"Counterinsurgency on Contract: Project Camelot, Social Science, and American National Security in the Cold War[1]"

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Miller Center Fellowship Conference
Charlottesville, Virginia
May 10, 2007

[1] Excerpt from Chapter Four of "'The Social Scientists' War': Expertise in a Cold War Nation," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, August 2007.

Intellectual life in the boundary zone between academe and the national security state may have been fraught, but by early 1965, its inhabitants appeared to be on the verge of accomplishing their goal of seamlessly uniting military and scholarly pursuits. The Special Operations Research Office (SORO), a research office run by American University in Washington, D.C. and funded by the Army, was embarking on a ground-breaking, unprecedented study of the mechanisms that instigated violent social change. Code-named "Project Camelot," this multi-year, multi-million dollar study promised to put the research office on the map of elite academic social scientific research institutes. Heralded as the Manhattan Project of social science, Camelot would confront what many in the U.S. government viewed as the most pressing causes of instability and violence in the developing world—guerrilla insurgency and communist revolution. Describing the project as "a major assault by the social sciences on a pressing national problem," Camelot planners stressed that participants and sponsors should "anticipate the possibility of spectacular results."[2] But before planning was complete, the project precipitated a minor international incident and was unceremoniously cancelled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Instead of finding themselves at the forefront of Cold War social science, SORO's researchers wound up in the midst of a battle between the Pentagon and the State Department over which bureaucracy was best equipped to control foreign area research and direct American foreign policy in the communist-threatened developing world.

The Camelot incident has been treated by Cold War social scientists and historians alike as a crucial turning point in the history of military-funded research, the moment when the Cold War intellectual consensus exploded and the boundary zone between academe and the military

[2] "Project Camelot: A Research Concept Paper," August 1964, 20, AC 6904.2 Special Operations Research Office Box 1, Folder: "Project Camelot"—Theodore R. Vallance 1966, American University Archives and Special Collections. Collection hereafter cited as **SORO/AU**.

became uninhabitable.[3] In fact, the tale is rather more complicated. At the beginning of 1965, it seemed that members of SORO—they called themselves Sorons—were well on their way to gaining more institutional autonomy and intellectual freedom. By the year's end, they were subjected to more security classifications, more restrictions on their research designs, and new set of regulations that allowed the State Department to intrude upon their work. Camelot did not signal the end of the academic-military union in Cold War social science. Rather, it revealed a fault line between strictly academic and military-funded social researchers that would widen in the late 1960s, ultimately leading to the creation of a set of for-profit foreign affairs research companies detached from and unresponsive to academic social science.

The Rise of Project Camelot

Camelot was an ambitious project intellectually and organizationally. Its goal was nothing less than the creation of a model that could predict when and how social systems would undergo violent change. Instability and post-independence nation-building appeared to many policy makers to go hand in hand.[4] To cope with the ostensible increase in "low-level conflict" in the developing nations, Camelot's planners reasoned, the Army needed to know more about when internal wars break out, why, and what to do to circumvent violence. Camelot was

[3] See especially Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Mark Solovey, "Project Camelot and the 1960s Epistemological Revolution," *Social Studies of Science* 31 (2001): 171-206. See also Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). Ellen Herman provides a much more balanced interpretation of the academic response to Camelot in *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), Chapter 6.

[4] These insights were a reflection of development theories popular in government circles in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and of the Kennedy Administration's interest in counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Cf. David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele and Michael Latham, eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); and Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation-Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

motivated by the desire to achieve a greater social scientific and military understanding of "(a) the nature of social conflict, (b) the factors operative in the exacerbation of conflict, and (c) the effects of various postures on the course of conflict."[5] Armed with this information, Sorons and their military sponsors would create an early warning system for social revolutions and a set of statistically-validated procedures that would prescribe the interventions necessary to avert them. Anticipated to be a "quantum jump" in social research, Camelot was to be the biggest social science project completed in the postwar U.S. A three to four year effort requiring an estimated 140 professional man years, it was to be allocated between four and six million dollars of Defense funds. Camelot's planning staff expected to produce at least forty analytical reports by its conclusion in July 1968.[6] And because it was only a feasibility project—it was unclear, after all, if the creation of such a predictive model was possible given the state of knowledge and theory about conflict in the mid-1960s—if it were successful, further funds were sure to follow.

Camelot was to be the ultimate realization of the hybridization of military and academic concerns and expertise. According to the project's official Task Statement, which by necessity stressed the military pay-off of Camelot (the Task Statement was an internal Army document), the project would "assist the Army in planning for appropriate advisory and assistance operations in developing nations."[7] But Camelot's planners stressed that it would be far more than an applied, operational project of interest only to uniformed counterinsurgency units. Although motivated by policy considerations, the project would, its director insisted, "result in major

[5] "Project Camelot: A Research Concept Paper," 1, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: "Project Camelot"—Theodore R. Vallance 1966. "Postures" in this context means military actions.
[6] SORO, "Project Camelot: Design and Phasing," 1 February 1965, 34, 2, 52, Accession 79-0067, UD-WW Entry B-1, Folder 1302-01 Project Amelot [sic] Design and Phasing 65, Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives, College Park. Entry hereafter **Acc 79-0067**. On anticipated funding levels, see Herman, *Romance of American Psychology*, 156.
[7] SORO, "Task Statement: Methods for Predicting and Influencing Social Change and Internal War Potential (CAMELOT)," 17 December 1964, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (2) CAMELOT (Publicity)/1965.

theoretical and methodological advances."[8] Prediction of social change had to be rooted in a solid theoretical and empirical understanding of the basic processes of social conflict, an area of research still in its infancy. Researchers would spend the first year of their effort constructing an "analytical model," developed out of existing social research and supplemented by further empirical study, that identified which aspects of a social system—"social variables," in the language of planners—were relevant to social conflict. The project was thus grounded in academic research at the forefront of political development and internal warfare. The names of esteemed scholars such as Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, and Ithiel de Sola Pool graced the footnotes of Camelot's research design. Harry Eckstein's theory of revolution formed the backbone of the study's analytical frame. Eckstein argued that systematic understanding of revolution could only be reached once scholars learned to differentiate the "precipitants" of revolution—those events which spark violence, such as the formation of insurgent groups or conditions of economic deprivation—from its "preconditions"—the fundamental causes of revolution, like social "cleavage structures" or a society's "behavioral" characteristics.[9]

Endowed with an analytical model, Camelot would move into its second phase. Researchers would weigh the importance of all identified hypothetical preconditions and social variables by producing twenty-one case studies of internal warfare since 1940, ranging from the Argentinean Revolution of 1943 to the 1960 military coup in Turkey. Comparative analysis of these cases, in turn, would further refine the original social systems model by testing and validating, or rejecting, various hypotheses. Camelot's staff would spend the final two years of the project conducting five in-depth case studies of contemporary societies that appeared

[8] SORO, "Project Camelot: Design and Phasing," 2.
[9] Harry Eckstein, "Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, et. al, *Social Science Research and National Security*, A Report Prepared by the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 5 March 1963), 112; "Project Camelot: A Research Concept Paper," 4-7.

susceptible to revolution. By February 1965, Sorons had identified Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela as likely candidates, but considered substituting two of those nations with cases from Africa and Asia. Finally, after further refining their social systems model on the basis of these on-the-ground studies, Camelot would culminate in a "one-country study" that would serve as the final test of the accuracy and predictive quality of the model.[10]

To direct this unprecedented project, SORO hired Brooklyn College sociologist Rex Hopper. Hopper was an expert on Latin American revolutions, and had taught at the University of Texas, as well as at universities in Mexico, Argentina, and Paraguay. Like many of his peers at the research office, he had found his way to social science through a youthful dedication to social progress. He first ventured to Latin America in the 1920s as a missionary, but quickly discovered that mission work did not satisfy his lofty ambitions. Gripped with a desire to "contribute to the achievement of changes in the social structure," he returned to the United States to pursue a Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Texas. Hopper began studying revolution and social change in Latin America the 1930s.

