An "Unconstitutional Governor": Woodrow Wilson and the People's Executive, 1885-1913

Saladin M. Ambar
Rutgers University
sambar@eden.rutgers.edu

Prepared for the
Miller Center Fellowship Spring Conference
The University of Virginia
May 2008, Charlottesville, VA

ABSTRACT: This paper examines a case study at the heart of a series of converging political stories involving governorships which foreshadowed the rise of the modern presidency. Woodrow Wilson's anti-machine politics, executive philosophy, legislative, and party leadership are detailed, in light of the Progressive Era's changing notions of executive responsibilities. The outlines of the modern presidency come into focus through an account of Wilson's governorship as it relates to the larger narrative of emerging executive-centered governance during the period (1885-1913). The examples of Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson –and their progeny –as state executives, have been for the most part disconnected from the larger story of how moderns reconceived the office of President. This paper posits that newly emerging Progressive Era notions of executive power has been understudied, and in the main, undervalued. When considering the presidency's shift toward legislative and party leadership, and the changed communicative avenues traversed by modern presidents, it is of great value to first see these phenomena altered by executives at the state level. From Grover Cleveland to Franklin Roosevelt, a progressive line of governors and governor-presidents helped construct an executive tilt in governing philosophy that has uniquely stamped what we have come to know as the modern presidency. By exploring a crucial element of presidential background, the executive, writ large, is brought into the discourse on the nature and origins of the modern presidency. This paper explores one crucial dimension of that construction, while raising questions regarding its democratic implications.

"Some gentlemen…seem to have supposed that I studied politics out of books. Now, there isn't any politics worth talking about in books. In books everything looks obvious, very symmetrical, very systematic, and very complete, but it is not the picture of life and it is only in the picture of life that all of us are interested." –Governor Woodrow Wilson, Jersey City, New Jersey, 1911[1]

"It will not do to look at men congregated in bodies politic through the medium of the constitutions and traditions of the states they live in, as if that were the glass of interpretation. Constitutions are vehicles of life, but not the sources of it."
–Woodrow Wilson, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1911[2]

Introduction

In late summer of his first year as governor, Woodrow Wilson attended the fourth annual conference of governors, held in Spring Lake, New Jersey. The so called "House of Governors," instituted by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908[3], was a political phenomenon illustrative of the growing power of state executives during the Progressive Era, and a reflection of the theoretical debates surrounding just what direction that newly found power should take. As the conference's host governor, Wilson found himself in the midst of a profound exchange that in myriad ways embodied the type of executive leadership he had grown to espouse, and, quite purposefully – pitted against those more closely associated with the views of the Constitution's framers. Discussion over executive powers turned "warm" when the question of the initiative, referendum, and recall arose.[4] These hallmarks of progressivism were designed to restore democracy to the people, giving ordinary citizens direct access to legislation, public policy, and their leaders. Importantly, all three features had the tendency to weaken the strength of parties while bolstering the authority of executives.[5] While Alabama's governor Emmett O'Neal argued against catering to "every popular impulse and yielding to every wave of popular passion,"[6] Wilson stood firm:

> The people of the United States want their Governors to be leaders in matters of legislation because they have serious suspicion as to the source of the legislation, and they have a serious distrust of their legislatures…what I would urge as against the views of Gov. O'Neal is that there is nothing inconsistent between the strengthening of the powers of the Executive and the direct power of the people."[7]

For his part, O'Neal was unmoved. "I would rather stand with Madison and Hamilton, than to stand with some modern prophets and some of our Western statesman," he retorted, offering a jibe at both Wilson and his beloved British parliamentary system.[8]

Wilson's movement to an executive-centrist political philosophy ran parallel to the rising profile of America's governors. At the previous year's conference, New York's Governor Hughes proclaimed "We are here in our own right as State Executive."[9] While Hughes declaration was an admonition against federal encroachment into "states' rights," it was also a proclamation of new found state executive authority and popular appeal. Wilson himself had used the group as a platform even before becoming governor, sounding his views on executive power during the conference's keynote address in 1910:

> Every Governor of a State is by the terms of the Constitution a part of the Legislature. No bill can become law without his assent and signature…His legislative vote, so to say, is never less than half of the Legislature. He has the right of initiative in legislation, too, though he has so far, singularly enough, made little use of it…There is no executive usurpation in a Governor's undertaking to do that. He usurps nothing which does not belong to him of right…He who cries usurpation against him is afraid of debate, wishes to keep legislation safe against scrutiny, behind closed doors and within the covert of partisan consultations.[10]

By the time Wilson began to put into practice his executive philosophy as Governor, state executives had gained a degree of national prominence for the first time in American history. With few national exemplars of executive leadership after the Civil War –save for persistent plaudits for Grover Cleveland – governors became the locus for theoretical musings on executive power. By the turn of the century, the number of state

constitutions that included strong provisions for executive leadership had grown considerably, and would continue to do so for the next half century.[11] Western states in particular were leaders in executive experimentation, capturing the attention of progressive thinkers such as Herbert Croly. Wilson was equally impressed, citing, like Croly, the State of Oregon's innovations in executive power. "I earnestly commend to your careful consideration the laws in recent years adopted in the State of Oregon," Wilson implored in his Inaugural Address as Governor. "[Their] effect has been to bring government back to the people and to protect it from the control of the representatives of selfish and special interests," he said.[12] Oregon's Governor William S. U'Ren, a westerner by way of Wisconsin, like so many future progressives, made quite an impression on Wilson, who over time came to support Oregon's "new tools of democracy" –the initiative, recall, and referendum, under certain circumstances.[13] Nevertheless, what western progressives lacked was a forum as powerful as the still heavily press dominant East. New York, long since a leader in executive powers – Alexander Hamilton upheld the New York governor as exemplar for the relative strength of the President in the *Federalist* – was at the fore of this reconceptualization of executive leadership.[14] Here, in the Hudson corridor of power, former New York governors Samuel J. Tilden and Grover Cleveland loomed largest, in some respects, even surpassing the gubernatorial legacy of Teddy Roosevelt. Press coverage of New York's governors in the New York Times reflected the rise of the office's significance since the paper's inception, through the unprecedented number of citations for FDR's administration (see chart below):

Chart 1



What gave New Jersey's governor similar advantage was the strength of the State's patronage system. As Wilson biographer Arthur Link noted, "Few governors in the country possessed the sweeping range of patronage that the governor of New Jersey had at his disposal in 1911; he appointed practically all high-ranking judicial and administrative officials."[15] The State's constitution had been revised in 1844, granting the governor "a three year term, a weak veto, and some appointment powers."[16] While seemingly not profound by today's standards of executive latitude, the new constitution also held one critical feature endemic to modern executive office:

> The constitution did, however, contain the provision that Coleman Ransone suggests opened the way to gubernatorial participation in policymaking: "[the Governor] shall communicate by message to the legislature at the opening of each session, and at such times as he may deem necessary, the condition of the State, and recommend such measures as he may deem expedient." Eventually, the governor's message became the vehicle for laying out a legislative program.[17]

At the time of this addition, New Jersey was already among a handful of states with a comparably strong legacy of executive authority.[18] Yet, because of its vast patronage opportunities and concomitant venues for corruption, New Jersey had long been a choice state for bossism and executive malfeasance. Wilson once referred to New Jersey as "the Bloody Angle" – a term linked to the battle at Gettysburg – in placing emphasis on where the state stood in relation to its significance in leading the national progressive reform charge. Wilson, no doubt saw himself as General Meade, if not Lincoln outright.[19]

