prominent place on the Senator's legislative agenda. When Democrats held power in Washington, Kennedy seized the initiative, passing a host of landmark legislation, including COBRA (giving workers access to group health benefits after a change in job status), the Ryan White CARE Act (offering treatment to HIV/AIDS patients), HIPPA (protecting patients' privacy), and SCHIP (providing health insurance for children).

When Republicans controlled the White House and/or Congress, Kennedy fought to scale back health care budget cuts proposed by President Ronald Reagan and, subsequently, House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Yet Senator Kennedy knew the value of reaching across the aisle to work with Republicans, such as Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), and John McCain (R-AZ), on major pieces of health care legislation.

Kennedy's battle to reform what he saw as a broken and unfair system led him back repeatedly to one of the defining issues of his career—universal health care. In the early 1970s, he held private negotiations on the issue with the Nixon White House. Affordable medical care

for all Americans became the central theme of his unsuccessful 1980 presidential campaign. In the early 1990s, Senator Kennedy worked closely with President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Clinton on national health insurance legislation. Teddy's collaboration with President Barack Obama on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which passed in 2010, seven months after the Senator's death, appropriately made it the crowning achievement of his Senate career.

At the White House bill-signing ceremony, attended by Senator Kennedy's widow, Victoria Reggie Kennedy, and his son, Congressman Patrick Kennedy, President Obama observed, "I remember seeing Ted walk through that door in a summit in this room a year ago, one of his last public appearances, and it was hard for him to make it, but he was confident that we would do the right thing."

To Edward Kennedy, access to affordable health care was a right, not a privilege. No issue was more important to him than working to ensure that all Americans had access to quality medical treatment. His son Patrick, named for the first of the famous clan to arrive on U.S. shores in the midst of the Irish potato famine, placed a poignant note on his father's Arlington grave immediately after passage of the PPACA. It read: "Dad, the unfinished business is done."



Family Medical Issues and the Origins of Kennedy's Interest in Health Care

KENNEDY: I thought maybe I'd start off initially with my association with the health issue and also the family's association with the health issue and why it was a central force in my life growing up, and with my early days in the United States Senate—how the opportunity to become involved in it from a policy point of view, in many respects, goes back to my own observations about the importance of health in a personal way, but also in a way that exposed me as a young person to the policy considerations, and the impact that it had on me.

I have commented...about the fact that my sister Rosemary [Kennedy] was mentally and intellectually challenged, and how she always was considered special in our family. As a small child, I found that I could play with children that were my age, or in many instances



February 1984. Senator Kennedy and Representative Richard Gephardt (D-MO) present their deficit reduction proposal.



July 1984. Senator Kennedy appears with his son, Teddy Kennedy, Jr., to help raise money for cancer research.



June 1985. Senator Kennedy speaks at a health care hearing.

I would find that she was both available, acceptable, and desiring to play ball with me. We'd take a soccer ball and either play soccer, or bounce a lighter ball, like a beach ball, and play tag with it, or other children's games. She always seemed to be willing to spend more time with me than the others, who were always distracted in playing other games.

I noticed that she had some special kinds of needs. I observed that early as a child. I didn't understand it in the early years, and it took a while, obviously, to grasp the full dimensions of that, but I noticed that that was different

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KENNEDY: In 1963, I remember the incident when my brother [President Kennedy] lost a baby to hyaline membrane disease. The child lived two days and then died at the Children's Hospital in Boston. The interesting factor and force of all of this is that, if the child had been born two years later, it would have survived. The progress that was made in medical research would have permitted the child to survive. Here was the person who was the President of the United States, with all of the assets that he could have, and still was unable to see a positive outcome of this.

.....

KENNEDY: I was elected to the Senate, and in the early years as my family arrived I was exposed to the power of asthma with a small child, Patrick [Kennedy]. We detected when he was two that he was a chronic asthmatic. He had the test that is given to children, where they have pinpricks along their arm—I think it's 24 pinpricks—of different kinds of allergies. His arm looked like a nuclear meltdown; it just absolutely reddened, all of it. He was allergic to everything.... Since he was chronic, there was a whole series of different types of medications that they would talk about, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. That continued all the way up through his graduation from Andover, even in his last year at Andover.

No issue was more important to him than working to ensure that all Americans had access to quality medical treatment.



May 1986. Senator Kennedy discusses health care reform.



February 1989. Senator Kennedy calls on Congress to pass the Family and Medical Leave Act.



1993. Senator Kennedy attends a health care hearing with First Lady Hillary Clinton and Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS).



July 1994. Senator Kennedy calling for health care reform on Capitol Hill.

