"Power, Arms, and Allies: U.S. Multilateralism in an Age of Unipolarity"

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Abstract

This research addresses the question of why and under what conditions a state with a preponderance of power will seek allies to do what it has the material power to do alone. Tested against competing explanations about domestic politics, international norms, and regional powers, I find the most support for structural factors as the best determinant of variation between unilateralism and multilateralism in post-Cold War interventions. Those two structural factors include imminence of threat, which shifts intertemporal tradeoffs in favor of the immediate gains of unilateralism, and operational payoffs, which may create greater incentives to share the burden, or conversely, discourage the incorporation of allies when the operation is not expected to impose high personnel, financial, or opportunity costs or would complicate the military efficiency and flexibility of the mission. This paper outlines this structural theory of military cooperation behavior, introduces three competing explanations, then tests the four hypotheses against the case of Afghanistan, in which international support was overwhelmingly forthcoming but sidelined in favor of a largely unilateral intervention.

Introduction

In the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War, political analyst Robert Kagan argued that "we are in a novel situation in world history where one nation has such overwhelming power and the capacity to act unilaterally"[1]—an assessment that many international relations scholars share.[2] In contrast to U.S. alliances during World War II and the Cold War, allies today offer relatively little in terms of shifting the power balance. Yet the United States still acts multilaterally.

Why does the United States seek allies to do what it had the capacity to do alone? Acting alone would give the US freedom of action to pursue its objectives, without having to gain authorization from and coordinate goals with allies and international organizations (IO). Advocates of unilateralism have suggested that a state such as the US, with a viable unilateral option, might be wiser to intervene alone rather than undertake costly bargaining and incur constraints to its decision making. What explains why and when

[1] Robert Kagan," Interview: Robert Kagan and Joseph Nye Weigh the Option of a Military Campaign Against Iraq," *NPR Transcript*, September 21, 2002.

[2] For discussions on unipolarity in general, see *inter alia* William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5-41. For discussions of unipolarity's implications for great power relations, see Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *Unipolar Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); and G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). For the implications regarding unipolarity, cooperation, and the use of force, see Bruce Cronin, "The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations," *European Journal of International Relations* 7.1 (2001), pp.103-130; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism," *Perspectives on Politics* (September 2005); Erik Voeten, "Outside options and the logic of Security Council action," *American Political ScienceReview* 95 (4): 845–58; Alex Thompson, "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," *International Organization*, Winter 2006.

might multilateralism "ever be preferred to an architecture where the hegemon could more directly exercise dominance"?[3]

In spite of its structural advantages, the US has generally sought allies and IO authorization when intervening against significantly weaker adversaries; in 7 out of the 11 interventions since the end of the Cold War, the US aggressively sought broad multilateral support. For example, in 1994 the US vigorously recruited and obtained 19 allies—including Argentina, Australia, Israel, Bolivia, the Netherlands, and the UK—to participate in the 1994 Haiti intervention intended to remove their military from leadership.[4] The US had a clear material advantage over Haiti's 7,600 person military, and military victory was almost guaranteed. What does a state with a preponderance of material power gain from intervening multilaterally against significantly weaker adversaries? What are the cooperation costs associated with multilateral military interventions, do the benefits of cooperation outweigh those costs, at what stages of intervention, and for what types of conflict?

These are the questions this dissertation addresses. This chapter lays out some plausible explanations for US choices between unilateralism and multilateralism, as well as my own logic of multilateralism, which I argue is a function of the specific structural conditions surrounding an intervention, a function of time horizon and costs across two phases of an intervention: the planning and operational phases.

This paper proceeds in several parts. First, I discuss theoretical and empirical payoffs of multilateralism and unilateralism. Acknowledging that each approach comes with advantages and disadvantages, I then explain how a lead intervening state is likely to weigh these cooperation costs and benefits. In the context of military interventions, I argue that whether a state chooses multilateralism versus unilateralism is largely the product of two factors: 1) How immediately state interests are threatened or the costs of not acting quickly (time horizon) and 2) The potential benefits associated with multilateral burden-sharing. These factors create a set of incentives and constraints that determine whether a state with a unilateral option such as the US is likely to pursue its intervention multilaterally.

Those two factors correspond to two phases of the intervention. The first phase is the planning phase, the time between when the potential need for intervention arises until the inception of an operation.[5] In this phase, a state assesses the security threat and evaluates courses of action for addressing that threat. Whether it chooses the multilateral course of

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[3] Lisa Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," *International Organization* 46.4, (Autumn 1992), p.792.

[4] David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study," *Survival*, (Summer 1997), 126-146.

[5] The "planning phase" would correspond roughly to the military's phase I, which covers preparation and early deployment of forces into theatre. Phase II is called "shaping the battlespace," which includes air operations that prepares the area for ground forces. Phase III refers to decisive operations and is the main phase of combat in which the regime is overthrown. Phase IV is the post-hostility phase in which the lead intervening state transitions authority to a civilian government. For these military categorizations, see Tommy Franks *American Soldier*, Regan Books, 2004.

action for its intervention in this first phase depends on whether the state is under short-term challenges to its security or its time horizon.[6]

The second main determinant of structural constraint on multilateral-seeking behavior deals with the costs themselves across the operational phase.[7] I argue that the nature of intervention affects the advantages and burden of allies; long, conventional conflicts will create advantages to multilateralism whereas the operational requirements of a short, decisive, or special operations mission will create fewer structural constraints and make multilateralism less likely.

Cooperation Costs versus Gains

In spite of its preponderant power, the hegemon has incentives to act multilaterally when it intervenes abroad. First and foremost, multilateralism is a way to share the physical burden of an intervention, both during the combat phase but in particular, over the period of what are often long post-combat reconstruction operations. Sharing the burden has several components: Personnel, financial, and cost in terms of time (opportunity cost). Coalition operations can reduce the obvious personnel and financial costs associated with an intervention, as the Gulf War demonstrated, with about two-thirds of the financial costs and twenty percent of personnel requirements covered by allies.

A robust coalition can also assist over what is often a lengthy post-combat reconstruction and stability phase. Distributing peacekeeping responsibilities across allies, for example, permits some US forces to disengage and be employed as reserves or be available to deploy elsewhere and thereby decreases opportunity costs of otherwise having to maintain forces in one place rather than have them be available elsewhere. The US no longer retains forces in Bosnia, for example, because European allies have assumed the responsibility for the follow-on stabilization force (SFOR), reducing almost to zero the physical burden to the US military.[8]

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[6] In her work on the likelihood of violence, Monica Duffy Toft roughly equates time horizon with the degree to which a state discounts the future. My argument implies a similar logical equivalence. See "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War," *Security Studies*, 15.1 (January-March 2006), 34-69, especially 51-57.

[7] The "operational phase" corresponds to the military's phases II-IV, which include initial operations, combat, and transition respectively. In the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions, in which a rapid combat phase was followed by long, costly transition/reconstruction phases, the question of how seriously the US regards phase IV has been called into question. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan," *The Washington Post*, p.A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24891-2004Dec24.html

[8] See the Congressional Research Service, "Bosnia: US Military Operations," by Steven R. Bowman, July 8, 2003; IB93056. For an enumeration of the troop levels in Bosnia since intervention, see Tim Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005,"Center for Data Analysis Report #06-02, May 24, 2006, Heritage Foundation.

Reducing the long-term physical burden may be one of the best arguments for multilateralism, given that most post-Cold War interventions have come with lengthy post-conflict reconstruction and stability operation periods (phase IV operations). As the table above indicates, the post-combat phase of six out of 10 post-Cold War interventions is on-going. Operations Northern and Southern Watch, which followed the 1990-91 Gulf War, would still be continuing had the 2003 Iraq war not begun. Maintaining military presence in each of these campaigns would be militarily taxing were the US unable to transfer responsibility to multilateral organizations or multinational forces, as it did in Somalia, Haiti 1994, Bosnia, and Haiti 2004. Over the course of the intervention, the payoffs of multilateralism will increase, since the longer the post-conflict phase, the more likely it will be for the US, as state with global interests, to require the military for contingencies elsewhere. Unless it can transfer responsibility to allies or an IO, then it will be constrained in its freedom of action elsewhere. In the longer-term, multilateralism will likely pay; in addition to the ability to share financial and personnel costs, opportunity costs will be lower because of the lead state can share the physical burden and employ its assets elsewhere.

Multilateral payoffs over the long term, however, do not come without coordination costs. Cooperation costs arise at different points of the intervention, beginning with the initial phases in which the lead state decides whether and how to intervene. The US must invest both time and financial resources to convince often reluctant allies on the need for intervention. In the first Gulf War, for example, the US expended significant amounts of time persuading the Soviet Union, whose support the Bush Administration considered to be a *sine qua non* for intervening in the Middle East because they were an important player in the region, on the principle of the intervention. While the Soviets joined in condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and in committing to an arms embargo, they had expressed grave reservations about intervening, favoring economic sanctions instead. Secretary of State Jim Baker's diplomatic overtures to persuade the Soviets to consider tougher measures, force if necessary, were extraordinary. Almost daily phone calls, numerous letters, and several trips to Moscow in the period between the date of

intervention (August 2, 1990) and the UNSC vote to authorize "all necessary means" (November 30, 1990) were necessary to bargain successfully with the Soviets.[9]

Not only was the bargaining costly in terms of the time it took to convince the Soviets of the need for force, it was costly in terms of the date of launch for the intervention itself. The Soviets preferred to give Saddam Hussein two months from the passage of Resolution 678 to evacuate Kuwait, under the assumption that two months of economic sanctions would sufficiently squeeze Iraq economically and prompt their withdrawal. The US, however, viewed two months as a signal of insufficient resolve; the US was additionally concerned that it had deployed 500,000 American soldiers to the region that needed to act both before the start of Ramadan and the beginning of the torrid Middle East summer. Ultimately, the French struck a compromise between the two, settling on January 15, 1991 (45 days) as the date to initiate combat rather than the US preference for January 1 and the Soviet preference for January 31, 1991.[10]

Cooperation costs may also arise in terms of policy compromise within the intervention itself. Multilateralism requires that states coordinate interests, which may diverge whether in strategy or tactics.[11] As Kenneth Waltz has suggested, "since the interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them are never identical…alliance strategies are always the product of compromise."[12] The greater number of participating states means more sets of interests, greater coordination problems, and greater prospects for policy discord and or compromise. Ken Oye writes that "as the number of players increases, transactions and information costs rise. In simple terms, the complexity of N-person situations militates against identification and realization of common interests."[13] Policy compromise is then the means by which states can realize common interests, but such compromise is also the vehicle for reaching a sub-optimal outcome for individual states. The US, for example, pursued compromise strategies in Bosnia when its NATO partners resisted the US intervention preferences; rather than pursuing aggressive bombing strategies advocated by the US Congress, the US agreed to a strategy of limited air strikes and aggressive diplomacy.[14]

Lastly, the growing capabilities gap between the US and its potential allies may mean less material return if the US does invest in multilateral operations. As one military officer said on background, "apart from the British, there is no single state whose participation is essential and without whom the mission could not be performed."[15] No other potential allies have similar capabilities, and in fact, they lack the capabilities required to accomplish expeditionary missions[16] and actually rely on the US for strategic

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[9] Baker, pp.278-281.
[10] Baker, ibid.
[11] James Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization*, 47.2 (Spring 1993), pp.207-233, specifically p.208.
[12] Kenneth Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: McGraw Hill, 1979: p.166.
[13] Mancur Olson argues that large groups tend to be less successful in organizing than small groups in part because of free-riding on the part of smaller entities in larger grops. See *The Logic of Collective Action*; Ken Oye makes a similar, more concise argument in "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy," *World Politics*, 38.1 (Oct 1985), pp.1-24; p.19.
[14] Paul Papayoanou, "Intra-Alliance Bargaining and US Bosnia Policy," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (Feb 1997), 91-116.
[15] Personal interview with an Army colonel who advised on the "internationalization" of the Iraq conflict, fall 2006.
[16] Expeditionary missions are those in which "joint forces are rapidly deployed, conduct networked strikes to destroy enemy forces, and set the stage for stability operations."

airlift, precision weapons, refueling, and advanced command and control capabilities and cannot independently contribute capabilities for expeditionary missions[17] that have become increasingly common in the post Cold War security environment. The divergence of capabilities and ability to communicate across capabilities has further diminished the "rewards" of multilateralism; most allies not only do not contribute materially, they actually require operational and policy compromise as a result of their participation. Although they do confer some benefits, allies also come with costs. As one prominent Army officer said, multilateral operations are "not an unmixed blessing."[18]

When is the Hegemon Likely to Cooperate Multilaterally?

How a state with the material power to intervene alone weighs these tradeoffs of multilateral uses of force has been the source of lively but unresolved debate. To some critics of unilateralism, the US decision to intervene in Iraq without a UN resolution authorizing force and with few substantive material contributions other than from the UK, Australia, and Poland marked the apotheosis of a growing trend towards unilateralism. That trend included unilateral US behavior towards international treaty regimes such as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Such behavior has led some scholars to offer structural explanations for the "unilateralist turn." David Skidmore suggests that the end of the Cold War reduced incentives for the US to perpetuate the "institutional [read: multilateral] bargain" that had committed western allies to US during the Cold War in exchange for the US restraining its power projection by acting multilaterally.[19]

Implicitly, scholars William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks raise a similar structural argument, making the observation that unilateralism may be a temptation of unipolarity. According to this logic, the preponderance of material power associated with unipolarity meant that the unipolar power would see little material benefit in alliances in exchange for acquiring costs associated with multilateral cooperation. Garnering few benefits for higher operating costs, the US would therefore see no net payoff in multilateralism and instead be tempted to intervene unilaterally.[20]

This explanation seemed corroborated by US actions in Afghanistan, which sought to limit multilateral participation, and in Iraq, where the US went in with 90% of the troops and higher amounts of financial investment, as well as Bush Administration rhetoric that referred to the "mission determining the coalition" paired with decisions to sideline allies. But an historical look at US intervention behavior shows that the US has *always* reserved the right to intervene unilaterally and that recent behavior is not necessarily a significant disjuncture from the past. Just a few examples include George Washington's caution regarding "entangling alliances," John Quincy Adams' unilateralism in Florida, McKinley's engagement in the Spanish-American War, rampant US unilateralism and

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[17] David C. Gompert and Uwe Nerlich, "The Road to US-European Military Cooperability," RAND IABG, p.ix; see also James Appathurai notes that while US procurement budgets dropped 8% between 1996 and 2002, European budgets dropped 18%. Europe has also cut investment in research and development; the total R&D budget is now 25% of the US budget. See "Closing the Capabilities Gap," *NATO Review*, Autumn 2002, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/art1.html

[18] Personal correspondence with Colonel HR McMaster, October 2006.

[19] David Skidmore, "Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol 2 (2005) 207-228.

[20] Brooks and Wohlforth.

hegemony in its own hemisphere throughout the 1900s (Haiti 1915-1934, Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, among others), and Clinton's unilateral airstrikes against Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iraq.[21] Based on this quick survey of the empirical record, in which the US has intervened unilaterally even when it was not a unipolar power, unipolarity is apparently not a necessary condition for unilateralism.

Nor is it sufficient. The US operated *mostly* multilaterally throughout the 1990s, with multilateral operations in the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In spite of its preponderant power, the US acted with self-restraint, operating largely within multilateral frameworks, and did not undertake a major unilateral operation until the 2003 Iraq War. While it did conduct unilateral airstrikes, the unilateral nature of these did not mark any disjuncture from previous operations in which the US had acted alone in its prosecution of airstrikes. Given the overwhelmingly multilateral record of the 1990s at the same time as it achieved unipolarity for the first time in its history, it is difficult to see how unilateralism is a temptation of unipolarity; the US had numerous opportunities for unilateralism throughout the 1990s but did not exercise that option. Unilateralism may not be possible without a preponderance of power, but explaining the unilateralism of Iraq in terms of international structure appears to be an incomplete picture of US decision making after 1990.

