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# The War in Afghanistan:

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**Burke Chair  
in Strategy**

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## **The US and ISAF Waste Eight Years Losing By Default**

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- **Afghan government fails the Afghan people. Power brokers, militias, corrupt officials alienate the people.**
  - **US, allied, and ISAF failures to control funding and contracts become the driving force that raises Afghan corruption to unacceptable levels.**
  - **No serious effort to address corruption and lack of capability in Afghan government, rise of corruption, and alienation of people.**
  - **US gives priority to Iraq while spinning false sense of progress in Afghanistan.**
  - **Key Allies virtually deny or ignore the fact a serious war is developing.**
  - **Aid focuses on mid to long term programs as if war did not exist, but does not operate outside the increasingly limited areas which are not safe.**
  - **US and ISAF focus on defeating the insurgent in clashes in the field or in ways that threaten Afghans without offering any lasting protection.**
  - **No consistent or meaningfully resource effort to create an effective ANSF.**
  - **Failure to deal effectively with Pakistan creates a second war in a nation of far greater strategic importance.**
  - **No ISAF nation provides meaningful transparency and reporting to its legislature and people.**
-

# The ISAF View of Challenges and Risks

## Critical Risks :

- *Governance*: Ineffective or discredited
- *Pakistan*: Insufficient steps to curb insurgent support and sanctuary
- *Afghan ownership*: Inability to mobilize and share responsibility

## Key Challenges :

- Civ-mil disconnect in clear-hold-build campaign
- Divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines
- Waning domestic (coalition) political support
- Rejection of reconciliation by ‘spoilers’
- Resilient and growing insurgency
- Rejection or stagnation of ANP

## **“Winning” Must Address Seven Centers of Gravity**

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- Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.
  - Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.
  - Building up a much larger and more effective (**and enduring base for transition**) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
  - Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (**and lasting stability**) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.
  - Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational **civil and civil-military** effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.
  - **Dealing with Pakistan both in the NWFP** and as a potential failed state.
  - Making effective trade-offs with other US domestic and security interests
-


# **Shaping Today's War:**

## **The Growth of Insurgency from 2003-2009**


# ISAF Warns that “Time is Running Out...”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces


Kinetic Events by Geography



01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05




01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07




01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09


Kinetic Events by Week and Type



- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09)




# Total Weekly Kinetic Events 7-08 to 9-10



Kinetic Events (KE) include Direct Fire (DF), Indirect Fire (IDF), Surface to Air Fire (SAFIRE), Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events. IED events comprise IED exploded, IED found/cleared, mine strike, mine found/cleared, and turn-ins.

There have been increases in all methods of attacks, except IEDs, which were lower in August 2010 than they were in August 2009, and direct fire (DF) is increasing at a higher rate than indirect fire (IDF). This is possibly due to the amount of resources it takes to attack utilizing IDFs versus DF and IEDs. Overall kinetic events are up 300 percent since 2007 and up an additional 70 percent since 2009. Total kinetic events increased nearly 55 percent over the previous quarter and 65 percent compared to the third quarter, 2009, as Figure 12 below indicates. The overall increase was driven primarily by increased incidents of direct fire. Insurgent-initiated attacks also increased this quarter by over 60 percent, and direct fire attacks comprised the majority of this increase. The rise in violence is partly attributable to the increase in Coalition Forces and ANSF as well as greater operational tempo. The sharp increase in insurgents' use of direct fire attacks may be significant, as it suggests capacity limitations for the insurgents.


# Civilian Casualties vs. Security Incidents







The trend line for 2010 in the figure below manifests a decreasing trend in ISAF caused civilian casualties during a sample 12-week period, compared to the same time period during 2009. ISAF and coalition forces have experienced a reduction in civilian casualties in spite of a spike in total violence during the summer fighting season. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS increased during the summer months, in line with the seasonal violence trends. Figure 15 illustrates the total number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties during this reporting period. The drop in CIVCAS compared to last year is attributable to both ISAF and insurgents. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS from direct fire doubled during the second half of the reporting period compared to 2009, which is likely due to insurgent shift in TTPs to a much greater use of direct fire.




# Where the Fighting Was: End 2009



## But the Fighting is Only Part of the Story: Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: End-2009

-  **RED:** Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace **95 Total**
-  **Orange:** Insurgents have demonstrated capability **97 Total**
-  **Yellow:** Insurgents have limited capability **162 Total**
-  **White:** Not able to assess **45 Total**




Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.