How the Health Care System in the U.S. Is Broken and Unfair

KENNEDY: Now we're probably into '74...the dramatic time that I had in the Dana-Farber Institute in Boston with my son Teddy. He had a treatment and we found out that he had this leg cancer that required the loss of his leg.... After we made a judgment about which regime we were going to follow, ...it required that Teddy spend three days every three weeks at the Children's Hospital in Boston, taking methotrexate, which is a medication that helps kill cancer cells, and this other medication [citraovorum] that helps to alleviate some of the adverse effects of methotrexate. That involved me giving him shots, which I did, both before he came on up to Boston and then right after he had finished the immediate treatment—for the next couple of days intensively, and in the night a couple of times, and then periodically, every four or five days after that....

What happened was, after two or three months [of Teddy Kennedy Jr.'s cancer treatment], the NIH [National Institutes of Health] took this off the list of regimes that they were supporting for experimental research. The whole regime had been completed. NIH had enough material to wind up their conclusions....

YOUNG: This was on an experimental research basis?

KENNEDY: Experimental research basis by the NIH. There were probably less than a hundred that had gone through it, but they had had positive numbers on that. Before that, it was very tough; the survival rate was not good, you know, 15 to 20 percent. But after this it was 85 or 90 percent. So that was enormously encouraging.

After about three months of my being involved in it, they had completed the whole regime for it. While it's an experimental drug, it's paid for by the company or whoever is producing it. But once it's stopped, the payment stops, and these families had to pick it up. Since it's an experiment, none of the insurance would cover it, except mine, which is Senate insurance, federal employees' insurance. The cost is \$2,700 a treatment. These parents would be in the waiting room—they had sold their house for \$20,000 or \$30,000, or mortgaged it completely, eating up all their savings, and they could only fund their treatment for six months, or eight months, or a year—and they were asking the doctor what chance their child had if they could only do half the treatment. Did they have a 50 percent chance of survival? A 60 percent chance of survival?

This was a very powerful presentation, in terms of starkness, about health and health insurance and coverage, and basically the moral issue presented here. We were all in the same circumstance. This is a very rare disease that could have happened to anybody. It happened to a United States Senator; it happened to children of working families. There was nothing that they could do about it, and they were being put through this kind of system. This is about as stark as you can get, in terms of the compelling aspects of this issue....

KENNEDY: At the time that we were debating family and medical leave, these families would lose their jobs if they didn't show up, let alone get paid for it, you know? They would either lose their job for not showing up, or at least lose their pay, because they didn't have the kind of coverage that we had in the United States Senate.... I spent six months in the hospital and five months in a Stryker frame—six months in all—when my back was broken, and I saw the dedication of the people. I knew it was costing a chunk of change for the insurance companies to cover my health insurance on it, but it didn't present itself—the starkness, the compelling aspects—

YOUNG: Pocketbook issues.

KENNEDY: —about the pocketbook. And that has never left me.

KENNEDY: It was two families that had children who had spina bifida. In the U.S. family the mother was a schoolteacher and the husband was a construction worker.... They went through all their savings looking after this child, and the result was that the state was going to take away the child because the parents could no longer take care of this child. You had the mother and the father completely distraught about this. This was out in Chicago. Then—this was very interesting—in Canada, the family with the spina bifida child, and they were taking care of it. While the mother had the spina bifida child, she had a family of four: three of them had graduated from high school and were out. She had one left, and she went and adopted three children who were disabled, and the governmental system paid for taking care of them—the food and the clothing and a stipend for the housing. You'd ask the mother why she took in these children and the mother's response was, "I want to teach this child what love is all about."

You had this dramatic contrast between the system that was just wringing the last ounce of humanity out of a family, and this other system that was dealing with it in a humane and decent way, and a more economic way in terms of the whole process. I mean that was

just one—I can remember it just as clearly as I'm here. You know, these things don't leave you....

KENNEDY: I use the example of the parents that hear a child cry in the night and wonder whether they are \$485 sick, because that's what it costs to go to an emergency room. They listen to the child. Is the child getting better or sicker? They wait until the child finally goes to sleep and wonder whether the child is going to be worse in the morning, because they can't afford the \$500. Or they take that \$500 that they put aside to educate their kids, and it's gone. And that is what's happening all across the country. So this aspect of health and the coverage and the rest of the policy issues are all rooted in a very early association and personal attachment....

KENNEDY: Even Teddy, who has had cancer—even though he's 47 years old, he could not get an individual insurance policy today, because he's had cancer, even though he's as healthy and strong as can be. He could not go out and buy, in the United States, an individual policy. That's the way it is. That's the way the system works on this....

KENNEDY: Under the current system, in order for a person to get services for a child, they have to work at the Medicaid level. If they work above that, they don't get the services. You have people who are enormously talented, who've got skills and families, but they still have to sacrifice and work at the Medicaid level in order to get these services for their child. It's enormously unfair.

These parents had sold their house for \$20,000 or \$30,000, or mortgaged it completely, eating up all their savings, and they could only fund their treatment for six months, or eight months, or a year—and they were asking the doctor what chance their child had if they could only do half the treatment.