As social change seemed to accelerate in the 1960s, Hopper's dedication to his work became more fervent. After spending a year on sabbatical from Brooklyn College to work at SORO, he gave up his university position to devote himself permanently to Project Camelot.[11] Hopper's interest in revolution was more than just academic. Indeed, by the early 1960s, he had become concerned that the U.S. was well on its way to revolution. His studies of Latin America had convinced him that violent social and political change was predated by the "emergence of a numerically significant, economically powerful, intellectually informed marginal group." Such a

[10] SORO, "Project Camelot: Design and Phasing," 29-39, 9. Each country study would also be published individually.
[11] Theodore Vallance to Harold L. Hutson, 13 Jan 1965, SORO/AU Personnel Records, Folder SORO (Personnel)/1965-6.

group, he feared, was beginning to form in the U.S. as computers supplanted humans in the work force. This "cybernation," he argued, would cause widespread unemployment, leaving a small, privileged elite in power. As the rest of the nation became politically alienated and economically obsolete, Hopper feared, the world's greatest democracy would fall into "militarized and cybernatized totalitarianism."[12]

Hopper's colleagues at SORO may not have been galvanized by a fear of impending social revolution in the U.S., but many did see in Camelot the opportunity to catalyze a profound change in American policy. Camelot researchers hoped they might provide a fresh approach to American foreign relations. Sociologist Jessie Bernard explained that the driving force behind Camelot was the conviction that "the goals sought by violence [could] be achieved by non-violent means."[13] Her colleague, Robert Boguslaw, explained that the project "represented an attempt to find nonmilitary and nonviolent solutions to international problems."[14] Bernard, Boguslaw, Hopper and the dozens of other scholars brought to SORO to work on Camelot fervently believed that they could use social science to inject reason, rationality, and even an element of pacifism into foreign and military policy. The project's name captured it all. SORO's Director Theodore Vallance explained that Camelot stood for "the development of a stable society with domestic tranquility and peace and justice for all."[15]

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[12] Rex D. Hopper, "Cybernation, Marginality, and Revolution," in I. L. Horowitz, ed., *The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory, in Honor of C. Wright Mills* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 313-330, 313.

[13] Jessie Bernard, Letter to the Editor, *American Sociologist* 1:1 (November 1965): 24-25, 24. On Bernard's involvement in Camelot, and her theory of social scientific objectivity and value-freedom, see Robert C. Bannister, *Jessie Bernard: The Making of a Feminist* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 136-141.

[14] Robert Boguslaw, "Ethics and the Social Scientist," in I. L. Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Science and Practical Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), 107-127, 120.

[15] Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Behavioral Sciences and the National Security," Report No. 4, Together with Part IX of the Hearings on "Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive," July-August 1965, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. Report 1224, 20. Report hereafter cited as ***BSNS***.

The Fall of Project Camelot: Precipitants

Tranquility and peace, however, were not in Camelot's future. Three months before the project was slated to begin, it precipitated a small international conflict when anthropologist Hugo Nutini lied about it to Chilean scholars and government officials. The Associate Professor at the University of Pittsburgh arranged with SORO's leadership to explore the "feasibility of conducting some research in Chile" for Camelot while traveling there on other business in the spring of 1965.[16] He contacted a number of scholars and university administrators in Santiago about the project, which he took it upon himself to misrepresent. Rather than disclosing the Defense Department's patronage of Camelot, he explained that it was funded by the National Science Foundation, and that such esteemed American social scientists as Seymour Lipset and Robert K. Merton were participants.[17]

These claims were, of course, false, and before long, Nutini's dissimulation caught up with him. Camelot was unclassified, and Hopper had invited dozens of Americans and a handful of foreign social scientists to join the project as consultants. The details of its sponsorship were far from secret, and Nutini happened to be lying about the project's nature in the backyard of an invitee who had recently declined Hopper's offer to work on the Army-sponsored project. Scandinavian sociologist Johan Galtung, in Chile that spring as a visiting professor, seized upon the opportunity to expose Camelot as an exercise of American imperialism. Armed with his copy

[16] The quote is Vallance's attempt to explain Nutini's relationship to SORO after the story broke. Vallance to Anderson, 4 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (2) CAMELOT (Publicity)/1965.

[17] Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, *Technical Information for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 25 April 1969, Revised 15 May 1971), 132 (hereafter ***Technical Information for Congress***); Kalman H. Silvert, "American Academic Ethics and Social Research Abroad: The Lesson of Project Camelot," *Background* 9 (1965): 215-236, 219. According to the State Department, Nutini may have contacted 150 or more government and academic authorities, including four government ministers and the rectors of four universities during his month-long visit. Santiago, to Washington, 7 July 1965, Subject-Numeric Files 1964-1966, Box 1711, Folder DEF 11 US 1/1/65, RG 59. Folder hereafter cited as **DEF 11 US 1965**. Nutini's motivation for lying about the project is a mystery. He may have sought to enlarge his own status in Chile by claiming association with important American scholars, and he may have sought to avoid the attacks on the project that might have followed were its true patronage revealed.

of SORO's task statement, which clearly identified the Army as Camelot's sponsor, Galtung exposed Nutini and the true nature of the study in meetings with Chilean scholars. Predictably, most were outraged.[18] A committee of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies announced its intention to investigate Camelot as an infringement upon Chilean sovereignty. The outcry over what the Chilean press on both the Left and the Right called a "Pentagon plot" soon captured the attention of the American embassy in Santiago, and in mid-June, American Ambassador to Chile Ralph Dungan fired an angry cable to Washington demanding to know what the project was, who had sponsored it, and what Nutini was doing in Chile without the Embassy's knowledge.[19]

For the next two weeks, the Departments of State and Defense struggled to pin the blame for events in Chile on each other, to keep the story out of the American press and the purview of a nosy Congress, and to identify just what had happened in Chile.[20] The press, however, caught wind of the story and Congressional interest followed. On June 30, Senator Eugene McCarthy demanded a Congressional inquiry into the episode and the lack of coordination between the Departments of State and Defense. An irritated President Lyndon Johnson instructed Secretary of State Dean Rusk to get to the bottom of the issue, and fast.[21] With Congress, the White House, and the press asking questions, Defense and State worked damage control. On the morning of July 8, hours before the Congressional inquiry into the relationship between the two

[18] According to Irving Louis Horowitz, Galtung explained that he could not accept the idea, implicit in Camelot, that the American Army was a force of progress, and objected to a Defense-funded scientific study of counterinsurgency. I. L. Horowitz, "The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot," in Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, 3-44, 13. See also Johan Galtung, "Scientific Colonialism," *Transition* 30 (Apr.-May 1967): 10-15.
[19] Dungan to Rusk, 14 June 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.
[20] Allan Evans to Llewellyn Thompson, 15 Jun 65; Evans to Thompson, 18 Jun 1965; Joseph A. Califano, Jr. to Gordon Chase, 16 Jun 1965; Evans to Thomas L. Hughes, 17 Jun 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.
[21] Recording of a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, June 30, 1965, reproduced in David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968* Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004) (hereafter cited as ***FRUS* XXXI**), Entry 280.

bureaucracies was to convene, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced abruptly that Camelot was cancelled.[22] Camelot was dead before it even began.

The Fall of Project Camelot: Preconditions

Social Science and the Militarization of American Foreign Policy

Among American social scientists in subsequent years, the Camelot episode became synonymous with scientific pretension and manipulative, imperialistic pseudo-intellectual interventions abroad. This was particularly the case among leftist anthropologists concerned that the Pentagon had encouraged social scientists to use their academic credentials as a cover for espionage.[23] This interpretation has significantly colored subsequent historical scholarship on the subject. Historian Mark Solovey has argued that the project's very public demise catalyzed an "epistemological revolution" that led scholars to question the very notion that politics and science were separable and that social science could be objective or value-free. Likewise, Ron Robin characterizes Camelot's fall as a "Paradigm Lost," the moment in which the Cold War "supernarrative of behavioralism as an extension of the natural sciences appeared to self-destruct." Social scientists had seen the light, and no longer would they peddle their expertise in the service of modern warfare.[24]

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[22] Department of Defense News Release, 8 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (2) CAMELOT (Publicity)/1965.
[23] Concerns that science was a cover for espionage in the Cold War were not confined to Project Camelot. Between 1950 and 1975, for example, American ornithologists working in India were suspected of being spies. Michael L. Lewis, *Inventing Global Ecology: Tracking the Biodiversity Ideal in India, 1947-1997* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), Chapter 4. Nor were such suspicions unique to the Cold War. Franz Boas famously accused a set of anthropologists of "prostitut[ing] science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies" in 1919. Franz Boas, "Scientists as Spies," Letter to the Editor, *The Nation* 109 (1919): 797, reprinted in George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., *The Boas Reader: The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 336-7.
[24] Solovey, "Project Camelot and the 1960s Epistemological Revolution," 172; Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy*, 224-5.