# Meeting the Challenges of 2011




# Taliban Influence and Military Activity Coincides with Population Density



# ISAF Concept of Operations



# District Security Ratings



The map shows the 02 September 2010 security district assessment results. The arrows indicate positive or negative change compared to the 18 March 2010 security district assessment. The change captured in the above figure is a district that changed to or from a “satisfactory” rating. A “satisfactory” rating is equal to green (secure environment) or yellow (occasional threats). The proportion of the population residing within the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts living in areas rated as “satisfactory” remains relatively unchanged over the past three quarters, (a “satisfactory” rating comprises the highest two rating levels, “Secure Environment” and “Occasional Threats.”) The map in Figure 10 below depicts the current ratings of the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts as assessed by IJC. The arrows indicate districts that have increased to or decreased from a rating of “satisfactory” compared to June 2010. In RC-East, three districts’ ratings decreased from June to September 2010. In particular, the Nawah ye Barakzai district in RC Southwest improved its security rating.

# **Key Ongoing Challenges:**

**The Alliance: Unity of Effort  
versus National Caveats and  
“Branding”**

# Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War







# **Coping with the “Second Threat”**

**Afghan Governance and Corruption versus  
Popular Support in a War of Perceptions**

## Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat



# Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue



• Key district assessments in Governance and Development *improving slightly*

• Since Dec 2008, perceptions of GIROA's performance *improving*

▮ "How does the government do its job" (well / very well): then 36%; now 45%

▮ "Government is going in the right direction" (yes): then 43%; now 59%


04-Feb-10	29-Apr-10	Governance Assessment
5	5	Full Authority
26	28	Emerging
43	45	Unproductive
29	29	Dysfunctional
18	15	Non-Existent
1	0	Not Assessed

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives --a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).


Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded "yes" This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.

# Trends in Key Districts: 12/09 vs. 4/10

## Support for Afghan Government



## Comparative Security



**“Hold and Build”**

**The Challenge of Aid and  
Development**



# Total US Aid: \$51.5 Billion +

Cumulative appropriations as of FY 2010 increased by almost 30.1% over cumulative appropriations as of FY 2009, to more than \$51.50 billion.

Since FY 2002, security efforts have received the largest cumulative appropriations. Appropriations for security (nearly \$26.75 billion) account for more than 51.9% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance.

In FY 2010, security had a large gain in cumulative appropriations over FY 2009 (more than 32.5%), followed by governance and development (nearly 27.6%), and counter-narcotics (more than 20.8%).

Appropriations for FY 2010 amounted to nearly \$11.91 billion, surpassing FY 2009 levels by over 15.0%. This is the largest amount appropriated in a single year for the reconstruction effort.


FY 2010 appropriations for security increased by more than 17.0% over FY 2009 appropriations, to more than \$6.56 billion.

Of the total appropriations for FY 2010, security initiatives accounted for almost 55.1%, followed by governance and development with almost 26.8%.


Appropriations in FY 2010 for security (more than \$6.56 billion) are the second-largest appropriations made in a single year; the largest (nearly \$7.41 billion) occurred for security in FY 2007. (nearly \$41.72 billion) of total reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan since FY 2002.

Of this amount, almost 82.9% (more than \$34.56 billion) has been obligated, and more than 73.1% (nearly \$30.50 billion) has been disbursed.


APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND PERCENTAGE (\$ BILLIONS)



CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010 (\$ BILLIONS)



# Provinces with PRT Bases




Note: Map depicts PRT base locations; some PRTs manage projects for more than one province.

a. Balkh PRT also supports Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, and Samangan provinces.

Sources: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/8/2010; NATO, "PRTs," 4/29/2009; USAID, "Paktiya," accessed online 1/13/2010.

# Little or No Progress in Development in Many Areas

## Development




04-Feb-10	29-/ pr-10	Development Assessment
6	7	Sustainable Growth
16	19	Dependent Growth
47	46	Minimal Growth
40	41	Stalled Growth
10	7	Population at Risk
3	2	Not Assessed




# **Shaping Transition**

## **Creating an Effective ANSF and Laying the Groundwork for Transition**

# ANSF Historical and Future Growth




- Growth accelerating
- Challenged by attrition and retention




## Promising Growth, Challenges Remain

- Growth on track for 2010;
  - ANCOP attrition enduring concern
  - Entering historical summer lull
- ANA quality improving, however;
  - Leader development lagging
  - Officer & NCO shortages persist
- Keys to arresting ANP attrition:
  - Recruit-Train-Assign Model
  - Pay-Partner-Predictable Cycle
  - Leader Development & Literacy
- Ministerial capacity improving – projecting self sustaining in 2012