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*Congress was going to have to take action again
for the second step, so what we were faced with was that
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of battles for the next four or six years.*

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This legislation permitted them to increase their salaries and still get their services. You pay more taxes, but it had a step-up so they could get several thousand dollars more and still maintain—and if they moved up, they gradually had a reduction in terms of the money that they got. So this was a winner for the families; it was a winner for the whole Medicaid because it reduced the amounts that were being drawn as these people made more money; and it increased the money for the federal revenue, so the taxpayers were greater protected.

Carter and Health Care Reform

KENNEDY: When he [Jimmy Carter] got elected, the question was—he had given certain indications that he was going to be for it, but that he wasn't going to be for the bill that I supported and the Democratic left supported. Then the question came about what the timing was going to be. As we were moving along during that time, he kept delaying putting forward a proposal, and it developed that he was going to put forth principles but wasn't going to put forward legislation.

He talked about doing cost containment. Health planning was going to be first, and then he was going to try and do cost containment next, before we had coverage. Then it eventually kind of deteriorated, where he was getting caught up with the high rates of inflation, economic challenges, and he was going to support a step-by-step program in health care, where he could take a step, and if other

economic indicators didn't come out quite right, he could either delay or pause before they'd take the next step.

Congress was going to have to take action again for the second step, so what we were faced with was that we were going to have not just one battle, but a series of battles for the next four or six years, and passing every two years an add-on in terms of health, which was a nonstarter.

Clinton and Health Care Reform

KENNEDY: There was a great sense of anticipation and a great sense of hope that we'd finally have health care legislation that was worthy of its name. It was clear that he [Bill Clinton] was for it, and that this was an important issue in the course of the campaign. It certainly appeared at the start of the administration that we were on track to get health care, but that hope gradually deteriorated and fizzled for a number of reasons.

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KENNEDY: So this is sort of the start, and there were just a variety of different things that affected the whole effort in terms of the success of the proposal. First of all, there was the extraordinary amount of time it took for them [Clinton Administration] to develop their particular proposal. Rather than taking any of the existing proposals and modifying them slightly and moving ahead, they wanted to do their own kind of health care proposal, and to take into consideration a lot of different suggestions and ideas. So they developed the task forces that were set up to try to sift through various ideas and suggestions.... I think everybody understands now that that was a catastrophic mistake.

YOUNG: Yes. Was there any consultation about this strategy with people in the Congress?

KENNEDY: No.

YOUNG: They just went ahead and did it?

KENNEDY: They thought that they could get it done in a timely way. They underestimated the complexity of it, and then they were faced with a variety of other kinds of issues that came up during this period of time, which diverted the focus and attention away from it.... They made the judgment decision to be more specific. They had very able, gifted, talented people, very knowledgeable, and they were



Senator Kennedy and First Lady Hillary Clinton visit Boston Children's Hospital.



Senator Kennedy and his son, Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI), attend the signing of the Mental Health Parity Act with President George W. Bush in the Oval Office in November 2008.

The politics was that the Republicans decided not to let anything pass. This could have been health care, it could have been education, it could have been the environment, it could have been tax policy.

EDWARD KENNEDY

going to get it and get it right, and get the best people to try and get that right and do it in a timely way. But the time slipped. It became disjointed, it became uncoordinated, and there were a number of other factors that interceded and became important, and moved and shifted the calendar back on it, and that caused an unraveling of the whole process. And as the process deteriorated, the groups that were focused in opposition became stronger and stronger, and their ability to influence became greater, and they had very considerable success. . . .

The politics was that Phil Gramm and the Republicans decided not to let anything pass. This could have been health care, it could have been education, it could have been the environment, it could have been tax policy. They recognized, you have a Democratic President, a Democratic House and Senate, and the best way to undermine that is to show they are ineffective, and what came tripping down the pathway was health care—I think it could have been anything else. . . . and they blew the whistle—[Newt] Gingrich blew the whistle—and said, “We’re not going to pass anything on through,” and these lemmings just followed. The record is there on it. They had a unified front in opposition to it. There was a small group of Republicans that tried to work with a group of Democrats at the very end of it, but it wasn’t a serious kind of effort. Bob Kerrey was involved in it, but it wasn’t a serious effort.

They made a judgment decision in this process—this was about ’94—that they weren’t going to let it go through. They made a calculated political judgment on it, and they were right, and Democrats lost, big time, in House and Senate. They served their special interests in terms of the insurance companies, in terms of the drug companies, in terms of the health industry professionals. They got massive contributions from them. Those groups got set up and were very effective, and it just ended the whole effort with a whimper.

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KENNEDY: It’s basically a miscalculation on their part, an obsession with the details. In one sense you had to sort of admire the fact that they were trying to give as much information and get this information out. On the other hand, just strategically, in retrospect, it should have been done in another way. But you can’t take away from the fact that they were trying to get this out. . . .

It was a combination of different elements, but the basic blame, clearly, I would give to the Republicans. I mean, we deal with other complicated issues up there.