On the contrary, the apparently overwhelmingly trend towards multilateralism in the face of unipolarity actually prompted some scholars to attribute multilateral outcomes to preponderant US power; such power, they argued, contributed to the ability to convince other states to want what the US wanted. Erik Voeten argued that through the unipolar power's ability to provide lucrative side payments to potential opponents of US goals, the US was better able to translate its power into unique global leadership.[22] He writes that the unipolar power's "asymmetric outside options profoundly affect the logic of UNSC action and multilateral action more generally."[23] The combination of a viable outside option combined with resources to persuade otherwise reluctant allies, creates a bargaining range in the Security Council that might not exist under conditions other than unipolarity.[24] US leadership, both in IOs and with allies meant anything from passing UNSC resolutions on behalf of US realpolitik interests in Haiti to successfully negotiating compromise in the 1995 Dayton Accords. US power meant global leadership.[25] Unipolarity was clearly not a sufficient condition for unilateralism. Rather, it appeared for part of the 1990s to be a sufficient condition for multilateralism. As

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[21] Robert Kagan chronicles the US history of unilateralism in *Dangerous Nation*, making the argument that the US has showed a strong history of expansionist and unilateral behavior. (New York: Knopf, 2006). John Lewis Gaddis also notes the unilateral underpinnings of US history in *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

[22] As Erik Voeten points out, the international community also had an incentive to compromise to US interests so that it could have at least some agency over US intervention activity. See "Outside Power and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review*, 95.4 (December 2001), 845-858.

[23] Voeten, p.845.

[24] As Voeten notes, this argument varies little from the hegemonic stability argument in that it suggests the stabilizing influence of a dominant power and the improved prospects for international cooperation under large, asymmetric power distributions.

[25] *The Road to Dayton: US Diplomacy and the Bosnia Peace Process*, May-December 1995, US Department of State, Dayton History Project, May 1997 available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB171/index.htm#study

former Director at Policy Planning, Richard Haass, said, "multilateralism is not an alternative to leadership, but its manifestation."[26]

Unipolarity may offer structural advantages to the hegemon that make it easier for the hegemon to intervene unilaterally, but unipolarity itself is indeterminate with regard to whether the hegemon will exercise its outside, unilateral option rather than intervene multilaterally. Despite its structural advantages, there are still costs to unilateralism that would militate against such behavior. Similarly, the hegemon may have an abundance of resources, but would still seek to conserve and share the costs of intervene if the constraints of multilateralism were not prohibitively high. Unipolarity, both theoretically and empirically, is therefore indeterminate with regard to cooperation behavior. [27]

Other critics of US unilateralism have offered a first image (individual level) explanation of unilateralism, locating the cause "in the nature and behavior of men," or the US executive.[28] These critics argue that the Bush Administration is particularly hawkish on US security issues and is more inclined to operate unilaterally than previous administrations. Stephen Walt writes that the Bush Administration shared goals of US primacy and the global promotion of liberal US ideals as George HW Bush and Bill Clinton, it appropriated a different set of means to achieve those goals. The Bush administration was more willing to "go it alone", unilaterally exercising power to achieve US policy goals.[29]

While the Bush Administration has indeed shown a propensity towards unilateralism, other seemingly multilateral presidents were also clearly willing to use unilateral force. The invoker of the "new world order," George HW Bush, unilaterally sent 28,000 American troops into Panama to expel Daniel Ortega. In addition to his unilateral airstrikes, the seemingly strong multilateralist, Bill Clinton, took tough stands on several multilateral treaties that were considered to be singularly rejected by George W Bush. Referring to the ICC, Clinton said that "I will not, and do not recommend that my successor submit the Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied."[30] Similarly, the Clinton administration symbolically signed the Kyoto Protocol but never submitted it to the Senate for ratification. His tone was certainly more multilateralist—though even that had its hints of arrogance as the administration talked of the "indispensable nation"—but his actions were at times quite unilateral.[31]

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[26] Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of the Policy Planning Staff, 14 November 2001, available at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/6134.htm

[27] This logic follows that of Benny Miller in "The Logic of US Military Interventions in the post-Cold War Era," in which he argues that regional constraints rather than international structure generate the incentives and pressures that drive state behavior. See *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 19, no. 3 (December 1998), pp. 72-109.

[28] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) 16.

[29] Stephen Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy*, WW Norton and Company, 2005, pp.30-31.

[30] Clinton, as with Bush, was concerned with how the ICC would exercise jurisdiction over US service personnel. While he signed the treaty in the last days of his presidency, he argued that the treaty should not be ratified without careful consideration of how the ICC would have jurisdiction over Americans. See the Statement by the President on the Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty, 31 December 2000; available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/library/hot_releases/December_31_2000.html

[31] Robert Lane Greene writes in *The New Republic* that there was not as much a discontinuity between the "unilateralist" Bush and so-called "multilateralist" Clinton, except perhaps in diplomatic tone. He goes on

These examples erode the value of an individual-level analysis as a powerful tool in explaining variation between multilateral and unilateral interventions across administrations. Historical variation largely independent of polarity and US power makes international structural explanations untenable. Noting these shortcomings, I argue for a largely rationalist framework that lays out a more determinate set of expectations based on a localized set of structural constraints that are imposed on a state. Whereas standard structural realist theory lays out a set of expectations based on the incentives that the *international* system imposes on a state, I argue for a more localized set of incentives and constraints rather than one that follows from international conditions of anarchy and polarity. As I argue in this chapter, the set of incentives and constraints that determine whether or not a state is likely to cooperate multilaterally when it intervenes abroad derive instead from two factors: 1) How immediately its state interests are threatened (i.e., the costs of not acting quickly) and 2) The potential payoffs associated with multilateral over the course of the operation, both in the combat and post-combat phases.

As with other structural theories, I take preferences as a given. I assume that states are rational actors interested in maximizing gains relative to costs, regardless of the state's material power. [32] If a state—even one with preponderant power—has a choice between benefiting from burden-sharing or not benefiting, it will choose the course of action that maximizes its benefits; the concern lies in how costly it is for a state with preponderant military power to cooperate militarily, and this cost depends on the particular context or structural conditions, which are a function of the state's time horizon across two phases of the intervention, the authorization and operational phase, which I address in the next section. While this theory relies heavily on structural considerations, I do not dismiss the role of norms or "intersubjective understandings" of appropriate means of intervention, but I largely argue that structural constraints are likely to trump normative or domestic considerations. Moreover, in taking preferences as a given, I argue that most rational individuals or states in a particular context will behave the same way because of the behavioral incentives that those constraints present.[33]

The structure or context of intervention derives in part from the threat to state interests, more importantly the timing of that threat. The logic rests on the premise that as with international cooperation in general, deciding to intervene multilaterally begins and ends by resolving a bargaining problem, which James Fearon defines in the following ways: First, it refers to a situation in which there are several "outcomes that two or more parties would all prefer to no agreement, but the parties disagree in their ranking of the mutually preferable agreements." A second characteristic of bargaining problems is that they are

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to say that Kerry would have unlikely struck a new discontinuity and reversed the seemingly unilateral policies of Bush, though his tone would also have likely been more conciliatory. See "Abroad Appeal," *The New Republic*, 4 August, 2004, available at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=express&s=greene080404

[32] Rational states will seek to minimize costs to an extent that allows governments to limit the tax burden on their population. As such, they generally try to find ways to minimize the burden their state must assume and maximize the degree to which others are available to offset those burdens. I defend the rational actor assumption as David Lake "because it is the only general assumption of decision making available. Any other assumption requires detailed, actor-specific information to make behavioral predictions." See David Lake, *Entangling Relations*, 40.

[33] Robert Powell, "Anarchy in Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neo-Realist-Neo-Liberal Debate," *International Organization* 48:2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344.

dynamic. Over time, the problem may (or may not) be resolved by a series of offers and counteroffers "with one or more parties 'holding out' in hope that the other will make concessions.[34] A multilateral intervention then involves a series of bargains, from coordinating the decision to intervene to reaching policy compromise on each strategic or tactical decision within the mission itself.[35] Each of those decisions entails transaction costs in the form of time and sometimes payoffs to other states for their cooperation. Reaching agreement make take the form of one party holding out for a better deal, a process that "often takes the appearance of a war of attrition—two sides holding out, waiting in the hope that the other will make some significant concession first."[36] This process may involve either "costly delay" or no agreement at all.[37]

Those transaction costs associated with engaging in the multilateral bargaining process may be costly in terms of time and resources but over time are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of cooperation because of the way payoffs of multilateralism and unilateralism accrue temporally. As the payoff curves—which reflect cooperation benefits relative to costs—indicate in figure 1, the net payoffs of unilateralism are concentrated up front.[38] Coordination costs for unilateral interventions are limited to the amount of time required for one state to develop a strategy, align its assets, make decisions about mobilization, and initiate the attack. The intervening state does not have to coordinate preferences, policies, and assets of other states, does not have to go through the process associated with IO authorization, can initiate the intervention at a time suited to its own advantage, and can prosecute the military campaign using an internally-generated rather than a consensus-driven plan. In contrast, the upfront payoff of multilateralism is negative. While the state may at some point score some domestic and international political advantages of operating multilaterally, the coordination costs are extraordinarily high. The state must pay costs associated with striking multilateral bargains on the policy, strategy, and operations of intervention; each of these involves potentially costly delays and loss of decision making autonomy with which to pursue security interests.

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[34] James Fearon draws on Thomas Schelling and John Nash to define a "bargaining problem" as above. See "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Cooperation," *International Organization* 52.2 (Spring 1998), 269-305, p.274.

[35] In the multilateral intervention setting, those key members usually mean the UNSC and especially the permanent five members of the UNSC. In an ad hoc setting, the key players would be great or middle powers who may have enough leverage to resist bargaining with the US.

[36] Fearon, p.277.

[37] An example of costly delay would be reaching a peace agreement only after many have already perished in a war or in the effects of not initiating a war in a sufficiently timely manner. See Muthoo, p.147.

[38] The simple model assumes that the players involved for each curve remain the same across time. A unilateral intervention assumes that the state intervenes by itself and continues as a unilateralist state across the period of the intervention (e.g., the initial unilateral move "poisons the well" and reduces the likelihood of a multilateral follow-on phase) whereas a multilateral intervention assumes that the same states that initiate intervention are those that carry out all phases of the intervention. A scenario in which states enter and leave the intervention was not taken into account, but it would certainly affect the slope of the curves. An ideal case, for example, might be one where the US intervenes unilaterally up front, garnering the immediate autonomy benefits of unilateralism, but collects allies after the early phases and thereby shares the burden over the longer term. The payoff curves themselves borrow from the logic of Jonathan B. Tucker, "Partners and Rivals: A Model of International Collaboration in Advanced Technology," *International Organization*, 45.1 (Winter 1991), pp.83-120.

Over the course of a longer intervention, however, the costs of unilateralism begin to mount and the net payoff of unilateralism declines commensurately. The capital burdens fall entirely on one state, domestic and international political costs edge upward, and the operational agility and availability are limited by the need to maintain many troops in one location. The payoffs of multilateralism, however, increase across time. Although material costs invariably increase, the per unit (state) cost is less than it would be for a unilateral intervention and the opportunities for burden-sharing mean higher benefits of cooperation.[39] The longer the intervention lasts, the higher the payoffs for multilateralism because some of the fixed costs—such as the authorization and key strategic decisions—remain the same while the opportunities for burden sharing increase.

Given the way payoffs of multilateralism and unilateralism vary across time, it follows that a state with a short time horizon is likely to value the future gains of cooperation less, prefer the immediate and tangible benefits of unilateralism, and see a limited justification for multilateralism.[40] A short time horizon in the authorization phase means that a state is less willing to consider the potential benefit in the operational phases but is more interested in the short-term benefit of unilateralism. As Stephen Brooks writes, "in a system with high levels of security competition, a rational state's first concern will be to maximize the likelihood of its continued existence, even if focusing on short-term security has negative long-term repercussions…a rational state will always seek first to maximize its short-term military security from potential rivals, even if this has negative long-term priorities for other state priorities."[41]

Indeed, a state may forgo longer term advantages of burden-sharing if it intervenes unilaterally, but the process of generating multilateral agreement may come at a short-term cost to security. While the state works to strike agreement on the principles, timing, and strategy of intervention with IOs and allies, the putative cause of intervention is gaining in strength and able to exploit the delays of a coalition-building process.

Structural Constraints in the Planning Phase

How a state mediates these intertemporal tradeoffs depends the timing of threats to its security interests. I argue that imminent threats to survival will reduce the attractiveness of longer term gains and make the payoffs of unilateralism more urgent.[42] In this phase, a state will analyze the threat to its security and evaluates the time sensitive nature of that threat; a state with short-term security challenges will be less likely to engage the bargaining process and seek authorization from allies or IOs; it will be more inclined to exercise its outside option and intervene unilaterally rather than risk engaging the multilateral process as the threat to its security rises.

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[39] The Bosnia intervention offers a useful illustration. While the US has troops in Bosnia 10 years after the intervention, the number is many fewer (only 800) because other European states have picked up the peacekeeping burden. As a result, US costs for the intervention over time are much less than if the US had to carry the burden during both the combat and peacekeeping phases of the intervention.

[40] Charles Lipson, "Why are Some International Agreements Informal?" *International Organization*, 45.4 (Autumn 1991), pp.495-538; see page 512.

[41] Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *International Organization*, 51.3 (Summer 1997), pp.445-477, specifically 450.

[42] While Martin aptly identifies the general conditions under which a state would be inclined towards multilateralism, those conditions are not clearly operationalized and never addressed in the context of security, which is the subject of this inquiry. Her framework is a useful starting point but requires an elaboration in the context of security for it to have purchase on outcomes such as on the use of force.

Thus, imminent threats to security will increase the discount rate, or increase the way the state values present gains over potential future gains. Concerned with their short-term security, the state will discount the value of longer-term priorities and circumvent costly bargaining in favor of shorter term flexibility to pursue its security and survival even if doing so means forgoing the longer-term benefits of burden-sharing and preservation of the US position of primacy.[43] The likelihood for poor bargaining outcomes increases because the multilateral option becomes less attractive to the US.

The causal mechanism for the effect of imminent threat on discount rate and cooperation outcomes is as follows:

Immediate threat→high discount rate (short time horizon) → decreased incentives for multilateral bargaining→ less investment in multilateral coalitions and organizations, more in unilateral action

In contrast, a rising challenger, one whose ability to attack another state is more distant, grants states the luxury of more time to address those threats. The threatened state has the luxury of time to work through multilateral channels, collect allies, and generate IO authorization to address the problem. Delays associated with the bargaining process are immaterial because the security threat does not require immediate attention or action. Threats that are not immediate will decrease the discount rate and increase the state's willingness to countenance the time consuming bargaining process. Low level and insulated ethnic conflict such as in the Balkans during the early part of the 1990s and post-conflict peace and stability operations would be consistent with imposing a less immediate security threat to a potential intervening state. The consequence will be weaker security pressures on the state, lower discount rate, preference for the longer-term advantages of multilateralism, and greater tolerance for the multilateral bargaining process.[44]

The causal mechanism for the effect of distant threat on discount rate and cooperation outcomes is as follows:

Distant threat→ low discount rate (long time horizon)→tolerance for up front coordination costs→ increased likelihood for multilateral bargain

In her work on cooperation and states' propensity for multilateralism, Lisa Martin argues that discount rate is the independent variable that determines whether a state is more likely to act multilaterally or unilaterally.[45] In contrast, I argue that discount rate is actually the intervening variable in security affairs. Accordingly, immediacy, or lack thereof, of threat becomes the independent variable that affects the discount rate and

[43] This logic, which correlates the way a state values future versus present priorities with the degree to which is security interests are threatened, follows closely from that of Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *International Organization*, 51.3 (Summer 1997), pp.445-477, specifically p.450.
[44] Brooks, ibid.
[45] Lisa L. Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," *International Organization*, 46.4 (Autumn 1992), 765-792.

shadow of the future, which ultimately determines whether the state exercises its unilateral option or seeks a multilateral bargain.