At the cusp of the modern presidency, modern executive practice was well under way at the state level. These innovations were built around legislative leadership by the executive, direction of the party –rather than mere compliance – and a command of press and media relations that furthered a vigorous executive philosophy of government. While the presidency would be strengthened over the next century, the governorship as political institution would be vital to the reconstruction of executive possibilities. As the following chart demonstrates, the last twenty-one presidents dating from Grover Cleveland through George W. Bush were three times as likely to have had prior experience as elective executives than the first cohort of twenty-one chief executives from Washington through Chester Arthur (see Chart 2):

Chart 2



Despite the rising significance of executive background[20], the preeminence of the governorship would recede for a time, and not become a source for presidential timber until Jimmy Carter's nomination and ultimate victory in 1976. In some respects, the

success of progressive executive innovation was the undoing of state executive prowess – at least temporarily. As Kendrick Clements illustrates:

> [Wilson] and other progressives demonstrated that state government could be revitalized to deal with modern society. The irony of his success, however, was that triumph at the state level made him a national figure and a potential candidate for the presidency. The best leaders were thus plucked from the states and thrust upon the national stage, where to be successful they had to argue that the problems they had been dealing with effectively at the state level could only be attacked from Washington. The success of state reform movements seemed to doom them and to focus government on the national government.[21]

The earliest pre-Progressive executive figure of note was New York's Democratic governor Samuel J. Tilden. His defeat in the 1876 presidential election under the most dubious of circumstances was a great disillusionment for Wilson, and presaged his disdain for the corruptibility of legislatures. "When I see so plainly that there is an endeavor to make the will of the people subservient to the wishes of a few unblushing scoundrels, such as some of those in power in Washington, I am the more persuaded that while the government of the Republic is beautiful in theory, its practical application fails entirely," he would write.[22] Tilden's reform record would become the standard for future executive reform among Hudson progressives. While Cleveland attained the White House and held his own captivation over would-be reformers, Tilden's defeat was a perpetual scar, and a reminder of the price for taking "the machine" head on. The New York Times' early expose on Wilson in 1910 just months before the election, captured progressive aspirations for Wilson quite well. *"Wilson – A Tilden, But a Tilden Up to Date,"* ran a late September headline. The Times would tout Wilson as "a man with all the Tilden characteristics and an appreciation of the facts that conditions have changed since Tilden's day."[23] In New Jersey, Wilson would face tremendous opposition, but also

great opportunity for progressive support, provided he demonstrate credentials worthy of the Tilden legacy.[24]

In some important respects, Wilson's governorship was nothing new; it was built upon emerging national progressive principles and practices –especially those honed by Wisconsin's former governor Robert La Follette and other westerners–and shaped to a great extent within the state by New Jersey's progressive (self-styled "New Idea") Republicans.[25] As Arthur Link noted:

> [P]rogressive spokesmen knew that Wilson was no pioneer of reform, either in the state or in the nation. Many of them had personally helped Hoke Smith in Georgia, Bob La Follette in Wisconsin, Hiram Johnson in California, or Charles Evans Hughes in New York to push through similar reform programs years before. These all paved the way for Wilson's success.[26]

Yet, Wilson's governorship was more than any other, a platform for neo-executive theory to be put into practice. Wilson was the intellectual progenitor of the executive turn in American governance. His understanding of the relationship between public opinion and executive leadership, coupled with his direction of the Democratic Party, was a microcosm of an executive style that most Americans would ultimately come to take for granted by mid-century. From his command of the press, use of rhetoric, popular appeals, and his leadership of a collapsed wall between the executive and the legislature, Wilson's tenure as Governor represents an indispensable element for understanding what twentieth and twenty-first century presidential leadership would come to look like. And, perhaps most important, Wilson's tenure is the bridge between the Progressive Era and New Deal executive leadership – the link between Cleveland –the last of the stronger nineteenth century executives, and FDR –the quintessential modern executive leader. Ultimately, Wilson's executive philosophy was not merely "written in books," as he

cagily remarked on the campaign trail for governor in 1910. It would likewise be written into his practices as state executive. "There is no training school for Presidents," Wilson had once mused, "unless as some governors have wished, it be looked for in the governorships of states." That had been in 1908, in Wilson's classic *Constitutional Government.* By 1911, his training, and indeed, that of a new American executive leadership, was well underway.[27]

Woodrow Wilson's American Executive Zeitgeist

Over a decade before entering politics and laying out what has come to be seen as his transformative treatise on the presidency in *Constitutional Government*, Woodrow Wilson expressed the essentials of his perspective on executive leadership in an article in the Atlantic Monthly.[28] The subject of the article was Grover Cleveland. In examining the Cleveland presidency, Wilson telegraphed his future executive philosophy while paying homage to the chief representative of executive authority since Lincoln. "He has been the sort of President the makers of the Constitution had vaguely in mind: more man than partisan; with an independent executive will of his own," wrote Wilson.[29] Just how closely connected to the Framers' vision of the presidency Cleveland was is an interesting question. What drew admiration from Wilson likely would likely have drawn the ire of Madison:

> It was singular how politics began at once to centre in the President, waiting for [Cleveland's] initiative, and how the air at Washington filled with murmurs against the domineering and usurping temper and practice of the Executive. Power had somehow gone the length of the avenue, and seemed lodged in one man.[30]

As one of the earliest presidents to invoke the use of executive privilege and the first to use the veto with astonishingly regularity, Cleveland was in many respects the type of executive Madison would have blanched at.[31] In this regard, as on later occasions, Wilson was closer to reinterpreting the founding –if not rewriting it – than he was to upholding its contemporary merits. For Wilson, Cleveland represented the popular, if not fully plebiscitary president. He was, Wilson would say, "a President, as it were, by immediate choice from out of the body of the people, as the Constitution has all along appeared to expect."[32] Wilson also saw fit to laud Cleveland's party leadership and his intrusions into legislation, reminding readers that "the President stands at the centre of legislation as well as of administration in executing his great office."[33]

Moreover, Wilson's trained eye saw the connection between Cleveland's executive experiences as Mayor of Buffalo and Governor of New York State. At each turn, Cleveland was party-defiant, a leader of his legislature, and no simple-minded legalist. "Not all of government can be crowded into the rules of law," Wilson would instruct.[34] Indeed, the extralegal executive would become a signature part of Wilson's leadership philosophy. When running for the governorship, Wilson would make good on the promise of executive independence. "As Governor of New Jersey I shall have no part in the choice of a Senator," he would say during the campaign. "Legally speaking, it is not my duty even to give advice with regard to the choice. But there are other duties besides legal duties."[35] Indeed Wilson's first political battle was in exercising these extralegal duties in personally stumping for the Senate candidate of his choice. But that was in 1911. In 1897, Grover Cleveland was Woodrow Wilson's most proximate model of a modern executive – before there was a Roosevelt administration, before Wilson had

ventured into politics himself. If anything made Wilson's dormant executive found in his *Congressional Government* obsolete in 1885, it was the presidency and executive power found in the person of Grover Cleveland.[36] For Wilson, "[Cleveland] made policies and altered parties after the fashion of an earlier age in our history."[37] Time, it seemed, had passed the Founders by.