The State Children's Health Care Program (SCHIP)

KENNEDY: I worked out legislation with Orrin Hatch, and the basic compromises on the legislation that were put in are why the opposition of President [George W.] Bush at this time [2008] makes very little sense: One, I wanted to have Medicaid standard for health care coverage for children, which is very extensive coverage because it has a lot of prenatal care. Well, it has not only the prenatal care, but it also has a good deal of preventive care. Hatch wouldn't go for that. He said, "What we are going to have to do is describe the services, and we'll say that the state has to provide a certain number of them, but we're not going to require some." Some of the ones that he wouldn't require were dental care and eye care. We left it as an option in terms of prenatal care, I believe.

The second big compromise is we said that it would all be administered by private insurance companies, within a certain context. So he got the privatization and he got states making the judgment decision on the benefit part: the two big, big compromises, from our point of view, which is the compromise with the Republicans. He would be able to say this was a state program. And then they changed it from Hatch-Kennedy to—the Republicans had insisted that they call it a *state* children's health insurance, to make sure it wasn't going to be a federal program. State, SCHIP, they insisted on it and that was eventually dropped.

That had a lot of complications to it because the Clinton Administration opposed it because it had budget implications. President Clinton had made an agreement with the Republicans—Trent Lott—on the Budget, and Trent Lott wasn't going to support the alterations and change, so they resisted and resisted and resisted it. It was effectively defeated once, and then we were able to save it at the very end. At the very end we had everyone pulling for it, including Senator [Hillary] Clinton. By that time we had Marian Edelman, who had been rather cool to it in the beginning. They thought we were going to draw money away from Head Start and other kinds of programs, and they weren't—Hatch and I went around and spoke to all of these organizations here in Washington, together, putting in a very considerable amount of time and effort and energy to get that moving.

They had a very tumultuous meeting in the Finance Committee. I called up Orrin and laid into him that I thought he was selling out. He's never forgotten this thing. Eventually, as the result of the meeting, they did save it, but they had to cut back on it a bit. But he has never forgotten my conversation with him.



*You had industrial unions that wanted it,
because a third of all of their premiums that are paid
are being used to cover somebody else.*

EDWARD KENNEDY

Labor and Universal Health Care

KENNEDY: You know, it was always very interesting with Labor, because there was a great dichotomy. You had industrial unions that wanted it, because a third of all of their premiums that are paid are being used to cover somebody else. So those are lost wages. They understand that their economic interest is in getting universal coverage, because then they weren't going to be picking up and paying for people who didn't have it. So that made sense. They were going to increase their wages and have a stronger position, and it was sort of the right thing to do for other workers. They liked it. That's one part of it.

The other part of Labor said that they don't want any part of this program for universal coverage, because they want to be able to deliver it as part of their organizing. They want to be able to go out and say, "Join my union because we're going to give you health insurance." They're not as interested in universal coverage, because that's going to take away a major kind of an appeal that they would have.

So you had lip service. You had some who were very strongly for it—the industrial unions; others who said they were for it and really were not; and others who basically sat on their hands because they said, "Why are we going along with this Kennedy proposal when we can use this as an organizing tool? We're losing members, and we're losing support in terms of working—this is a key way of getting it. It's got a lot of grassroots support, and we use it as an organizing tool."



Everybody's crying for food safety. People on the one hand all want much safer food, and on the other hand they don't want government involved.

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*We're talking about the general good.
And this is complex. It's enormously complex.*

EDWARD KENNEDY

The Prospect of Passing Health Care Reform under President Obama

KENNEDY: I think it's important, probably, in the discussion, to think about what is out there now [2008] in terms of the future, and I think this: On the plus side, you have the fact that there's pretty much an agreement about what is going to be in the bill, which is a lot different. Between Barack [Obama] and Hillary [Clinton], there's pretty much agreement on it. There are some tweaks and changes, but there's a pretty good common understanding about the details of it. People would know how to draft that very easily, very quickly, if they were going that way.

Secondly, I think there is a much better understanding and awareness, because many of the states have already debated these issues now. Massachusetts has debated it, California has debated it, the state of Washington has, Maine has, Vermont has. There are a number of states that have gone through these discussions and debates.

And the language has altered and changed. I was always against individual mandates, but Massachusetts got an individual mandate, and I can live with that today. There are people who had locked on the positions that, "We are not going to have a mandate on companies and corporations." Well, they have—the Republicans went along with that in Massachusetts. They're not as worked up about that aspect of it. They call it something different. I'm not as worked up about individual mandates. The philosophical and ideological differences that were out there, that put people at people's throats, have been in a very important way adjusted and modified, and—not melted away, but—that's two....

On the other side, the other side knows how to—you have an increasing hostility towards government and government solutions and resolutions to problems, and this is going to have to take a governmental hand. You can have the private sector very much involved in it, and you ought to have that, but it's going to have a governmental framework. This increasing hostility towards anything that appears—There's enormous ambivalence.