The decision theoretic model for hegemonic choices between unilateralism and multilateralism becomes the following:

1. Intervening multilaterally has the payoff
U(M) = u(m(t0)) + <delta>u(m(t1))

where u(m(t0)) is the payoff for the multilateral intervention now, <delta> is the state's discount on future payoffs, and u(m(t1)) is the payoff for multilateral intervention in the future, and

2. Intervening unilaterally has the payoff
U(U) = u(u(t0)) + <delta>u(u(t1)).

This model assumes that information is both costly and limited, and that given the limitations of information, states will not have access to complete or perfect data on threats. In reality, states can never extract perfect information about potential adversaries and conditions but make decisions based on the expectation of costs and benefits for particular outcomes. The explanation therefore rests on the *expectation* of benefits and costs, such that when the expected benefits of cooperation are equal or greater than the cooperation costs, then there will be some form of multilateralism that is preferable to unilateralism.[46]

According to this framework, u(u(t0)) > u(m(t0)) because of the short-term gains of unilateralism. On the other hand, u(m(t1)) > u(u(t1)) because in the out years it is more advantageous to have intervened multilaterally. The discount rate then becomes the difference between whether the rational decision is to intervene unilaterally or multilaterally, and that, I argue, is a function of the immediacy of threat, or the degree to which structural pressures make any longer term gains less attractive. The next section turns to what constitutes threat, to what interests, and in what context of time.

Operationalizing Time Horizon

The first structural indicator hinges on the issue of time horizon: how decision-makers calculate the security costs of not acting quickly versus the military benefits of burden-sharing over the longer term. The argument assumes that a long time horizon will favor multilateralism, but a short time horizon, one discounted by short-term security challenges, will favor unilateralism. Time horizon is central to the argument, but the literature offers a weak point of departure for my research because of the deficient attention it has been given. As Herbert Simon writes, "the question of time horizon, and how choices would be affected by it, is seldom discussed in the public choice

[46] These assumptions are drawn from those that David Lake applies in his framework of unilateralism and joint production economies (a framework that considers conditions likely to lead to unilateral or multilateral outcomes). See David Lake, *Entangling Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Chapters 1-3.

literature."[47] Nor is it well-studied in the context of cooperation behavior. Monica Duffy Toft reports that "there remains relatively little written on the subject of how time horizons might impact cooperation and bargaining in the international relations theory literature."[48] Echoing this observation, Jack Levy writes that "time horizons are an undertheorized and understudied question of international relations" and urges more rigorous treatment of the concept.[49]

John Mearsheimer has given the question of time horizon as a rich a treatment as any scholar. In his theory of offensive realism, time horizon features prominently because time can be the difference between annihilation and survival; under conditions of anarchy, states will tend towards shorter time horizons out of a fear that states with offensive military capability, which all states have, are necessarily threatening to its neighbors. Because they are under constant threat, states tend to forgo longer-term and potentially more profitable interests for immediate but perhaps smaller payoffs.[50] Bruce Russett and Miles Lackey sum up the logic: "if there's no tomorrow, why save today?"[51]

The concept of time horizon is also at the center of the theory on preventive and preemptive war. On what constitutes a preemptive strike, Levy has written that it is one, "undertaken in response to the threat of an attack that is perceived to be imminent, whereas preventive action is a response that will generally take several years to develop. Preemption is a tactical response to an immediate threat, whereas prevention is a more strategic response to a long-term threat."[52] This emphasis on time horizon tracks closely with the conceptualization of other scholars who have worked on preemptive and preventive attack. Dan Reiter writes that "the term preventive war is used for a war that begins when a state attacks because it feels that in the longer term (usually the next two years) it will be attacked or will suffer relatively increasing strategic inferiority." Preemption, on the other hand, takes place when the "attacker feels it will itself be the target of a military attack in the short term. The essence of preemption, then, is that it is motivated by fear, not by greed."[53]

Michael Walzer notes the preventive and preemptive distinction as follows. Preventive attack is one that a state initiates to redress balance of power issues in order to prevent power from shifting disadvantageously. Preemptive war is a state's response to a "manifest intent to injure" or "a degree of active preparation that makes intent a positive

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[47] Herbert A. Simon, "Rationality in Political Behavior," *Political Psychology* 16.1 (March 1995), 45-61 p.50.
[48] Monica Duffy Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War," *Security Studies*, 15.1 (Jan-Mar 2006): 34-69.
[49] Jack Levy, personal correspondence, 8 April 2007.
[50] John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: WW Norton, 2001); for a critique of how Mearsheimer employs time horizon, see Gerald Geunwood Lee, "To be Long or Not to be Long—that is the Question: The Contradiction of Time-Horizon in Offensive Realism," *Security Studies*, 12.2 (Winter 2002), 196-217.
[51] Bruce Russett and Miles Lackey, "In the Shadow of the Cloud: If there's no Tomorrow, Why Save Today?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 102.3 (Summer 1987), 259-272.
[52] Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40.1 (Oct 1987), pp.82-107.
[53] See Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," *International Security* 20.2 (Autumn 1995), pp.5-34.

danger." It is a situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, only magnifies the risk to the state.[54]

The time distinctions of preventive and preemptive war align with what I would characterize as growing versus imminent threat, and by consequence, the degree to which a state discounts the future versus the present (i.e., the time horizon). All things being equal, an imminent threat would be more likely to shorten the time horizon and elicit immediate, unilateral action. Short-term challenges to security would include imminent conventional attack, evidenced by adversary amassing large units of ground forces on border or mobilizing air, sea, or ground assets.[55] Direct attack on state assets will also tend to elicit unilateral reactions, not because a subsequent attack is imminent, but because the attack creates a heightened sense of security awareness and is likely to prompt quick retaliatory response.[56]

In contrast, threats that are not imminent are less likely to provoke a unilateral response because the state is not concerned about the "costly delays" of multilateralism. The situation with Iran is a good example of such a threat; since threat estimates indicate that Iran is 10 years from a nuclear weapon, the US can work within time-consuming multilateral channels to address the threat rather than resorting to unilateral measures.[57] The logic of this explanation would predict, however, that if the US pursued multilateral diplomacy and sanctions, but that if Iran accelerated its program or was still developing its program several years out, the US would be more inclined to resort to unilateral action.

What confuses an already vague set of conditions is the contemporary security environment, in which weapons of mass destruction (WMD) blur the line between imminent and developing threats. Former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, Richard Haass, addressed that evolving environment in a 2003 speech:

> The challenge today is to adapt the principle of self-defense to the unique dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Traditionally, international lawyers have distinguished between pre-emption against an imminent threat, which they consider legitimate, and "preventive action" taken against a developing capability, which they regard as problematic. This conventional distinction has begun to break down, however. The deception practiced by rogue regimes has made it harder to discern either the capability or imminence of attack. It is also often difficult to interpret the intentions of certain states, forcing us to judge them against a backdrop of past aggressive behavior. Most fundamentally, the rise of catastrophic weapons means that the cost of underestimating these dangers is potentially enormous. In the face of such new threats and uncertainties, we must be more prepared than previously

[54] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, Basic Books, 2006. get page numbers

[55] Examples of imminent conventional attack include the mobilizations that preceded the Six Day War as well as the mobilization leading up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

[56] This explanation is more of a psychological explanation for behavior; it is unlikely that a subsequent attack is imminent, but the direct attack shows that an adversary has the capability of attacking at any time, which has the effect of heightening a state's discount rate and shortening its time horizon, which would tend to elicit a unilateral rather than cooperative response.

[57] Dafna Linzer, "Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb," *The Washington Post*, August 2, 2005, p.A01.

> to contemplate what, a century and a half ago, Secretary of State Daniel Webster labeled "anticipatory self-defense." [58]

Indeed, it was relatively straightforward to identify conventional imminence; Walzer gives the example of the Six Day War of 1967, in which Egypt was amassing troops on the border with Israel and which provoked a preemptive attack by Israel. A conventional developing threat was that of the US in the late 1930s and early 1940s, which prompted Japan to initiate a preventive attack against the US before it grew in relative strength.[59]

Unconventional threats populate a murky middle ground between imminence and developing threats and are therefore more indeterminate with regard to military responses; by the time a WMD is imminent, for example, it is too late for a state to react on behalf of its security. Yet the international legal community has been slow to respond to these contemporary security imperatives. Alan Dershowitz notes the absence of international legal principles on the question of preemption and prevention in the contemporary security context, and acknowledges that preventive attack is the natural outcome of such a legal vacuum.[60] Other legal scholars such as Richard Posner seem to suggest that conditions of uncertainty and high consequence of not acting mean that it is more likely for states to hedge against those threats.[61] In this context, that would mean that a state with a unilateral option may err on the side of caution and act against the threat.[62] Israel's attack of the Osirak reactor in 1981 is a good example of this behavior; some critics argued that the attack was preventive rather than preemptive, but the potential consequence of allowing the program to reach development was catastrophic, causing Israel to hedge and take precautionary action.[63]

This discussion of time horizon and what may constitute an imminent versus distant threat is conceptually helpful but is not as valuable in social science terms because it is not entirely falsifiable. What constitutes short-term challenges to security? When do distant threats become imminent? Where do humanitarian challenges fit on the continuum? To clarify these questions, I quantify the question of time horizons and security responses on the continuum in figure X.

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[58] Richard N. Haass, Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities. Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University (U.S. State Department, 2003 [cited October 5 2006]); available from http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm.
[59] Walzer, ibid.
[60] Alan Dershowitz, *Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways*, (WW Norton, 2007).
[61] This cost-benefit way of thinking about threats means that states would evaluate the risk and consequence under conditions of uncertainty and act on high consequence given the uncertainty of the environment. For an assessment of that framework, see Richard Posner, *Catastrophe: Risk and Response*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).
[62] The Bush Administration appears to have operated under these principles, evidenced by the accounts of Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine*: *Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies since 9/11*, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2007).
[63] For an account of the difficulties of managing risk that is associated with nuclear weapons, see Shai Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited," *International Security*, 7.2 (Autumn 1982), 114-142.



As the continuum shows, an attack that has taken place at t<0 will almost certainly elicit a unilateral attack. So will a conventional amassing of troops on a state's border. Given the uncertainty and unpredictability of WMD, a development program that has delivered capability or is expected to deliver capability within 1-2 years may elicit a preemptive and unilateral attack. Distant threats are those >5 years out or of infinite distance. Included in this category are WMD development programs 5-10 years out such as Iran's, rising challengers such as China, and humanitarian challenges that are at a large distance from another state's core security interests. Because the time horizon on these issues is long, a state should be expected to pursue diplomatic channels to deal with the issue rather than initiate a unilateral attack.

Where these distinctions become problematic is the transition zone. In this zone, multilateralism should be the expected default approach, but depending on the issue—particularly having to do with WMD because of its unpredictability—it may elicit a unilateral attack. Structure may create incentives to act multilaterally, but how a leader responds to those incentives may vary according to idiosyncratic factors, such as individual-level variables. For example, Stephen Rosen has discussed the role of human emotion in affecting time horizons, suggesting that certain types of political elites (tyrants) will have shorter time horizons, making bargaining failures—in this context, unilateralism—more likely.[64] Indeed, individual propensity towards risk acceptant behavior may cause one leader to act unilaterally when a different leader under similar conditions may have been unwilling to do so. While these individual-level variables and propensities cannot be predicted, so in this zone, we should expect multilateralism but with the possibility for a risk-acceptant individual who may respond erratically to his or her security environment.

Structural Constraints in the Operational Phase

The second main determinant of consequences and structural constraint on multilateral-seeking behavior deals with the operational costs themselves. As the first structural variable explains, over the longer term, multilateral payoffs are likely to exceed those for unilateralism. But certain factors are likely to condition those payoffs either in a positive or negative direction, affecting the likelihood that a state with a unilateral option will seek allies. As Hans Morgenthau notes, even a strong state is likely to seek allies, but only if the payoffs are expected to be fruitful:

[64] Stephen P. Rosen, *War and Human Nature*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

> "Whether a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is, then, a matter not of principle but of expediency. A nation will *shun* (emphasis added) alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of commitments resulting from the alliances is likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected."[65]

This second determinant of my explanation therefore relies on this connection between cost, benefit, and alliance outcome, but seeks to operationalize those payoffs more concretely. First, I suggest that the nature of intervention affects the advantages and burden of allies. A conventional conflict (force-on-force against another actor) is likely to create operational constraints even for a state with a large and advanced military. Force-on-force conflicts such as those of the two world wars and more recently the Persian Gulf War require vast numbers of troops, which translates into a high financial and personnel burden[66] that will create advantages for multilateralism.

During the first Gulf War, for example, Bush Administration leaders expressed concern for the number of troops Saddam Hussein had quickly stationed in Kuwait: 200,000 compared to the 20,000 US troops in theater. "As the US brought in heavy armored forces, two of the world's large armies eventually would be facing off. If there was conflict, it would be major land warfare. This was nothing like the liberation of Grenada or Panama."[67] The Iraqi military was thought to have one million well trained soldiers,[68] compared to an active duty Army size of about 800,000 soldiers.[69] By activating reserve forces and employing other services, the US may have been able to field the force it deemed necessary to confront the world's fourth largest military, but also stood to gain substantially by combining its forces with those from states such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Pakistan, and the UK.[70] This dynamic relates to an interest even on the part of a great power to shift the balance of power in its favor; conventional, force-on-force requirements will therefore call for alliance-seeking behavior.

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[65] Morgenthau, 193.

[66] For a comparison of "big" versus "small wars" and why the US tends to excel at one versus the other, see Michael R. Melillo, Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities, *Parameters*, Autumn 2006, 22-35.

[67] Woodward, p.285.

[68] Gordon, "Bush's Aims."

[69] The army also had almost 500,000 in the Army National Guard and 300,000 in the Army Reserve, bringing the total force up to about 1.6 million, but half of this total were soldiers that would have to be activated and were less immediately available. For force structure comparisons between the Cold War and the 1990s, see "A Changed Army," available at http://www.army.mil/aps/98/chapter2.htm

[70] Stephen Biddle discusses the 1:1.5:1 "rule of thumb" in the context of the Gulf War in *Military Power*, Princeton University Press, 2004; see p.136. It is important to note that this theatre level rule of thumb differs from the conventional 3:1 ratio in "combat power to break through a defender's front at a specific point." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and its Critics," *International Security*, 13.4 (Spring 1989), pp.54-89. The reason why this theatre-point distinction is important is that a total coalition could be quite small but amass all its forces at the point which it hoped to break. What is of interest though is the theatre-wide coalition totals because these reflect the breadth of the coalition more generally, rather than the ability of a small force to localize at a particular point/depth. For troop contributions, see "Operation Desert Storm: Allied Troop Contributions," which enumerates the contributions from various states. Total contributions were roughly 180,000, compared to the roughly 550,000 troops from the US. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_storm-allied.htm

Second, the anticipation of an intervention with a long combat or post-combat phase also increases the advantages of multilateralism for three reasons. The main reason is one of simple math. The longer the intervention endures, the greater the financial and personnel burden on the lead intervening state. Second, assuming that many of the transaction costs associated with multilateral bargaining are concentrated up-front and are relatively fixed, then the longer the intervention endures, the more efficient multilateral operations will become over time.[71] Third, a longer operation places constraints on the agility of allied forces; it creates high opportunity costs for one state's military. Having to maintain 60,000 of one's own soldiers in Bosnia on a relatively permanent basis, rather than maintain a fraction of that number, means either having restricted agility in terms of reacting to other contingencies around the world or growing the size of one's military to take that number into account.