Woodrow Wilson and The Hegelian Turn in Presidential Political History

American progressivism was nothing, if not keenly aware of time. As its exponents frequently lacked a coherent political philosophy the Progressive Era was more about aspirations than strict ideology. Nonetheless, progressives were definitionally linked to the idea of democratic triumphalism – the emergence of science, education, and indeed civilization, over former darkness and barbarism. Sometimes darkness was simple immaturity and anachronistic features of society. For Wilson, the Constitution fell within the former category. It wasn't so much that Wilsonian political science sought a dissolution of American constitutionalism as much as it wanted to drag constitutional formalism into modernity. In an 1890 lecture on Democracy, Wilson addressed the Founders from the assumed perch of historical clarity:

> We have in a measure undone their work. A century has led us very far along the road of change. Year by year we have sought to bring government nearer to the people, despite the original plan.[38]

Much of this sentiment was a product of Wilson's reading of history and the German philosopher G.W.F.. Hegel. As Ronald Pestritto explains, "while Wilson's thought is perhaps most obviously influenced by [Edmund] Burke and Walter Bagehot, both

members of the English Historical School, Wilson goes beyond their evolutionary conservatism to adopt a historicism most directly attributable to Hegel."[39]

Hegelian history is best understood as a series of progressions, each age governed by a Spirit or "zeitgeist" relevant to its own conditions. There are no "good" or "bad" epochs per se; each is good for their time, with "the slaughter bench" of history compelling progress, sometimes imbuing the period with characteristic brutality.[40] Wilson's understanding of the American founding is thus tied to his broader sense of History:

> Hegel agrees with the basic precept of the Historical School that one cannot transcend one's own historical environment. Historical contingency makes it impossible to ground politics on an abstract principle. Wilson cited Hegel directly in making this same point in his essay, "The Study of Administration." The political principles of any age, Wilson contends, are nothing more than the reflections of its corresponding historical spirit. Wilson claimed that "the philosophy of any time is, as Hegel says, 'nothing but the spirit of that time expressed in abstract thought.'"[41]

This is a crucial distinction from the founding conceptualization of time. Jeffersonian History is universal, abstract, and timeless. That is, in rooting itself upon the Lockeian social contract, society is "created" out of truths that defy any particular age or set of circumstances. Human freedom therefore, is not subject to context – it is "evident" and intractable. For Wilson, such theoretical musings defy the logic of history. The theme of the universe is change; Darwin supplants Newton as modernity has supplanted the founders' strict adherence to social contract theory. Since power is tied to the necessarily transient sentiments of the people, structure and symmetry hold no allure for Wilson. It is why some have suggested that Wilson's executive philosophy reflects the closest thing to a "reversal of the whig revolution of 1689." [42]

In his 1891 essay on Edmund Burke, Wilson argued "no state can ever be conducted on its principles."[43] Principles are loose and subject to change. "Good government, like all virtue, [Burke] deemed to be a practical habit of conduct," Wilson wrote. It is "not a matter of constitutional structure."[44] If the personal president owes its origins to any theoretical exposition by an American statesman, it is this one expressed by Wilson. In marrying Burkeian traditionalism to Hegelian progress, Wilson espoused an at once conservative and radical doctrine of governance. Since custom is read as temporal, formerly conservative traditional notions of the state are turned on their head. Instead of tradition representing solely an aversion to revolutionary change, Wilson argues for tradition as epochal. Constitutional structure is merely a legal appendage to generational understandings. As Jeffrey Tulis notes

> Wilson attacked the founders for relying on mere "parchment barriers" to effectuate a separation of powers. This claim is an obvious distortion of founding views. In *The Federalist*, nos. 47 and 48, the argument is precisely that the federal constitution, unlike earlier state constitutions would *not* rely primarily upon parchment distinctions of power but upon differentiation of institutional structures.[45]

For these reasons, Wilson is seen by some as inaugurating a "postconstitutional presidency."[46] Perhaps the theoretical change wrought by Wilson is better understood as a form of *presidential* constitutionalism. As Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson suggest

> Wilson agreed with [Theodore] Roosevelt that the president must direct more attention to national problems. But he also believed that executive leadership would be ineffective or dangerous unless it was accompanied by a fundamental change in the government's working arrangements. Such a change would unite the constitutionally separated branches of government.[47]

In effect, modern American conceptions of a "unitary executive" owe their origins to Woodrow Wilson's theory of executive governance. His governorship was among the first forums to put these ideas to the test.

The Case for the Unconstitutional Governor

In early October of the campaign for governor, Woodrow Wilson expressed his executive philosophy as tersely as possible. At the Trenton Taylor Opera House, Wilson upbraided his Republican opponent, Vivian M. Lewis, for suggesting that if elected, Lewis "would only talk to the Legislature and be bound by the acts of that body."

> If you elect me [said Wilson] I will be an unconstitutional Governor in that respect. I will talk to the people as well as to the Legislature, and I will use all moral force with that body to bring about what the people demand. I am going to take every important debate in the Legislature out on the stump and discuss it with them. If the people do not agree, then no harm will be done to the legislators, but the people will have their way in things. This is serving the spirit of the Constitution…The Governor is elected in this State, and if he does not talk the people have no spokesman.[48]

Wilson was advocating a clean break with the notion of a separation of powers, one that New Jersey's constitution has seemingly embraced for decades.[49] Wilson would read between the lines of the document –seeing as he suggested to his Trenton audience – far greater latitude than imagined. It was a popular message – Wilson's "unconstitutional Governor" line earned him a two-minute ovation.[50]

Three months later and newly elected, Wilson would say, "The thing I am violating is not the Constitution of the State but the constitution of politics."[51] However read, Wilson was at the least inveighing against constitutional formalism; at worst, he was close to embracing patently anti-republican principles. In *Constitutional Government*, Wilson had rebuked the legalist approach altogether. "Liberty fixed in

unalterable law would be no liberty at all," he would claim.[52] For all his sense of Jeffersonian populism, Wilson was similarly dismissive of Jeffersonian Natural Law, arguing the true heart of The Declaration of Independence was to be found not in its preamble, but in Jefferson's insistence on the right of the people to alter their government according to generational necessities.[53] The President is best positioned to determine such imperatives as he best embodies the will of the people. Since parliaments were literally "talking shops" for Wilson, they could not expect to move beyond theoretical considerations.[54] In this regard, Wilson does indeed represent a form of overthrow of the Whig Revolution in 1689 –he as much says so:

> The government of the United States was constructed upon the Whig theory of political dynamics, which was a sort of unconscious copy of the Newtonian theory of the universe. In our own day, whenever we discuss the structure or development of anything, whether in nature or society, we consciously or unconsciously follow Mr. Darwin; but before Darwin, they followed Newtown...The trouble with the [Founders'] theory is that government is not a machine but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton [55]

Wilson's theory is not divorced from his broader appreciation of executive background and the requisites for presidential success in the modern era. "Certainly the country has never thought of members of Congress as in any particular degree fitted for the presidency," he wrote in *Constitutional Government*. And while cabinet officers were well-suited for the office in "our earlier practice" customary to the Whig Era in American politics, "the men best prepared, no doubt, are those who have been governors of states."[56] The thought was hardly without precedent. During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry made an interesting albeit unsuccessful appeal for electing the President. Gerry reasoned that executives – namely governors – should be the ones electing the nation's chief executive. It was

counterintuitive, he argued, for legislators, who knew little of the requirements of executive governance, to make such a critical choice outside the purview of their natural political disposition. Meanwhile, James Madison recorded in his notes on the Constitutional Convention that part of the opposition to Gerry's plan was the argument that governors would never reduce themselves to "paltry shrubs" by supporting such a great national "Oak."[57]

Not everyone would find solace in such executive exuberance. None other than Henry Cabot Lodge would argue "Mr. Wilson stands for a theory of administration and government which is not American." In fairness, it was not customary to much of the American political experience of Lodge's lifetime.[58] The prevalence of anything resembling strong and persistent executive leadership during the Progressive Era was occurring at the state level. It was "the new and strong leadership of the Governors," wrote the New York Times, that were foisting reform upon the nation; they, and not the nation's presidents, were the parties responsible for "cleansing their legislative halls."[59] Indeed, the closest thing to a modern president for Wilson was a modern governor –or a president that had been one. As early as 1885, Wilson recognized that "the presidency is very like a big governorship."[60] In truth, by his election to the governorship of New Jersey in 1910, and with the modern presidency still evolving, the nation's chief executive remained a figure still somewhat less demonstrably powerful and creative than his erstwhile junior executive contemporaries.