Everybody's crying for food safety. We're going to have a good food safety bill, and that's going to mean that government is going to—you're going to have to have registration; you're going to have to have inspection; you're going to have to have the power of recall in that. And yet, people on the one hand all want much safer food, and on the other hand they don't want government involved. There's this incredible dichotomy that's going to make it somewhat more difficult.

Secondly, it used to be more for the coverage on health care; now, it's the cost. It's much more cost now than coverage, even though you've got a large number of people that aren't covered. The cost is the thing. If you look through your polls in there, that's the thing that is of most concern. People don't want to pay any more. They think we're paying too much, so they don't want to pay any more. In these [proposed] programs—Barack's...and Hillary's...—they're going to have to be able to show how they're going to be able to deal with this. There are going to be a lot of people whose ox is going to get gored in this, who are going to lose out on money, and there are going to be people who are going to be unemployed, and that's going to create a lot of problems. Those are going to be in specific areas where—We're talking about the general good. And this is complex. It's enormously complex.



Senator Kennedy attends the Health Care Summit in the East Room of the White House in March 2009.



LIST of SENATOR KENNEDY'S INTERVIEWS

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|------------|---|------------------|--|
| 1.21.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 2.18–19.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 3.23–24.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 3 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 6.3–4.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 4 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 6.17.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 5 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 8.2.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 6 | Hyannis Port, MA | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 10.14.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 7 | Hyannis Port, MA | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 12.19.05 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 8 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 2.27.06 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 9 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 3.20.06 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 10 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 5.8.06 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 11 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 8.14.06 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 12 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 8.15.06 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 13 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 11.29.06 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 14 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 12.1.06 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 15 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 1.6.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 16 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 2.12.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 17 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 4.3.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 18 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 5.30.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 19 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 5.31.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 20 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 8.7.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 21 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 8.8.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 22 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 10.8.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 23 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 10.9.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 24 | Hyannis Port, MA | James S. Young |
| 12.9.07 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 25 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 1.7.08 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 26 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 1.7.08 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 27 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 2.19.08 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 28 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 3.28.08 | Edward M. Kennedy , Interview 29 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |



President Barack Obama and Senator Kennedy on the day the president signed into law the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act of 2009.



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1. Jim Young and Steve Knott of the Miller Center interview Kennedy at his Senate office in January 2005.

2. Kennedy with Jim Young after a Miller Center oral history interview in Hyannis Port in 2006.

3. Kennedy with Rob Martin of the Miller Center after an oral history interview in Hyannis Port.

4. Janet Heininger and Steve Knott with Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) during a Miller Center oral history interview.

5. Vicki and Senator Kennedy with Steve Knott, Jim Young, and Jane Rafal Wilson in Hyannis Port during a Miller Center oral history interview.

6. Kennedy and Jim Young in Hyannis Port after a Miller Center oral history interview.



LIST of EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEWS

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|------------|---|---------------------|---|
| 11.4.04 | Dan H. Fenn, Jr. | Charlottesville, VA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 2.17.05 | Samuel Beer | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.31.05 | John Culver , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott (chair), Gregg Lindskog, Paul Martin |
| 4.20.05 | Edward Martin | Dennisport, MA | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young |
| 5.18.05 | Theodore Sorensen , Interview 1 | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 6.16.05 | John Dingell | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 7.8.05 | Mary Frackleton | Hampton, NH | Stephen F. Knott |
| 7.8.05 | George Cabot Lodge | Boston, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 7.11.05 | Betty Taymor | Boston, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 7.12.05 | Barbara Souliotis | Boston, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 7.13.05 | Alice Fitzgerald and Patricia Hagan | Cambridge, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 7.13.05 | K. Dun Gifford | Cambridge, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 7.19.05 | William J. vanden Heuvel , Interview 1 | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 7.20.05 | Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 8.8.05 | Charles Tretter | Boston, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.9.05 | Donald Dowd | Springfield, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.9.05 | Eugene Dellea | Pittsfield, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.10.05 | Robert Healy | Scituate, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.11.05 | Joseph Gargan | Hyannis, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.12.05 | Edmund and Doris Reggie , Interview 1 | Nantucket, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.13.05 | John Kenneth Galbraith | Cambridge, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 9.27.05 | Albert Reynolds | Dublin, Ireland | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 9.28.05 | Garret Fitzgerald, Michael Lillis, Sean Donlon | Dublin, Ireland | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 9.29–30.05 | John Hume | Dublin, Ireland | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young |
| 9.30.05 | Dermot Ahern | Dundalk, Ireland | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young |
| 10.10.05 | Charles Haar | Cambridge, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 10.10.05 | Gerard Doherty | Boston, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 10.11.05 | Richard Clasby | Quincy, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 10.11.05 | Ann Gargan | Milton, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 10.24.05 | Thomas Francis Eagleton | St. Louis, MO | Janet E. Heining, Paul Martin, James S. Young (chair) |
| 10.25.05 | John Claggett Danforth | St. Louis, MO | Janet E. Heining (chair), Paul Martin, James S. Young |