While 60,000 or even 100,000 may seem like a small number for a military with about 2.4 million men and women, the physical burden is even larger considering the need for troop rotations. Rarely are forces permanently stationed in intervention zones; rather, they rotate through at about four to fourteen months at a time, requiring about 24 months[72] between deployments between returning to theatre. The need for rotations plus the requirement for a robust number of forces even (or especially) into phase IV then it means that a state must draw from an even larger troop base in order to maintain a force in the intervention area over time.[73] This means an even larger opportunity cost; that is, foregone opportunities sacrificed because state assets are obligated to one area and unavailable for another.[74] Responsiveness to contingencies elsewhere, for example, becomes severely hampered.

A third type of intervention expected to increase the payoffs of multilateralism is a humanitarian or peacekeeping mission. In this case, the payoffs have less to do with operational costs, which are in fact lower for humanitarian interventions than a conventional conflict,[75] but the political and security benefit side of the calculation. These interventions lie outside the traditional security interests of a state and less directly

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[71] This is likely to be a fair assumption both because up-front cooperation costs include a steep learning curve for each new coalition operation and because of the difficulty of interoperability in the combat versus post-combat phase of operations.

[72] The US has compressed this number in recent years in order to maintain about 140,000 troops in Iraq and about 22,000 in Afghanistan, but at the expense of readiness and morale.

[73] James V. Quinlin of Rand has studied successful interventions and estimated that about 20 troops are needed per thousand inhabitants during stability operations. In Iraq, that translates into about 500,000 foreign troops; based on a six month deployment and time between deployments of about 24 months, this means a state must draw on a troop base of 2.5 million troops to meet its stabilization requirements. This number exceeds the total number of US military personnel. See *Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations*, Rand Review, 2003.

[74] Robert Samuelson defines an "opportunity cost" as the "foregone opportunities that have been sacrificed." A more economics-based definition is that an opportunity cost if "the maximum alternative earning that might have been obtained if a productive good, service, or capacity had been applied to some alternative use." For these definitions, see Wayne E. Leininger, "Opportunity Costs: Some Definitions and Examples," *The Accounting Review*, Vol L11.1 (January 1977), 248-251.

[75] A US operation in Haiti, for example, costs an estimated $876 million for an expected 14 month mission, compared to the cost of operations in Iraq, which are as much as $2 billion per week during 2006. For Haiti costs, see "Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical US Operations in Haiti," *GAO Report*, February 2006; for Iraq costs, see "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11," *CRS Report*, 14 March 2007.

affect the lead intervention state's ability to defend itself.[76] As such, the security stakes are lower, which reduces the incentive to sacrifice one's own resources for victory and the interest in transferring some of the burden to allies. Similarly, the political advantages of intervening in these operations are few while the downside risks are potentially high; Kenneth Schultz notes that "for reelection-minded legislators, armed humanitarian interventions are high-risk, low-return policies," which creates incentives to sacrifice less and offload some of the burden (and in some cases blame) to allies.[77]

Public opinion data supports this proposition. In a series of polls, the only types of missions that have received less than 50% of support are those that fall under the heading of humanitarian or peacekeeping missions, such as those in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Those interventions that are characterized as *realpolitik* missions are those that receive the highest levels of support in principle and in terms of public's willingness to accept casualties. Oneal, Lian, and Joyner find that "the public evaluates the use of force pragmatically and in a way consistent with fundamental international principles regarding sovereignty and self-determination."[78] Summing up the research that shows a greater amount of support for *realpolitik* missions than humanitarian or peacekeeping operations, Dan Drezner concludes that "Americans appear to have realist instincts in placing a value on the uses of force."[79] Accordingly, they will prefer burden-sharing for liberal, humanitarian types of interventions because the security benefits of acting alone are fewer, and will be willing to intervene unilaterally for issues of foreign policy restraint or those that directly threaten US security interests. These political dynamics add a further set of constraints and dynamics in choosing whether to intervene multilaterally or unilaterally in a particular intervention.

Thus, whether a state will seek to intervene multilaterally depends on the incentives to share the cost, whether operational or political. Conventional interventions that require large numbers of forces, those interventions expected to lead to long post-combat reconstruction operations, and humanitarian interventions in which the political or security stakes are low create greater than average incentives for multilateralism. The payoffs of intervening multilaterally under one of these conditions will tend to look as follows:

$$U(m(t1)) >>> U(u(t1))$$

where the payoffs of multilateralism over time are greater than average because of the higher than average incentives for burden-sharing.

In contrast, the more the operational requirements call for a small logistical footprint and quick in and out mission, the less burden to share, the fewer structural constraints on the

[76] Richard Ullman seeks to make an argument that human rights and other humanitarian issues deserve greater attention as a "security" issue but I remain with the more narrow definition he criticizes, that which involves military issues. See "Redefining Security," *International Security*, 8.1 (Summer 1983), 129-153.
[77] Kenneth Schultz suggests that multilateralism can allow leaders a way to "wash hands" of blame for humanitarian operations that go awry. See "Tying Hands and Washing Hands: The US Congress and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention," in Daniel Drezner, *Locating the Proper Authorities*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
[78] John Oneal, Brad Lian, and James Joyner, "Are the American People 'Pretty Prudent'? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950-1988," *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (June 1996), p. 274.
[79] Dan Drezner, "The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion," working paper, April 2006.

state and the less probable a multilateral intervention. Fewer overall costs mean that the payoffs of multilateral burden-sharing are also lower for the same up-front, fixed coordination costs. Special operations missions, which require fewer personnel or costs than conventional operations, will reduce incentives for multilateral burden-sharing. Quick in and out missions,[80] those in which long stability operations are either not anticipated or not contemplated,[81] or air strikes will also reduce structural constraints on a state and increase incentives for unilateralism.

What magnifies the disincentives for multilateralism is any need for secrecy, which special operations forces or interventions predicated on surprise would require. Difficult to pull off under any circumstance, as the failures associated with the Bay of Pigs fiasco show,[82] special operations missions would become even more difficult by extending beyond the US military. Bureaucratic restraints on sharing intelligence beyond the US (and to some extent the UK) military would make granting access and integrating allied partners into such operations almost impossible while still keeping the secretive, special operations elements in tact.

The payoffs of intervening multilaterally for a short, special operations mission in which prospects for burden-sharing are low or incorporation of allies is difficult will more accurately look as follows:

$$u(m(t1)) \leq u(u(t1))$$

where the payoffs of multilateralism over time are negligible or even negative because of the lower than average prospects for burden-sharing.

Such expectations assume complete information; in the context of intervention decision-making, complete information would mean fully complete and accurate intelligence assessments on the likely conditions not just for the combat phase of operations but especially the post-combat operations. How long and expensive is reconstruction likely to be? In most cases, policy makers underestimate phase IV reconstruction and thereby understate the need for allies.[83] As former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman said referring to the hugely underestimated extent of post-combat reconstruction needs, "knowing what we know now about the Iraq war, we would have

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[80] An example of a quick "in and out" mission would be Panama, where the US was going in quickly to retrieve Noriega but had no intentions of remaining and building a new, democratic regime.

[81] An example here might be Operation Urgent Fury, in which the US intervened in Grenada responding to a coup d'etat. Once it had overthrown the old government and waited for a new government to take over, US forces left, without any contemplation of helping the new government build institutions and maintain stability.

[82] The National Security Archives' Bay of Pigs chronology shows the importance of the effective coordination of land and air assets. Calling off air strikes which were a central and necessary part of the invasion plan became one of the main reasons for the mission's failure. In this case, the President's decision making reflects the difficulty of coordinating just American air and land assets; integrating additional forces whose capabilities are more foreign would generate exponential difficulties. For the Bay of Pigs chronology, see http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html

[83] Lt Col Isaiah Wilson argues that America's perennial inability to correctly estimate and plan for phase IV operations has compromised our effectiveness in "winning the peace" and therefore winning the war. Personal interview, 24 July 2006. See also forthcoming book entitled *Thinking beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace*, (Palgrave, 2007).

waited until we had more allies to go in so we could be sharing the burden now."[84] A "mission determining the coalition" strategy works as long as planners have adequate information on what will constitute the entire mission, not just the combat phase.

> Hypothesis 1. While unipolarity may make unilateralism easier, it is indeterminate with respect to hegemonic choices between unilateralism and multilateralism. In contrast, the structural conditions surrounding an intervention will impose a set of incentives and constraints that make unilateralism or multilateralism more attractive. The context for those decisions are as follows:
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> > a. Imminent threats will shorten a state's time horizon and reduce the likelihood of unilateralism
> > b. Distant threats will decrease the discount rate lengthen the shadow of the future, creating conditions for high levels of diplomacy, policy compromise, and robust multilateralism
> >
> > c. Expectation of high operational payoff—whether because of the type, duration, or low interest of the conflict—will increase incentives for multilateralism
> > d. Expectation of short, light, or secretive intervention will reduce incentives for multilateralism and elicit a higher likelihood of unilateral behavior

The Normative Explanation

The normative explanation for cooperation behavior would suggest that the end of the Cold War marked a disjuncture in behavior. During the Cold War, states had acted according to a "spheres of influence" system in which the two superpowers "could organize political and economic life according to its ideology…Sovereignty in this system was strongly tied to territory."[85] Under this system, "superpowers were entitled under the rules of this system to intervene unilaterally to put down revolutions in their sphere."[86] Indeed, states could intervene unilaterally in their sphere of influence with impunity. If a state needed allies for material aggregation (that is, if it lacked power relative to its adversary), it would seek multilateral approach to an intervention, but its actions were not governed by the presence of multilateral norms in the international system.

That behavior changed at the end of the Cold War, when the coin of the realm became multilateralism. Multilateralism confers legitimacy because it signals broad levels of international support for the intervention. The norms associated with multilateralism "create political benefits for conformance and costs for nonconforming action. They create, in part, the structure of incentives states face…failure to intervene multilaterally creates political costs…these benefits and costs flow not from material features of the intervention but from expectations that states and people in contemporary politics share about what constitutes legitimate uses of forces."[87]

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[84] Personal interview with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 17 January 2007.
[85] Finnemore, pp.124-126.
[86] Finnemore, p.128.
[87] Finnemore, p.82.

In the order that emerged at the end of the Cold War, states had a responsibility to intervene according to the "logic of appropriateness," based on a sense of "oughtness" rather than ends-means calculations. Finnemore defined appropriate intervention behavior as multilateralism, both through UN authorization and international participation in the operation itself. Not only should a state organize its intervention under UN auspices, it should carry out the operation with a multilateral force consisting of troops from "disinterested" states, "usually middle-level powers outside the region of conflict."[88]

Finnemore makes several observations that testify to the strength of the multilateral norm in a post Cold War environment. First, she notes that

> "states adhere to them [multilateral norms] even when they know that doing so compromises the effectiveness of the mission. Criticisms of the UN's ineffectiveness for military operations are widespread. That UN involvement continues to be a central feature of these operations, despite the UN's apparent lack of military competence, underscores the power of multilateral norms."[89]

What further bolsters the claim that the multilateral norm constrains state behavior is that the unipolar power would bind itself by UN resolutions and the preferences of coalition members if it has the capacity to avoid such constraints and intervene unilaterally? That is, the question of why the US would self-impose costs of multilateralism when it does not have an instrumental need to do so can only be answered with a normative rather than rationalist calculation, Finnemore argues. Indeed, "such strong multilateral norms are not what one would expect from a distribution of material capabilities so overwhelmingly unipolar" especially when operating multilaterally may hinder the military aspect of the operations.[90] The US, with a larger and more sophisticated military than any other in the world, does not want for better equipment. That it nonetheless seeks allies suggests an understanding of the political—i.e., normative—value of having allies. Allies then bring to the unipolar power what a large defense budget cannot: legitimacy. Interested in appearing legitimate in its interventions, the US would then want to intervene multilaterally, and that normative constraint would impel the US towards multilateralism even when strict utility imperatives might indicate a unilateral outcome.

The multilateral norm argument would predict is that in a post Cold War environment, states seek IO authorization and a diverse set of allies not for material reasons but rather for political and normative reasons. Constrained by the prospect of political penalties for not intervening multilaterally, states will "go to great lengths" to generate a multilateral solution to legitimate their interventions.

Further, though this is not something that constructivists have made explicit, is that a state would seek to intervene legitimately. States can do that either by assembling a multilateral coalition, which confers legitimacy by showing that the intervention has been screened or sanctioned by many states, thus legitimating the objectives of the intervention. But states can also achieve legitimacy through legal means, that is, by acting within the

[88] Finnemore, p.80.
[89] Finnemore, p.82.
[90] Finnemore, p.134.

legal justifications of international law. Article 51, for example, provides that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."[91] Acting unilaterally in self-defense is entirely legal and also a legitimate recourse for a state under attack.[92] Thus, a state has two ways to legitimate its intervention: through legal provisions on the use of force, and through a robust multilateral coalition. States acting consistent with normative expectations of state behavior will seek either legal or multilateral means to legitimate its behavior.

> Hypothesis 2: States should be expected to constrained by a need to intervene legitimately and will do so either by assembling a multilateral coalition (authorized by the UN and/or with robust multilateral representation) or by acting within the legal provisions on the use of force.

Domestic Politics

A second explanation for the variation between multilateralism and unilateralism is the domestic audience. There are three aspects to this argument. One aspect is that decision-making elites accommodate domestic preferences on intervention and will be responsive to their particular preference for multilateralism or unilateralism on a given intervention. The second aspect is the degree to which the public actually expresses a preference for multilateralism. If indeed the US audience does express preferences for multilateralism and the decision-making elite does accommodate public preferences, we should expect to see convergence towards multilateralism. A third aspect is that the foreign domestic audience prefers multilateralism and that US elites, in order to generate international consent, will accommodate those preferences. This section will discuss those aspects in turn.

The first aspect is the most fundamental. Do decision-making elites listen to public preferences when the make foreign policy decisions? The realist perspective on this question would argue that public preferences do not affect decision-making outcomes.[93] The Almond thesis on public opinion, for example, suggests that because of the nuanced nature of national security decisions and the magnitude of risks associated with foreign policy decisions, decision-making elites cannot allow decisions to be both democratic and effective.[94] Since the thesis emerged, other scholars of public opinion have challenged this notion, suggesting that decision-makers do take public opinion into account, even in

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[91] See Article 51 of the UN Charter, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm

[92] On the laws of war and the legality of force in response to attack, see Adam Roberts, "Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War," *Survival*, 44.1 (Spring 2002), 7-32.

[93] David Lumsdaine and Ole Holsti refer to the argument that public opinion does not affect outcomes as the "realist" position. See "The Intertwining of International and Domestic Politics," *Polity*, 29.2 (Winter 1996), 299-306; Holsti, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, *International Studies Quarterly*, 36 (1992): 439-466. The realist position is consistent with the Almond-Lippmann consensus that emerged after World War II that suggested that 1) the public is capricious with its views and does not provide a stable foundation for policy making, 2) lacks coherence, and 3) has little impact on policy outcomes. See Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925; Gregory Almond, "Public Opinion and National Security," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20 (1956): 371-378.

[94] Gabriel A. Almond, "Public Opinion and National Security Policy," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20.2 (Summer 1956), 371-378.

terms of foreign policy decisions.[95] As Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro showed in their study of public opinion and policy outcomes, there is a strong correlation between public opinion and government behavior across time.[96] The public opinion thesis suggests that decision making elites are both aware and responsive to the public's preferences. A more recent study indicates that "decision-makers were constantly aware of public opinion and were by necessity constrained in the timing, extent, and direction of their actions."[97] The argument is that a democratic society is predicated on popular consent and will not function efficiently without harmony between public preferences and actions by the government.[98] If the public influences government behavior, we should expect to see the public's preferences revealed in decision-making outcomes.