The New Boss and the Hudson Press: Wilson's Party Leadership

By the end of Wilson's tenure as Governor he had launched the inexorable transformation of both the Democratic Party and its relationship to its political leadership. After two years of reducing, if not destroying New Jersey's bosses, Wilson had indeed made his mark as a "Tilden up to date." At an Independence Day conference of Democratic National Committee members held at Sea Girt, New Jersey, one attendee freshly arrived from Baltimore, put it best to one reporter. "We have come merely for a visit to the new boss."[61] After years of fighting bossism, Wilson was more supplanter than vanquisher. He, and future presidents would mark modern presidential leadership by the personal direction of their parties – not the other way around, as it had been at least since the days of Martin Van Buren. As Sidney Milkis notes, "Martin Van Buren's efforts to legitimate party competition in the United States during the 1830s rested on an effort to control presidential ambition."[62] At Sea Girt in 1912, the Party arrived to receive instructions. As the New York Times reported, "as the committee members left the Governor's home at nightfall, each one in shaking his hand told him that the future policy of the Democratic National Committee was to give him 'whatever he wanted and felt called upon to request at its hands.'"[63]

Before Wilson could lead his party, he would have to upend the political bosses endemic to Trenton politics. While Theodore Roosevelt's governorship was in some ways instructive for Wilson, in some respects his task in New Jersey was more formidable. As James D. Startt expressed it:

> The political terrain of New Jersey was a landscape unknown to Wilson. In no state in the union did lenient corporate laws attract more "trusts" than in New Jersey, and in no state did boss-controlled political machines, often in alliance with large corporate interests, wield greater power…New Jersey

> Republican newspapers outnumbered Democratic ones 92 to 52. When the state's 86 independent newspapers are added to the equation, the problematic nature of support for Wilson can be appreciated.[64]

If Wilson were to be successful, he would have to employ uncommon skill in molding public opinion. He would do so – as governor—in terms characteristic of modern presidents.

Wilson's press challenges were like pincers –southern New Jersey commuters were beholden to Philadelphia opinion while "the *New York Tribune* for instance, made a habit of targeting [Northern] New Jersey commuters with news and opinion about their state."[65] This difficulty in generating attention and resources across the state – a problem not unfamiliar to modern New Jersey statewide office holders – challenged Wilson to secure and hold the attention of a dispersed press –particularly the Hudson variety that was highly influential in generating news of national import.[66] To his later national advantage, Wilson garnered an unusual amount of coverage from the New York press. Indeed, he was covered more by the New York Times than its own Governor Roosevelt had been during TR's Albany tenure.[67] As will be shown, Wilson's formidable presence in the press was far from accidental, as he would take what was essentially instinctive to Roosevelt, and formalize it. In short order, Wilson dwarfed all previous New Jersey governors, exploding the trend towards more press coverage of Hudson executives that had begun in New York with Samuel J. Tilden. Reflecting the advent of the personal executive, Wilson's governorship was covered more by the Times than all previous New Jersey governorships combined, since the paper's inception (see table below).

Table 1 Governors of New Jersey and New York Times Citations: 1851-1913

Governor	Years[1]	Total Citations	Yearly Avg.	Rank
Woodrow Wilson (D)	1911-1913	645	322.5	1
John Franklin Fort (R)	1908-1911	50	16.6	6
Edward C. Stokes (R)	1905-1908	33	11	8
Franklin Murphy (R)	1902-1905	101	33.6	2
Foster M. Voorhees (R)	1898-1902	40	10	9
John W. Griggs (R)	1896-1898	34	17	5
George T. Werts (D)	1893-1896	39	13	7
Leon Abbett (D)	1890-1893	77	25.6	3
Robert S. Green (D)	1887-1890	16	5.3	11
Leon Abbett (D)	1884-1887	63	21	4
George C. Ludlow (D)	1881-1884	8	2.6	14t
George B. McClellan (D)	1878-1881	7	2.3	17t
Joseph D. Bedle (D)	1875-1878	1	.33	21
Joel Parker (D)	1872-1875	19	6.3	10
Theodore F. Randolph (D)	1869-1872	4	1.3	19
Marcus L. Ward (R)	1866-1869	8	2.6	14t
Joel Parker (D)	1863-1866	13	4.3	12
Charles S. Olden (R)	1860-1863	2	.66	20
William A. Newell (R)	1857-1860	10	3.3	13
Rodman Price (D)	1854-1857	7	2.3	17t
George F. Fort (D)	1851-1854	8	2.6	14t

As was the case with its coverage of New York's governors, the Times increasingly covered state executives in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. While TR and Wilson were both anomalies in terms of the amount of press coverage they received, they were both part of an upward trend, no doubt tied to the Progressive Era, in the rise of the governor's significance in state and national politics.

Deftly, Wilson worked the Democratic Party controlled press corps before later seeking some distance from them. Early on, he mastered what today might be called an "embedded" relationship with the press corps:

> Reporters accompanying Wilson during the campaign were drawn not only to his ability as a speaker but also to the man. He made himself accessible

[1] Dates encompass January 1 through January 1st for years cited.

> to them…[C]arrying a group of reporters and stenographers hurried across the state on rough, dusty, and sometimes impassable roads, Candidate Wilson remained patient and congenial. He was gracious about campaign inconveniences and impromptu demands made upon him…Moreover, Wilson let his regard for the reporters traveling with him be known. He often brought them together to ask their opinion on a point..."We have learned to love this man," [said one].[68]

While not on a two-a-day pace as Roosevelt, Wilson did in fact institute daily press meetings –called "séances," while the legislature was in session.[69]

The person responsible for later regularizing press conferences in the Wilson White House was none other than Wilson's Trenton secretary Joseph P. Tumulty, who had been with Wilson since his first campaign in New Jersey.[70] Tumulty served Wilson in New Jersey as advance man, information-gatherer, confidant, and advisor. Tumulty had proven so valuable that Wilson stood firm in his appointment of Tumulty as his private secretary while President, despite vehement anti-Catholic opposition from within Wilson's circle.[71] As he had advised in his capacity as secretary during Wilson's gubernatorial years, Tumulty would likewise suggest to President Wilson that the best remedy for political opposition was taking to the stump.[72] Indeed, Wilson recognized Tumulty as "one of the ablest young Democratic politicians of the State" and someone to "have as a guide at my elbow in matters of which I know almost nothing."[73]