LIST of EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEWS continued

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|----------|------------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| 10.31.05 | Joseph Gargan , Interview 2 | Charlottesville, VA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 11.27.05 | Paul Kirk , Interview 1 | Boston, MA | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 11.29.05 | Nicholas Katzenbach | Princeton, NJ | Kent Germany, Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 11.30.05 | John Douglas | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.10.06 | Charles McCurdy Mathias | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 3.20.06 | Walter Mondale | Minneapolis, MN | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 3.22.06 | George Stanley McGovern | Charlottesville, VA | Kent Germany, Stephen F. Knott (chair), Paul Martin |
| 5.9.06 | Neil MacNeil | Bethesda, MD | Charles O. Jones, Paul Martin |
| 5.10.06 | Alan Simpson | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, Stephen F. Knott (chair) |
| 5.13.06 | Desmond Tutu | Williamsburg, VA | Stephen F. Knott, James S. Young (chair) |
| 5.15.06 | Robert Dole | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 5.16.06 | Warren Rudman | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, Stephen F. Knott |
| 5.24.06 | Orrin Hatch | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 5.25.06 | James Sasser | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, Stephen F. Knott |
| 6.5.06 | Robert C. Byrd | Washington, DC | Russell Riley, James S. Young (chair) |
| 6.29.06 | Charles Ferris | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 7.12.06 | Adam Clymer | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 7.13.06 | John Farrell | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 8.16.06 | Edward Brooke | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.16.06 | Melody Barnes | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 8.28.06 | Michael Myers | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, Stephen F. Knott (chair) |
| 8.28.06 | Esther Olavarria | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 9.14.06 | Martin Nolan | Cambridge, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 9.15.06 | Thomas Costin | Nahant, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 9.19.06 | Thad Cochran | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, Stephen F. Knott |
| 9.19.06 | Michael Enzi | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, Stephen F. Knott (chair) |
| 9.26.06 | Barbara Mikulski | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 10.2.06 | Dale DeHaan | Charlottesville, VA | Stephen F. Knott (chair), Darby Morrisroe |
| 10.17.06 | Ellis Mottur , Interview 1 | Charlottesville, VA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 11.15.06 | Thomas Oliphant | Charlottesville, VA | Stephen F. Knott (chair), Darby Morrisroe |
| 11.30.06 | Ellis Mottur , Interview 2 | Bethesda, MD | Stephen F. Knott |

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|-------------|---|-----------------|--|
| 12.1.06 | David Broder | Arlington, VA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 12.4.06 | John Lewis | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 12.7.06 | Theodore Sorensen , Interview 2 | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 12.7.06 | William J. vanden Heuvel , Interview 2 | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 1.25.07 | William Taylor , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 1.26.07 | Nan Aron | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 1.26.07 | Ralph Neas | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott, Paul Martin |
| 2.2.07 | Burton V. Wides | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 2.20.07 | E.J. Dionne | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott (chair), Paul Martin |
| 2.20.07 | William Taylor , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 2.21.07 | Marcia Greenberger | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, Stephen F. Knott |
| 2.21.07 | Judith Lichtman | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining (chair), Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.9.07 | Stanley Jones , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.14.07 | Stuart Altman | Arlington, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.14.07 | Thomas Oliphant , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.20.07 | Phillip Caper | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 3.20.07 | David Blumenthal | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining (chair), James S. Young |
| 3.21.07 | Rashi Fein | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining (chair), James S. Young |
| 3.22.07 | Olati Johnson | New York, NY | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.22.07 | Antonia Hernandez | New York, NY | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.23.07 | James King | Gloucester, MA | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.27.07 | Carolyn Osolinik | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 3.28.07 | Peter Parham | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.29.07 | David Sutphen | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.29.07 | Michael J. Frazier | Rockville, MD | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.30.07 | Ronald Weich | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 3.30.07 | Jeffrey H. Blattner | Washington, DC | Stephen F. Knott |
| 5.3.07 | John Tunney , Interview 1 | New York, NY | Stephen F. Knott (chair), James S. Young |
| 5.7.07 | Lee Goldman | Flat Rock, NC | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.8.07 | Robert Bates | Friendship, MD | Paul Martin |
| 5.9.07 | James J. Mongan | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |



LIST of EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEWS continued

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|----------|-------------------------------|-----------------|--|
| 5.23.07 | Thomas Susman | Washington, DC | Paul Martin |
| 5.23.07 | Max Fine | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 6.5.07 | John Siegenthaler | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 6.5.07 | John Culver, Interview 2 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 6.19.07 | David Burke | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 6.20.07 | Paul Kirk, Interview 2 | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 6.27.07 | David Nexon | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.5.07 | Judy Feder | McLean, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.13.07 | Christopher Jennings | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.26.07 | Robert Bates, Interview 2 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 7.26.07 | Stuart Eizenstat | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.26.07 | Thurgood Marshall, Jr. | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.27.07 | Sheila Burke | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining (chair), James S. Young |
| 8.7.07 | Alice McGoff | Boston, MA | Beatriz Swerdlow |
| 8.7.07 | Melvin Miller | Boston, MA | Beatriz Swerdlow |
| 9.10.07 | Anthony Fauci | Bethesda, MD | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.11.07 | Willis D. Gradison, Jr. | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.14.07 | Stanley Jones, Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining= |
| 9.21.07 | John Hilley | Great Falls, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.24.07 | C. Everett Koop | Hanover, NH | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.25.07 | Patti B. Saris | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.5.07 | Michael Iskowitz, Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.19.07 | Ira Magaziner | Quincy, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.27.07 | James Flug, Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young (chair) |
| 12.4.07 | James Flug, Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young (chair) |
| 12.12.07 | Mathilde Krim | New York, NY | Janet E. Heining= |
| 12.14.07 | Ranny Cooper, Interview 1 | New York, NY | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young (chair) |
| 12.18.07 | James Flug, Interview 3 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 1.23.08 | Joseph Califano | New York, NY | Janet E. Heining |
| 2.25.08 | Ranny Cooper, Interview 2 | New York, NY | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young (chair) |
| 3.7.08 | Angela Williams | Chicago, IL | Janet E. Heining |

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| 3.9.08 | David Kessler | San Francisco, CA | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.24.08 | Ellen Guiney | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.25.08 | A. Clayton Spencer | Cambridge, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.25.08 | Tom Payzant | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.9.08 | David Burke , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 4.10.08 | Anne Strauss | New York, NY | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.11.08 | Terry Hartle | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.13.08 | Marshall Smith | Menlo Park, CA | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.15.08 | Larry Horowitz , Interview 1 | Atherton, CA | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 4.16.08 | Larry Horowitz , Interview 2 | Atherton, CA | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 4.21.08 | Michael Iskowitz , Interview 2 | Sedona, AZ | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.3.08 | Nick Littlefield , Interview 1 | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 5.4.08 | Nick Littlefield , Interview 2 | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 5.8.08 | Barbara Lahage | Hull, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.9.08 | Nance Lyons | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.13.08 | Danica Petroschius | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.20.08 | Joel Packer | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.21.08 | John Jennings | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 6.17.08 | Stephen Breyer , Interview 1 | Cambridge, MA | James S. Young |
| 6.30.08 | Nick Littlefield , Interview 3 | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 7.1.08 | Nick Littlefield , Interview 4 | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 7.2.08 | Sandy (B. Alexander) Kress | Austin, TX | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.8.08 | Kenneth Feinberg | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 7.8.08 | Donald Riegle , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 7.15.08 | Melody Miller , Interview 1 | Arlington, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.16.08 | Mona Sarfaty | Philadelphia, PA | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.22.08 | Trent Lott | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 8.27.08 | Margaret Spellings | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.8.08 | Richard Riley | Greenville, SC | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.22.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 9.23.08 | David Boies | New York, NY | James S. Young |



LIST of EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEWS continued

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|----------|---|------------------------|--|
| 9.28.08 | Stephen Breyer , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 10.6.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 10.6.08 | Lester Hyman | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 10.7.08 | Melody Miller , Interview 2 | Arlington, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 10.9.08 | Nancy E. Soderberg | Jacksonville Beach, FL | Janet E. Heining |
| 10.13.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 3 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 10.20.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 4 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 10.27.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 5 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 11.6.08 | Paul R. McDaniel | Gainesville, FL | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.7.08 | Trina Vargo | Arlington, VA | Janet E. Heining (chair), James S. Young |
| 11.10.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 6 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 11.17.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 7 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 12.1.08 | Carey Parker , Interview 8 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 12.8.08 | Kathy Kruse | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 12.16.08 | Connie Garner , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 12.17.08 | Edmund M. and Doris Reggie , Interview 2 | Lafayette, LA | James S. Young |
| 12.19.08 | Sharon L. Waxman , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 2.2.09 | Mark L. Schneider , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 2.4.09 | Mark L. Schneider , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 2.11.09 | Robert E. Hunter | Arlington, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 2.14.09 | Nick Littlefield , Interview 5 | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 2.15.09 | Nick Littlefield , Interview 6 | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 2.15.09 | Natalya and Boris Katz | Cambridge, MA | James S. Young |
| 2.17.09 | Paul Donovan | Natick, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 2.17.09 | Galina Nizhnikov Veremkroit | Arlington, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 2.18.09 | Alma and Brian T. Hart | Bedford, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.6.09 | Richard G. Lugar | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.10.09 | Thomas M. Rollins , Interview 1 | McLean, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 13.18.09 | Jan H. Kalicki | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.24.09 | Mary Beth Cahill | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.3.09 | Stuart H. Shapiro , Interview 1 | Bala Cynwyd, PA | Janet E. Heining |