A second aspect of the public opinion debate has emerged in recent years that treats multilateralism more specifically. On this aspect of the debate, the contention surrounds whether multilateral operations are more likely to generate greater public support than those that are unilateral. Kull et al and Eichenberg find evidence for the argument that the unilateral/multilateral distinction is an important variable that affects public opinion, using public opinion data to support their argument. Table X illustrates the relative public support for multilateral and unilateral approaches to several interventions.[99]

Intervention	***Year***	**Unilateral**	**With allies**	**With UN**
Somalia[100]	1992-93	55%	--	66%
Haiti[101]	1994	17%	51%	64%
Bosnia[102]	1992-95	17-27%	60%	--
Iraq[103]	1998	53%	72%	--
Kosovo[104]	1999	40%	51%	--
Afghanistan[105]	2001	90%	--	--

[95] See, *inter alia*, H.S. Foster, "Activism replaced isolationism: US Public Attitudes 1940-1975, Washington, DC: Foxhall, 1983. R.S. Beal and R.H. Hinckley, "Presidential decision making and opinion polls," *Annals*, March 1984, 72-84; Leslie Gelb, "The essential domino: American politics and Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1972: 459-475; Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly*, 36:439-466.

[96] Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, "The Effect of Public Opinion on Policy," *APSR* 77 (March 1983): 175-190.

[97] Richard Sobel, "The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the Colossus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 238-239; quoted in Joseph Grieco, "Second Opinion," p.9.

[98] Philip Powlick, "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials," *International Studies Quarterly*, 39.4 (Dec 1995), pp.427-451.

[99] While comparison across interventions is difficult because of the variances in the way questions were asked, comparisons within cases can more easily be made by using the same survey group within each case. Since the table is intended to illustrate the way the public values multilateral versus unilateralism, within case consistency is more important than across case consistency. See also Steven Kull, IM Destler, and Clay Ramsey, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How policymakers misread the public*, (College Park: PIPA, 1997).

[100] Eichenberg, p.160

[101] Time/CNN Poll, 1994.

[102] ABC/WP poll, quoted in Sobel, Bosnia.

[103] CBS/New York Times poll, February 9, 1998; the unilateral category includes participation with the UK and therefore actually represents support for bilateral strikes. The "with allies" category reflects the public's assertion that the US needed to get support from allies before initiating air strikes; poll about UN support was the CBS News poll of August 2, 1994.

[104] Eichenberg, p.160.

Iraq[106] (pre-war)	2002-Feb 2003	28%	37%	55%
Iraq war[107]	Mar-Apr 2003	72%	--	--

A key motivation behind multilateral preferences is the public's reluctance to bear the entire burden of what is thought to be a global responsibility for peacekeeping or restraining expansionist leaders, and that they assert that "global problems can't be solved by a single country."[108] The public tends to have a pragmatic perspective on multilateralism, understanding that the transnational and costly nature of most problems provides incentives for broad multilateral cooperation. Such public proclivities towards multilateralism would make it more costly for an executive to take his country into military conflict unilaterally and more politically rewarding to intervene multilaterally.[109]

The US public does appear to be supportive of multilateral operations versus unilateral, but is somewhat inconsistent in what it means by "multilateral." In some cases, multilateral seems to be a function of whether key European allies "go along." In the Bosnian War, for example, only 27% of Americans favored air strikes against Bosnians even if Europeans did not agree to participate; 65% supported air strikes under the condition that the US operate alongside European allies.[110] A similar trend of public support for multilateral versus unilateral approaches has held with other interventions such as Haiti, in which public support for the interventions escalated from 17% to 51% when asked whether the public would intervene "along with troops from other countries" rather than unilaterally.[111] Americans do exert some preference for UN authorization but seem more willing than Europeans to intervene with less a less formal version of multilateralism as necessary.[112] The combination of the proposition that Americans have

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[105] Numerous polls asked whether Americans supported American or American/British use of force but few if any polls asked about intervening with allies or IOs. The support levels for the US use of force were extraordinarily high across all polls, *inter alia* CNN/ USA Today/ Gallup Poll of 8 Oct 2001 (90% support) and Washington Post (in which 94% supported or strongly supported military force).

[106] Program on International Policy Attitudes, Jan 21-26, 2003; Pew Research Center, Jan 16, 2003.

[107] This measure takes into account public support for the ad hoc coalition that ultimately intervened in Iraq; that number included some rally-round-the flag effects and perhaps some belief that the coalition at least resembled a multilateral effort. See CBS News, March 4-5, 2003.

[108] Quoted in Richard L. Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends: US Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005," *International Security*: 30.1 (Summer 2005), p.146. Eichenberg challenges the Jentleson and Britton thesis that whether an intervention is conducted multilaterally has no bearing on levels of public support. To the contrary, Eichenberg asserts that multilateralism *does* enhance levels of public support largely for the reasons outlined here: burden-sharing and a realist understanding of what capabilities are necessary to address transnational issues.

[109] Although the public's preference for multilateralism is still debated, most scholars have found support for the argument that the public is more willing to support multilateral interventions over those that are unilateral, all things being equal. See Eichenberg and, more persuasively, Steven Kull and IM Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of the Isolationist Public*, (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999). Jentleson and Britton, on the other hand, are skeptical of the effect of multilateral participation on US public opinion. This seems to be the minority view, however.

[110] See Richard Sobel, "The Poll-Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 62 (Summer): 250-329. See also the Rand public opinion study, which shows comparable results on page 6.

[111] For an excellent treatment of public support for the Haiti intervention, see Kenneth Schultz, especially figure 2 (multilateralism and support for the Haiti operation, 1994). P.122.

[112] Only 41% of Americans say that UN approval is necessary for a state to intervene militarily, but 73% say they do not support American military intervention if its allies do not go along. There is a key

multilateral tendencies with the assertion that decision-making elites listen to American preferences would suggest the following: The greater the differences between multilateral and unilateral preferences on the part of the public, the greater the likelihood that decision-makers will choose multilateral outcomes over those that are unilateral.

Related to this proposition on US domestic preferences is the role of foreign domestic audiences. While the domestic preference towards multilateralism is debatable, that of the foreign audience is not. Rather, it is consistently multilateral. To foreign domestic audiences, organizational authorization—most often that of the UNSC—is a necessary condition for multilateralism. Support for the intervention is contingent on that authorization. For example, whereas 70% of Europeans supported the first Gulf War, only 19% supported the more recent Iraq War; the prospect of UN authorization raised support in most European countries by 30-50%. As Erik Voeten notes, Secretary James Baker cites the allied domestic preference for organizational multilateralism as a key motivator for his efforts to obtain a UN endorsement in Desert Storm.[113] In some cases, lack of UN authorization poses an insurmountable challenge for some states' leaders. Turkey argued, for example, that "a resolution gives us something to work with domestically."[114] Without a UN authorization, Turkey could not justify the Iraq intervention to its domestic audience and thereby withheld its support.

Whether it seeks foreign support for material or political value, this part of the hypothesis would suggest that foreign domestic preferences for multilateralism will prompt the US to increase the degree to which it intervenes unilaterally. Doing so will give foreign elites a way to justify their countries' participation in the intervention in a way that persuades an otherwise skeptical foreign domestic audience. If this part of the explanation is correct, then we should expect to see the US going out of its way to conduct its intervention in ways that are sufficiently multilateral to co-opt the support from foreign domestic audiences. That means the US will be willing to pay the cooperation costs associated with multilateralism according to the preferences of allies it needs most. If the US were seeking European participation for an intervention in the Balkans, for example, and European preferences consisted of a NATO rather than an ad hoc multinational coalition, then we should expect to see the US compromise on its set of preferences in order to reach a NATO-based solution to the intervention. Thus, while foreign domestic audiences will typically favor multilateral interventions, there is likely to be variance on the degree of multilateralism that they require for a given intervention. With an interest in bringing allies on board, the US should be expected to accommodate that degree of multilateralism—whether through UN, NATO, or other IO authorization—before engaging in the intervention.

It should be noted that since foreign preferences for multilateralism is fairly constant in the post-Cold War period, the only way to test for whether those preferences are

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distinction between the UN as a legitimating body and the legitimating factor of US alliances. See Rand Public Opinion study.

[113] Erik Voeten, "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review*, December 2001, p.848.

[114] Alex Thompson discusses the domestic political value of UN authorization in "Screening Power: International Organizations as Informative Agents." In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, edited by D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson and M. Tierney. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

constraining US behavior is through process tracing. Since there are several cases in which the US did not act multilaterally, it would be easy to conclude that foreign preferences for multilateralism has no influence; or in the cases in which the US intervenes multilaterally, we cannot conclude *ipso facto* that doing so was the result of allied pressure. Only through process tracing and looking at the mechanisms through which particular causes contributed to outcomes can we actually see whether foreign preference for multilateralism caused a particular multilateral decision.

This discussion on domestic and foreign public opinion leads to the following testable hypothesis:

> H3: Decision-making elites will be constrained by the multilateral preferences of domestic and foreign publics and modify their decisions accordingly; the more dominant preference for multilateralism, the more constrained US decision-makers should be.

Regional Power Dynamics

In response to the unilateral Iraq intervention, some scholars have suggested that perhaps unilateralism resulted as a temptation of US unipolarity.[115] According to this argument, shifting structure of the international system—from bipolarity to unipolarity at the end of the cold war—has created two, related sets of conditions. First, the US gained the imbalanced, unchecked ability, and therefore temptation, to act autonomously in its foreign policy goals and without the constraints of bipolarity or insufficient resources to act alone.[116] The huge disparity in power means that the effectiveness of any countervailing coalition would be marginal and the likelihood of disrupting the political or economic order is also of minimal likelihood.[117] Second, and more implicit, the US stands as having achieved an unprecedented degree of "internal balancing." Since internal balancing is thought to be more reliable than external balancing, structural incentives for alliance formation would be negligible.

While the logic is persuasive, the enduring nature of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War still does not account for the variation between unilateralism and multilateralism in

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[115] Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism," *Perspectives on Politics*, September 2005, pp.509-524. Separately, John Ikenberry has raised that specter in "Multilateralism in Decline," *Perspectives on Politics*, G. John Ikenberry, "Multilateralism in Decline," *Perspectives on Politics*, 1.3 (Fall 2003). Although the status of international structure is open to debate, many scholars agree that the "unipolar moment" has endured since the end of the Cold War. The phase "unipolar moment" and a discussion of what that means may be found in Charles Krauthammer made the original "unipolar moment" reference in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/91; see also a variety of other articles that attest to the unipolar nature of the international system, from the end of the Cold War until present.

[116] Robert Jervis, who opposes recent US foreign policies, concedes that "realists of many kinds simultaneously believe that the desire for greater security, material benefits, and status will lead states to expand their influence when there are no immediate checks on their doing so." *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*, Routledge, 2005, p.6

[117] Cronin has argued that a stable order would lend itself to unilateral actions "without fear of disrupting the system." Although he does not explicitly label unipolarity as a type of stable order, it is logical to assume that the huge power disparity under unipolarity means that the hegemon can operate unilaterally and not be wary of disrupting the system.

interventions during that same period. For that reason, as discussed more fully in the early section of the chapter, I therefore dispense of the argument that international structure is a determinant of cooperation behavior.

What may more plausibly account for the variation is a regional rather than internationally-based power explanation. While most scholars consider the post Cold War security environment to be unipolar, Samuel Huntington has suggested that the international system is actually uni-multipolar.[118] The term is indeed clunky but makes a valid point: The US is the superpower, has preeminence in every domain of power, and has the capability to advance its interests throughout the world. But the international system also has secondary powers that, at a regional level, have political or economic prominence. In a hybrid uni-multipolar system, major regional powers may not be able to promote their interests globally as can the superpower, but can constrain the US strategic options at least within their respective regions. China constrains US strategic autonomy in Asia, Russia does the same in its region, and the France-Germany-Britain triad is operative in Europe.[119] In general, the US is better able to operate autonomously in regions where regional powers are less dominant, such as in its own hemisphere, and must operate more gingerly in areas where regional powers are more proximate or run the risk of creating high political costs for actions that have not first been coordinated with the key regional actors.[120]

In practice, this explanation will translate into the following prediction: when intervening in regions with major regional powers, the US will seek to integrate those states, whether into its coalition directly or through the respective regional organization. The main reason is that the political costs for not doing so may be high; a regional power maintains an interest in dominating its region and is unlikely to respond favorably to unilateral incursions by actors outside the region.[121]

At the worst, the regional power can make things more difficult for the intervening state by resourcing the target state, rendering it more difficult to achieve the strategic objectives. For example, during the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union provided substantial technical and material assistance to the Viet Cong, in the form of air defense equipment as well as Soviet personnel responsible for training and equipping the North Vietnamese.

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[118] Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999, pp.35-49.

[119] John Mearsheimer makes a similar argument in chapter 6, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, WW Norton, 2001.

[120] Alex Thompson argues that regional powers create political costs that curb another actor's freedom of action in the region. See "Screening Power: : International Organizations as Informative Agents,"

[121] John Mearsheimer writes that powerful states seek regional hegemony; implied is the dominance of the political, economic, and military agenda in their region. While the reactions of regional hegemons to unilateral incursions in their regions may amount to balancing behavior, in which states pool efforts or resources or increase defense spending to counter US power, but the type of political cost I refer to here would more likely fall short of hard balancing yet still be an important consideration for a US decision-maker. Diplomatic friction or denial of basing rights can make military actions more difficult and create costs that would not exist had those states been incorporated. For more on balancing and soft balancing, see Josef Joffe, "Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule the World?" August 6, 2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/05/1060064182993.html; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is Not Pushing Back," *International Security*, 30.1 (Summer 2005), pp.109-139.

Soviet Air Force pilots also deployed to Vietnam to repair MiG aircraft and assist in anti-air defenses shooting down US forces.[122]

At best, the intervening state forgoes an opportunity to benefit from the regional hegemon's valuable political, economic, and military leadership. Intervening in the Balkans, however, would have been militarily and politically difficult for the US to do unilaterally, given its proximity with Europe. As Huntington writes, "the settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states."[123] Intervening in the Balkans, for example, required the political influence of the European states; neither the Bush nor Clinton administrations wanted to take the lead on Bosnia and deferred the problem to the Europeans, whose backyard included the Balkans and who were therefore in a better diplomatic and military position to influence the outcome. Ultimately, the lack of European state capacity required American military and diplomatic leadership, but the US would certainly not have intervened unilaterally in what was clearly the European sphere of influence.[124]

Thus, when intervening in areas with a regional hegemon—whether a particular state or set of states—the US should be expected to generate a multilateral approach that incorporates that hegemon. The inverse of this argument would suggest that absent regional powers, the US alone can intervene unilaterally rather than generate the regional support necessary to resolve the military or political issue it is trying to address through intervention. For example, the US would be most likely to intervene unilaterally in the western hemisphere, in which the US is the sole regional hegemon and has no regional competitors that would constrain its freedom of action.

Hypothesis 4. Regional power dynamics will constrain US unilateralism:

a. The Western Hemisphere, a zone of historical unipolarity, should offer the most policy latitude for the US and be the region with the most consistently unilateral interventions across time.

b. Intervening in Europe and east Asia will require multilateralism because of the restraining influence of several proximate state powers the European triad and China/Japan respectively

c. Interventions in the Middle East will have moderate constraints on cooperation behavior; they have no regional hegemons but medium states with important economic and political importance as well as strong states outside the region with regional interests (e.g., Russia) that will constrain US freedom of action

<u>The Case of Afghanistan</u>

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[122] See memo from the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, available at http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/sovietunion/vietnam_working.htm; see also Mari Olsen, *The Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China, 1949-64: Changing Alliances*, New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).

[123] Huntington, 36.

[124] See Jon Western, *Selling Intervention and War*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). Information also derived from personal correspondence with Jon Western, who served as a Balkans and East European specialist at the US Department of State during the 1990s.

In the wake of 9/11, the US saw an outpouring of international support on its behalf. From the now-famous "nous sommes tous americains" headline in *Le Monde* to the unprecedented Article V invocation by NATO to the unanimous condemnation of the attacks within the Security Council, the US enjoyed a rare respite in anti-Americanism and resistance to US policies abroad.[125] In principle, that support extended to US retaliation through the use of force, and indeed, key international states agreed that the US had "the right of individual or collective self-defense."[126] Yet in practice, the US exercised its self-defense almost entirely individually, intervening in Afghanistan with minor participation from the UK but otherwise with its own financial and personnel resources.