But even if these interpretations were accurate representations of scholarly opinion in the mid-1960s, a questionable proposition, they do not explain why the Defense and State Departments were so anxious to sweep the project under the rug. Camelot's abrupt cancellation had little to do with the strictly social scientific elements of the project, and everything to do with the tense relationship between the Department of State and the Pentagon. The public outcry in Chile gave the State Department some much needed ammunition to counter what State officials considered to be the Defense Department's unrelenting expansion into foreign area research and foreign policy-making. And they got what they wanted, to a degree, at least. On August 2, President Lyndon Baines Johnson directed his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to "establish effective procedures which will enable you to assure the propriety of Government-sponsored social science research in the area of foreign policy."[25] Camelot was a victim not of its designers' intellectual impropriety (although the project was certainly deeply flawed), but of a turf war between the Departments of State and Defense.

As the days wore on after Dungan's initial outraged telegram, the Ambassador continued his tirade against Camelot in daily cables to Washington.[26] The Department of State demanded that the Pentagon subject all of its planned foreign fieldwork programs to State scrutiny and clearance.[27] But for two weeks, Defense stonewalled. They insisted (truthfully) that they had no plans to conduct research in Chile and that Project Camelot had not even begun; that neither they, nor SORO, had hired Nutini (perhaps less truthfully); and that they had already informed the State Department of the project (also true—a Department representative was on Camelot's

[25] *FRUS* XXXI, Entry 280, see especially notes 3 and 4. As with most official correspondence of this nature, the directive originated in and was written by the Department of State for Johnson's signature. See also Walter Pincus, "Camelot Probe Fended Off," *Washington Evening Star* 9 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (2) CAMELOT (Publicity)/1965; "Burying Camelot," *New York Times* 9 August 1965, 24.
[26] Ralph Dungan to Dean Rusk, 21 June 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.
[27] Allan Evans to Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, 18 June 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.

planning staff). Therefore, McNamara insisted, Dungan, Rusk and their lot were not only overreacting, but were attempting to impugn Defense for their own bureaucratic ineptitudes.

With discussions appearing to go nowhere, someone, almost certainly a State Department official, leaked the story to the press.[28] This anonymous informant blasted Camelot as, "naïve and sometimes alarming." He characterized a colleague's response to the audacity and idiocy of the project as one of "open-mouthed amazement."[29] It was through the press that several Congressmen discovered the episode, and they too, added their critiques. Senator McCarthy immediately came out in support of the State Department's position, arguing that the Army had "intruded itself into the field of foreign policy without authority."[30] State had not anticipated, it seems, that Congress might attempt to get involved in the rift between the two Departments. But the leak tactic worked, forcing McNamara to announce Camelot's cancellation before Senate hearings on the Defense-State relationship convened. Immediately after McNamara's announcement, Rusk telephoned McCarthy to request a private meeting, heading off what would have been an uncomfortable investigation for both Departments. The final Congressional inquiry into the episode lasted only four days and was rather painless for both parties.[31]

Even so, it was clear to observers at SORO, in the Pentagon, and in Congress that the State Department was using Camelot for its own ends. Seymour Deitchman, the head of counterinsurgency for the DOD's Advanced Research Projects Agency, described the leaks as "a

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[28] Seymour Deitchman, *The Best-Laid Schemes: A Tale of Social Research and Bureaucracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976), 173. Lyndon Johnson appears to have been under the impression that Dungan was the source of the leak, but I have found no evidence to prove or disprove his assumption. See *FRUS* XXXI, Entry 280, note 2. Press leaks were common in interagency conflicts. As State Department official Roger Hilsman explained in his account of life in the Kennedy Administration, "Leaks, of course, are the first and most blatant signs of a battle." Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), 8.

[29] Quoted in Walter Pincus, "Army-State Department Feud Bared by Chile Incident," *Washington Star*, date unknown, in SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (2) CAMELOT (Publicity)/1965.

[30] McCarthy, quoted in Walter Pincus, "McCarthy Calls for Probe of Army's Project Camelot," *Washington Star*, 27 June 1965, A-1, reproduced in *Technical Information for Congress*.

[31] Horowitz, "The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot," 15. I discuss Congressional attitudes toward social science in the late 1960s in more detail in Chapter Five.

carefully oriented sequence" that were in keeping with the State Department's more general "bureaucratically oriented malevolence" toward the DOD's involvement in foreign area research.[32] SORO's Director Theodore Vallance explained to the president of American University (where SORO was located) in early July that the State Department was the root of the Camelot problem.[33] Social scientists at the National Academy of Sciences expressed frustration that "the behavioral sciences were regrettably caught in the middle of a conflict between the State Department and the Department of Defense."[34] And Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen asked the Army's head of social science research in a public hearing whether the episode was not, in fact, "an opportunity for the State Department to get back at what they basically are not enthusiastic about." "Surely Camelot was killed," he insisted, "because the State Department felt it had been left out."[35]

That was exactly the problem. The theory that foreign policy should flow from the State Department to other agencies was a far cry from practice in the postwar period as the Departments of Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, the Treasury, and Defense became active players in international affairs.[36] A 1960 Senate Report concluded that, while the President had historically turned to the State Department for help creating foreign policy, "today, the sphere of the State Department is far narrower than the full range of contemporary foreign relations. As an organization, the State Department can now claim no greater concern in certain aspects of

[32] Deitchman, *The Best-Laid Schemes*, 209, 173.
[33] Vallance to Hurst R. Anderson, 4 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (2) CAMELOT (Publicity)/1965.
[34] National Academy of Sciences, Division of Behavioral Science, Minutes of the Second Meeting, Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, 10 December 1965, 2, National Academy of Sciences Division of Behavioral Sciences, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv Meetings: Minutes: Dec 1965, National Academy of Sciences Archives, Washington, D.C. (Division of Behavioral Sciences collection hereafter cited as **NAS Papers**).
[35] *BSNS*, 48, 85.
[36] Cf. Chester Bowles, "Toward a New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 40 (January 1962): 244-251, 246. See also Clark A. Miller, "An Effective Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1938-1950," in John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth, eds., *Science and Technology in International Relations, Osiris* 21 (2006): 133-160, 153. Of course, this theory likely never accurately described foreign policy-making in the United States. See, for example, Dean Acheson, "The Eclipse of the State Department," *Foreign Affairs* 49 (July 1971): 593-606.

foreign policy than the Defense Department."[37] Things did not improve for State under the Kennedy Administration, as Kennedy's Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy and his staff in the National Security Council took on much of the responsibility for foreign policy decision-making. By the early 1960s, the State Department appeared to many in Washington to be an inflexible, ineffectual bureaucratic behemoth. According to press accounts, Kennedy referred to the Department as "a bowl of jelly," and he claimed with exasperation that he and Bundy accomplished "more in one day than they do in six months at the State Department."[38] The Defense Department, too, had become more proactive in foreign policy-making. Project Camelot was just one example of the Department's turn to experts for advice in international affairs. The Pentagon brought foreign policy experts into the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and military educational institutions offered instruction in foreign affairs.[39] Whether or not it was true, the idea that "Defense, not State, really runs foreign policy" was widespread by the time the Camelot story hit the presses.[40] The episode also called attention to the huge funding disparity between the research budgets of the two departments. While Defense commanded over twenty million

[37] Quoted in C. W. Borklund, *The Department of Defense* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 219.
[38] Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 34-5; Andrew Preston, *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 44. The cause of the State Department's plight was, and remains, a matter of some debate. For various interpretations, see: Borklund, *The Department of Defense*, Chapter Seven; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, Parts I-II; Charles E. Neu, "The Rise of the National Security Bureaucracy," in Louis Galambos, ed., *The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies Since World War II* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 85-108; Preston, *The War Council*, esp. 1-54; and Richard E. Neustadt, *Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective*, 15 November 1963 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), esp. 3, 113-120, 159-60.
[39] Gene M. Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), 179-180.
[40] Borklund, *The Department of Defense*, 223. In matters of scientific research and foreign policy, State had fared poorly. For examples, see Allan A. Needell, *Science, Cold War, and the American State: Lloyd V. Berkner and the Balance of Professional Ideals* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 155-180; Allan A. Needell, "'Truth is Our Weapon': Project TROY, Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State," *Diplomatic History* 17 (1993): 399-421; and the chronicle of the Skybolt incident in Neustadt, *Report to JFK*. I am indebted to Bruce Kuklick for pointing out the implications of Skybolt to me.

dollars for social research in 1965, State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research claimed only $125,000.[41]

But at least two Department members responded positively to Camelot's intellectual design. One affiliate of the science staff endorsed the study as an unprecedented attempt to "weigh (quantify) the preconditions of insurgency" using a systems approach. He wrote that after attending a briefing on the study, "It was apparent to me that the army is realistic about Camelot—they accept the possibility that their labors will result in the ability to measure and predict only a portion of the factors leading to insurgency—but they are also dedicated." As evidence of this combination of realism and dedication, he quoted one of the officials who briefed him as saying, "If we can only predict half of the causes, we are half way down the road."[42] Walt Rostow, then chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council also reportedly endorsed the project.[43]