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|-------------|--|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 4.6.09 | Nancy Kassebaum Baker | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.22.09 | Thomas M. Rollins , Interview 2 | McLean, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.27.09 | Laurence H. Tribe | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.28.09 | Elizabeth Shannon | Brookline, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.29.09 | Thomas A. Daschle | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 5.6.09 | John W. Warner | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 5.7.09 | Timothy A. Hanan | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 5.11.09 | Sharon L. Waxman , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 5.12.09 | Thomas M. Rollins , Interview 3 | McLean, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.14.09 | Thomas M. Rollins , Interview 4 | McLean, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.15.09 | Stuart H. Shapiro , Interview 2 | Bala Cynwyd, PA | Janet E. Heining |
| 5.29.09 | Milton S. Gwirtzman , Interview 1 | Bethesda, MD | Janet E. Heining |
| 6.10.09 | Exchange Students: Syed Asad ali Shah, Mohammed al-Amer, Zaharra al-Ubaidi, Shuhd Al-Sharki | Washington, DC | James S. Young, Virginia H. Young |
| 6.18.09 | Anthony Lewis | Cambridge, MA | James S. Young |
| 6.18.09 | Robert P. Fitzgerald, Jr. | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 6.19.09 | Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. | Charlottesville, VA | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.6.09 | Robert Shrum , Interview 1 | Sagamore Beach, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.7.09 | Robert Shrum , Interview 2 | Sagamore Beach, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.7.09 | Elizabeth Philipps | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.8.09 | Ken Regan | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 7.22.09 | Terri Robinson , Interview 1 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 8.5.09 | Milton Gwirtzman , Interview 2 | Bethesda, MD | Janet E. Heining |
| 8.5.09 | Patrick Leahy | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 8.25.09 | Terri Robinson , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.1.09 | Donald Riegle , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 9.10.09 | Birch Bayh | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 9.22.09 | John Culver , Interview 3 | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 19.28.09 | Jim Manley | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 10.12.09 | John Tunney , Interview 2 | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 10.13.09 | George Miller | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 10.16.09 | A. Lee Fentress | Charlottesville, VA | James S. Young |



LIST of EDWARD M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEWS continued

| Date | Interviewee | Location | Interviewer |
|----------|--|---------------------|--|
| 10.16.09 | James Young | Charlottesville, VA | A. Lee Fentress |
| 10.16.09 | John McCain | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 10.16.09 | Michael Myers , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.9.09 | Barbara Souliotis , Interview 2 | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.9.09 | Michael Dukakis | Boston, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.9.09 | Wyche Fowler | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 11.10.09 | Stephanie Cutter | Cambridge, MA | Janet E. Heining |
| 11.10.09 | Curran Raclin | Cambridge, MA | James S. Young |
| 11.11.09 | Caroline Raclin | Boston, MA | James S. Young |
| 12.9.09 | Kara Kennedy, Patrick Kennedy, Edward M. Kennedy, Jr. | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 12.16.09 | Claude Hooton | San Antonio, TX | Janet E. Heining |
| 1.29.10 | Maria Shriver, Robert S. Shriver, III | Santa Monica, CA | Janet E. Heining |
| 2.18.10 | Henry Waxman | Los Angeles, CA | Janet E. Heining |
| 3.25.10 | David Espo | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 4.8.10 | Victoria Reggie Kennedy | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 4.22.10 | Cindy McGinty | Bloomfield, CT | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.23.10 | William G. Barry | New City, NY | Janet E. Heining |
| 4.29.10 | David Bowen, Mark Childress, & Michael Myers | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 4.30.10 | Nancy Pelosi | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 5.3.10 | Larry Horowitz , Interview 3 | Mountain View, CA | James S. Young |
| 5.17.10 | Barack Obama | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 5.26.10 | Joseph R. Biden | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining, James S. Young |
| 5.27.10 | Connie Garner , Interview 2 | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 6.18.10 | Harry Reid | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 6.21.10 | John Kerry | Washington, DC | Janet E. Heining |
| 7.13.10 | Greg Craig | Washington, DC | James S. Young |
| 11.8.10 | Sean O’Huiginn | Dublin, Ireland | Russell L. Riley, James S. Young (chair) |
| 11.8.10 | Bertie Ahern | Dublin, Ireland | Russell L. Riley, James S. Young (chair) |
| 11.11.10 | Gerry Adams | Belfast, Ireland | Russell L. Riley, James S. Young (chair) |
| 11.18.10 | Niall O’Dowd | New York, NY | James S. Young |
| 9.6.11 | George Mitchell | New York, NY | James S. Young |



Vicki and Senator Kennedy meet with the oral history staff at the Miller Center in Charlottesville, Virginia.



Interviewers

*Edward M. Kennedy Institute
for the United States Senate*

A. Lee Fentress

*Miller Center,
University of Virginia*

Kent Germany
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Charles O. Jones
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Darby Morrisroe
Russell L. Riley
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James S. Young
Virginia Young

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