Indeed, instead of accepting material offers and integrating NATO into its campaign plans, as many members had hoped, the US declined the offer and instead chose to position NATO assets domestically as part of Operation Noble Eagle (the homeland security mission). None of NATO's collective assets deployed to Afghanistan. As evidence of the fact that Europe would not be any center or periphery of gravity, one US senior official said that "I think it's safe to say that we won't be asking SACEUR [the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] to put together a battle plan for Afghanistan."[127] There was a clear interest in avoiding the "cumbersome military command and planning structure" of a multilateral military organization such as NATO.[128] An ad hoc set of arrangements, such as the bilateral arrangements the US organized with specific allies, would enable the US to maintain military flexibility, as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz made clear at a meeting in Brussels in September 2001.[129]

The US, therefore, adopted the approach that it would let the mission "determine the coalition. The coalition is not going to determine the mission because it will dumb down everything to the lowest common denominator."[130] Concern with how the US would interoperate with less capable militaries, and with states with heterogeneous interests compared to the American interests, clearly drove the alliance-building strategies. Rather than incur any inefficiencies of coalition warfare, the administration called for a strategy that would leverage only its assets and to a lesser extent, those states with necessary or

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[125] For the verbiage of 1368, see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm; in this statement, the Council notes that the "members departed from tradition and stood to unanimously adopt resolution 1368, by which they expressed the Council's readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the attacks of 11 September and to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with its Charter responsibilities." 12 September 2001. For a more comprehensive listing of IO responsiveness, see "International Organizations Respond to Sept 11 Attacks, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/International_Organizations_Respond_to_Sept._11_Attacks-406c8d6f4da73.html

[126] UNSC Resolution 1368

[127] Quoted in Nora Bensahel's treatment of coalition cooperation in Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom more broadly. See *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*, (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003), 7-8.

[128] Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, "NATO leaders warm to US flexibility," *The Financial Times*, 27 September 2001, p.6.

[129] Judy Dempsey, Stephen Fidler, Edward Luce, and Alexander Nicoll, "US lines up a flexible action plan: White House avoids seeking NATO-Wide Aid," *The Financial Times*, 27 September 2001, p.1.

[130] See Rumsfeld interview with Chicago Sun Times editorial board, Nov 16, 2001; www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t11212001_t1116sun.html

comparable assets and preferences. Where those conditions could not be met, allied participation would not be accepted.[131]

With this as the guiding principle, allied participation was limited.[132] The only parties that the US integrated into its combat plans were the UK, as a state, the Northern Alliance, as a key non-state participant, and some western states' special forces. Under the leadership of General Tommy Franks, US Central Command (CENTCOM) initiated campaign planning for an attack on Afghanistan, for which there were no existing plans on the shelf. As a Rand report on Afghanistan notes, the strategy for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan "was built from the ground up and was expressly tailored to the tasks at hand, since none of the preexisting contingency plans on file at CENTCOM was even remotely appropriate to the special needs of Enduring Freedom."[133] Britain, with officers "seconded" (or assigned) to CENTCOM from the outset,[134] was the only state whose troops were directly integrated into the development and execution of those plans. British officers participated in the planning and their Chief of Staff, Admiral Boyce, was in consistent and close contact with General Myers, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[135] Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld met frequently with Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon; throughout the planning phase, the US and UK were "in lockstep." [136]

Participating in what it called Operation Veritas, Britain took on the role of the principal coalition partner to the US. It contributed numbers of commandos, a Parachute Regiment, Royal Marines, Nimrod surveillance aircraft, and four C-17s from the Royal Air Force.[137] It launched some of the early rounds of Tomahawk cruise missiles from hunter-killer submarines, fought side-by-side with the US in its search for Osama bin laden and Taliban leaders, and participated without national caveats in the mountainous engagements,[138] including Tora Bora and Anaconda.[139] While the US had 29,000 troops and 349 military aircraft in theatre, Britain was well within that range, providing close to

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[131] See DoD News Briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Franks, Nov 27, 2001, available at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t11272001_t1127sd.html; Charles Krauthammer compares the rigidity of the Gulf War coalition to that of Afghanistan in, "Clear Thinking on Coalitions," *The Washington Post*, Oct 19, 2001, p.A29.

[132] I distinguish here between multilateral support, which includes basing and overflight rights and which many states—particularly those in central Asia—provided, and actual participation, which includes the incorporation of combat forces into campaign plans and which was limited to the US and UK.

[133] Ben Lambeth, p.60.

[134] Many other states such as the Czech Republic and Uzbekistan later established presences at CENTCOM but only Britain and to a lesser extent Australia had personnel at CENTCOM during the planning phase for Afghanistan. See "United Against Terrorism," the *American Forces Press Service*, available on the DoD site, www.defendamerica.mil/articles/mar2002/a030402a.html.

[135] Alexander Nicoll, "Seeking to take Mazar and Heart by Winter; Interview: Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of UK Defence Staff," *Financial Times*, Oct 25, 2001, p.02.

[136] Stephen Fidler and David Stern, "US, UK discuss tactics as attacks continue," *Financial Times*, Oct 31, 2001, p.8.

[137] Michael Evans, "Coalition Troops Set for Covert Action," *London Times*, September 22, 2001.

[138] A national caveat is "generally a formal written restriction that most nations place on the use of their forces." General James L. Jones, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has said that "Collectively, these restrictions limit the tactical commanders' operational flexibility." See "Prague to Istanbul: Ambition versus Reality," speech at the Center for Strategic Decision Research, available at http://www.csdr.org/2004book/Gen_Jones.htm

[139] Gordon, Oct 27, 2001.

20,000 troops and 50 aircraft in theatre in the fall of 2001,[140] the only state that came closest in terms of combat potential and contribution. [141] In terms of direct engagement in combat, however, the picture looked a bit different. While the British had provided the Nimrod reconnaissance platform and tanker support, they did not have any aircraft in a shooting role and at one time the British Foreign Office reported that the UK had as many members fighting on the side of al qaeda as they had on the US-led coalition in Afghanistan.[142]

The combat contributions of other non-US states did exist but from were minimal and came from NATO countries with whom the US frequently had trained; their numbers were small and the troops applied in a discrete, bilateral, ad hoc manner for their expertise in mountainous and winter combat. Indeed, forces from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and New Zealand sent special operations forces to Afghanistan, but all on a bilateral basis, which granted the US much more operational flexibility than a multilateral framework would have allowed.[143]

The actor the US was most willing to engage in combat terms was the Northern Alliance,[144] which worked closely with United States Special Operations Force (SOF) teams to capture areas such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul. Relying on this loose coalition of forces opposed to the Taliban meant that the US did not require as large a footprint and foothold in Afghanistan, advantageous since it was trying to minimize its appearance as an occupying force. Moreover, the Northern Alliance had expertise from fighting a twenty year civil war with the Taliban and would have more local knowledge than the US, which had few if any regional experts or linguists, would have.[145]

Aside from these few allies who were invited to fulfill special requirements and with whom the US operated bilaterally rather than as a cumbersome multilateral force, however, the US was averse to robust multilateralism along the lines of the first Gulf War. American commanders were concerned foremost with allies not obstructing their ability to conduct the mission. In November, when international peacekeepers began deployment into areas previously occupied by the Taliban, CENTCOM quickly terminated the allied deployment "out of concern that this could encumber American military operations." The decision, however, meant that several allied governments, including those of Britain, France, Canada, Turkey, and Jordan, were left "in limbo after

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[140] Many of the UK troops were participating in an exercise in Oman but were close enough to be available for operations in Afghanistan.

[141] Alexander Nicoll, "US and UK amass 50,000 troops and 400 aircraft," *Financial Times*, Oct 3, 2001, p.03.

[142] Quoted in Robin Harris, "The State of the Special Relationship," *Policy Review*, Jun/Jul 2002, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460326.html

[143] Ann Scott Tyson, "US, allies in a riskier kind of war," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 March 2002, p.1; "The Grand Global Coalition," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 March 2002, p.8; Tim Naumetz, David Pugliese and Hilary Mackenzie, "JTF2 locked in fierce Afghan fight," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 5 March 2002, p.A1; Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, "US, Allied Forces Patrol Battle Zone," *The Washington Post*, 15 March 2002, p.A14.

[144] The reason why I focus on allies in combat is that it is the hardest test for alliance formation; it is easy for a state to have allies when it is convenient to do so. Developing allies for intelligence sharing or for disrupting financial network does not impose many costs; integrating allies into combat comes at higher risk, both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of operations, including potential threat to troop survival.

[145] Chip Cummins and Jeanne Cummings, "US Reliance on Northern Rebels may Dilute Support from Pakistan," *WSJ*, Oct 30, 2001, p.A4.

they had readied their troops for duty." But the US made it clear that it was unwilling to engage in the vagaries of coalition warfare while it was still in the midst of combat operations. One spokesman for CENTCOM, Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, said 'You take them [allies] up on their offers at the location and time and manner that fits into the overall fabric of Enduring Freedom…the best intentions in the world, if provided in an uncoordinated way, makes things worse instead of better.'" [146]

When the principals of the Bush Administration were discussing the potential role of allies, then National Security Advisor Rice mentioned the number of allies—specifically the Australians, French, Canadians, and Germans—who were offering their assistance to the operation. To this, Secretary Rumsfeld responded that "we want to include them if we can" but he voiced his concern that allied military forces could interfere with the effectiveness of US forces, and that the coalition had to be hand-selected to accommodate the operational needs of the conflict, rather than to mold the operational plan to the availability of allies.[147] The military commanders´ and Administrations´ interest was in minimizing allied forces into operational plans until the US had secured regions of Afghanistan. That reluctance was in evidence at various points since the operation's inception, including from the "get-go" when "'the Pentagon did not want to open up its operational military plan against the Taliban to a lot of other players.'" The preference, one senior administration official indicated, was " to keep the decision-making here and in London."[148]

Even Britain, the trusted, well-equipped ally of the US, was limited from full participation until later phases of the intervention. In mid-November, Britain dispatched about 100 commandos to Bagram, but CENTCOM instructed them to stand down because of inopportune timing. France had similarly planned to send 250 troops to Mazar-e-Sharif as part of a security and stabilization force, and Jordanian and French forces had deployed to Uzbekistan as part of an offer to set up a field hospital. CENTCOM postponed all of these offers until they had established better security.[149] Part of the confusion on the part of eager allied participants resulted from the disorder coming from the US, which was acting not as a unitary actor but as the State Department and Pentagon, which had different views on whether and when allied peacekeepers should engage. State Department officials tended to be more receptive to the European and allied position, agreeing to accept their deployment earlier rather than later, but the Defense Department was highly skeptical, resisting their participation at all, and certainly not until the military finished the combat phase of the campaign.[150]

Structural Constraints in the Planning Phase

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[146] Alan Sipress and Peter Finn, "US Says 'Not Yet' to Patrol by Allies," *The Washington Post*, November 30, 2001.
[147] Woodward, *Bush at War*, 179-180.
[148] David Sanger and Michael Gordon, "US Takes Steps to Bolster Bloc Fighting Terror," *The New York Times*, Nov 7, 2001, p.A1.
[149] Alan Sipress and Peter Finn, ibid.
[150] Michael Gordon, "U.S. and Britain at Odds Over Use and Timing of Peacekeeping Troops," *The New York Times*, Dec 2, 2001; see also Michael Gordon's, "Afghans Block Britain's Plan for Big Force," *The New York Times*, Nov 20, 2001, p.B1 in which he quotes a Pentagon official who doubts that there will at any point be some role for British and French forces in northern Afghanistan's operations.

In the case of Afghanistan, US time horizon constraints made multilateralism less attractive. Specifically, the attacks of 9/11 had the effect of increasing the US discount rate and making short-term interests a higher priority than longer-term considerations. Despite the series of terrorist attacks in the decade leading up to 9/11,[151] the US had largely followed a law enforcement approach to counterterrorism, dissuaded from acting unilaterally and undiplomatically against sovereign states that may have been harboring terrorists.[152]

Cofer Black, the Director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center from 1999 until May 2002, testified that in terms of operational flexibility, "All I want to say is that there was "before" 9/11 and "after" 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off."[153] In some ways, the drastic policy disjuncture prompted by the 9/11 attacks was a sub-rational response. The attacks did not necessarily mean that more attacks were more imminent or more likely than before September 11, 2001. But in terms of how leaders perceived their threat environment, the attacks certainly had the effect of crystallizing the nature and capability of the adversary in a way that the smaller attacks of the preceding decade had been unable to do.[154] The attacks dislodged what had been a firmly planted notion that terrorist attack on US soil was "remote," and ended the "risk aversion" that had characterized the government throughout the 1990s.[155]

As part of the increased risk acceptance that the 9/11 attacks prompted, government attention shifted from longer-term, evolving threats to immediate security details. From this shifting mindset, the doctrine of "preemption" ultimately emerged in which the US would not "remain idle while threats gather" but rather would take "anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."[156] The post-9/11 approach is one of greater risk acceptance in engaging threats immediately rather than waiting for future certainty on a particular threat.[157] The attacks clearly made longer-term priorities subordinate to short-term security requirements, a

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[151] Those attacks include the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1995 Khobar Towers bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombing, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.

[152] In *Ghost Wars*, Steven Coll writes about the way concerns with diplomatic relations with other states dissuaded the US from targeting Osama bin Laden when it had a chance during the 1990s. The argument of time horizons would suggest that a higher discount rate would have make the US more risk acceptant and would have produced more aggressive counterterrorism action than was in evidence before 9/11. See *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (Penguin Books, 2004).

[153] See "Statement of Cofer Black: Joint Investigation into September 11: September 26, 2002."

[154] In his well-known discussion of how states perceive their threats, Jervis hypotheses that information that percolates in is less likely to shift perceptions than information that emerges in large doses. For US decision makers, the smaller terrorist attacks of the 1990s did little to shift threat perceptions compared to the more dramatic attacks of 9/11, which drastically shifted the mindset about threats. See *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[155] See "Testimony of Richard A. Clarke before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," 24 March 2004, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/clarke_statement.pdf

[156] See the 2002 National Security Strategy, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, p.15.

[157] Ron Suskind refers to this approach—requiring less certainty on threats before acting—as the "one percent doctrine," which he documents in *The One Percent Doctrine*, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

classic neorealist prediction of how increased discount rates will shorten a state's time horizon and affect behavior.[158]

With this post-9/11 mentality came an interest in retaliating quickly in order to deny the adversary the ability to attack again.[159] To accommodate this interest, the US had an incentive to reject any factors that might constitute a "costly delay" in prosecuting the campaign in Afghanistan. Even though allies might mean the expectation of burden-sharing over the long term, for example, the immediate security considerations obscured those possibilities as issues that could be revisited once the US had addressed the immediate needs.

Against a backdrop that included structural pressures to retaliate quickly[160] were several related effects that discouraged the incorporation of allies. The first was the campaign planning process. What was typically a twelve month process would be severely compressed; military planners had to scramble to expedite planning and coordinate, mobilize, and deploy joint US assets in a dramatically shortened window.[161] The compressed planning timeline created the follow-on problem that the US was unable to develop detailed operational plans. The short amount of time from 9/11 to inception of military operations meant that execution of OEF was "essentially an ad hoc approach to an unconventional war."[162] While the initial goals—punishing the Taliban government, removing air defenses, and trying to scare Osama bin Laden out of the caves[163]—were clear, it was unclear how the adversary would respond to the use of air power and commandos to achieve that goal, and therefore unclear what follow-on tactics and operations would make sense. As one defense official said, "we want to position ourselves in such a fashion that we have a wide range of options."[164] More allies would increase the coordination problems and limit the flexibility of those options.