Wilson's most strategic and influential move followed by the press came early in his governorship, as he stared down New Jersey boss and Democratic senator James Smith. It would become Wilson's signature experience in demonstrating popular executive leadership over his party. Wilson's "Bloody Angle" reference was a nod to this intra-party fight over the governor's influence in political matters formally outside his purview. Smith miscalculated in expecting Wilson's endorsement for reelection to

the Senate, as the new governor sought to carve out an independent executive path in Trenton. In exchange for the Governor's support, Smith offered Wilson a clear route to full enactment of his legislative agenda. Wilson deflected this offer and supported a clean but unimpressive candidate in James E. Martine. "If you beat me in this fight," said a knowing Wilson to Smith, "how do I know you won't be able to beat me in everything?"[74] The battle would have lasting impact for Wilson, who like TR, earned his executive stripes by an act of defiance of Hudson bossism. As Wilson biographer Kendrick Clements describes:

> During December and January Wilson traveled around the state as if he were campaigning, denouncing Smith and urging support for Martine. It was an unprecedented appeal to the public in a senatorial campaign, and it was effective in keeping pressure on the legislators. When the Democrats met in caucus on 23 January 1911 thirty-three were pledged to Martine, and despite last minute efforts by those Wilson denounced as Smith's "agents and partisans," the first ballot in the legislature the next day produced forty votes for Martine, just one short of the number needed for election.[75]

Wilson had made his point. Smith capitulated later that day. What is especially noteworthy from the episode is Wilson's assault on traditional party king making. "Of whom does the Democratic Party consist?" he would ask. "Does the Democratic Party consist of a little group of gentlemen in Essex County?"[76] Wilson's early executive legend was no doubt built around this Democratic Party infighting. It was widely reported for example, that Wilson on one occasion kicked out of his office Boss Smith's nephew and lieutenant, James Nugent.[77] By such open defiance Wilson was defining a new relationship between the executive and party. The Times put the implications of the fight with Smith best:

> Dr. Wilson's attitude in deciding to take up the cudgels against Smith has cleared the political atmosphere marvelously and has made every one realize that the

> former President of Princeton University has now absolutely assumed the leadership of the Democratic Party in New Jersey.[78]

Wilson's defiance did not come without cost. He would go on to lose the Democratic hold over the New Jersey legislature in 1912, as the Smith machine instructed its Democratic state workers to "lay down" during the election, thus "destroying Wilson's presidential chances."[79] While Wilson would go on to win the 1912 presidential election, New Jersey progressive reform would suffer a significant blow.

With progressives clamoring for executive strength, Wilson was demonstrating that the party was no longer the prime mover in politics. "Only the President represents the country as a whole," argued Wilson in *Constitutional Government*. Because of the vast powers of his office he can "if he chooses become national boss."[80] While Wilson rejected the democratic implications of such a reality, the only restriction upon the President as he saw it was public opinion. Wilson's own record as Governor in New Jersey demonstrated that American politics could be remade such that a popularly elected executive could effectively win public support while accruing enormous power in party leadership –at least at the state level—while employing extra-constitutional measures. Such leadership had proven widely popular across the country during the Progressive Era. And it would become the embodiment of modern presidential leadership, Wilson's caveats aside. It was a form of leadership that elicited the admiration, if not approval of, Herbert Croly:

> [Wilson] has the power to write his own platform and practically repudiate the official platform of his party. He becomes the leader, almost the dictator, of his party, as no president has between Andrew Jackson and Woodrow Wilson. A wise, firm, yet conciliatory man like President Wilson can exercise his enormous power as to make his party a more rather than a less effective instrument of government, just as a monarchy may become, in the hands of an exceptionally

> able, independent, energetic and humane administrator, a temporarily beneficent form of government. But a Woodrow Wilson is not born of every election.[81]

Croly represented an anti-party variant of progressivism; his fears, and those of similarly situated progressives, was based on the premise that the executive would succumb to the type of bossism rampant in America's urban centers. As Richard Hofstadter reminded at the time, the age was largely reviled as urbanized beyond recognition. "The first city," Hofstadter wrote, quoting Josiah Strong, "was built by the first murderer."[82] Neo-bossism in the form of presidential party leadership, was presumably not the answer to the howls of the cities. Yet the executive autonomy –one that effectively headed party – coveted by so many progressives, was best represented in the firm hand of Wilson, even as governor. As Alexander and Juliette George noted in their study of Wilson,

> The legislative session of 1911 was a triumph for Wilson. Never in the history of the state had there been so fruitful a session. In four months Wilson had succeeded in piloting his entire program through both houses. He had done so by eliminating the two major obstacles on which, in less skillful hands, the whole program might have foundered: boss control of the Assembly, and Republican opposition in the Senate. His masterful performance had increased his availability for the presidential nomination immeasurably.[83]

Wilson's leadership here is best understood in the context of his executive era. Wisconsin's Bob La Follette had demonstrated similar success, using the same tactics as governor to great effect –and like Wilson—helped pave the way for a far more executive-centered governance, in an era increasingly open to personalist leadership.[84] Wilson had proven he understood the modern requisites of public executive leadership –well before television, and in the dawn before radio. Fred Greenstein's point that "the presidential activism of FDR had been preceded by the assertive leadership of Theodore Roosevelt

and Woodrow Wilson," can be applied to their dual mastery of press relations and for Wilson especially, the leadership of his party. The seeds of such leadership, of necessity, may be applied more generally to the governorships of all three future presidents.[85]

Woodrow Wilson's Modern Legislative Leadership

While it is well established that Woodrow Wilson "was the first chief executive since John Adams to appear before Congress rather than sending messages in written form,"[86] what are often overlooked are the influences upon Wilson in coming to this decision. It was in all likelihood, New York's pre-Jacksonian constitution, and Wisconsin's progressive governor, that served as the inspiration for Wilson's seeming innovation. As Joseph Kallenbach described:

> Wilson did not use the personally delivered message while governor of New Jersey, although he attended party legislative caucuses…[One] possible source of inspiration was the example of Governor Robert La Follette of Wisconsin. At the beginning of his first term in 1901 La Follette had read his message to the legislature in order to "invest the whole matter [of his proposed legislative program] with a new seriousness and dignity that would not only affect the legislators themselves, but react upon the public mind." Until revision of the New York constitution in 1821 the governors of that state delivered their messages to the legislature in person…Later, having in mind his erstwhile rival who had himself raised the legislative leadership role of the President to new levels, he remarked gleefully to a friend that he had "put one over on Teddy."[87]

Besides La Follette, only one other modern executive had been linked to such a daring encroachment into legislative authority. North Carolina's Democratic Governor Robert Broadnax Glenn had also personally delivered his address in person in 1905.[88] Glenn and Wilson were political contemporaries – his term ended the year before Wilson was elected Governor of New Jersey in 1909. An attendee of the first Governor's Conference in 1908, Glenn was an executive progressive typical of the era – a conservationist and a

strong advocate of executive authority.[89] True to the period, Glenn opened his remarks at the conference with praise for Grover Cleveland and an attack on the laxity of Congress.[90] It stands to reason that Wilson's atavistic emulation of this Federalist-era presidential practice would emerge during a period of renewed executive authority and creativity –fostered most consciously by progressive governors. While Wilson was breaking a 113-year precedent at the national level, at the state level, the innovation was relatively fresh –a mere eight years removed from Wilson's modern presidential iconoclasm.