Other assessments, however, were not so positive. A turf battle instigated the public conflict over Camelot, but State officials had legitimate reasons to be concerned about the Defense Department's sponsorship and direction of the project. Even before Ralph Dungan cabled Washington about Chilean concerns, Camelot's design had come to the Department's attention. In May 1965, State Department officials contacted the Army about SORO's plan to include a study of the French-Canadian separatist movement in Camelot. They explained in a classified memo that, "Such a study seems unwise to us and likely to be harmful to US-Canadian relations. … Canadians are always very sensitive to any implication—intended or not—of United States interference." The Department reminded the Army that the U.S. Government's

[41] Walter Pincus, "Senate to Air Camelot Issue," *Washington Star* 6 July 1965, in SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (2) CAMELOT (Publicity)/1965.
[42] William E. Mills to Mr. Pollock, 28 Jan 1965, Lot File 68D383, Box 36, Folder: Project Camelot, Entry 3008 E, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Central Files, 1964-66, RG 59.
[43] Deitchman, *The Best-Laid Schemes*, 172.

position on the "French Canadian question" was strict non-intervention. They asked that the Army leave the issue aside, even if it would prove detrimental to science. On June 8, just days before events in Chile captured the State Department's attention, the Army agreed to forego its study of the movement.[44] In the minds of State Department officials, foreign area research should rest on a risk calculus. "The issue," Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research Allan Evans explained, "is to balance the amount of information [that is needed from abroad] against the cost of acquiring it."[45] While the Defense Department had calculated the financial costs of Camelot (and anticipated reaping a powerful tool of social control for a bargain), State calculated the costs of social research politically. For them, it was simply too high.

Yet, they were powerless to put a stop to the project until the Chilean government presented them with an opportunity. Even before Dungan's telegram alerted Washington of the situation in Santiago, State social scientist Pio Uliassi had been working to plant the seeds of doubt about DOD sponsorship of such research. As the State Department representative to the Camelot Core Planning Group, Uliassi had been involved in the project's planning. But according to State Department officials, the group was charged with designing the scholarly portion of the study and engaged in "very little discussion of plans or operations—certainly not enough to give any means of control" over the project to the State Department.[46] State had no recourse to action against Camelot—the project was only in its planning phase, and before the summer of 1965 there was no federal requirement that the Defense Department clear its foreign area research with State Department officials. Deputy Director Evans quickly saw opportunity in

[44] Richard H. Davis to Willis M. Hawkins, 20 May 1965, and Hawkins to Davis, 8 Jun 1965, DEF 11 US 1965. This solution worked, for although the press eventually caught wind of Army plans in 1966, the story blew over rather quickly. See Consul, Montreal to Washington, 1 Mar 66, Box 1711, Folder DEF 11 US 1/1/66, Subject-Numeric Files 1964-66, RG 59; and "Ottawa is Upset over a U.S. Study," *New York Times*, 3 Mar 1966, 8.
[45] Allan Evans to Thomas L. Hughes, 17 June 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.
[46] Allan Evans to Hughes, 17 June 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.

the Chilean uproar. He explained to his colleagues that it "enables us to suggest direct action against danger we suspected but were unable to prove."[47]

And they were successful—to a point. President Johnson's August 2 directive to Dean Rusk resulted in the creation of the Foreign Affairs Research Council (FARC). Located in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, FARC was empowered to vet all projects sponsored by military and foreign affairs agencies (the DOD and each of the services, the U.S. Information Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the CIA) that included foreign travel, contact with foreign nationals, or any other "sensitive" activities. Grants made to academic institutions were exempt from review.[48] To some observers, FARC seemed to be the answer to State's problems. As an opponent of DOD-sponsored social research wrote, "One might say that the social sciences, as Clemenceau said of war, are much too important to be left to the generals." With the creation of FARC, foreign relations would "be left to the State Department, where it belongs."[49]

The power of the new bureaucratic apparatus, however, was quite circumscribed. FARC reviewed research projects for their potential effect on U.S. foreign relations. Following the same calculus of risk that State Department officials had used in the case of Camelot's planned study of French-Canadian separatism, the FARC staff weighed the dangers to foreign relations posed by each study against its "value to the United States."[50] Reviewers asked questions like: if foreign nationals become aware of this project, will we have another Camelot on our hands? Are

[47] Allan Evans to Llewellyn Thompson, 15 Jun 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.
[48] Thomas L. Hughes, Public Notice 242: Government-Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research, Procedures for Review, 21 December 1965, reprinted in Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Government Research of the Committee, *Federal Support of International Social Science and Behavioral Research*, Hearings, 89th Congress, 2d Sess., June 27-8; July 19-20, 1966, 45-48. Hereafter ***Federal Support of International Social Science***.
[49] "Burying Camelot," *New York Times*, 12 August 1965, 24.
[50] Department of State, "Procedures for Department of State Review of Government-Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research," 18 November 1965, 7, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Gov't Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv Background Data 1965, RG 59.

the project questions, design, and methodology sensitive to diplomatic relationships, or do they pose a risk to foreign relations? To answer these questions, they considered the political climate of the countries where work was to take place; the inherent sensitivity of the subject matter under examination; the propriety of project sponsorship, military or civil; and whether or not the project was or should be classified. FARC did not inquire into the intellectual merits of projects, nor their relevance or importance to the agency that sponsored them. In fact, the organization did not have the expertise to do so. FARC staff and advisors were drawn wholly from the State Department; few had any training in the social sciences. A project's methodology was of interest only insofar as it involved contact with locals, through public opinion surveys, ethnography, or other means. As one State Department official explained, "Clearance means only that State has determined that, whatever other merits or deficiencies a project may or may not have, it is not likely to prove seriously embarrassing to the Government."[51] The Council did not refuse clearance to many projects. In its first two years, it reviewed 284 studies and denied clearance to only six.[52] To avoid potential diplomatic humiliation, the Council could grant conditional clearance by suggesting that different countries be studied, or by restricting the amount of contact researchers had with foreign nationals. In its first year, the Research Council imposed extra surveillance conditions in 40 percent of cases; these typically involved increasing the classification level of studies or requiring that projects be fully coordinated with U.S. abroad.[53]

This arrangement did give the State Department some of the power it had sought over Pentagon incursions into foreign area research. The Defense Department was required to keep the Council apprised of its foreign area research projects, at the very least from the inception of

[51] George C. Denney, Jr., "State Department Procedures for Reviewing Government Sponsored Foreign Area Research," *Background* 10 (August 1966): 95-110.
[52] "Research Council Activities," *FAR Horizons* 1:3 (May 1968): 6-9, 6.
[53] *Federal Support of International Social Science*, 8-9.

planning to the award of a contract, if not for the duration of the study, and the existence of FARC encouraged Pentagon officials to maintain steady contact with Bureau officials to ensure their blessing. The guidelines also gave American embassies a larger role in research activities. Projects involving foreign visits had to first be cleared by Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission. Most insisted, at the very least, that researchers meet with embassy representatives upon their arrival, and in more than a few cases in the years after Camelot, they objected entirely to visits by foreign scholars.[54] For example, a month after the Camelot story went public, the embassies in Rio, Bogota, and Caracas opposed brief, consultative in-country visits by Army-funded researchers contracted to study the techniques of "Communist subversion" in Latin American cities. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon managed to have the Brazilian element of the project cancelled entirely.[55] He explained in a cable to his superiors in Washington that the "unfriendly press could readily use [the project's reports] to blazen [the] prospect [of] US Marine invasion of Rio, Recife, and Venezuelan and Colombian cities."[56] The project itself, however, went on. Despite their objections, the State Department insisted that Bogota and Caracas agree to an Embassy-only visit by one of the study's researchers. State officials in Washington explained to its ambassadors that, although they opposed the conduct of field research for the project, the Department was "reluctant to block reasonable requests" for fear of appearing "negative" to

[54] See State Department Subject-Numeric files for the periods 1964-1966, and 1967-1969, in the category of DEF SCI 11, for countless cables between Washington and its embassies about scientific research visits.
[55] *Technical Information for Congress*, 140, n. 44. See also Rusk to Rio, 15 July 1965; Bogota to Rusk, 21 July 1965; Caracas to Rusk, 22 July 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.
[56] Gordon to Washington, 14 July 1965, DEF 11 US 1965. Gordon also got the story of the study into the American press, rubbing salt in the wounds of an already embarrassed and embattled Pentagon. The Defense Department, of course, told the press that the project to which Gordon was objecting was only in the planning stages. Pentagon press agents informed journalists that Gordon's concern was, much like Dungan's over Camelot, the result of a "misunderstanding" between State officials in Washington and their representative in Brazil. John M. Goshko, "Army Quizzed on Brazil 'Study,'" *Washington Post* 22 July 1965, B1. The State Department did not fail to take note of DOD tactics, and promptly cabled Gordon to inform him of them. Washington to Rio, 22 July 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.

social research. State planned to cancel the fieldwork element of the project once the FARC review procedures were complete.[57]

The Department of State had garnered a measure of control over Pentagon encroachment into foreign policy-making by calling attention to the Camelot episode in Chile. By the fall of 1965, the State Department had established its right to monitor the movements of Pentagon-funded social scientists abroad and had established an avenue through which they could voice their concerns about research sensitivities. But their purview was limited to a small slice of Pentagon research directly related to foreign affairs; they had no say over Pentagon-funded grant projects pursued at research universities, nor any Defense-sponsored research in the hard sciences, although these too had consequences for American diplomacy. State had, by the second half of 1965, acquired a tool to deal with a single species of American social research, that directly commissioned by the Pentagon.