# ANA Growth






28

# ANP Growth



# ANP Effectiveness



# Development: Continuing Challenges

- Far too much aid still goes to showpiece projects.
- Fiscal controls and accountability still weak. Many corrupt contractors, Afghan power brokers.
- Aid, coupled to lack of adequate accountability and control of all other US and ISAF forms of contracting, still has a near crippling impact in increasing Afghan corruption.
- Still fail to properly validate requirements for many efforts, poor overall prioritization, and much of aid still goes to mid-to-long term projects and efforts of limited priority and practical value.
- Still often fail to provide basic accountability and transparency. Corruption, waste are still critical issues.
- Still often fail to provide credible and meaningful measures of effectiveness.
- Shortage of both experienced and effective aid workers and Afghan government personnel.
- Lack of coordination between donor countries and NGOs.
- Activity often responds to priorities of donor or capitals and not Afghan needs or wartime priorities: National branding.
- Many aid and advisory personnel still lack experience, and rotate in assignments too short to allow them to be fully effective.
- Deteriorating security in many areas sharply reduces ability to operate outside secure areas.
- Efforts at integrated civil-military plans are still largely a facade on the civil side.
- Anti-corruption efforts largely cosmetic and without any broad effect. Afghan power brokers dominate much of activity.
- Hollow “spin” about near to mid term prospects for “new Silk Road” and mining wealth.


# **Regional Operations**

**Finding the Right Priorities  
within Credible Time and  
Resource Levels**



# Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent Momentum at a Broader Level: Struggle for the Rest of the Population

**Most Threatened Population Areas**




*Prevent GIROA development and influence  
Limit population ability to choose*

## **Elements of Insurgent Influence**

- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

**Essential Security Influence**




*Create time and space  
Enable population opportunity to choose*

## **Elements of Security Influence**


- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable

# Beyond the South: A National Campaign









# SOF Effects: Degrading the Insurgency



**Effects on the Insurgency**



- > In the Last **90 Days**:
  - > 121 Insurgent Leaders Removed
  - > 505 Insurgents Detained
- > Instability among leadership is degrading insurgent operations
- > Reduced efficacy of Taliban "shadow governance"
- > IED networks being degraded



# **Centers of Gravity Fighting in the South**

# Operational Main Effort: RC-South

- Most significant Taliban influence over the population
- Protect the population in threatened or key areas
- Create time and space for governance to improve
- Create conditions for development, with freedom of movement and security along contiguous economic corridor




Demonstrable, near-term stabilization of the south is critical to success




# Central Helmand Update

Jun 2009



Jun 2010




- Central Helmand under insurgent control; Marjah insurgent-narco hub
- Restricted freedom of movement; Illegal checkpoints and IEDs
- Negative perception of GIRoA

- Initiative shifting to Coalition; presence in every major village
- Increased freedom of movement; IED threat remains
- Attitude of population trending positive

# Moshtarak Update (Marjah and Nad' Ali)


1 February 2010



ANSF		ANSF
2,734	+60%	4,794
ISAF	Increase	ISAF
2,107		3,157

Security Forces

1 June 2010



- Limited access by GIRoA officials
- Activities limited to provincial center

## Governance

- District Governors in place
- Councils functioning; limited by tashkil growth

- Schools: Limited or no attendance; madrasses open
- Clinics: Limited access; open only in Provincial Center

## Basic Services

- Schools: 81 teachers available; students returning to school
- Clinics: Many opening; two new clinics under construction

- Few bazaars open in Marjah and Nad' Ali
- Limited access to goods

## Commerce




- Four major bazaars open in Marjah; 100 new shops
- Expanding availability of goods



# Marjah is a Complex Civil-Military Challenge


## Where It May Take 12-18 Months

## More to Fully Establish “Clear, Hold and Build”






# Kandahar in Context






# Resilient and Complex Insurgency





# Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation



# Pakistan


## The Key Wild Card

# The Challenge of Pakistan

- **Pakistan is as or more complex than Afghanistan**
  - Tribal and religion overtones, yet strong national identity, multiple ethnicities, most desire some form of democracy, a worsening economy but a nuclear weapons state
- **Foreign intervention resented in most of the country**
  - Predominantly an Indian issue, but strong resentment against the US and UK; appears to be growing against Taliban
- **Tribal values and traditional core beliefs still dominate large parts of the country**
  - “Outsiders” trying to impose new ideas and beliefs create tension; nature of tribal traditions can supersede Islam
- **Army is perceived to be more capable (and dependable) than the government**
  - Regarded as a positive influence in the FATA and NWFP because they are locally recruited and able to work within local systems
- **Large numbers of internally displaced people from years of fighting, a poor economy and natural disasters**
  - Potential breeding ground for the Taliban...but offers opportunities for counter-radicalization programs
- **Violations of Pakistan sovereignty may contribute to radicalizing the population and diminishes credibility of the Government of Pakistan**
  - Demonstrates an inability of the government; perception they cannot protect their own; exacerbates anti-western sentiment

Staying the course in Pakistan as important as staying the course in Afghanistan


# Tribal Connections at Afghanistan/FATA (Pakistan) Border



Source: Afghan Opium Trade Programme, STAS/UNODC.



## Afghan-Pakistan Military Operations: March 2010



Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation's history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.