To appreciate the boldness of Wilson's foray into the sanctity of the legislature, a watershed moment that has come to distinguish the modern presidency from its predecessors, it is important to revisit Wilson's theoretical understanding of the founding.[91] As Ronald J. Pestritto notes, "for Wilson, the separation of powers, and all of the other institutional remedies that the founders employed against the danger of faction, stood in the way of government's exercising its power in accord with the dictates of progress."[92] As Wilson would later explain during the presidential campaign of 1912, "You know that it was Jefferson who said that the best government is that which does as little governing as possible…But that time has passed."[93] Where the framers had feared excessive power, progressives in many ways feared powerlessness. The neat, symmetrical ("Newtonian" in Wilson's words) order of the American Constitution had to be re-interpreted as an organic (now, "Darwinian") order willing to defy structural impediments for the greater good of the people. Where Madison had taken for granted that "in republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates,"[94] Wilson sought to "relocate administrative processes from Congress to the executive

department."[95] In the end, the personally delivered Message became the symbol of executive-driven government.

Wilson's Legislative Executive Enlarged

Wilson focused his legislative agenda in New Jersey on bedrock progressive policies: the establishment of direct primaries; fighting corruption; the regulation of public utilities; and a liability act for employers.[96] To these ends, Wilson would personally lobby the Democratic Assembly. "Breaking all precedent, Wilson attended a caucus of the Democratic Assemblymen. For three hours, he lectured them about the necessity of passing the [election] bill. For the benefit of those who might remain impervious to his arguments, he warned them that if necessary he would carry the fight to the people."[97] The exchange between Wilson and the Legislature was memorable, as noted by Russell Stannard Baker:

> "What constitutional right has the Governor to interfere in legislation?" demanded one of the legislators bluntly. "Since you appeal to the constitution," responded Wilson, "I can satisfy you." He drew from his pocket a copy of the constitution and read the following clause: "The governor shall communicate by message to the legislature at the opening of each session, and at such other times as he may deem necessary, the condition of the state, and recommend such measures as he may deem expedient."[98]

In this fight over what would become the Geran Bill for electoral reform, Wilson won outright. Twenty-seven of the thirty-eight assemblymen attending the caucus voted for the measure.[99] For his part, a truculent Wilson would boast "A notion has gone abroad that I whipped the Legislature of New Jersey into performing certain acts, but that view of the matter is not correct. I did appeal to public opinion, and public opinion did the rest."[100]

In passing the Geran Bill for electoral reform, Wilson had won himself a legislative legacy of the first order. The victory was earned with a style of personal executive leadership characteristic of the era's upstart progressive governors. Wilson had met with nearly every legislator on the Smith appointment issue,[101] and in this instance, took to the stump to educate New Jersey voters about the provisions of the Geran Bill. "The Geran Bill is intended to clear all obstacles away and to put the whole management alike of parties and of elections in the hands of voters themselves," urged the Governor.[102] Wilson specifically sought direct involvement of the people in the bill, which contained the distinctly anti-party feature of disallowing the name of any person on a primary ticket of any party, unless pledged to vote for New Jersey's top-primary vote getter for the State's senate seat.[103] As the Times reported,

> In the past New Jersey has voted with the old-fashioned party ballot containing only the names of the nominees of one party. This year [1911] every one nominated appeared on one ballot, but there were no party designation devices except the words denoting the parties name…There was no way that a ballot could be prepared by a single mark.[104]

If the measure put greater power in the hands of the people, it did equal damage to party control, and more significantly, made the Governor a figure with plebiscitary power and popular authority. Nevertheless, young progressive idealists like New York's Robert Moses took note of Wilson's executive acumen during his governorship. "His writings show not only a clear understanding of the defects of our…civil service, but also a keen realization of the executive leadership necessary to remedy them," wrote New York's future Power Broker.[105]

Again, one reason why Wilson and other Hudson-based executives were so vital to the era was their command over national press attention. In defying Hudson machines,

New York and New Jersey governors could garner greater attention than other politicians. They could be sure their legislative acts of defiance would be heard not only in greater New York, but picked up nationally. Wilson had the particular good fortune to also be a southerner, which meant his brethren would be predisposed to excusing aspects of his northern political lineage and governance, while southern newspapermen covered his more favorable exploits. Wilson may have joked that "compared with Princeton politicians," New Jersey's party bosses were "neophytes," but people around the country knew better, even as they laughed.[106]

Like Teddy Roosevelt's, Wilson's governorship meant much to the stream of modern innovations that would flow into the presidency. His use of rhetoric, directly speaking to voters –and openly encouraging dissent with the less progressive wing of his party –all became part of a new executive manner. Not all presidents (or governors for that matter) would employ it, but those who did quickly became pacesetters of modern executive leadership. As Theodore Lowi notes, Wilson's call for the president to be "as big a man as a man as he can be," eventually became unnecessary, as all presidents eventually became de facto, "exceptional." "The presidency grew," notes Lowi, "because it had become the center of a new governmental theory, and it became the center of a governmental theory by virtue of a whole variety of analyses and writings that were attempting to build some kind of consonance between the new, positive state and American democratic values."[107] The most telling and first practical clashes between these contending realities occurred in America's statehouses. Along with TR's, Wilson's governorship reflected this crucial dialectic in American executive political development. It was a tension common to the larger Progressive Era, and heightened by Hudson

progressives, who were compelled to confront at the crossroads of the new century, a new American state, one requiring new conceptions of executive leadership. Such was summed up by Wilson himself, who at once argued that the presidency was essentially a "big governorship," while reserving for himself the audacious, if not chilling right to execute its office, "unconstitutionally," if need be.

Conclusion: Conceiving the Unitary Executive

Woodrow Wilson's governorship was the practical reflection of his political thought and a harbinger of future presidential practices. It was in Trenton that Wilson personally crossed the threshold of executive impropriety –hitherto he had only done so in theory. By intruding into a Democratic legislative caucus, making popular appeals to the people outside of his constitutionally designated appointment powers, and by leading, rather than following his party, Wilson exemplified the features of modern American executive leadership. And yet, much of this was not particularly new; La Follette had done much quite like this in Wisconsin –and with more radical flair. La Follette was more feared than admired. For his part, Teddy Roosevelt had continued a tradition of gubernatorial independence in New York that at least dated to Samuel J. Tilden. And other governors had been as forthrightly "executive" –indeed the word itself had changed in meaning from its tepid incarnation at the founding – as Wilson had been during the Progressive Era. But Wilson went furthest – he alone theorized a full turn from founding notions embedded in the Constitution. Theodore Roosevelt, for one, would not go so far. Likewise, Wilson was the first to openly advocate and fulfill a rejection of such constitutional bulwarks as the separation of powers and checks and balances, since the

days of Andrew Jackson. And only Wilson rhapsodized about Darwinian political change over static traditionalism. He did all of this first, in his executive experience as Governor.

In his Hegelian epistemology, Wilson was a true radical. Coupled with his Burkeian sensibility, he was also a paradigm breaker. Wilson would take Burke – modernity's archetype conservative thinker, and embellish him with stilts such that FDR and a host of liberal policy makers could dash away from staid political forms. Custom mattered for Burke, but it was always epochal for Wilson. It lacked the continuity of political culture Burke had infused it with. Thus with great irony, Wilson's executive-centered theory of governance embraced the Jeffersonian claim to the life of politics belonging to the living. But Jefferson had meant this as a guard against government's perpetual encroachment into the lives of its citizens; Wilson meant it as a liberating device for popular and ever-changing executive leadership. In a sense, Wilson's was a call for government of the people, for the people, but through the executive. While Wilson saw a sort of "passionless"[108] austerity in Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* in his essay "The Historian," we can but wonder at Wilson's assessment of this earliest of republican falls. "The principles of a free constitution are irrevocably lost when the legislative power is nominated by the executive," wrote Gibbon of Rome's decline.[109] In a later salvo, Gibbon would warn, "By declaring themselves the protectors of the people, Marius and Caesar had subverted the constitution of their country."[110] Writing at the dawn of the modern republican era, Gibbon had an intriguingly contrarian project in revisiting Rome's fall.[111] For Wilson, his personal history in the making was a neo-republican project –founded on popular executive appeal

– and far removed from the republican structures so beloved by Gibbon, and America's founders.