The Militarization of American Social Science

If State Department officials were furious that Camelot had ever been planned, many social scientists were equally furious that it had been cancelled. Political scientist and unabashed Cold Warrior Alfred de Grazia was among the first scholars to respond in print to McNamara's announcement. The editor of *American Behavioral Scientist* was not shy about blaming Galtung for the entire debacle, writing that the Scandinavian pacifist had, "egged on a Chilean communist paper to agitate South American anti-yanqui jingoism." And the State Department, along with "Generalissimo McNamara," played right into communists' hands by cancelling Camelot, which he described as a "skillfully manned, well-planned" project that was dedicated to solving

[57] Washington to Caracas and Bogota, 25 August 1965. See also Caracas to Washington, 28 August 1965; Bogota to Washington, 27 August 1965, DEF 11 US 1965.

"problems of pressing and universal interest." Outraged by the argument that the Defense Department had no business sponsoring research vital to national security, he asked his readers, "Are Cuba and Santo Domingo, Lebanon and Vietnam, and other cases too, going to stand as historical proof that the Army can send men in to be killed but cannot help anyone go in and forestall by preventive understanding the occasions of killing?"[58]

De Grazia was far from a lone supporter of Camelot's intellectual and moral mission. Rather than provoking a soul-searching "epistemological revolution" against Pentagon-funded social research, Camelot's cancellation inspired a well-spring of support for such work.[59] Leonard E. Schwartz, a public policy consultant, described Camelot as the kind of "peace research" and "action-oriented" study that the Cold War required. He argued that Camelot, "constitutes a model combining action and scholarship that deserves careful consideration for further emulation not preemptive rejection."[60] Sociologist and onetime student of Rex Hopper, William Goode, agreed. Although he had not joined the project when Hopper invited him in 1965, he wrote, "I am convinced Camelot was intellectually the most significant research project under way during the past decade. Even now, I would accept its challenge and devote the next ten years of my professional life to its execution."[61] Political scientist Gabriel Almond endorsed the program as "a straightforward basic study of social systems [and] social stability" and did not support its cancellation.[62] In fact, Nutini's clear dissimulation enabled social scientists sympathetic to SORO's mission to chalk the incident up to one man's immoral actions in an

[58] Alfred De Grazia, "Government and Science: An Editorial," *American Behavioral Scientist* 9:1 (September 1965): 40.
[59] Cf. Solovey, "Project Camelot and the 1960s Epistemological Revolution."
[60] Leonard E. Schwartz, "Social Science and the Furtherance of Peace Research," *American Behavioral Scientist* 9:7 (March 1966): 24-28, 25.
[61] William Goode, Letter to the Editor, *American Sociologist* 1 (1966): 255-257, 255. Goode intimated that he declined to join Camelot not out of concern for its propriety, but because he would have liked to direct it, not simply serve on the staff.
[62] *Federal Support of International Social Science*, 112.

otherwise unobjectionable project.[63] For many scholars, events in Chile signaled nothing about the intellectual integrity of the project.

Opposite expressions of sentiment were much rarer among American academics. Dale L. Johnson lambasted Camelot in letters to the editors of the *American Sociologist* and the *American Anthropologist*. His work in Chile had been interrupted by the incident. In July 1965, the Chilean Chamber of Deputies denounced him and described his research on Chilean industrialists as "Yankee espionage." But Johnson was one of the only American scholars to attack SORO explicitly as a cover for government intelligence operations.[64] One of the only other American scholars to come close to doing so in print was anthropologist Marshall Sahlins. Citing revelations that CIA front organizations were funneling funds to unwitting fieldworkers, Sahlins intimated that Camelot was only the tip of the espionage iceberg.[65]

Of course, as Harry Eckstein argued of revolutions, cataclysmic events have both precipitants and preconditions, and Camelot's cancellation was only a precipitant, not a precondition, of conflict in the scholarly community. The question driving the majority of scholarly conversations about Camelot in the wake of its cancellation was *not*: how did this misguided project get off the ground? Very few scholars intimated that Camelot's inauspicious fate necessitated a soul-searching discussion about whether counterinsurgency and military assistance were viable subjects of disinterested research. A forum on the implications of the project, held at a joint meeting of the American Anthropological Association, the Washington D.C. Sociological Society, and the District's Psychology Association in December, was so

[63] See, for example, remarks by William J. Nagle and unidentified participants, "Discussion: The New Intelligence Requirements," *Background* 9 (1965): 195; and William Marvel, "Remarks," *Background* 9 (1965): 177-83.
[64] Dale L. Johnson, Letter to the Editor, *American Sociologist* 1 (1966): 206-7, 206. The same letter was published in abbreviated form in the *American Anthropologist*. See Dale L. Johnson, "Ethics of the Nature, Procedures, and Funding of Research in Other Countries," *American Anthropologist* 68 (1966): 1016-7.
[65] Marshall Sahlins, "The Established Order: Do Not Fold, Spindle, or Mutilate," in Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, 72. The CIA did fund social research covertly, but there is no evidence that the Agency was involved in any capacity with Project Camelot.

friendly to Camelot, in fact, that Sorons in attendance later reported that they did not feel the need to speak up in their own defense. When an audience member suggested that military-sponsored research might raise problems of professional ethics, "he was demolished by the panel," whose members included sociologist Morris Janowitz and anthropologist Stephen Boggs.[66] Nor did any American professional association ever publicly condemn the project, much to the dismay of Latin American social scientists.[67]

Camelot did not instigate an "epistemological revolution" in the social sciences. But it did become a flashpoint for a cross-disciplinary discussion of the institutional relationship between science and politics in the Cold War state. Few social scientists questioned the government's need for the information to which social scientists were privy. As the International Studies Association President John Gagne remarked matter-of-factly, "the government in every respect has got to have more information which is more up to date and more reliable."[68] Even members of the anthropological profession—the discipline most galvanized by the revelations about Camelot—tended to agree that they had a "responsibility to government even if they do not agree with government practices," if for no other reason than the profession's dependency of federal funding.[69] The problem was quite simply how scholars and bureaucrats could best arrange for the government to get that information without imperiling the professional standards of social scientific objectivity and scholarly autonomy. The questions underlying scholarly post-mortems of Camelot were not: Should scholars work for the national security state. Rather, social scientists asked: How could scholars meet the government's clear need for foreign area

[66] Charles Windle, "SID Holds Joint Meeting on Overseas Research," in "The Bystander," Vol. 1, No. 3 (December 1965) 3, SORO/AU Box 2, Folder: CRESS.
[67] Munro S. Edmonson, David Felix, Daniel Goldrich, Joseph A. Kahl, and Henry A. Landsberger, Letter to the Editor, *American Sociologist* 1 (August 1966): 207-8.
[68] John Gagne, "The New Intelligence Requirements: Introduction," *Background* 9 (1965): 171-2, 171.
[69] Ralph L. Beals, *The Politics of Social Research: An Inquiry into the Ethics and Responsibilities of Social Scientists* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 4.

information while preserving their intellectual autonomy and scholarly integrity? What differences were there between "the demands of scholarship and the demands of a government contract study?"[70] Were government and scholarship better served if national security research was carried out by a nominally private contract research organization like SORO, by a scholarly grant from an institute like the National Science Foundation, or some other form of patron?[71] Almond summed up the sentiments of many social scientists when he said, "The Camelot problem really is only a symptom of a problem which has been with us and will perhaps be with us on an increasing scale" as the government funds more and more "big" social science geared toward fulfilling its new requirements for information in an age of global Cold War.[72]