Second, since some of the targets of interest to the US were time sensitive rather than static, the US had little time to develop plans for US forces, let alone plan with and integrate potential allies. Noting the incentives and disincentives for alliance formation in the case of Afghanistan, Simon Serfaty makes the point that "with fast-diminishing targets in Afghanistan, the air war was reduced to opportunity bombing that allowed little

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[158] Brooks, ibid.

[159] Coercion by denial would entail hitting the adversary's military capabilities through a combination of air and ground forces, as opposed to coercion by punishment, which would mean hitting the civilian centers, something US forces emphatically sought to avoid in Afghanistan. For this distinction between denial and punishment, see Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

[160] In addition to the shift in mindset among decision makers was public opinion pressure to act quickly. As one middle America newspaper noted, many people "have longed for an immediate retaliatory blow, a crushing counter-strike to let the world and its terrorists know that America-the-target will be America-the-avenger as well. "What are we waiting for?' has been a commonly heard complaint." See "Now, we wait," *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 22 September 2001, p.8 editorial.

[161] See *Campaign Planning Primer 2006*, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, the US Army War College. This document articulates the planning process and notes that the *Adaptive Planning Process* has consolidated two campaign planning processes into one, meaning that mission analysis, estimates, strategic concept, and support planning means that two major planning cycles that previously would take between 18-24 months now takes 12 months.

[162] Thomas E. Ricks, "Next Phase to Include More Troops; Ground Soldiers' Role Not Clearly Defined," *The Washington Post*, Oct 9, 2001, p.A01.

[163] Thomas E. Ricks, ibid; see also Lambeth, p.82-83.

[164] Ricks, ibid.

time for consultation with contributing allies."[165] Thus, rather than integrate but not consult allies, the US chose to limit the integration of allies until it had addressed those time sensitive targets.

Third, the short timeline created constraints on the degree of multilateralism from a simple logistics standpoint. Strategic airlift of US-only forces would be difficult enough in a short amount of time. Coordinating the assets of other states and securing strategic airlift for allies that lacked that capability (which included all states other than the US) would be next to impossible in the 26 day period from 9/11 to the inception of the operation on 7 October 2001.[166]

In short, the planning phase leading up to the Afghanistan intervention was one in which a spectacular attack on US assets demonstrated the severe consequences of not retaliating quickly. With a dramatically shortened campaign planning window, the US had little time to coordinate its own assets, and did not want to introduce what would be costly delays by introducing foreign interests and assets. Acting first and then asking questions about multilateral assistance later would optimize immediate security interests even if it meant compromising longer-term prospects of cooperative burden-sharing. Thus, the immediacy of the threat and its impact on planning meant there were potentially negative consequences associated with multilateralism and therefore greater incentives to act unilaterally.

Structural Constraints in the Operational Phase

In the case of Afghanistan, contrary to the early expectations or rhetoric that the US military retaliation would resemble a World War II level of effort, the campaign plan looked quite the opposite. Eventually referred to as the "Afghan Model" of warfare, the campaign would rely on small numbers of special forces, some indigenous forces, and precision weapons, meaning that there was little burden to share in the combat phase and that the secretive aspects would compound any coordination problems. Second, any detailed consideration of post-war planning was minimal and therefore calculations on the longer-term consequences of not having allies featured less prominently; in this sense, the time horizon was remarkably short, focused only on the immediate combat phase and the fact that the US and a select group of allies could manage those requirements. Neither of these operational factors encouraged the incorporation of allies.

As the US contemplated responses to 9/11, it drew from a blank slate. The 1998 Embassy bombings had elicited a response of strategic air strikes against Afghanistan (and Sudan) but the US lacked fully developed contingency plans and essentially had to generate a new campaign plan.[167] In considering appropriate and feasible military action,

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[165] Serfaty, "The New Normalcy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 25.2 (2002): 209-?

[166] One OEF analyst suggests that geography plus time did play a role in determining the operational plan. The US was able to project power into theatre, but the long distances did impose limits on the number of sorties and amount of materiel that could be projected in a short amount of time. See Milan Vego, "What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 128.7 (July 2002), pp. 28–33; http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles02/PROvego07.htm

[167] Since the US military had no existing plans, generating a plan for Operation Enduring Freedom actually took longer than expected, much to the chagrin of President Bush, who hoped to attack sooner rather than later. See, for example, Woodward and Loeb.

planners considered a range of options, including an immediate cruise missile attack, an air attack supported by some ground forces, a major aerial bombing campaign, small scale covert operations, and a land invasion.[168]

CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks initially anticipated a response closer to the large-scale land invasion end of the continuum, which assumed months of preparation and large numbers of conventional forces positioned in the area of responsibility (AOR), Rumsfeld argued for the approach proposed by the CIA, one that relied on lighter special operations forces rather than more conventional forces.[169] He instructed Franks to "Go off, be more creative, we don't want to put huge forces on the ground, and your time lines are too long."[170] Separately, Rumsfeld said that "you don't fight terrorists with conventional capabilities. You do it with unconventional capabilities."[171] Rumsfeld's philosophy and intent was to fight the war against Afghanistan's terrorists not with the conventional land forces characteristic of a conflict such as the Gulf War but with smaller, unconventional means.

With that guidance, Franks developed a campaign plan that was lighter and more reliant on agile SOF troops, apparently ultimately convinced that small-scale forces were more advantageous in that particular context than large conventional forces. As General Franks said in defense of the small number of ground forces, progress in Afghanistan would need to be measured by different yardsticks. "Those who expect another Desert Storm (and the huge number of ground troops) will wonder every day what this war is all about. This is a different war."[172]

In addition to Rumsfeld's bias towards transformational, agile special operations forces, several factors pointed in the direction of using SOF troops. One reason was geography; Afghanistan was extraordinarily mountainous compared to the desert flats of the Middle East. Moreover, it was landlocked; as one military planner said, "due to the land-locked nature of Afghanistan, (and the proposed timeline), traditional ground forces were a non-starter. Therefore, heavy reliance on SOF became standard."[173] The mountainous terrain of Afghanistan was more likely to require forces riding on ponies, a practice in which US and British forces had some experience, but which was entirely incompatible with large divisions of ground forces.[174] Planners also seemed to conclude that the Soviet experience with large conventional forces in Afghanistan had led to their ultimate demise and should not be replicated; the US knew that if it "repeated the mistakes of the Soviets

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[168] Rand, pp 49-50.
[169] Thomas Ricks "War Plan for Iraq is Ready, Say Officials," *The Washington Post*, November 10, 2002.
[170] Thomas Ricks, ibid.
[171] Seymour Hersh, "The Other War: Why Bush's Afghanistan Won't Go Away," *The New Yorker*, April 12, 2002.
[172] Bryan Bender and Ellen Barry, "US Troops on Ground in Afghanistan; Rumsfeld Says Effort Aiding Rebel Forces," *The Boston Globe*, Oct 31, 2001, p.A1.
[173] Personal interview with LtCol Michael Fleck, now assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force/Legislative Liaison, 20 September 2006.
[174] For a full account of OEF operations in Afghanistan, see Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, p.8.

by invading with a large land force, they would be doomed."[175] Smaller numbers of special operations troops seemed to present the most favorable prospects for victory.

Moreover, military leaders intended to rely on SOF because of the lack of high-value targets; as Rumsfeld noted two days into the bombing, "That country has been at war for a very long time. The Soviet Union pounded it year after year after year. Much of the country is rubble. They have been fighting among themselves. They do not have high-value targets or assets that are the kinds of things that would lend themselves to substantial damage."[176] Without high-value targets, military planners concluded that a combination of special operations forces plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally (the Northern Alliance)—now referred to as the "Afghan Model" of warfare—would be the most successful way to wage the campaign.[177] Human intelligence, close-in electronic surveillance, and precision weapons, all employed covertly, would best penetrate terrorist networks, the proponents of this model claimed.[178] The Afghan Model, however, which theoretically employed fifty US special forces to achieve the conventional military equivalent of 50,000 ground troops, had little slack in it for additional coalition forces.[179] Reliance on SOF meant keeping troop numbers low and limiting access to information about SOF operations; the covert nature of this special operations mission made a small, homogeneous coalition even more desirable, creating disincentives to bringing in additional allied participants.[180]

Another incentive to avoid large-scale conventional troops is that the US anticipated—though had created no firm plans for—the need for Afghan reconstruction following combat and wanted to do the following: avoid noncombatant fatalities, limit collateral damage to nonmilitary infrastructure such as electrical power and roads that would be central to humanitarian relief and reconstruction aid after the combat phase. In general, the goal was to leave a minimal footprint and limit the destructiveness so it would have infrastructure in place for postwar governance. This would also signal motives that were designed against the Taliban and al qaeda, not against Afghanistan and Islam. With these goals in mind, a massive campaign, such as the air and land campaign of the Gulf War, would vastly outsize what was thought to be the appropriate degree of force in Afghanistan. Rather, these goals "meant the smallest possible military presence on the ground in Afghanistan, a concern that ruled out any heavy US conventional ground-force involvement." [181] It also essentially ruled out assistance from other states would add to the footprint and be counterproductive to the interest in setting the stage for postwar reconstruction. A smaller, lower impact force that disrupted the networks but left

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[175] Woodward, quoted in Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Winning with Allies," *International Security*, 30.3 (Winter 2005/06), pp.124-160; p.131.

[176] Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Richard Myers, and Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld in press conference on 8 October 2001.

[177] For an excellent discussion on the basis and employment of the Afghan Model, see forum on "The Afghan Model and its Limits" in the 2005-06 *International Security*. Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith, "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model" and "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq."

[178] Barton Gellman, "Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld's Domain," *The Washington Post*, January 23, 2005, p.A01.

[179] Andres et al, ibid.

[180] Simon Serfaty, "The New Normalcy."

[181] Lambeth, p.60. For more on the objective to minimize collateral damage with an eye towards reconstruction, see also Thomas E. Ricks and Alan Sipress, "Attacks Restrained by Political Goals," *The Washington Post*, Oct 23, 2001, p.A01.

infrastructure largely in place would be more suitable and effective. Not only was there little benefit to a large, multilateral coalition, such a coalition was actually considered to be counterproductive.

Although there was some notional idea that the Afghanistan operation would necessarily require "regime change" and a change to President Bush's campaign promise of not using the military for "nationbuilding,"[182] the definite focus going into Afghanistan was on military targets rather than institution-building after combat. Nowhere in US campaign planning was there a detailed discussion on the kind of government that the US would seek to install in place of the Taliban-ruled Afghan government or how the US would go about creating a democracy, other than general notions that the UN and World Bank would certainly be involved.[183]

Detailed planning for phase IV—post combat reconstruction and transition to peacekeeping operations[184]—was highly limited.[185] As military historian, Conrad Crane, notes, "in Afghanistan, there was no phase IV [planning]…there was then a scramble to create a Phase IV plan. It was done initially from a top down approach and modified to employ provisional reconstruction teams."[186] In a separate document, the Army War College commented on these deficiencies, saying that "the Afghanistan situation had been marred by the excessively short-term approach of the top defense leaders. This problem of a 'tactical focus that ignores long-term objectives' was especially notable at CENTCOM."[187] Emphasis on shorter-term military objectives rather than longer-term reconstruction plans meant that the potential benefits of allies in the reconstruction phase were obscured by the potential problems they could cause in the combat phases.

Only a couple of months into the operation was more serious consideration given to the political objectives, including who would govern Afghanistan, how the US would go about constructing a democratic government, and how the military objectives related to any political objectives were still unanswered.[188] The administration was focused on its immediate military objectives of hitting specific targets, ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and finding bin Ladin and Mullah Omar. Rebuilding the country was a distant goal, one that the US confronted sequentially, after it had achieved its more immediate security objectives.[189] Finding the means it might need to achieve those

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[182] During the campaign, Governor Bush and his advisors had signaled that the US military should not be in the business of nation-building or using the 82nd Airborne to walk children to school and would instead leave that responsibility to other states. See Steven A. Holmes, "Gore Assails Bush on Plan to Recall US Balkan Force," *The New York Times*, 22 October 2000, p.1.

[183] Woodward, 192-193.

[184] Phase IV refers to postconflict operations, which includes transition back to peace and civilian government control. See Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV operations: where wars are really won," *Military Review*, May-June 2005, 27-36.

[185] LtCol Isaiah Wilson notes that there was "no original Phase IV planning of any kind" in Afghanistan. See "Defeating the regime and occupying Iraq," in *War in Iraq*, Thomas Keaney and Tom Mahnken, eds., (Routledge, 2007).

[186] Dr. Conrad Crane's presentation at "US Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation," 2 November 2005, held at the School of Advanced International Studies (rapporteur's notes)

[187] Internal Army War College memo, quoted in Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco*, 70.

[188] Woodward, 275-6.

[189] The first sign that the US was looking at building a new government in Afghanistan was the appointment of James Dobbins as a special envoy to opposition parties in Afghanistan in November 2001. Dobbins deployed to central Asia in November 2001 to begin negotiating the transitional government, the

goals—which might include generating alliance support for peacekeeping, stability, and reconstruction operations—would therefore follow at a later time.

Alternative Explanations for US Alliance Behavior in Afghanistan

In addition to the operational incentives to act unilaterally, the US had few domestic and international constraints on the way it approached the intervention. Public opinion was overwhelmingly behind the intervention and was more interested in seeing a quick response, which was more likely to happen if the US operated unilaterally, the international multilateral norm seemed to be superseded by the sui generis nature of the 9/11 attacks, and US had sufficient power to execute the mission by itself and ample goodwill, even from Russia, to operate unilaterally in a region with great powers.

Public Opinion about 9/11 and Afghanistan

Operational incentives pointed in the direction of unilateralism, and international and domestic public opinion favored US reactions to terrorism to such an extent that the US had as much latitude as it desired in carrying out the operation. In terms of the domestic determinants of policy, 94% of Americans supported taking military action against perpetrators, and 80% of Americans maintained their support for military action even if that response led to war.[190] A separate poll a week later indicated that 82% supported military action, even with the use of ground forces, 77% still supported military force even if the use of force resulted in thousands of casualties,[191] and 65% were prepared to support military force even if it meant resorting to conscription and a high economic toll.[192] With 84% of Americans supporting the President and 86% of Americans seeing the 9/11 attacks as acts of war against the US, American leaders were receiving signals from the domestic audience that indicated full and unconstrained support for military force.[193] Congress reinforced that impression with a 98-0 vote authorizing the use of force against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.[194]

International support for US counterterrorism efforts was more subdued but nonetheless high following 9/11. In western Europe, 90% supported US counterterrorism efforts, compared to 64% for Eastern Europe and Russia, and an average of 62% of the global "business, economic and cultural influentials overseas" who said that the US was right to fight terrorism with the use of force.[195] At the level of international elites, the support was more overwhelming. Britain promised to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the

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earliest evidence that the US was considering the political objectives associated with OEF. See, for example, "Dobbins named US Envoy to Opposition in Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*, 6 November 2001, p.A14 and Robert D. McFadden, "Seeking a Kabul Coalition," *The New York Times*, B1.

[190] Mark Memmott, "Poll: Americans Believe Attacks 'Acts of War,'" *USA Today*, September 12, 2001.

[191] "American Psyche Reeling from Terror Attacks," The Pew Research Center, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=30

[192] Jim Drinkard, "America Ready to Sacrifice," *USA Today*, September 17, 2001.

[193] Mark Memmott, "Poll: Americans Believe Attacks 'Acts of War,'" *USA Today*, September 12, 2001; see also Drinkard.

[194] See S.J. Res.23, "Joint resolution to authorize the United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States," September 14, 2001; see also HJ Res.64, the House version of the same legislation.