In considering the profound changes in American life, both addressed by and influencing the Progressive Era, it is worth considering just how elementally audacious Wilson's critique of past executive practices was. Beyond an embrace of direct primaries, the recall or referendum, Wilson was calling forth a new way of conceiving democratic governance. Many saw his popular executive, immensely popular at the time, as the only possible counter to the excesses wrought by unfettered industrial capitalism. In exemplifying the type of executive demanded at the time while Governor, Wilson set not only himself, but the presidency on a course that has known little sustained retreat in the domain of executive power. There is much to lament in pondering, like Gibbon where such power might lead, and has indeed led. Shortly after Wilson, such power was heaped upon the quintessential executive of the age –another Hudson progressive, who would come to personally identify with as early as his days in Albany, the complete arts of executive governance. In so doing, much more could be ascertained at the time that was gained by progressives, than that which would be lost in the acquisition of such demonstrable executive power. It was one of the Progressive Era's great ironies that the call for democratic processes would unleash the aggrandizing forces of personalist leadership. And steeped in this educative realm, yet just beyond the horizon, loomed the early political legacy of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt.

APPENDIX: Years in Prior Public Office

Note: The capital "X" denotes a sitting governor or one elected directly to the White House; the lower case x reflects a conventional governorship. "Y" represents a colonial governorship, and "T" a territorial governorship

President	Public Office	Executive Administration	Elective Executive	Gov.
G. W. Bush	6	6	6	X
Bill Clinton	12	12	12	X
G.H.W. Bush	16	12	8	
Ronald Reagan	8	8	8	X
Jimmy Carter	8	4	4	X
Gerald Ford	25	1	0	
Richard Nixon	14	8	8	
Lyndon Johnson	27	5	3	
John F. Kennedy	14	0	0	
D. Eisenhower	0	0	0	
Harry S. Truman	20	10	10	
F. D. Roosevelt	13	11	4	X
Herbert Hoover	13	9	0	
Calvin Coolidge	20	7	7	x
Warren Harding	12	2	2	
Woodrow Wilson	2	2	2	X
William H. Taft	25	14	0	
Theo. Roosevelt	14	12	3	x
W. McKinley	18	6	6	X
Ben. Harrison	11	0	0	
Grover Cleveland	6	6	6	X
Chester Arthur	8	7	0	
James Garfield	20	0	0	
Rutherford Hayes	9	5	5	X
U.S. Grant	0	0	0	
Andrew Johnson	26	9	7	x
Abraham Lincoln	10	0	0	
James Buchanan	35	5	0	
Franklin Pierce	13	0	0	
Millard Fillmore	18	2	2	
Zachary Taylor	0	0	0	
James K. Polk	18	2	2	x
John Tyler	23	2	2	x
William Harrison	24	13	0	T
Martin Van Buren	22	6	4	x
Andrew Jackson	12	1	0	T
John Q. Adams	24	18	0	
James Monroe	26	14	3	x
James Madison	23	8	0	
Thomas Jefferson	23	9	6	Y
John Adams	26	8	8	
George Washington	16	0	0	

NOTES

[1] Address delivered January 5, 1911. Kallenbach, Joseph E. *The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) 174.
[2] Wilson, Woodrow. "The Law and the Facts: Presidential Address, Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February, 1911), 10.
[3] The first Conference was held to address the specifics of TR's conservation plan. See Edmund Morris' *Theodore Rex* (New York: Random House, 2001), 514-518.
[4] "Governors Clash on the Referendum," *New York Times*, September 13, 1911.
[5] See John Gerring's *Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), for a summary on the Progressive Era's assault on parties and the rise of presidential campaigning. (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 2002), 190-93.
[6] "Governors Clash on Referendum," *New York Times*, September 13, 1911.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Wilson had just been extolling the virtues of the British system. Ibid.
[9] "The House of Governors," *New York Times*, January 19, 1910.
[10] "Dr. Wilson Speaks to Many Governors," *New York Times*, November 30, 1910.
[11] The veto power was particularly salient in this regard. See Frank W. Prescott's "The Executive Veto in American States," *Western Political Quarterly*, 3.1 (March, 1950).
[12] "Governor Wilson Takes Office in New Jersey," *New York Times*, January 18, 1911.
[13] See Ray Stannard Baker on U'Ren's meeting with Wilson and his influence on his thinking in *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, Governor, 1910-1913* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 130-131.
[14] "There is a close analogy between him [the President] and a Governor of New York," assures Publius in Federalist 69.
[15] Link, Arthur S. *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 269.
[16] Salmore, Barbara G. and Stephen A. Salmore. *New Jersey Politics and Government: Suburban Politics Comes of Age* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 127.
[17] Ibid, 128.
[18] Charles Thach notes that New Jersey was the only state for a time with no restrictions regarding reeligibility for office. Thach, Charles C. *The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1922), 28. This changed in 1844. but the governor was now popularly elected.
[19] Wilson actually appropriated the phrase from a conversation with a "prominent" but unnamed public figure in New Jersey. See David W. Hirst's *Woodrow Wilson: Reform Governor: A Documentary Narrative* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), 146.
[20] See appendix for relevant figures for presidential background.
[21] Kendricks, Clement A. *Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), 73.
[22] Diary citation found in Thorsen, Niels Aage. *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875-1910* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 11.
[23] "Wilson – A Tilden, But a Tilden Up to Date," *New York Times*, September 25, 1910.
[24] This was no intellectual chore for Wilson. Arthur Link argues that Wilson in fact derived his American political philosophy from Tilden and Grover Cleveland. See Arthur S. Link's "Woodrow Wilson: The American as Southerner," *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (February, 1970), 11.
[25] If Wilson was billed as a "Tilden up to date," he was also billed as a "safer" version of La Follette. See Robert A. Kraig's *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost World of the Oratorical Statesman* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 122.
[26] Link, 271-72.
[27] Wilson, Woodrow. *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 63.
[28] Wilson, Woodrow. "Mr. Cleveland as President," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Vol. 79, No. 478), March, 1897.
[29] Ibid, 289.
[30] Ibid, 296.