Scholars and their professional associations articulated a number of potential solutions to this thorny problem, ranging from the suggestion that the government create a new institution or set of institutions to fund social science to the creation of codes of professional ethics. Political scientists half-heartedly discussed creating ethical codes in the wake of Camelot, but did not begin serious deliberations on the issue until February 1967, when allegations surfaced that two high-ranking figures in the American Political Science Association had received funds from several foundations revealed as CIA fronts. Even then, most members of the profession remained lukewarm to the idea. An ad hoc committee created to examine the issue reported that, while "the rapid development of political science research in the past decade or two gives the relationship between government and the profession a salience it has not had in the past," the committee could not make any recommendations for dealing with the issue without "a great deal of

[70] William J. Nagle, "Remarks," *Background* 9 (1965): 185-189, 188-189.
[71] Marvel, "Remarks," 193.
[72] Gabriel Almond, "Remarks," *Background* 9 (1965): 173-6.

work."[73] A year later, the ethics committee determined that the matter was so complex that it would be premature to promulgate a code regulating the relationship between scholars and the government.[74]

Anthropologists responded with rather more vigor, resolving in November 1965 to create a committee to examine the relationship between the profession and its sponsors, paying especially close attention to questions of "access to foreign areas, government clearance, professional ethics," and responsibilities toward colleagues and informants.[75] A year later, most anthropologists strongly endorsed the committee's findings. These included a call to anthropologists to: "avoid both involvement in clandestine intelligence agencies and the use of the name of anthropology… as a cover" for those activities; and to be aware that DOD sponsorship might be problematic, resulting in classified research or the imposition of limitations on research design. They also recommended that despite these issues, anthropologists make more of their research available to the government.[76] While anthropologists continued to grapple with these issues through the late 1960s, they never established a binding ethical code. Rather, the American Anthropological Association stressed that the code they ultimately ratified in 1967 was a set of guidelines for practitioners. Even Sahlins, who spoke out vehemently against Camelot and objected to anthropologists pursuing "any further engagement in strategic research," which in his opinion placed the researcher "in a sycophantic relation to the state unbefitting of science or citizenship," refused to support a binding code. Instead, he endorsed "the principle of letting

[73] Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, Harry Eckstein, Heinz Eulau, Austin Ranney, and Clinton Rossiter, "Report of the Executive Committee," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1967): 565-568, 566.
[74] Bernstein Committee, "Bernstein Committee Interim Report: Ethical Problems of Social Scientists," *PS* 1 (Winter 1968): 5-16.
[75] "Resolution, Council of Fellows of the American Anthropological Association," November 1965. Reprinted in Beals, *Politics of Social Research*, 187-8.
[76] Fellows of the American Anthropological Association, "Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics." Reprinted in Beals, *Politics of Social Research*, 192-196.

each man learn to live with himself."[77] This was the favored approach among many social scientists. Sociologist Herbert Blumer pointed out that while agency-directed research posed a high risk to scientific objectivity, scholars could counteract it by personally embracing an unwavering commitment to "the precepts and ideals of science," such that sponsors would have no choice but to bend their needs "to meet the requirements of the scientific ethic rather than the reverse."[78]

No serious discussion of severing academe from the DOD ensued from the Camelot episode. The two scholars who did the most to sound the alarm on Camelot, Silvert and Galtung, stopped far short of any radical proposal to this effect. Defending himself against the accusation that he was anti-American, and quite pragmatic about the realities of research funding, Galtung wrote, "I see nothing wrong in general in Defense Department sponsored research and fully appreciate the role of the armed services in sponsoring important behavioral science research."[79] And Silvert insisted that the military had a legitimate need for social scientific investigations of internal war. The questions raised by the Camelot debacle were how that "knowledge should be accumulated and presented in the first place, and then what conclusions should be drawn and who should determine the action appropriate to these conclusions."[80]

After Camelot, no consensus developed about the relationship between academe and government. Social scientists did not speak with a single voice when asked whose responsibility it was, the researcher's or his sponsor's, to protect the integrity of social science. As sociologist Irving Louis Horowitz put it, "the heart of the question" raised by Camelot was "what are and are

[77] Sahlins, "The Established Order," 79, 76.
[78] Herbert Blumer, "Threats from Agency-Determined Research," in Horowitz, ed., *Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, 167, 174.
[79] Galtung, "Scientific Colonialism," 12.
[80] Silvert, "American Academic Ethics," 217.

not the legitimate functions of a scientist?"[81] Social scientists were no closer to answering that question after Camelot, although the dialogue had begun in earnest.

But the answer to the question would be limited by the federal government's role in the debate. Remarkably, the main target of scholars' ire in the wake of Camelot was not the Pentagon but the State Department. The majority of social scientists were at least unhappy with, but more often outraged by, the creation of the Foreign Affairs Research Council.[82] Academic social scientists generally had an extremely low opinion of the Department. Psychologist Arthur Brayfield told Congress, "I would certainly go strongly on the record that I think the State Department has been in the nineteenth century in its use of behavioral sciences and behavioral scientists."[83] Almond, one of the few scholars to grant the review procedure a lukewarm endorsement, explained in a Congressional hearing that, "the Department of State has a record of on the whole being unduly skeptical and unduly slow in carrying on social science research. … I believe they are a backward agency, as far as their relationship with science is concerned."[84] State, many social scientists felt, did not recognize the value of expert knowledge, preferring instead to make decision "through some kind of intuitive and antenna-like process."[85]

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[81] Horowitz, "The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot," 40.
[82] See, for example, George I. Blanksten, Letter to the Editor, *American Behavioral Scientist* 9:2 (October 1965): NS-12; Testimony of Arthur Brayfield, in *Federal Support of International Social Science*, 58-67; Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments," *Background* 10 (August 1966): 111-22, esp. 120; Dael Wolfle, "Social Science Research and International Relations," *Science* Vol. 151 N. 3707, 14 January 1966, 155. In fact, it wasn't until Johnson called for the creation of FARC that social scientists began to respond publicly to the Camelot episode.
[83] Testimony of Dr. Arthur H. Brayfield, *Federal Support of International Social Science*, 67.
[84] *Federal Support of International Social Science*, 114. On Almond's feelings about the review procedures, see Gabriel Almond to Thomas L. Hughes, 9 November 1965, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv Background Data 1965, NAS Papers.
[85] Gabriel Almond, quoted in Luther J. Carter, "Social Sciences: Problems Examined by Senate Panel," *Science* 153 (8 July 1966): 154-156, 155. For similar sentiments, see Gabriel Almond to Thomas L. Hughes, 9 November 1965, NAS Papers, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv Background Data 1965; Daniel Greenberg, "Science and Foreign Affairs: New Effort Under Way to Enlarge Role of Scientists in Policy Planning," *Science* 138 No. 3537 (Oct 12, 1962): 122-24; National Academy of Sciences, Minutes of the Second

Many social scientists saw State regulations as a threat to their scholarly autonomy, and even as censorship. As William Goode explained, the FARC procedures made it appear that all scholars were working directly for the government. The stamp of approval from FARC made social scientists the government's "vassals, lackeys, carrying out [its] will. We cannot claim to be independent, if everyone knows that our research has been previously 'approved.'"[86] Far from protecting their intellectual autonomy and integrity, scholars argued, the State Department's review abrogated them. Anthropologist George P. Murdock characterized the State Department's new review procedures as "a dagger aimed at the integrity and independence of the behavioral scientist." [87]

In fact, State's unwelcome intervention in social scientific affairs solidified many social scientists' view that DOD involvement in research was benign, even beneficial. In a widely-circulated letter to Thomas L. Hughes, the director of the office of State that would be responsible for designing and enforcing the regulations, Almond explained that social scientists felt the DOD was "quicker [than State] to recognize and appreciate" the potential of behavioral science.[88] The National Academy of Sciences Executive committee signaled its own appreciation, noting that the Defense Department "was among the first government agencies to recognize the behavioral sciences and has so far done more than any other agency to foster

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Meeting, Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, 10 December 1965, 2, 26-27, 54, NAS Papers; Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership*, 185, 188. Defense Department officials felt much the same way. Cf. Deitchman, *The Best Laid Schemes*, 85-90; 209-212.

[86] Goode, Letter to the Editor, 256. See also: Jessie Bernard, Letter to the Editor; Blanksten, Letter to the Editor; Horowitz, "The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot," 40; Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists doing Research for Governments," 120; and Dale Wolfle, "Social Science Research and International Relations."

[87] National Academy of Sciences, Minutes of the Second Meeting, Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, 10 December 1965, NAS Papers, 54.