[195] "America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen As Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders," Pew Global Attitudes, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=60

US.[196] Russia asserted the need and interest in "unit(ing) the powers of the international community in the fight against terrorism."[197] The President of France, Jacques Chirac asserted that "when it comes to punishing this murderous folly, France will be at the side of the United States."[198]

Separately, key multilateral organizations threw their support in the direction of the US. NATO invoked Article V for the first time in the alliance's 52 year history and provided airborne warning aircraft (AWACS) for Operation Noble Eagle (homeland defense). The North Atlantic Council stated that "US' NATO allies stand ready to provide assistance that may be required as a consequence of these acts of barbarism."[199] The statement continued by expressing full support "in providing the United States any and all the diplomatic, political, and, if required, military means at their disposal in order to deal with the perpetrators of this outrage."[200] The UNSC unanimously approved Resolution 1368 that condemned "in strongest terms" the terrorist attacks and called on all member states to bring the perpetrators to justice. The resolution also cited the right of individual or collective self-defense as well as international anti-terrorist conventions and SC Resolutions, including Resolution 1269 (1999).[201] Resolutions by the General Assembly, official commitment from the IMF, EU, NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and OAS rounded out the overwhelming support that multilateral organizations conferred on the US after 9/11.[202]

International constraints on the US were few. Under normal circumstances, the US might expect pressure from IOs and individual states either not to intervene militarily at all or at least to collect allies, as there was in the Iraq war. In this case, the international community de facto gave a blank check to the US in terms of how it prosecuted the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. It is surprising that they did not seek some form of agency over how the US conducted its retaliation, but the terrorist attack was so unprecedented that imposing institutional constraints on self-defense did not seem to be a primary concern for the international community, in part because most member states realized their potential vulnerability and also had an interest in partaking in counterterrorism efforts. The US therefore risked very low political costs in operating

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[196] George Jones, "We Will Help Hunt Down Evil Culprits, Says Blair," *London Daily Telegraph*, September 12, 2001.
[197] David R. Sands and Tom Carter, "Attacks Change US Foreign Policy," *The Washington Times*, September 12, 2001. See also "Angered Putin Calls for Coordinated Response," *Moscow Times*, September 12, 2001.
[198] "Germany Calls for 'Measured response'" September 16, 2001, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/16/europe.support/
[199] Statement by the North Atlantic Council, available at www.nato.int;docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm
[200] "Members of Parliament from NATO countries Declare Solidarity with United States, Support for Article 5 Collective-Defence Declaration," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, September 14, 2001, http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/press/p010914a.asp
[201] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm; in this statement, the Council notes that the "members departed from tradition and stood to unanimously adopt resolution 1368, by which they expressed the Council's readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the attacks of 11 September and to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with its Charter responsibilities." 12 September 2001. For a more comprehensive listing of IO responsive, see "International Organizations Respond to Sept 11 Attacks, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/International_Organizations_Respond_to_Sept._11_Attacks-406c8d6f4da73.html
[202] State Department, ibid.

unilaterally because the reservoir of political goodwill was plentiful so even reducing that goodwill by some would still leave a remarkable amount.

International Norms

After the end of the Cold War, the degree to which states intervened multilaterally increased, in large part because the power politics that had paralyzed cooperation efforts during the Cold War had yielded to a new sense of international cooperation, further reinforced by the positive example of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Scholars of international norms argued that we were observing a post-Cold War internalization of a multilateral norm, in which states would intervene multilaterally not based on the logic of consequences—in which states consider their material interests and make decisions through a means-ends calculation of what is in their interests—but rather on the logic of appropriateness, which considers "identities more than interests" and is based on the "selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations."[203]

Although March and Olsen argue that the two logics are not mutually exclusive, but rather that they can co-exist, under certain conditions, one of the two is likely to dominate. "When preferences and consequences are precise and identities or their rules are ambiguous, a logic of consequences tends to be more important."[204] The post 9/11 environment matches these conditions closely. Under a direct attack, preferences for state survival became the clearest, highest priority; moreover, rules for how to retaliate against this new type of threat and adversary were decidedly unclear. No attack of this scale had ever hit the US, and some sort of legal precedent for putative action was therefore absent. In the absence of clear retaliatory rules and in the presence of clear threat to survival, the logic of consequences dominated US decision making.

International norms in general, and the multilateral norm specifically, were less important than considering what actions would most likely contribute to state survival and undertaking those actions. Coalition-building strategies may have been the norm during the 1990s, when state survival was not directly at risk and the US was more engaged in humanitarian assistance enterprises, but the new approach, or at least that of Afghanistan, would be one that enabled the US to maximize its chances of success. As Rumsfeld said, that strategy would involve not a multinational force but rather a floating coalition, in which some states contributed overflight rights and basing access, other states provided tacit political support, and others helped with intelligence gathering. But all of these contributions would have to fit into means-ends calculations of utility rather than the logic-of-appropriate types of coalition-building strategies that characterized the 1990s.

Common in the 1990s was the practice of including states such as Bangladesh in multilateral coalitions; they were neither great powers nor necessarily strategically interested—two criteria for a coalition driven by the "logic of appropriateness" on the issue of interventions[205]—but also lack a highly advanced military. They were adequate for peacekeeping missions such as in Somalia or the Congo, but lacked the military

[203] James March and Johan Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization*, 52.4 (Autumn, 1998), pp.943-969, especially the logic of institutions as spelled out on pp.949-953.
[204] March and Olsen, p.952.
[205] Finnemore, pp.80-81.

capabilities for advanced coalition warfare.[206] In an intervention in which the US was retaliating for an attack against its survival, an appropriate coalition was less important than one that was consequential in terms of defeating the adversary that had threatened its survival. Minimizing coordination problems by matching the mission requirements with state capabilities was the instrumental way to achieve that objective. This meant leaving out states that might have added normative but not instrumental value and included only states that offered strategic benefit, such as the "stans" around Afghanistan and the highly capable and like-minded British.

A related normative argument is that the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent UNSC Resolution granted the US the right to self-defense, either collective or individual. If one reason that states intervene multilaterally is for legitimacy that multilateralism confers on an operation, then the US would not have had to concern itself with the legitimacy of multilateralism because it had already gathered enough legitimacy with the unequivocal right to self-defense. As other sections suggest, states can generate legitimacy either through legality of their actions or through the legitimation conferred through multilateral coalitions. Having gathered legitimacy from the self-defense (Article 51) provision, the US did not need to gather symbolic support through multilateralism. The US could therefore intervene unilaterally without risking alienation of the international community, thus paying a smaller political cost than if they intervened unilaterally under other, non self-defense circumstances.[207]

Although it may seem obvious, this observation adds specificity to the existing literature on the multilateral norm, which implies unlimited scope conditions. Taking into account just the case of Afghanistan, we might therefore refine the argument about multilateral norms by stating that *ceteris paribus*, the multilateral norm may constrain state behavior and deter states from intervening unilaterally, but is likely to impose fewer constraints when a state has achieved intervention legitimacy by other means.

While the multilateral norm as defined by Finnemore—with UN authorization and with a coalition of "disinterested states"—did not drive state behavior, other normative issues associated with perceptions and identity did guide calculations. First, the US wanted to demonstrate clearly rather than diffusely its commitment and resolve to retaliate against al Qaeda and the Taliban. As one marine planner indicated, one of the purposes of the Afghanistan attack was to "send a message to the world and specifically to terrorists and states that sponsor terrorists" that the US would not tolerate attacks against its country. The US could conceivably send that message if it were part of a large, multilateral operation but the message would be more diluted and less dominant. A unilateral operation using predominantly US firepower and technology would best send that message.[208] Unilateralism was actually thought to confer reputational benefits.

Second, the US was concerned that this message not be perceived as being anti-Muslim, whether in Afghanistan or around the world. As the former Under Secretary of State for

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[206] For more on Bangladesh's participation in peacekeeping, see Colum Lynch, "UN Votes 2,100 More Troops for Congo Force," *The Washington Post*, July 29, 2003, p.A12.

[207] Tom Farer, "Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium," *The American Journal of International Law*, 96.2 (Apr 2002), pp.35-364, particularly p.362.

[208] Personal interview with LtCol Stephen Sklenka, marine fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 2007.

Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, said, the US was concerned that this not be perceived as a "clash of civilizations" and that a NATO-led intervention could take on the appearances of a conflict between east and west. While admitting that the US perhaps waited too long to integrate NATO, and that perhaps could have handled the diplomacy surrounding NATO inclusion more adeptly, Secretary Grossman noted that political and normative factors mediated *against* rather than *for* multilateralism.[209]

Regional Power Dynamics

US alignment in Operation Enduring Freedom suggests patterns of behavior consistent with the regional power constraints thesis. US actions do not reflect a "we acted unilaterally because we could" motivation in which there are no structural incentives for alliance formation. On the contrary, there were significant structural incentives to align with key actors in the region. Several examples serve as evidence of these structural constraints.

One of the most important examples is that of Russia. Russia was important for several reasons. First, it had experience in Afghanistan that would be useful guidance for America's own intervention in the "graveyard of empires." Second, Russia was important logistically. The US needed Russia's CSAR support for US operations in the north of Afghanistan and would need their allegiance for that allowance. Third, Russia was an important actor for its indirect influence. Despite the fact that the Cold War had ended over a decade earlier, Russia had maintained a close hold on its near abroad, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, all of which enjoyed ideal access to Afghanistan and had Soviet-era air bases in their territories. It was these central Asian republics that the US needed for basing support. To garner the approval to use their airspace and bases, the US therefore had to work through Russia, which in principle condemned the 9/11 attacks and supported UNSC Resolution 1368; it was willing to offer the US homeland security assistance but was apprehensive about the prospect of having US influence in its backyard. Putin's Defense Minister, Igor Ivanov had argued that he did not "see absolutely [any] basis for even hypothetical suppositions about the possibility of NATO military operations on the territory of Central Asian nations."[210] Obtaining access to these states meant gaining acquiescence from Russia, which administration leaders secured through numerous phone calls and trips to Moscow.[211]

The US could have intervened in Afghanistan without Russia, but their geostrategic value meant that doing so may have imposed some political costs that would make doing business in Afghanistan more difficult. The US therefore courted Russia for its influence. Russia and their central Asian client states became targets of the US

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[209] Personal interview with former Under Secretary of State, Marc Grossman, 17 January 2007.

[210] Putin offered two planeloads of medicine and 70 rescue workers, in addition to providing intelligence on the source of the attacks themselves. That said, Russia was adamantly against participating in any intervention and reluctant to approve any intervention that might be launched from an area it considered its region of influence. See for example, "Russia won't join any US retaliation," *The St. Petersburg Times*, September 15, 2001; available at wwwsptimes.com/News/091501/Worldandnation/Russia_won_t_join_any.shtml; see also Susan Glasser, "Russia Rejects Joint Military Action with United States," *The Washington Post*, September 15, 2001, p.A6.

[211] Woodward, p.116, 118.

"coalition-building and military spadework" efforts.[212] The highest level of US military and civilian leaders met with their leaders to enlist their support, which came in part because Russia had a shared interest in fighting terrorism because of its own internal threats (those in Chechnya).[213] In exchange for eventual Russian support for the intervention—which came in the form of overflight rights, CSAR support for downed US crews, and even acquiescence on the *temporary* US role in Central Asia—the US tempered its criticism of Russia's handling of Chechnya and even gave the Russians support along their southern border of central Asia.[214]

Similarly, the US could have intervened without key political actors in southwest Asia—namely Iran and Pakistan—but sought their support rather than intervene alone for the same reason. Iran and Pakistan clearly had enough regional power and geographic proximity to impose friction and even failure on an operation, so their political buy-in was almost a necessary condition for intervention. On behalf of the coalition, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visited Tehran, the highest ranking British officer to visit Iran since the 1979 revolution. Straw argued that "the most important consideration for any kind of action is to forge international consensus, particularly the public opinion of people of the region. Only then can we put our seal of approval on such actions." Iran did not actively come to support the intervention but did so tacitly, looking the other way when the US crossed through its airspace, for example.[215]

US diplomatic efforts with Pakistan, which formed an important border with Afghanistan, was thought to be a haven for terrorist activity, and which was politically salient by virtue of having been the last state to recognize the Taliban,[216] were even more important. Those efforts were also more fruitful, in part because the US granted hefty concessions.[217] Congress lifted economic sanctions against Islamabad, allowing Pakistan to buy US weapons, which had not been possible for the decade preceding. Moreover, Powell agreed to finagle debt relief for Pakistan's $37 billion debt.[218] The result was access to airspace, intelligence, and limited ground presence.[219]

Conclusion

In the overwhelming international support the US received following the 9/11 attacks, the US undertook its military retaliation to 9/11 with a largely unilateral approach. As

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[212] Howard Fineman, "Bush's 'phase one'" *Newsweek*, Oct 15, 2001, p.48.
[213] Robin Wright, "Response to Terror; Coalition of Exceptional Depth is Forming," *LA Times*, September 30, 2001, p.A3.
[214] Edwin Chen and Maura Reynolds, "Russia to Aid Anti-Terror Effort," *LA Times*, September 25, 2001, p.A1; see also Woodward, p.118, Lambeth, p.30.
[215] Scott Neuman, Peter Fritsch, Hugh Pope, Greg Jaffe, and Chip Cummins, "US Gains More Support against Afghanistan," *The Wall Street Journal*, Sept 26, 2001, p.A14.
[216] Peter Fritsch, "Pakistan Gives Crucial Boost to Coalition," *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct 5, 2001, p.A11.
[217] Political concessions have continued in the years following the fall of the Taliban. In spite of what is thought to be a lackadaisical effort to prevent the Taliban from taking refuge and training in Pakistan, the US appears satisfied with the degree of intelligence, logistical, and political support that it has received from Musharraf and continues to support Pakistan. See, for example, M K Bhadrakumar, "US elevates Pakistan to regional kingpin," *Asia Times*, 27 January 2007, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IA27Df03.html accessed on 28 January 2007.
[218] Greg Jaffe and Steve LeVine, "US Strikes Pound Taliban Forces as Powell Tries to Woo Moderates," *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct 17, 2001, p.A4.
[219] Lambeth, p.67.

Thomas Friedman noted, "My fellow Americans, I hate to say this, but except for the good old Brits, we're all alone. And at the end of the day, it's US and British troops who will have to go in, on the ground, and eliminate bin Laden."[220] What explains the insistence on unilateralism when offers of multilateralism were forthcoming?

In this chapter, I have argued that US alliance behavior in Afghanistan was best explained by structural constraints—time horizon and operational payoffs—surrounding the intervention. Specifically, the attacks of 9/11 had reduced the US time horizon and made addressing short-term security threats a higher priority than longer-term considerations, which made it more difficult to incorporate allies. Moreover, the nature of the intervention—special operations forces, light footprint, and insufficient post-conflict planning—meant that the expected payoffs of cooperation did not make multilateralism attractive. Thus, the preponderant capabilities associated with unipolarity provided the necessary capabilities to launch a unilateral response, but not sufficient. The structural context of the planning and operational phases are what ultimately determined the degree of allied cooperation in the US-led intervention in Afghanistan.

Compared to the alternative explanations of US cooperation behavior in Afghanistan, the structural argument appears to be the most convincing. International norms were largely sidelined after 9/11 and created little observable pressure to intervene multilaterally. Public opinion for intervention was overwhelmingly high, giving US elites high degrees of latitude to conduct the intervention most effectively, including unilaterally. Regional power dynamics did determine which states the US sought to include in its campaign—specifically, the central Asian countries, Russia, and Pakistan—but largely from an instrumental perspective, since the US needed these states operationally for basing access to the landlocked Afghanistan.

Although the case of Afghanistan lends support for the structural explanation of cooperation choices between multilateralism and unilateralism, it needs to be tested against several other interventions in order to understand whether Afghanistan was an outlier or a rather representative case. As I show with case studies of the Gulf War, Haiti, Iraq, and three negative cases (Bosnia 1992-94, North Korea 1994, and Rwanda 1994), the causal mechanisms I demonstrate for Afghanistan apply similarly to other cases of post-Cold War intervention. I provide more detailed evidence for that claim in those particular case studies.

[220] Thomas Friedman, "We Are Alone," *The New York Times*, Oct 26, 2001.