[31] Despite accounting for roughly one-third of all presidencies, governor-presidents have accounted for nearly two-thirds of all presidential vetoes. See the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives for running veto counts: http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/vetoes.html.
[32] Ibid, 289.
[33] Ibid, 294.
[34] Ibid, 293.
[35] Hirst, 132.
[36] See Thorsen, 50.
[37] Wilson, *The Atlantic Monthly*, 300.
[38] Di Nunzio, Mario. (ed.) *Woodrow Wilson: Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 298.
[39] Pestritto, Ronald J. *Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 8.
[40] The phrase is from Hegel's *Philosophy of History*.
[41] Pestritto, 14.
[42] See Gary L. Gregg II's *The Presidential Republic: Executive Representation and Deliberative Democracy* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 101.
[43] Di Nunzio, 90.
[44] Ibid, 90.
[45] Tulis, Jeffrey. *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 122.
[46] See Pestritto, 167-172.
[47] Milkis, Sidney M. and Michael Nelson. *The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2002* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 232-33.
[48] "Dr. Wilson Says He is Owned by No One," *New York Times*, October 4, 1910
[49] See Ray Stannard Baker, 134. Baker called New Jersey's constitution "one of the most antiquated in the Union, following the French revolutionary model." Importantly, the document nonetheless held significant implied powers, and Wilson exploited them.
[50] "Dr. Wilson Says He is Owned by No One," *New York Times*, October 4, 1910.
[51] Baker, 155.
[52] Wilson, *Constitutional Government*, 4.
[53] Ibid, 4.
[54] Ibid, 11.
[55] Ibid, 55-6.
[56] Ibid, 64.
[57] The arbor-filled analogy was provided by Virginia's Edmund Randolph. Madison, James. *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966), 93-94.
[58] Gould, Lewis L. *The Modern American Presidency* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2003), 54.
[59] "The Exponent of the New Stateism," *New York Times*, November 14, 1910.
[60] The quotation is from *Congressional Government*, cited in Alan Ehrenhalt's paper prepared for the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Colloquium, Princeton University: "Woodrow Wilson in the Nation's Service." The paper is entitled, "Woodrow Wilson and the Modern American Governorship," Princeton University, April 28, 2006,3. http://region.princeton.edu/media/pub/pub_main_39.pdf)
[61] "Bow to Wilson as Party Leader," *New York Times*, July 5, 1912.
[62] Milkis, Sidney M. *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 5.
[63] "Bow to Wilson as Party Leader," *New York Times*, July 5, 1912.
[64] Startt, James D. *Woodrow Wilson and the Press: Prelude to the Presidency* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 67.
[65] Ibid, 68.
[66] As Robert A. Kraig notes, "New Jersey's proximity to the most influential newspapers and magazines, had kept a constant national spotlight on [Wilson's] state battles," 120.
[67] Roosevelt averaged 204 annual citations in the *Times*, while Wilson averaged over 322.
[68] Startt, 75-6.

[69] Ibid, 101.
[70] Gould, 45.
[71] Baker, 458.
[72] Kraig, 137.
[73] Hirst, 140.
[74] Clements, 61.
[75] Ibid, 61-62.
[76] "Wilson Acclaimed in Attack on Smith," *New York Times*, January 6, 1911.
[77] For his part Nugent referred to Wilson as "an ingrate and a liar." "Governor Wilson Opens Attack on Nugent," *New York Times*, September 16, 1912.
[78] "Wilson Tells Smith He Will Fight Him," *New York Times*, November 29, 1910.
[79] "Predicting Defeat for Gov. Wilson," *New York Times*, October 30, 1911.
[80] Wilson, 215.
[81] Croly, Herbert. *Progressive Democracy* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914), 344.
[82] Hofstadter, Richard. *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 176.
[83] Clements, 69.
[84] Burgchardt, Carl R. *Robert La Follette, Sr.: The Voice of Conscience* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 62.
[85] Greenstein, Fred I. *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 28.
[86] Stuckey, Mary E. "The Domain of Public Conscience: Woodrow Wilson and the Establishment of a Transcendent Political Order," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 6.1 (2003).
[87] Kallenbach, 335.
[88] See Kraig,131, and notes, 209.
[89] Sobel, Robert and John Raimo. *Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States, 1789-1978, Volume 3* (Westport, CT: Meckler Books, 1978).
[90] Blanchard, Newton C., John Franklin Fort, et.al. (eds.) *Proceedings of a Conference of Governors: In the White House, Washington, D.C., May 13-15, 1908* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 119-123.
[91] See Tulis on Wilson's break with tradition, 133, 134.
[92] Pestritto, Ronald J. *Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 6.
[93] Ibid, 255.
[94] *Federalist* 51.
[95] Thorsen, 60.
[96] See Alexander and Juliette George. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: Dover Publications, 1964), 66.
[97] Ibid, 67.
[98] Baker, 141.
[99] Ibid, 193.
[100] Pestritto, 170.
[101] Hirst, 131.
[102] "Woodrow Wilson's Victory," *New York Times*, January 26, 1911.
[103] Ibid.
[104] "New Jersey Carried by Republicans," *New York Times*, November 8, 1911.
[105] Moses cites Wilson here in his 1913 Columbia University dissertation, "The Civil Service of Great Britain." See Robert Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 55.
[106] Cooper, Jr., John Milton. *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 170.
[107] Lowi, Theodore J. *The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 57.
[108] See Wilson's "The Historian," referenced here in Di Nunzio, 153.
[109] Gibbon, Edward. (Edited by Hans-Friedrich Mueller), *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 39.

[110] Ibid, 44.
[111] Along with the *Declaration* and Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, Gibbon's work was published in 1776.

REFERENCES

Baker, Ray Stannard. *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, Governor, 1910-1913* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931).

Blanchard, Newton C., John Franklin Fort, et.al. (eds.) *Proceedings of a Conference of Governors: In the White House, Washington, D.C., May 13-15, 1908* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909).

Burgchardt, Carl R. *Robert La Follette, Sr.: The Voice of Conscience* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).

Caro, Robert. *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).

Croly, Herbert. *Progressive Democracy* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914).

Cooper, Jr., John Milton. *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

Di Nunzio, Mario. (ed.) *Woodrow Wilson: Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President* (New York: New York University Press, 2006).

Ehrenhalt, Alan. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Colloquium, Princeton University: *"Woodrow Wilson in the Nation's Service."* The paper is entitled, "Woodrow Wilson and the Modern American Governorship," Princeton University, April 28, 2006,3.

George, Alexander and Juliette. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: Dover Publications, 1964).

Gerring, John. *Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Gibbon, Edward. (Edited by Hans-Friedrich Mueller), *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: The Modern Library, 2003).

Hirst, David W. *Woodrow Wilson: Reform Governor: A Documentary Narrative* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965).

Gregg II, Gary L. *The Presidential Republic: Executive Representation and Deliberative Democracy* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

Hofstadter, Richard. *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

Gould, Lewis L. *The Modern American Presidency* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2003).

Greenstein, Fred I. *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).

Kallenbach, Joseph E. *The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

Kendricks, Clement A. *Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999).

Kraig, Robert A. *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost World of the Oratorical Statesman* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004).

Link, Arthur S. "Woodrow Wilson: The American as Southerner," *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (February, 1970).

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

Lowi, Theodore J. *The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

Madison, James. *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966).

Milkis, Sidney M. and Michael Nelson. *The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2002* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003).

Milkis, Sidney M. *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Morris, Edmund. *Theodore Rex* (New York: Random House, 2001).

Pestritto, Ronald J. *Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).

Prescott Frank W. "The Executive Veto in American States," *Western Political Quarterly*, 3.1 (March, 1950).

Salmore, Barbara G. and Stephen A. Salmore. *New Jersey Politics and Government: Suburban Politics Comes of Age* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1998).

Sobel, Robert and John Raimo. *Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States, 1789-1978, Volume 3* (Westport, CT: Meckler Books, 1978).

Startt, James D. *Woodrow Wilson and the Press: Prelude to the Presidency* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Stuckey, Mary E. "The Domain of Public Conscience: Woodrow Wilson and the Establishment of a Transcendent Political Order," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 6.1 (2003).

Tulis, Jeffrey. *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Thach, Charles C. *The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1922).

Thorsen, Niels Aage. *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875-1910* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Wilson, Woodrow. "The Law and the Facts: Presidential Address, Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February, 1911).

Wilson, Woodrow. *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908).

Wilson, Woodrow. "Mr. Cleveland as President," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Vol. 79, No. 478), March, 1897.