[88] Gabriel Almond to Thomas L. Hughes, 9 November 1965, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv Background Data 1965, NAS Papers.

them."[89] Social scientists allied with the Pentagon to protect the interests of their professional community against unwanted State incursions. In the process, their questions about the impact of Pentagon patronage on autonomy and objectivity fell by the wayside.

Camelot's demise broadened considerations of the relationship in the boundary zone between science and the state, academe and defense. But the debate that was sparked in Chile was never settled in the U.S. Scholars attempted to regulate the relationship between themselves and the government through codes of professional ethics, but they stopped far short of dictating binding rules. They expressed concerns that the Pentagon might be wedding scholarship to its specific military-politico regime. But most scholars were reluctant to blame Sorons, or even the Pentagon, for this. Rather, they were quickly galvanized against a common enemy—the State Department—and they worked to make sure that they would not find themselves beholden to both bureaucracies. As for Horowitz's question about the legitimate functions of the social scientist, each individual was left to answer that question for himself.

Unintended Consequences

Despite the historical claims that have been made in its name, what is most remarkable about the Camelot episode is how little changed in its wake. The project's cancellation in no way signaled an end to Pentagon sponsorship, design, and management of foreign area research. Nor was the study itself an unmitigated failure. Although data collection never began, researchers met one of their goals, even if their success was not something they could brag about in Congressional inquiries or in print. According to Camelot planning documents, one of the study's "principle objectives… is to test whether such a large scale, closely integrated project has

[89] National Academy of Sciences, Minutes of the Second Meeting, Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, 10 December 1965, 2, NAS Papers.

a higher probability of pay off than a series of small, loosely related studies."[90] The answer was unequivocal, and the Defense Department applied the result immediately. The day after Camelot received McNamara's axe, the Army informed SORO that it was "not feasible to conduct large-scale programs treated as comprehensive single projects." Military officials explained that even though the study's "overall objectives… remain valid as an ultimate military requirement… research program plans must be subdivided into discrete research tasks that are subcontracted to universities or performed in foreign countries" by indigenous research outfits.[91]

The Army could hardly have made it more clear in the weeks following the project's cancellation that that the study of internal warfare, social change, and counterinsurgency would go on. The day after it was cancelled, Camelot had a new task statement, titled "Measurement of Predisposing Factors for Communist Inspired Insurgency." The objective of the research: "To develop a tentative research plan that will specify those research tasks necessary to ultimately identify the parameters significant in detecting social unrest which lead to Communist penetration of the society and potential Communist-inspired revolt in the developing nations," untangle the impact of military postures and other government action on that unrest, and bring the results of research to bear on U.S. military activity. The task statement called for the staff to "draft research proposals for those discrete studies which should be initially undertaken," and specified that each research task should stress the "limited objective" of the research, rather than the overall goal of the project.[92] In other words, Sorons' new job was to break Camelot into a series of seemingly unconnected, small studies. In case the new task statement did not make it

[90] SORO, "Project Camelot: Design and Phasing," 2.
[91] Stubbs to Vallance, 9 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (1) Camelot 1965.
[92] Task Statement, 9 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 2, Folder: SORO Contracts-Legal.

clear enough, the Director of Army Research informed SORO's staff that "all SORO research was to go on" after Camelot was cancelled.[93]

For the Army and the Pentagon, the lesson of Camelot was that appearances needed to be better managed. As the Director of Army Research explained, future research projects needed to recognize both foreign "sensitivities" and the "sensitivity of the State/Defense relationship." In practice, that simply meant using discretion. Catchy project names would be avoided, as would any impression that research might lead to Army intervention abroad.[94] Written documents would be tailored more specifically to their audiences. Task statements would clearly express the relevance of research to Army missions, but descriptions of research that would be read by outsiders would use language "which is of interest to and acceptable to universities and to foreign governments and the U.S. Department of State."[95] Social science jargon would be shunned. Since "a major criticism of past work was language," the Director of Army Research explained, Sorons "should attempt to use plain 25c words" and "basic English."[96]

The few scholars who raised concerns about Camelot hoped to infuse more autonomy and transparency into Pentagon-funded foreign area research. But the Pentagon reacted to the episode by using security classification more vigorously. In a confidential directive to the R&D offices of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Harold Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering at the Pentagon, explained that because foreign governments were sensitive to U.S. incursions, and because communists looked for any propaganda opportunity to exploit, all future documents that referred to U.S. involvement in foreign internal defense measures, revolutions,

[93] Unidentified to Vallance, 20 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (1) Camelot 1965. In fact, the Army Office of Research made it clear in Congressional testimony that Camelot was being continued. *BSNS* 32-33.
[94] Unidentified to Vallance, 20 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (1) Camelot 1965.
[95] Stubbs to Vallance, 9 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (1) Camelot 1965.
[96] Unidentified to Vallance, 20 July 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (1) Camelot 1965; Stubbs to Vallance, 29 September 1965, Entry 1393, OCRD DAR Transaction Files, 1967-1969, Box 2, Folder: Research Analysis Corporation: Correspondence, 1961-1966, RG 319, National Archives College Park. Entry hereafter cited as **Transaction Files**.

and any other issue that might imply U.S. involvement in or influence over any foreign government, would be classified and marked as non-releasable to foreign nationals. Furthermore, while discrete research tasks could be made public knowledge, "the connection with overall task objectives should not be published." Brown suggested that in cases of data gathering—even library research—in foreign countries, research directors should consider doing work at second, and even third hand, through subcontracts.[97]

The Defense Department reacted to Camelot by increasing its control over the content of research, while attempting to maintain the fiction that it was now sensitive to the diplomatic complexities of foreign area studies. As soon as the story of events in Chile made it into American papers, the Pentagon clamped down on SORO. Subcontractor Lyle McAlister reported that he had been free to design and conduct his work as he pleased until Camelot became the subject of unwanted attention. He explained that, "Initially, no restrictions were placed on freedom of research [at SORO]. However, the unfortunate *denouement* of Project Camelot produced injunctions emanating from the Department of the Army against free inquiry in the field."[98] The actions of outraged Chilean scholars and their American supporters led to more, not less, intervention in research.

And Camelot brought the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) closer to the Pentagon as well. At the request of and with funds from the Army Research Office, the Division of the Behavioral Sciences had in 1964 created an ad hoc panel, the Non-Materiel Research Advisory Committee to advise on Project Camelot. Led by University of Pittsburgh anthropologist John P. Gillin, the committee met only three times before requesting its dissolution in early June 1965,

[97] Harold Brown to Assistant Secretary of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, 18 August 1965, Folder: Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.
[98] L. N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 2 (1966): 5-36, 32.

when it became clear that the study was causing ire among Chilean scholars.[99] But by late July, the Pentagon was seeking a new advisory committee from the NAS, composed of more prestigious members, supported by more money, and saddled with more responsibility. Project Camelot, Harold Brown explained in a confidential letter to the Academy's President, Fred Seitz, had illustrated to the military the enormous difficulties inherent in performing behavioral scientific research into counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense efforts. Brown asked that Seitz see to it that the Academy establish a committee to advise the Defense Department Research and Engineering staff, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the agencies of the armed forces on these issues as needed.[100]

Although Brown paid some lip-service to the need for technical feedback, he made it very clear to Seitz what kind of advice he was seeking: suggestions for how to manage the sensitivities of projects like Camelot. He expected the NAS committee to advise his staff about how to make its research programs palatable to host governments and foreign scholars. "Often," he explained, "the simple manner of phrasing a particular task can make a difference in its acceptability" as a Defense-sponsored project. He also saw in the committee a set of connections for the DOD to university scholars who could take on sensitive research under contract. Brown explained that the members of the committee "should represent a 'bridge' from the Government and its contractors to the universities and private foundations."[101] Seitz agreed with Brown's approach. He explained to the NAS Council that the committee members would "be qualified to

[99] On the Gillin Committee's creation, see: Glen Finch to invitees, 22 September 1964, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: SORO-1964; Folder: Behavioral Sciences, Com on Non-Materiel Research: Adv Ad hoc, 1965, and Folder: Behavioral Sciences General 1964, NAS Papers. On the request for dissolution, see Peter B. Hammond to Major John H. Johns, 6 October 1965, in Folder: Behavioral Sciences, Com on Non-Materiel Research: Adv Ad hoc, 1965, NAS Papers; and Minutes of the Council Meeting, 5 June 1965, 7-8, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.
[100] Harold Brown to Fred Seitz, 28 July 1965, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.
[101] Harold Brown to Fred Seitz, 28 July 1965, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.

explain, and if necessary, defend the scientific content of proposed programs while being alert to the danger of unwarranted objectives."[102] The new NAS committee enlisted scholars wholesale in the Defense Department's counterinsurgency research mission, down to its new, more surreptitious nature. Brown placed Deitchman, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in the Office of the Deputy Director for Tactical Warfare Programs, in charge of coordinating the new committee with the Academy.

The Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, chaired by Rockefeller University's Donald Young, was funded by the Defense Department Research and Engineering office at over forty thousand dollars in its first year.[103] The money was well spent. Shortly after the advisory committee was constituted, the Defense Department learned that State was attempting to formulate its clearance procedures without input from the DOD. According to Deitchman, the Department was initiating an "end-run tactic" to keep Defense out of the loop. Deitchman asked that the NAS mobilize its authority on behalf of the Defense Department.[104] The Academy did so, and served as a broker in the relationship between State and Defense, while protecting the interests of social scientists who were deeply concerned about the prospect of State Department censorship.[105] As Frederick Seitz explained to the NAS

[102] Council Meeting, 25 September 1965, Folder Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.
[103] The inaugural members of the committee included Allan R. Holmberg, George P. Murdock, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Thomas C. Schelling, and Alexander Spoehr. The NAS did succeed in garnering between five and ten thousand dollars of State Department support, as well as funding from the Russell Sage Foundation to produce a history of the relationship between social science and the federal government. According to Murdock, this added support would ensure that the Advisory Committee could "act with freedom." "Division of Behavioral Sciences," Appendix 2, 5 December 1965, 2. On State Department funding, see C. E. Sunderlin, Diary Note, 23 November 1965, Folder: Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers. On foundation funding, see Minutes of the Council Meeting, 5 February 1966, 6; and Minutes of the Council Meeting, "Division of Behavioral Sciences," n.d., Folder: Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv 1967, NAS Papers.
[104] C. E. Sunderlin, Diary Note, 13 October 1965, Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.
[105] See, for example, C. E. Sunderlin, Diary Note, 2 November 1965; Minutes of the Council Meeting, Division of Behavioral Sciences, Appendix 2, 5 December 1965; and C. E. Sunderlin, Diary Note, 23 November 1965, Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.

Council, the Advisory Committee was "a deterrent to uninformed or censorial actions on the part of the State Department, which is not highly competent in its comprehension of the behavioral sciences."[106]

SORO, however, did not fare as well when it came to avoiding censorship in the wake of Camelot. Following instructions from the Pentagon, the Army immediately silenced the research office when the story of Camelot came out. Its members found themselves banned from speaking publicly about SORO's work program or from contacting any foreign scientists without explicit Army approval.[107] Despite objections that such instructions might infringe upon Sorons' academic freedoms, the policy stuck even after the tumult over Camelot had passed.[108] The Defense Department also responded to the Camelot incident by instituting new security clearance procedures. From early July 1965 on, all research that had the potential to affect foreign relations was required to be cleared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, before any work was initiated.[109] The Southern Command of the Army, located in the Panama Canal Zone, too, informed SORO that henceforth all visits to Latin America by Sorons and their superiors in the social science research division of the Army, as well as all research conducted in the area, would have to be cleared with the command. These measures were in addition to the new rules requiring State Department clearance.[110]

These events left the staff feeling helpless and disheartened. Silenced by the Army, they had no recourse to address the allegations against them. In anticipation of SORO's new "big

[106] Minutes of the Council Meeting, Appendix 2, Division of Behavioral Sciences, 6 February 1966, Behavioral Sciences Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc Adv: General 1966, NAS Papers.
[107] Hilbert E. Friend to Theodore Vallance, 2 August 1965, SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: (1) Camelot 1965.
[108] Vallance expressed his concerns about the freedom of researchers in Vallance to Ewing, 23 July 1965, AU/SORO Box 2, SORO (Contracts/Legal)/1965-6.
[109] *BSNS*, 7R. For a fuller description of which studies fell into that category, see Harold Brown to Assistant Secretary of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, 18 August 1965, , Folder: Com on Govt Programs in Behavioral Sc: Adv General 1965, NAS Papers.
[110] USARSO to CRD, 10 August 1965, Entry 1295D, Box 3, Folder: 1303-01 CRESS Contract 67, RG 319.

social science" project, Vallance had hired dozens of new researchers. When Congress cut funding for the research outfit in an effort to put an immediate stop to Camelot, as many as fifty people were threatened with lay-offs.[111] Demoralized by the clear signs that ostensibly basic social science which staff members believed would benefit Latin American development had no place at SORO, some of Vallance's most senior researchers quit. Deputy Director of Social Research Philip Sperling left to manage social research at AID.[112] Recipient of the C. Wright Mills award, respected systems analyst, and Director of Research Robert Boguslaw left in 1966 for Washington University at St. Louis.[113] When he left, William Lybrand, who had been Chairman of the research division, took over Boguslaw's position as Director of Research. Lybrand had been Vallance's right hand man since he joined the research office in 1960, but he resigned only a few weeks after Boguslaw, informing Vallance: "I do not feel there is a compatibility between my interests, capabilities, and longer range career plans on the one hand, and the organization which SORO seems certain to become in the near future on the other."[114] The outcome of Camelot for the research office was far from the scholarly and institutional esteem they had anticipated in 1964.

Conclusion

The Camelot episode is shot through with the ironies of unintended consequences. Well-meaning scholars, seeking the keys to non-violent social change in the developing world, sparked a small international incident. A group of researchers hoping to increase their

[111] Ewing to Vallance, 24 November 1965, SORO/AU Box 2, Folder: SORO (Contracts/Legal)/1965-6.
[112] Vallance to SORO Staff, 2 September 1965, SORO/AU Box 2, Folder: SORO (Contracts/Legal)/1965-6.
[113] Vallance to SORO Staff, 3 May 1966, SORO/AU Box 2, Folder: SORO/1966.
[114] Lybrand to Vallance, 31 May 1966, SORO/AU Box 2, Folder: SORO/1966.

institution's academic prestige by taking on "big social science" embarrassed themselves through diplomatic insensitivities, scholarly hubris, and a lying consultant. They were reduced to pawns in a battle between the State and Defense Departments and were ultimately stripped of what little scholarly esteem they had managed to muster. Camelot left SORO so tainted that its name had to be changed in 1966, and it remained an intellectual backwater in the late 1960s. Finally, other well-intentioned scholars and bureaucrats, endeavoring to block the extension of federal control over research by calling attention to the improprieties of Camelot, motivated the Pentagon to increase its censorship of its researchers.

In the end, the Defense Department won the day. Congress briefly cut social science research funding, but budgets then continued their steady climb as the Vietnam War intensified. Camelot was cancelled in name, but many facets of the research went on under the more vigilant eye of the Pentagon. And that vigilance itself seemed to have a solid alibi in the wake of Camelot, for a classified research project would likely not be leaked to foreign nationals. Thus classification satisfied members of FARC.

The Department of State's victory was more limited. Department officials had hoped to use the Camelot episode to reassert their control over foreign area research and policy-making. They were only nominally successful. Their power was restricted in part by angry social scientists who, already saddled with one federal bureaucracy, objected to the State Department's intrusion into their research, labeling it censorship and a violation of scientific autonomy. If the State Department had deeper pockets, the outcome may have been different. But the Camelot episode did not lead Congress to redress the funding disparity between the Pentagon and Rusk's department. In fiscal year 1968, the Defense Department was allocated 27 million dollars for

foreign area research, while the Department of State received five million dollars.[115] Nor did the State Department manage to curtail the Pentagon's militarization of American foreign policy. In Congressional hearings in 1968, William Fulbright took up the State Department's torch and railed against the Defense Department's social science research program, accusing the civilian heads of the Pentagon of "assuming the responsibility for making political judgments all over the world."[116]

Meanwhile, Sorons continued to muddle through the boundary zone. Some used humor to deal with the helplessness of being a Soron in the days of Camelot. In October, 1965, the staff newsletter, "The Bystander," published a newsflash, alerting its readers that SORO's intelligence network had just uncovered a top-secret Kremlin project called Task EXPLOIT CAMELOT.[117] In December, "The Bystander" published a letter to Santa Claus from SORO, in which the research office asked for "a congress that loves social science," in addition to more parking spaces and Xerox machines.[118] Sorons did not get what they asked for, and they would shortly find their boundary zone on the edge of extinction.

[115] This was a very significant increase in funding for the State Department, although it did little to address the disparity with the Pentagon. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Defense Department Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, Part I, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 9 May 1968, 1

[116] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Defense Department Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research*, 18.

[117] "The Bystander," Vol. 1, No. 2 (October 1965), SORO/AU Box 1, Folder: SORO-Publications.

[118] "The Bystander," Vol. 1, No. 3 (December 1965) p. 3, SORO/AU Box 2, Folder: CRESS.